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ABSTRACT 
 
This research investigates the emergence of Turkey’s post-Kemalist nation-
state identity and its challenges in the post-9/11 era. By challenging the 
argument that there is essentially one understanding of Turkey’s identity, it 
exposes competing perspectives on Turkey’s new identity and its place in the 
world. To reveal the process of domestic power struggle in maintaining and 
transforming Turkey’s Kemalist identity, the study takes Ruth Wodak’s 
Discourse-Historical Approach in a search of different discourses on Turkish 
national identity and foreign policy in Turkish media from 2001 to 2011. On 
the historical context of Turkish politics in the post-9/11 period, the study 
argues that Turkey’s post-Kemalist identity crisis in the last decade has 
shaped both Turkish nation-state identity and foreign policy discourse which 
has directly targeted the Kemalist and Europeanist world view and 
empowered the nation’s Muslim and non-European perception of ‘self’ and 
the perception of Turkey’s place in the world. In this context, this study 
makes a significant contribution to Turkish politics, nationalism and media 
studies through a critical observation of different political positions and 
antagonisms in Turkish media discourse, considering the changes and 
challenges within the conceptions of new Turkey's identity. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
On 29 May 2013, the largest wave of protests in Turkey’s history was 
sparked when the Turkish police violently intervened during an 
environmentalist peaceful protest in Gezi Park, which was against an urban 
renewal project to save one of the last green public spaces in Taksim Square, 
Istanbul (Bilgic and Kafkasli 2013). This national turmoil spread to 
demonstrations in seventy-seven cities, resulting in eight deaths, more than 
8,000 injuries and approximately 5,000 taken into police custody. However, 
what may not have been expected and what made the ‘Gezi spirit’ unique 
was the huge variety of group profiles, mostly students and urban youth, 
including Kemalist secular nationalists, Turkish ethno-nationalists, liberals 
and leftist nationalists, anti-capitalist Muslims, artists, feminists, human 
rights and LGBT activists, football club fans and, last but not least, Kurdish 
nationalists. In addition, these protests proved that a new citizenship and civil 
society-state relationship have been emerging in Turkey. The protesters 
demanded to participate in decisions regarding their lifestyles, common 
spaces and future, specifically on relationships with neighbouring countries, 
growing neo-liberal restructuring and destruction of cultural geography, 
social memory of cities, the forests, the mountains and the rivers of Anatolia, 
namely, what makes them a nation (Oktem 2013). Despite the fact that 
Turkish Prime Minister R. Tayyip Erdogan enjoyed popular support as seen 
by his third election with almost 50 per cent of the general vote in June 2011, 
the massive explosion of discontent erupted towards him. He responded 
pejoratively (Erkoc 2013, p.45) to the ‘other 50 per cent’ of Turkey (Ozbudun 
2014) and provoked his supporters to press for demonstrations, which 
sharpened political polarisation. Thus, Gezi protests presented 'the clash of 
nations' (Atay 2013) in Turkey, as the sign of construction the new identity 
and culture. 
10 
In the last decade, Erdogan’s policies have led to success in economic 
progress, political neutralisation of the military and Kemalist laicite 
(secularism
1
) and acknowledgement of Kurdish cultural rights and religious 
minorities’ rights (Muftuler-Bac and Keyman 2012). However, the resistance 
showed both that the nation has emancipated from Kemalist authoritarianism 
and rejected new authoritarianism (Taspinar 2014) that imposes socially 
conservative,
2
 Sunni Islamic-inspired policies in both domestic and foreign 
relations (Yesilada and Rubin 2013; Uzgel 2013). Within this context, this 
thesis argues that there are different Turkeys and the tension involved in the 
attempts of both maintaining and transforming Turkey’s Kemalist identity. 
For a better understanding of new Turkey, it is important to shed a light on 
competing discourses of Turkish nationalism, their intermingled nature, in 
particular the process of how the new dominant Muslim nationalism became 
hegemonic in Turkey by a power struggle over the last decade. It should be 
kept in mind that hegemony is not necessarily imposed through coercion, but 
through the organisation and creation of a common consent for the change. 
Hence, the object of this study is to search on the process of power struggle 
over the Justice and Development Party's (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi-AKP) 
post-Kemalist imagination of the nation that has changed the image of 
Turkey and its place in the world from 2001 to 2011. In this context, it 
presents a critical discussion on how different discourses of Turkish nation-
state identity construct, interact, contrast and coexist with each other through 
the Turkish media by unpacking and examining the concepts of contested 
Turkish identity, which has a great importance for consolidation of pluralist 
democracy. 
 
                                               
1 In Turkish literature, the term is used as ‘laicite’ (laiklik); however, this thesis prefers the 
term ‘secularism’, which is more appropriate for covering issues of religion, identity and 
politics. For the conceptual discussions see also: Bhargava, R. (ed.) (1998), Secularism and 
Its Critics, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
2  In 2009, Binnaz Toprak published an outstanding empirical study on the religion and 
conservatism in Turkey. The study proved the fear of secularists circles, increasing social 
and political pressure of religious lifestyles upon secular lifestyles. 
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The Aim of the Study: Understanding the Process of Discursive 
Construction of New Turkey's Identity 
 
Since the AKP came to the power in 2002, there has been an ongoing debate 
about the emergence of New Turkey.
3
 Chriss Morris described the political, 
economic and cultural reforms of Erdogan's AKP as a 'quiet revolution on the 
edge of Europe' in The New Turkey (2005). In August 2014, Ahmet 
Davutoglu declared to the AKP Party Congress that they imagined the New 
Turkey and nobody would stop their walk to that destination.
4
 By pro-AKP 
journalists and academics, this has been portrayed as a project of redefining 
and re-establishing of Turkish nation-state. 
 
My study defines this historical process as an emergence of the post-
Kemalist Turkey. By analysing Turkish media discourse, it reveals that it has 
been emerging through the power struggle of contested perspectives on 
Turkish nation-state identity and its place in the world. It does so by, first, 
challenging the argument that there is a particular Kemalist conception of 
Turkish nation-state (Azak 2013; Alaranta 2011; Casier and Jongerden 2010; 
Ciddi 2010; Karasipahi 2009; Zurcher 2004), which causes a cleavage 
between the Republican secularist bureaucratic centre and the Muslim 
periphery. Instead, it empirically reveals that there are competing Turkish 
nationalisms and representations of identities in the last decade. It points outs 
that the both secular and Muslim identities of Turkey are historically 
constructed and mutually constitutive. Secondly, it challenges the argument 
that suggests there is a settled preference in favour of European Union (EU) 
membership and Western alliance in Turkey based on a consensus view that 
                                               
3 M. Hakan Yavuz (ed.) (2006), The Emergence of A New Turkey: Democracy and the AK 
Parti, The University of Utah Press; Graham E. Fuller (2009) The New Turkish Republic: 
Turkey as A Pivotal State in the Muslim World, Washington D.C.: United States Institute of 
Peace Press; Gerald Mclean (2014), Abdullah Gül and Making of a New Turkey, 
London:Oneworld Publications 
4 http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/27087274.asp accessed 07.11.2014 
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Turkey's place is/should be in Europe and the West. Instead, it shows there 
are competing perspectives on Turkey's foreign policy identity and Turkey’s 
prospective membership of the EU as a crucial matter of the nation-state's 
collective future. It empirically articulates why they have these discourses 
and how they have reshaped their discourses through the power struggle in 
the last decade. In this context, two key questions provide the starting point 
for this research's inquiry: Which discourses are competing in the 
construction of Turkey's post-Kemalist nation-state identity? How do they 
imagine Turkey and place it within the international world of nation-states? 
In order to indicate the discursive diversity, particularly it relies on a central 
research question – How did the Turkish media construct such discourses on 
national identity, Europe and the West in dealing with domestic and foreign 
policy debates during the last decade?   
 
The Literature Review on the New Turkey's Identity 
Is the new Turkey democratic and Muslim, Western and European or Middle 
Eastern and secular? There are multiple answers to these questions based on 
which knowledge is referred to in history and politics. Looking at the final 
years of the Ottoman Empire and its failure in political and economic 
systems, the West was seen as a source of insecurity but also inspiration for 
establishing a new system (Bilgin 2011, p.74). Thus, Turkey's identity and 
security policies came to run in parallel with Europe and the West. Despite 
the fact that military and economical Westernisation process of Turkey dates 
back to the Ottoman Empire times, which was a way of improving security at 
home and abroad, it has recognised as fundamental principal of the Republic 
since 1923. The difference between the two periods (Fokas 2008, p.88) is the 
twin aims of Westernisation and Europeanisation of Turkey linked with 
secularist programme of its founder and first president M. Kemal Ataturk 
(1881-1938). As Thomas W. Smith noted in his book Between Allah and 
Ataturk: Liberal Islam in Turkey (2005, p.308), Turkey became the only 
secular, democratic, pro-Western country in the Islamic world. During the 
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Cold War, Turkey maintained Westernisation in the Kemalist line and had 
distant relations with the Arab and Islamic world. The security reasons, such 
as Soviet threat, also pushed Turkey further to the West. The NATO 
membership and Turkey's Western-oriented policies contributed to the 
country’s Western identity (Bozdaglioglu 2003). 
 
With the end of the Cold War, Turkey searched for a new identity in 
international relations.  Although Turkey became a candidate country of the 
EU in 1999, the 9/11 Islamic terrorist attacks in New York diversified the 
definition of the threats in and outside Europe. The EU has put more focus on 
the military and technological dimensions of security as it has been seen in 
border management. The growth of identity-based conflicts and 'securitised' 
(Waever 2000) culture through the 'war on terror' and repositioned Turkey 
and redefined its importance for the West. Whilst Turkey historically and 
strategically emphasized its Western identity over its Eastern identity, the 
main references changed from being Western and secular to being Muslim 
and democratic. In other words Turkey's 'moderate' Islamic character became 
'marketable' (Tank 2006, p.470) as a model for the other Muslim countries.  
This phenomenon brought forth a new agenda for Europe in dealing with 
Turkey's position within the framework of 'the clash of civilisations' 
(Huntington 2002) and its implications for the country's EU accession. In the 
context of the relationship between democracy and Islam in the post-9/11 era, 
Turkey's Muslim population and Western values changed the value of the 
idea that it is a bridge between the East and the West, Christianity and Islam 
(Somer 2007). However, Kemalist secularist circles began to express their 
anxieties about the idea that Turkey was represented as a model of Muslim 
rather than secular democracy (Yavuz 2009, p.245). 
 
In this context, rather than focusing on the perception of a Muslim-Secular 
dichotomy within the concept of ‘national identity’, this thesis sheds light on 
the ‘process’ of emergence of new Turkey’s identity through power struggle 
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of different nationalist discourses and reveals non-European discourses in 
Turkish media. Hereby, it exposes how Turkey as the ‘Other of Europe’ 
discursively constructs its identity; thus it differs from publications that 
analyzed Turkey’s place in Europe with different dimensions of Turkey's 
possible EU membership (Cengiz and Hoffmann 2014; Nas and Ozer 2012; 
Cakir 2011; Usul 2010; Arvanitopoulos and Tzifakis 2009; Faucompret and 
Konings 2008; Jung and Raudvere 2008; LaGro and Jorgensen 2007; Zurcher 
and Van der Linden 2007; Arikan 2006; Baykal 2006; Joseph 2006; Ugur and 
Canefe 2004; Carkoglu and Rubin). 
 
In his book 'Strategic Depth', the main architect of the new Turkish Foreign 
Policy, Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu (2006) argued that Kemalist 
Republican elite neglected the Ottoman past and cultural ties in the Middle 
East and caused Turkey's alienation to its historical and religious ties with the 
Arab/Islamic world.  Given this perspective,  in fact, some previous  decision 
makers, such as the president Turgut Ozal (1989-1993) had defined his 
approach as neo-Ottomanism, and the coalition government's foreign 
minister Ismail Cem (1997-2002) represented Turkey as 'straddling 
civilizational divides' (Bilgin and Bilgic 2011, p.173) between the West and 
Islamic world. He aimed to develop cultural and economic relations with its 
neighbours; however, Turkey's relationship with its neighbours inevitably 
focused on security and military relations at his time, Turkey had an 'active', 
but hard/confrontational policy in the 1990s (Hale 2012; Oran 2011; Bilgin 
2005; Larrabee and Lesser 2003), mostly tied to the Kurdish issue (Altunisik 
and Martin 2011, p. 570). Unlike the 1990s, Turkey developed a deeper 
relationship with the Arab/Islamic world in the 2000s. In particular, the 
problematic relationship with the EU, growing security interests in the post 
9/11 process and the rational approach towards the West have embraced a 
new strategic thinking in Turkish foreign policy. According to Davutoglu’s 
discourse, Turkey cannot wait forever at the EU door (Murinson 2006, p.952) 
and needs to form its ‘own axis’ to develop a re-engagement with the Middle 
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East, the Balkans, the Caucasus, and even with Africa. The representatives of 
the AKP claim that the Middle East is not an alternative to Europe and that 
Turkey has an active diplomacy in the region to bring stability to Europe 
(Rumelili 2011, p.241). They argue that the traditional Kemalist foreign 
policy of Turkey had a focus on the importance of military security and 
balance of power that was based on securitisation and threat definition. This 
perspective hindered improving relationships with the region. In the last 
decade, the military’s power (symbolic and actual) in Turkey's political 
discourse has decreased (Bilgin 2011, p.78). Parallel to this, Turkey put more 
emphasis on diplomacy in foreign policy and less emphasis on the use of 
force in prioritising its economic interest. The cost-benefit calculations and 
adoption of pragmatic approach in relationships with the EU and US caused 
a 'shift of axis' from the transatlantic to Eurasia and Turkey’s pivotal role as a 
benign regional power (Onis and Yilmaz 2009) emerged a Middle-
Easternisation (Oguzlu 2008) tendency in TFP. Growing disagreements over 
Iraq, Iran, Syria and Kurds have determined mutual relationships, especially 
with the US and increased the speculations about Turkey's foreign policy 
choices. 
 
The Iraq War and Turkey's 'no' vote for the deployment of US troops on 1 
March 2003 provided an example of Turkey's shifting identity (Tank 2006, 
p.469). Regarding to Tank's point, Oguzlu and Kibaroglu (2009, p.577-578) 
claimed that the West's approach towards Turkey led Turkish decision makers 
adopt different policies. In the post-Cold War era, Turkey's membership in 
the NATO has no longer guaranteed its place in the Western international 
community. That means, not just Turkey has repositioned itself, but the 
West's new perspective located it in the Greater Middle East rather than in 
Europe. 
 
The notion of geographic imagination is employed by Aras and Fidan (2009) 
in order to analyse new official Turkish political rhetoric. They argue that 
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renewed geographic imagination and activism in foreign policy launched 
intensive security, trade, energy and cooperation relations in the Eurasian 
region. Fidan (2010, p.109) argued that Turkey reconstructed its foreign 
policy in parallel to the post-cold war developments. However, it failed due 
to the lack of confidence. AKP's new political elite changed this tendency 
and Turkey has had self confidence for the democratic reform process and 
reformulation of foreign relations.  Like Fidan, Sozen (2010, p.106-108) used 
the concept of 'self confidence' in explanation of the paradigm shift in TFP 
by the revival of Ottomanism in national and international policies of Turkey. 
Instead of Kemalist positivist-modernist narrative which is built on rejection 
of Ottoman heritage, Turkey's relations with Arabs, Muslims and Kurds 
moved to a resurgence and normalisation track in the revival period. Neo- 
Ottoman orientation brought Turkey closer to the Islamic world. In Yesiltas's 
analysis (2013), a liberal oriented geopolitical practice and a conservative 
Islamist vision represent a main rupture from the old Kemalist geopolitical 
vision in TFP.  Ozkan (2014, p.134) refers to Ahmet Davutoglu's writings of 
1980s and 1990s and reminds that Davutoglu believes the Western model 
democracy is not adequate for the Islamic world. The lack of religious values 
turned the West into a dangerous mechanical supremacy, thus the political 
regimes of the Middle East should derive their legitimacy from Islam.  He 
explains it as the logic behind why Davutoglu supported An-Nahda in 
Tunisia and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Syria with a pan-Islamist 
vision, but ignored the influence of Arab nationalism, sectarianism, 
secularism and socialism in the region (ibid. p.136). 
 
Significantly, Bilgin and Bilgic (2011) investigated how concepts of 
civilisational geopolitics have created a 'new geographic imagination' under 
the AKP. They highlighted what is different about Davutoglu and AKP's 
approach to Turkey. In the new geographic imagination Turkey is located 
outside Western civilisation and is imagined as the leader of its own 
civilisation, which changes the definitions of 'us' and 'others' (ibid p.173). In 
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Cagaptay's (2013) analysis, Turkey's revisionist new position neither 
challenges the Western order nor it changes its axis from the West, it has a 
broader international cooperation in the world within deeply embedded 
economic and political bonds with the Western world. These bonds rest on 
more than shared strategic alignment (ibid p.803). Turkey's political tradition 
and success in foreign policy, democracy, secularism and women’s 
emancipation have been consolidated within the Western order. Moreover, in 
2012 Oguzlu argued that some internal and external determinants continue to 
drive Europeanisation process under the third term of the AKP. In the terms 
of internal dynamics, liberal democratic steps should be taken, for instance, 
for the Kurdish dispute. Externally speaking, rising regional challenges after 
the Arab Spring requires Turkey's European transformation to be able to deal 
with the problems.   
 
Onis (2013) points out two main challenges of majoritarian democracy in the 
age of the AKP’s new Turkey. First, a consensus and mutual toleration needs 
to be constructed among the secularists and religious conservatives in the 
public life as well as pluralism should be protected under the law for every 
citizen, particularly for the minorities. Second, a compromise needs to be 
built on the matter of territorial unity of the Turkish state and the political 
rights of the Kurdish citizens. This means something should be done beyond 
the cultural and group rights of Kurds. In related to Turkey's transformation, 
Omer Taspinar (2014, p.49) called it as 'the end of the Turkish model' which 
referred to its positive democratic image replaced by authoritarianism in 
domestic politics, cronyism and corruption in economy and deadlock in 
foreign policy. The AKP aimed to end the Kemalist nature of the Republic, 
thus it reduced the power of the Turkish army in the politics, thus utilised the 
power of Gulenist network in the Turkish judiciary and governed the 
Ergenekon trials for this purpose (ibid p.54), which led to the imprisonments 
of many journalists, writers, military officers, including General Ilker Basbug. 
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Given literary attempts to understand and identify new Turkey's identity 
under the AKP government. According to these previous analysis, three main 
factors behind the construction of post-Kemalist nation-state identity appear: 
The first factor is the role of 9/11 and post-Cold War international system;  
the second factor is the role of Turkey's bid for EU Membership; and the 
third factor is the role of the AKP government in changing domestic power 
relations. Different notions are used to explain the role of the AKP in this 
change such as Davutoglu and AKP's worldview (Altunısık 2009), the idea of 
pan-Islamism (Ozkan 2014), neo-Ottomanism (Sozen 2010; Fisher Onar 
2009a; Fisher Onar 2009b; Kiniklioglu 2007), new geographic imagination 
(Aras and Fidan 2009; Aras and Polat 2007), geopolitical vision (Yesiltas 
2013); civilisational geopolitics (Bilgin and Bilgic 2011); civilisational 
discourse (Duran 2013); the triumph of AKP's conservative globalisation 
towards the domestic and international developments (Onis 2011; Onis 2010); 
the West's approach towards Turkey (Oguzlu and Kibaroglu 2009) and the 
religion (Sadik 2012). Most of the studies have looked at the AKP's identity 
with a focus on Islam or conservatism. Among others, Fisher Onar, by 
making use of speech act theory (2011), analysed four main narratives in 
AKP's discursive repertoire which helped to understand the multiple threads 
of AKP activism: democratisation; post-Islamism; Ottomanism; and Turkey 
Inc. story. Fisher Onar's constructivist approach is well suited to unpack the 
contradictions in AKP's policies and positions on a range of issues. But, her 
study did not cover the debates of nationalism, like other studies. If one 
surveys the main concepts, it is seen that the concept of national identity is 
not used to identify new Turkey's identity. The words of Islam and AKP are 
used together synonomously.  Religion is taking for granted in the political 
researches on the AKP, but the notion of nationalism frequently is not taken 
into account. However, the main power struggle in reconstruction of Turkey’s 
identity is based on how people diversely see the common past, present and 
future of the nation-state. Nationalism is a way of seeing, interpreting and 
structuring the world, which can be constructed or represented in several 
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different ways by various social agents and power relations. It is therefore, 
the lack of the concept of nationalism in the analysis that cloaks some 
discriminatory discourses in the new emerging nation-state discourse.  It 
should be remembered that Islamists do not avoid being nationalist; hence 
while analysing construction of Turkey’s new identity, the concept of 
national identity is accepted as the backbone of this study. Recently White 
(2013) wrote a book titled Muslim Nationalism and the New Turks in which 
Saracoglu (2013) defined the AKP's 'strategic depth' in foreign policy as the 
doctrine of nationalism. According to Saracoglu, nationalism in AKP's 
discourse is ignored in the literature due to the Party challenged with the 
official Kemalist nationalist imagination and its understanding of Turkishness 
(ibid p.53). This challenge has cloaked its nationalist discourse. It is accepted 
as AKP opposes nationalism, in fact, it opposes Kemalism. Saracoglu 
reminded that new Islamic conservative nationalism is a collective product of 
Turkish right-wing ideologies and traditions (ibid p.58), which consists new 
Turkish foreign policy discourse in the present. In addition, Gurcan (2013) 
distinctively made a comparative analysis in Turkish press on the 
paradigmatic transformation of Turkish foreign policy. Despite the lack of 
perspective of nationalism, the study indicated that five newspapers from the 
realist, anti-government camp had a pessimistic interpretation of TFP while 
five liberal, constructivist and pro-government newspapers had an optimistic 
interpretation of TFP.   
 
Therefore, the academic literature mainly emphasized what AKP brought to 
the Turkish politics as a pivotal or hegemonic actor; however the power 
struggle of competing nationalist discourses has been highly neglected in the 
examinations of transformation of Turkey's identity from the Kemalist 
discourse to the post-Kemalist discourse. Therefore, this study differs from 
the previous studies by going beyond these debates with a focus on the 
concept of nationalism and enlightening the process of power struggle in the 
media for the construction of post-Kemalist nation-state discourse in Turkey. 
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Understanding 'the process' of discursive construction of new Turkey’s 
identity serves to see the historicity of nationalist discourses, their symbiotic 
relationships and highlight how Islamic conservative nationalism became 
dominant with the AKP government in the last decade. To sum up, this thesis 
aims to understand ongoing process of construction of new Turkey discourse 
through a more fundamental question: What does it mean to be a Turkish and 
what is the place of this nation in the world? 
 
The Importance and Contribution of the Project 
To contribute to contemporary Turkish studies, this thesis intends to deepen 
understanding of the dynamic nature of Turkey’s identity from September 
2001 to June 2011. It argues that Turkey’s international identity has been 
reconstructed by historical antagonisms among different Turkish 
nationalisms and their power struggle with Islamist and Kurdish nationalism 
in the Turkish political sphere. In this context, this research is engaged in the 
struggle to define Turkish national/state identity by questioning how different 
Turkish narratives relate themselves to Islamist and Kurdish narratives and to 
the notion of Europe and the West. To unpack how beliefs and traditions 
inform national identity construction and how these practices arose in their 
specific historical context and power struggle for hegemony, a Discourse-
Historical Approach (Wodak et al. 1999) is taken to analyse the media data 
on Turkish nationalism and the developments in Turkish politics in the 2000s. 
 
In this context, this thesis seeks to make an original contribution in a number 
of ways in application of DHA to Turkish Studies. First of all, the case of 
Turkey serves to make an original contribution to literature on religion and 
nation-state identity.  Second, it contributes to debates on the broader 
application of Critical Discourse Analysis in international relations and 
nationalism studies, and particularly how we understand the process of 
discursive construction of nation-state identity within the power struggle of 
competing perspectives on the nation. Furthermore, it aims to highlight the 
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dynamic and discursive nature of national identity by providing a detailed 
examination of different Turkish nationalisms, their origins and how they 
have developed in the post 9/11 period. Therefore, it takes as its starting point 
major concepts in the literature of Turkish nationalism and foreign policy, 
and it surveys the variety of political challenges to, and transformation of, 
these concepts. It also contributes to the literature on Turkish foreign policy 
and Turkey-EU Relations, in particular to the discussions on Turkey's place 
in Europe and the West, with a critical analysis of how Turkey discursively 
constructs itself as the Other. 
 
To avoid focusing exclusively on the official governmental discourse or the 
circles at the top of the current political power pyramid, conceptual variety 
and challenges are explored in the media discourse. The role of media 
discourse is crucial in the expression of ideas regarding how people think 
about themselves and others.  Moreover, it also affects how they live in a 
particular way. Therefore, examining how the Turkish media represents 
concepts of nation and identity reveals the way people think about their 
nation and identity, contributing valuable information to both studies of 
media and politics. 
 
 
The Selection of the Case Studies 
In discursive construction of nation-state identity, the question of what it 
means to be ‘foreign’ is difficult to define in the complex interrelationships 
of dynamic political, historical and international contexts. Therefore, this 
study refers to the literature of foreign policy. David Campbell (1992 p. 37) 
recalls that the word ‘foreign’ was used to mean ‘distance, unfamiliarity, and 
alien character of those people and matters outside of one's immediate 
household, family, or region, but still inside the political community that 
would later comprise a state’ until the 18th century. This means foreign 
policy building should consider all kinds of practices of differentiation and 
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exclusion in all levels of social interaction from the individual level to the 
global level , which articulate identity within and outside the borders of each 
state. Media data allows the context of Turkey’s identity to be linked to wider 
social and international relations. Additionally, representations of Turkish 
identity in the media allow for comparison of various ways of being Turkish 
and a part of Europe and the world. To realise the targeted aim of studying on 
Turkey's post-Kemalist identity and its challenges, three case studies are 
selected. The first case study examines the domestic power struggle of 
definition of Turkish nation-state identity and articulates the main 
antagonisms in various imaginations of being a Turk. The second case study 
indicates how this domestic power struggle and antagonisms in different 
perspectives on Turkish nation-state identity determine different perspectives 
in foreign policy, particularly in Turkey's EU policy. Lastly, the third case 
study shows that new Turkish foreign policy discourse contributes the 
domestic power struggle and the construction of Turkey's post-Kemalist 
nation-state identity. 
 
Case Study One: Discursive Construction of Turkish National Identity in the 
Context of Religion: This case analyses discursive constructions of Turkish 
national identity, with a specific focus on what it means to be Turkish, or 
how the Turks imagine themselves as a nation, in terms of themes such as 
being Muslim, secularist or non-Muslim. It therefore seeks to answer these 
questions: How does Turkish media discourse reconstruct and challenge post-
Kemalist Turkish identity in terms of religion? Which concepts of Turkish 
national identity are naturalised, negotiated or contested? In this context, it 
looks at the media coverage around two particular events: the assassination 
of Armenian journalist Hrant Dink in January 2007 and the clash of Turkey’s 
secularist and Islamic identities during the 2007 Turkish presidential election. 
After the killing of human rights activist Armenian journalist Hrant Dink on 
19 January 2007, more than 100,000 people  at his funeral protested his 
assassination by shouting: ‘We are all Hrant Dink; we are all Armenian’. He 
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became the symbol of anti-racism in Turkey. Therefore, the media coverage 
of his assassination is chosen as the first case to represent inclusion and 
exclusion narratives of non-Muslim elements in defining the Turkish nation. 
It will also show the reactionary discourse of ‘We are all Turks’. The second 
part of the case study analyses the power struggle to choose Turkey’s 
president in 2007 and represents the binary nationalist imaginations of 
Turkey in terms of secularism and Islam. 
 
Case Study Two: Turkey and EU Relations in the Context of Turkey’s Kurdish 
Problem: This case study demonstrates that domestic struggle over the 
definition of Turkish national identity determines Turkey’s international 
identity and relations. Specifically, by evaluating reconstruction of Turkish 
self-imagination and the redefinition of Turkish identity through the Kurdish 
problem as a crucial element in the Turkish foreign policy toward the EU, it 
is possible to understand why Ankara redefined its vision and how the 
integration process strengthened not only the voice of nationalism or Euro-
scepticism in Turkey, but also the voice of pluralism. It searches for how the 
supranational (European), national (Turkish) and subnational (Kurdish) 
identities relate and challenge each other in the discursive construction of 
Turkey’s post-Kemalist identity. 
 
Case Study Three: The Relations between Turkey and the West in the Case of 
9/11 and the Iraq War: As the final case, this research explores how Turkey’s 
new external policy, in particular policy towards the US/West and Middle 
East, empowered the construction of the post-Kemalist narrative of the nation. 
Therefore, it observes how the media coverage of the events of 9/11 and the 
Iraq War reconstruct different discourses of Turkish identity. By observing 
the multiple definitions of Turkey’s new IR identity, the third case offers an 
analysis of different discursive constructions of Turkish foreign policy’s 
orientation, whether it is Western, Eastern, Eurasian or other, to better 
understand Turkey’s self-identification of its place in the world. 
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The Structure of the Thesis 
The research consists of seven chapters. Chapter One is devoted to 
introducing my theoretical and methodological framework. This introductory 
chapter will review the relationships among the discourse analysis, the media, 
national identity, in particular, the chapter concentrates on the concept of 
‘discourse’ and the role of the media in reconstruction of nationalism as an 
ideology. 
  
Chapter Two presents the historical background of Turkish nationalism and 
Turkish foreign policy. It reviews this literature to challenge the argument 
that there is just a specific Turkish nationalism and explores the origins of the 
main branches of Turkish nationalism. It demonstrates that Kemalist nation-
state ideology and its Turkish identity construction is the key factor driving 
Turkey’s policy towards its citizens and the EU/West. It portrays the origins 
of the current problems and polarisations of Turkey as different perspectives 
on Turkish nationalism that have different understandings of history and 
foreign relations based on diverse worldviews. Chapters Three, Four, and 
Five analyse the Turkish media discourse in three case studies for 
examination of the power struggle in defining the post-Kemalist narrative of 
the nation-state. Chapter Three focuses on the media coverage of the 
assassination of Turkish-Armenian journalist Hrant Dink in 2007 and the 
struggle in Turkish Muslim and secular identities in the process of Turkey’s 
11th presidential election in 2007. Chapter Four analyses Turkish press 
reports on European integration and examines the images of the EU with a 
specific focus on Turkey’s Kurdish question. Chapter Five extends the 
arguments that are sustained across the topic of the ‘shift’ in Turkish foreign 
policy’s Western orientation by analysing the Turkish media coverage of 9/11 
and the Iraq War. Chapter Six, the concluding chapter, provides an overall 
discussion and conclusion. It sums up the comparison of Turkish 
nationalisms and different Turkey imaginations; and newly emerging ‘self’ 
and ‘other’ relationships in the post-Kemalist narrative of the nation. 
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In this structure, an alternative explanation is provided by exploring the ways 
in which discussions around Turkishness, Muslimhood, European and 
Western identities are used to redefine Turkey’s nation-state identity in the 
last decade under the AKP rule.  By the discourse-historical analysis on these 
key themes in Turkish media, Turkish national identity is shown as a 
dynamic and negotiated concept which is open to the challenges and 
constructed through the power struggles.  This perspective challenges to the 
idea that suggests a Kemalist nation-state identity which has had European 
and Western orientation its politics since the Republican foundation in 1923.  
With the application of discourse-historical approach in the case of Turkey 
and working on the Turkish media discourse as the original contribution to 
the literature, the process of emergence of post-Kemalist nation-state identity 
with the hegemonic Muslim nationalism and non-European discourse is 
evidenced by a range of empirical data, which reveals how different Turkish 
nationalisms have contested and overlapped with each other in discursive 
construction of new Turkey. 
 
What have been naturalised in every day discourse give clues for establishing 
an emancipatory discourse for a pluralist understanding of Turkish nation. 
Involving dominant discourse, its opposition and resistance help to overcome 
polarisations which cause losing the 'daily plebiscite' of living together 
peacefully in Turkey. In this context, it is hoped that this thesis contributes to 
raise an awareness of tensions produced by the identity construction 
processes, discriminatory and exclusive practices committed for defining 
new ‘others’ for the sake of daily political interests, which are highly 
dangerous actions for the collective future of Turkey. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
THE THEORY AND METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY: 
THE NATION-STATE IDENTITY, DISCOURSE ANALYSIS AND THE 
MEDIA 
 
Introduction 
This dissertation argues that the discipline of International Relations can 
benefit from interdisciplinary studies to analyse the role of new actors in 
world politics. To analyse the case of contemporary Turkey's identity, it 
appeals to Nationalism and Media Studies. In this context, this thesis 
employs these studies through a comparative discourse analysis in the 
Turkish press to reveal how the Turks define themselves and others (the 
EU/West) and view their place in the world. In this context, the leading role 
of Turkish media is considered in interpreting, constructing and representing 
different ideologies of nationalism (Keyman and Kadioglu 2011) across the 
country. A deeper understanding on the struggle between competing versions 
of the definition of ‘Turkish’, Turkish Foreign Policy vision, even different 
answers to the question of where should Turkey’s place be in the world of 
politics is suggested to be had by applying the Discourse-Historical 
Approach (DHA) (Wodak et al 1999) to different Turkish newspaper 
coverage. In this context, this chapter presents a detailed theoretical and 
methodological background for the thesis. More specifically, to explore 
different discursive constructions of Turkish nation-state identity in the 
media, as related to Turkey and EU/West relations, this chapter presents a 
framework of the concepts of the media, national identity, discourse analysis 
and their interactions. It leads to an understanding of how the concepts of the 
Turkish nation and the domestic power struggle on its definition, as they are 
constructed in the media (Chapter Three), and how the media construct and 
negotiate concepts of the nation in their coverage of foreign policy (Chapter 
Four and Chapter Five). 
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1.1. Theorising the Nation-State Identity 
The term ‘identity’ means ‘the relationship between two or more related 
entities in a manner that asserts a sameness or equality’ (Wodak et al. 2003, p. 
11). It comes from social psychology and is connected with the image of 
individuality and the distinctiveness constructed by an actor through relations 
with 'others' (Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein 1996, p. 59). Locating the 
nation as a distinct group involves locating other nations, which provides a 
categorization and identification of ‘in-group’ and ‘out-group’ members 
(Billig 1995, p. 66). This establishes a unity based on an imagination, 
recognition and definition of 'us' and 'them' by promoting a sense of 
belonging together in a common present, past and future. In other words, 
national identities are situated within the historical narratives that construct 
the 'imagined communities' (Anderson 1983) in a narrative (Wodak et al. 
1999) that shares the past through the present and expected future. In this 
context, this research argues that Turkish identity does not have a fixed 
meaning; rather, its meaning changes with different historical circumstances 
and contexts. For a comprehensive understanding of the diversity of Turkish 
nationalism and the struggle to define Turkish identity in the last decade, this 
section summarises general approaches to the concept of national identity 
and introduces the discursive approach to the study of nationalism in the 
examination of different constructions of Turkish national identity in the 
media discourse. 
 
In the literature of International Relations (IR), even realists argue that the 
national identity and culture make a difference among nations, as Hans 
Morgenthau (1993) noted in Politics among Nations. However, there is no 
agreement on how identity matters should be studied within the constructivist 
and rationalist frameworks in the literature of IR theory. In the classical 
realist tradition of international political analysis, which has been the 
dominant approach to explaining interstate relations in the literature, foreign 
policy should be made by politicians, attuned to the national interest and free 
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of the influence of extraneous domestic factors such as national identity 
(Mermin 1999, p. 147). Waltz's Theory of International Politics (1979), as a 
key contribution to realist international relations theory, assumes that the 
international system is a material structure consisting of military and 
economic resources rather than ideas and norms. Under this realist 
fundamental assumption, neorealism (Mearsheimer 2001) does not allow us 
to theorize the construction and reconstruction of state/national identity. 
Neoliberalism (Keohane and Nye 1997) also does not offer an explanatory 
theory of how nation-state identity is constructed; since its focus is on 
political economy, environmental issues and human rights (Lamy 2008, p. 
135). Within the contemporary mainstream approaches of International 
Relations, both these approaches fail to consider the role of political culture, 
norms, identities, domestic interests and non-state actors in foreign policy 
decision making. As a critical reaction to these mainstream theories, social 
constructivism is concerned with normative structure (Barnett 2008, p. 168) 
and ideas. By analysing the effects that political identities, norms and culture 
have on national interests and policies in specific historical contexts, the 
social constructivist approach (Katzenstein 1996; Lapid and Kratochwil 1997; 
Wendt 1999; McSweeney 1999; Wilmer 2002) has demonstrated the 
importance of the social dimensions of international relations. Constructivist 
scholars argue the identities shape perceptions and determine intentions for 
the states' policies. As a source of interests and preferences, national identity 
has considerable influence on political decision making because it shapes a 
vision that is a possible, legitimate outcome (Saideman 2002, p. 177). Hill 
and Wallace’s (1986, p. 8) statement also supports the assumption of the 
study based on the crucial linkage of national identity and nation's place in 
the world: 
“Effective foreign policy rests upon a shared sense of national 
identity, of a nation state’s ‘place in the world’, its friends and 
enemies, intersects and aspirations. These underlying assumptions 
are embedding in national history and myth, changing slowly over 
time as political leaders reinterpret them and external and internal 
developments reshape them.” 
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It can be argued that the nation-state identity in international politics is 
constructed in interaction with both domestic and international ‘others’ rather 
than simply in one or the other. Nationalism is not just a collective political 
identity of a modern society, but also a particular way of seeing and thinking 
about the world through a nationalist discourse. It locates the nation 
physically, legally and socially within the world of nations. The reality is that 
we live in a world of nations and all fundamental rights and other social and 
economic rights are defined, regulated and institutionalised by this system.  
Despite the fact that a person would argue she/he is a world citizen without a 
nationality; however, it does not allow her/him to cross borders and travel the 
world without an identification of a place and a nation. The logic of national 
thinking makes sense of act in the contemporary world, frames language, 
habits, doing things, organise social, political and legal frameworks. 
 
Various definitions of ‘nation’ and explanations of the rise of nationalism 
have been offered in the literature (Hutchinson and Smith 1995; Ozkirimli 
2000); however, the concepts that define the ‘nation’ revolve theoretically 
around two approaches and arguments linked to them: the political nation by 
the will of a state’s citizens and the nation that is linguistically and ethnically 
defined by culture. According to the Habermasian definition of the concept 
(1993), national identification is based on a constitutionally equal citizenship 
and patriotism that takes place in the framework of universalistic principles 
and political culture, regardless of any differences in race, religion, gender, 
language or ethnicity. This type of civic nationalism can be evaluated in 
terms of Ernest Renan’s concept of nation, which is based on the will of 
individuals to live together. Yet in a culturalist perspective, Anthony D. 
Smith’s (2009) definition of nation is a ‘named human population sharing a 
historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass public 
culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all 
members’. In the sense of cultural or ethnic nationalism, what gives unity to 
the nation is inherited by birth and blood (Ozkirimli 2005, p. 23).   
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Although the distinction between civic and ethnic nationalism is useful for 
the purpose of description, the terms cannot capture the complexities that 
inhere in the culturalisation of politics and the politicization of culture. This 
classification leads to a normative project of dividing nationalisms into two 
camps, one is the civic-good nationalism of the West and other is the ethnic-
bad nationalism of the Rest (ibid. p.24). However, all nationalisms combine 
both the cultural and the political together and all nationalist discourses have 
common dimensions: the spatial, the temporal, the symbolic and the 
everyday (ibid. p.179). Ozkirimli reminds (ibid. 25) Roger Brubaker's (1998) 
nationalism categorisation of the 'state-framed' versus the 'counter-state'. To 
what extent these are exclusive is equivocal, thus seeing nationalism as a 
form of 'discourse' can work for capturing what is common in all nationalism, 
how different nationalisms challenge, overlap and intersect  with each other. 
 
In the debate on how nations have emerged, three main classical theoretical 
approaches address the nature of the nation and nationalism: the primordialist, 
the ethnosymbolist and the modernist (Ozkirimli 2000). The primordialists 
(Shafer 1968) consider that nationality is a natural part of human beings and 
predetermined in the same way as being a member of a family. For 
ethosymbolists (Smith 2000, 2001), nations come from pre-existing ethnic 
ties and the features of political and social landscapes that rely on a legacy of 
myths, symbols, values and memories of past. Benedict Anderson (1983), 
John Breuilly (1994), Ernest Gellner (1983) and Eric J. Hobsbawm (1991) 
represent the modernists and explain that nations are the products of the 
direct or indirect consequences of political movements and the rise of the 
modern state. Rather than using these pioneering approaches, new 
approaches to nationalism transcend the classical debate by proposing 
interdisciplinary analyses in such areas as globalisation studies, post-colonial 
theories, feminism, postmodernism and discourse analysis (Ozkirimli 2000, p. 
198). These fields of study place nationhood in the daily reproduction of 
specific ways of life, ways of viewing and interpreting the world.  
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This distinction in approaches to nationalism is useful to elucidate different 
perspectives on Turkish nationalism and how Turkishness is defined through 
these diverse perspectives. For instance, the Kemalist perspective can be 
accepted as a modernist approach, whilst ethno-nationalist perspective can be 
considered as a primordialist approach. However, to demonstrate competing 
perspectives and the struggle to redefine the Turkish nation-state identity 
during the last decade, this study approaches nationalism from a discursive 
perspective. The discourse-analytic approach connects the nation and state by 
indicating the national unity as a discursive construct (Calhoun 1994). 
According to this approach, the nationalist way of thinking, feeling, 
evaluating and speaking makes people understand and define themselves as a 
nation. 
 
1.2. Towards a Discursive Approach to Construction of Nation-State 
Identity 
In the most essential Foucaultdian meaning in spoken or written language use 
(Fairclough 1995, p. 131), 'discourse' frames the objects of knowledge, 
beliefs and values and simultaneously constitutes social identities, social 
relations and systems of knowledge and belief. Thus, it sustains or changes 
social relationships in society and among societies (Mayr 2008). Different 
discourses reflect different perspectives on the world, regulating and 
determining “individual and collective doing and/or formative action that 
shapes society” (Jager 1993).  Discourse constitutes what people know, how 
people know, what they speak about and what they silence about themselves 
and others.  It governs how to think and write about the nation (Waever 2002, 
p. 29) under the influence of power relations and interest order. In this 
context, the discursive constructive vision of nation as an imagined 
community (Anderson 1983) is useful in identifying strategies used in the 
definition of self and other relations. In a nutshell, nationalism resides in 
discourse and is shaped by discourse. 
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With the previous points in mind, this study argues that discourse analysis is 
the most appropriate method for identity questions in Politics that 
concentrate on self/other relations, often engaged in contrasting narratives of 
identities as ‘others’ being the opposite of ‘us’. The investigation of this 
research has a distinctive motivation that offers a way to see varying 
contested, converse or complementary ways of conceptualisation, recognition 
and configuration in Turkey’s identity construction as attuned to the 
complexity of in-group and out-group definitions. Determining how these 
groups involve, exclude, engage and connect with each other and how their 
identities are embodied and expressed in the media discourse are the most 
urgent tasks for this research. 
 
Different narratives of nationalisms are different constructs of the nation and 
different evaluations and mappings of it (Wodak et al. 1999). Based on this 
discursive approach to nationalism, this thesis argues that Turkish national 
identity is discursively constructed and that a fundamental conflict has 
existed between competing nationalist discourses in Turkish society (Canefe 
2008, p. 394) over the definition of what Turkish identity should be and how 
to place Turkey in the world. Changing and separate definitions of 
‘Turkishness’ shed light on the struggle between the domestic actors and 
ideologies and illuminate competing views of the world that differ with 
regards to Turkey’s regional and world role. 
 
There is a plurality of theoretical approaches and methods within the 
discourse analysis. Discourse analysis is useful in examining the ways in 
which discursive practices convey meaning to nationalist discourses through 
both contestation and communicative action. Four theoretical approaches and 
methods of discourse analysis can be delineated (Carta and Morin 2014): 
interpretive constructivism; poststructualism, discursive institutionalism and 
critical discourse analysis. In the versality of discourse analysis, 
constructivist authors such as Kubalkova (2001) use the most ideational 
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approach which focuses on the concept of cooperation. Poststructuralist 
studies emphasis on the concept of the power.  For instance, Ole Waever 
(2001) offers a discursive view of an identity that is more unstable, where 
identity explanations are measured with material factors such as economics, 
energy or military power. This can tackle the shifts in national identity and 
foreign policy and to elucidate why the same nation-state identity can lead to 
highly different policies. Vivien Schmidt's discursive institutionalism (2008) 
explores discursive interaction and the representation of ideas within given 
institutional context. According to this approach, institutions influence agents 
and are being influenced by agents (ibid. p.134). Critical Discourse Analysis 
(CDA) goes beyond these approaches, like others it seeks to understand and 
explain the social world and politics, but it also aims to criticise and change 
society. Discourses are seen as tools that reproduce the social relations and 
domination of a group over another. It has clearest commitment to practical 
ways of linguistic analysing texts. 
 
As noted, this study attempts to analyse Turkey’s identity discourse 
considering national and international factors, with a specific focus on the 
nationalist ideologies, values, beliefs and perceptions in the media. This idea 
considers the importance of the national context in the determination of the 
policy positions of all relevant actors and why a policy works and changes in 
a particular way at a given time. In this context, Rosenau (1980) proposes to 
include individual, governmental, societal and systemic factors as the sets of 
independent and explanatory variables in his study. The existing literature 
presents a framework that identifies the domestic factors in foreign policy
5
 in 
                                               
5
 As the framework for domestic sources of foreign policy and mapping of a model for the 
analysis of foreign policy discourse, Clarke (1996 pp. 22-37) defines six sets of variables. 
These are the constitutional ‘power map’ of the state political culture, beliefs, psychological 
processes of the key political leaders and officials in decision making, group dynamics of 
policy making and the information-processing characteristics of any system. Within the new 
approaches of foreign policy analysis, the impact of domestic factors on foreign policy is 
explained by three main approaches (Alden and Aran 2011, pp. 47-55). One primarily says 
that foreign policy is sourced by the structural forms of the state, such as the institutions and 
regime. The second focuses on the economic system and interests of some elite groups and, 
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relation to conditional parameters which depend on the geographic, political 
and social context of cases. Rosenau’s contribution may work in a multilevel 
analysis, but this study addresses the domestic power struggle over the 
definition of Turkey’s identity, which enables to understand new Turkey's 
post-Kemalist identity through combating national imaginations, shifting 
perceptions and priorities in domestic and foreign policy. 
 
Analysing political elites and decision makers’ discourses is often considered 
in traditional IR literature. The discourse analysis offers a mechanism and a 
systematic account of internal responses to international impulses. Basically, 
it applies to both official and non-official texts (Waever 2001, p. 26), but 
predominantly to public texts that stretch the concept of ‘political’, involving 
dominant discourse, its opposition and resistance. It creates a structure, or 
frame, which can link different elements of decision making, such as 
bureaucratic politics and institutions, domestic pressure and interest groups 
and perceptions of individuals in the general policy line. According to this 
perspective, national identity is a source of power and different imaginations 
of identity produce different policy outcomes. A change in national 
imagination denotes shifting perceptions on the 'self' and 'other' identities and 
policy priorities, that is, the perceptions about who we are and who our 
friends, rivals, and enemies are.  This framework also supplies a way to 
examine how national interests are formed and articulated within a wider 
political debate. This is also a tool for understanding how official discourse is 
reproduced, represented, legitimised or resisted in relation to the larger public. 
This 'multi-layered structure of discourse' (Diez 2001, p.14) enables to 
observe continuity and changes in construction of nation-state identity. 
Therefore, it provides a good indication of power relations and how national 
identity discourse might change.  To sum up, the discursive approach to 
national identity clarifies the mechanisms of norms and ideologies in their 
                                                                                                                         
last, the pluralist approach perceives foreign policy as a product of sub-state and non-state 
actors, societal interest groups, state decision makers, public opinion and the media. 
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production, transformation and how they exercise their power and influence 
in a historical context. 
 
As an example of poststructualist study, in ‘Writing Security’, David 
Campbell (1998) analysed the construction of US identity during the Cold 
War through foreign policy discourse. According to Campbell, US foreign 
policy discourse during the Cold War had productive influences on state 
identity. He argued that the Soviet threat in the discourses and practices of 
security during the period was an identity-constitutive tool for the United 
States. In the field of security studies, the Copenhagen School (Buzan et al. 
1998; Neumann 1999) has done works on particular acts of securitisation, 
determined by speech-acts; but Ole Weaver and some of his colleagues (Diez 
2001; Hansen and Waever 2001) are more interested in how certain vision 
and meaning of Europe relates to the concepts of nation and state. As a 
pioneering study, Ole Waever (1990) demonstrated in Three competing 
Europes: German, French, Russian that different organising principles, 
different ‘European’ values and different boundaries to West and East of 
these three ‘Europes’ constitute the contrast between their approaches to 
European cooperation and integration. In this regard, Henrik Larsen (1997) 
elaborated domestic political discourses on Europe in France and Britain and 
their impact on foreign policy. William Wallace (1998, p. 681) pointed out 
that Larsen’s study failed by not addressing how British and French 
discourses were constructed and reconstructed through the active process of 
political debate on Europe. This means it requires a clear understanding of 
the processes of the struggle and interaction between actors and their 
competing discourses. Critical Discourse Analysis can be used to overcome 
this shortage which enables to explore the versality of discursive 
constructions of the nation, produced by various agents and in various 
historical and political contexts, their competing concepts of the nation in 
flux and in dialog with other forms of identity (Inthorn 2007). In this way, 
Larsen (2014) showed in his latest study that poststructualist studies can 
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work with linguistics methodological tools of CDA. In fact, both approaches 
are interested in the analysis of the historical and political context of 
discourse and its critical stand to taken-for-granted knowledge (Aydin-Duzgit 
2014); however CDA does more with its goal of emancipatory critique which 
covers the comparison of different representations of the discursive and non-
discursive aspects of social reality.  How language is used by people, how 
meaning is created in context, how language use represents the exercise of 
socio-political power and control in abusing, dominance and inequality are 
particular interests of CDA (Richardson 2007, p.115). Making these 
ideological effects of particular ways of using language more visible, CDA 
has a political stance on the side of dominated, disadvantaged and oppressed 
groups (Wodak 2001, p.188) and against dominating groups and inequality. 
By taking explicit position provides an essential motivation for analysis for 
the purpose of understanding and exposing bias of what has been naturalised 
in everyday experience and actions. In this context, the questions arise as 
how some groups of people are labelled and categorized; how some forms of 
emphasising negative sameness and negative common features of 
generalisation are used to represent contrasting identities, which are 
expressed by discursive practices. Understanding the manner in which social 
relations and issues of power are reproduced through various forms of 
representation gives clues about where to start for a change and 
transformation concerning equality, emancipation (Forchtner 2011), 
democracy and pluralism. In this context, this research sees nationalism as an 
ideology, as patterns of belief, practice, assumption, habit and representation 
that are reproduced daily. Specifically, Ruth Wodak's Discourse-Historical 
Approach of CDA
6
 is suitable for use in research that explores nationalist 
                                               
6
 Wodak, R. and M. Meyer (2005) Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis, London: Sage; 
Krzyzanowski, M., and  Wodak, R. (2009). Politics of exclusion: Debating migration in 
Austria. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Press; Wodak, R. (2011a). “‘Us’ and ‘them’: 
Inclusion/exclusion-discrimination via discourse. ” In G. Delanty, R. Wodak, & P. Jones 
(Eds.), Migration, identity, and belonging (pp. 54–77). Liverpool, UK: LUP; Wodak, R. 
(2011b). The discourse of politics in action: Politics as usual. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave; 
Wodak, R., Khosravinik, M., and  Mral, B. (Eds.). (2012). Rightwing populism in Europe: 
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discourses in their own historical and linguistic production context. It defines 
the linguistic constructive strategies of national identities which allow 
understanding the changing and competing meanings of the identities 
through the discursive changes. 
 
 
1.3. Nation in Narrative: Discourse Historical Approach to Construction 
of National Identity 
Seeing the nation as a discursive construct conducts it with regard to the 
concept of narrative. People narrate different understandings of their social 
world, themselves and collective experiences (Defina 2003, p.17). Narrative 
recapitulates past events with a temporal and logic order. That is to say, the 
construction of a collective self-image concerning collective national identity 
is formed through the narrations of common past, present and future. 
Narratives, therefore, are about the birth of the nation, its past events, 
developments, where it came from to its present situation and where it is 
going to go in the future (Forchtner and Kølvraa 2012, p.381). This 
perspective understands national identity discourse as a social and historical 
setting and context dependent. 
 
The collective memory of the nation is based on a selective reading and 
construction of the history (Inthorn 2007, p.10).  Different memories of the 
past inform the ways of how to think about the nation and its identity. Thus, a 
change in dominant understanding of history can transform dominant 
concepts of national identity. It matters due to a specific nationalist discourse 
and its institutionalism and legalisation by the state legitimise hierarchy and 
formulate particular domination which directly constitutes power relations 
amongst actors. A dominant group (and its discourse) imposes its self-image 
on a wider population and builds its hegemony over other groups, namely, 
                                                                                                                         
Discourse and politics. London, UK: Bloomsbury Press; Wodak, R. (ed.) (2012) Critical 
Discourse Analysis (SAGE Benchmarks in Language and Linguistics), Volume I and IV, 
SAGE Publications Ltd 
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different ethnic or religious groups and disadvantaged groups. 
 
In a summary, like other identities, nationality is a narration which people tell 
about themselves and the position of others based on that. Narration of an 
‘identity’ is a specific way of telling, related to how collective experience is 
expressed, discussed and negotiated in members of specific community. This 
sets them aside from other communities. Searching on these different 
narrations on the collective experience allows us to see various contradictory 
experiences and perceptions; more specifically different constructions of a 
so-called one identity in a certain time period. Thus, perception of a national 
identity in a narrative configuration (Wodak et al. 1999, p.14) enables us to 
see its continuity, discontinuity, diversity and dynamicity. Therefore, for a 
better understanding of domestic power struggles for hegemony and 
reconstruction of Turkish nation-state identity, nationalism must be placed in 
the context of competing ideologies and their historical integration and 
exclusion dynamics in Turkey.  
 
As noted before, Ruth Wodak et al. (1999) developed the Discourse 
Historical Approach in Critical Discourse Analysis and dealt with diverse 
understandings on nationhood in the case of Austria by analysing different 
discursive constructions of Austrian identity. On the subject of a common 
political present and future in the narrative of Austrian national identity, they 
analysed commemorative speeches and policy addresses of Austrian political 
representatives of the European Union and Europe. For instance, the analysis 
of Chancellor Franz Vranitzky’s (1986-1997) speech (ibid, p. 100) 
exemplified how a political discourse on a foreign policy issue (European 
Union membership) simultaneously constructed the national identity 
(Austrian) discourse. In Vranitzky’s discourse, the EU member, Austria, was 
positively portrayed by using a strategy of perpetuation to demand continuity 
of the status quo which imagines the Austrian community as an 
internationally respected, social and stable nation-state. According to Wodak, 
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this positive self-representation alleviated the fears regarding Austria’s 
membership in the EU. As seen in the example, this approach helps to show 
various discursive constructs of a specific national identity that are given 
different shapes according to context, public and language. This leads to a 
comparison of different discourses on one and the same topic and how they 
interconnect and challenge with each other. This approach is suitable for use 
in research that explores diversity of discourse on one national matter.   
 
The concept of ‘intertextuality’ (Chilton et al. 2013, p. 53) allows 
identification of the linkage of all texts to other texts through reference to the 
same themes and actors in the narration of nation. This includes the 
reappearance of a text’s topic or main argument in another text in different 
ways and for various purposes, including political purposes that reshape 
power structures. In this manner, intertexuality enables the observation of 
continuities and discontinuities in the discursive construction of national 
identity (Leeuwen and Wodak 1999).  In this regard, coverage of the events 
in media discourse contributes continuous transmission of meaning over time. 
The themes of national identity appear in the media texts again and again 
through references to the meanings of the themes derived from its context 
and recontexualised or repeated utterances producing the same meaning of 
the events in different historical circumstances. This is why this discursive 
approach is chosen for this research, in particular to demonstrate the dynamic 
and hybrid character of Turkey’s identity in the last decade. 
 
Because of these, Wodak’s constructive strategies and Discourse-Historical 
Approach is adopted as a valid tool of observation of the continuity, shifts 
and diversity in the discursive construction of Turkish national and 
international identity. Significantly, specific characteristics of the Turkish 
case requires the consideration of three aspects of ‘critique’ (Wodak 2006, 
p.8-9), in order to uncover contradictions and dilemmas in different 
discourses of Turkish nationalism (‘text or discourse imminent critique’), 
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exhibiting the functions of discursive practices in aiming manipulation, 
persuasion or resistance (‘socio-diagnostic critique’). Furthermore, DHA 
enables us to cope with the main problem of Turkish national identity, which 
shows how it deals with its hybrid character and its past. It is used in 
criticising the present way of dealing with Turkish history (‘retrospective 
critique’), at revising an actual ‘picture’ or ‘narrative’ of the collective past as 
a new, responsible way of dealing with its consequences and effects. DHA 
was employed to integrate information about historical sources of diverse 
perspectives on Turkish nation-state with their social and political 
backgrounds and diversity. This interdisciplinary, problem-oriented approach 
(Wodak 2001, p.69) has powerful and efficient features for the methodology: 
 
– DHA includes systematically available background knowledge of the 
context and the case in the analysis and interpretation of the text (Wodak 
2005, p.188). 
– DHA sees discourse with their historicity (Krzyzanowski and Wodak 2008, 
p.31) related to their struggle in continuity, change and transformation. This 
focus makes it a more suitable approach by CDA to understand a historical 
and political process through its particular temporal and spatial conditions. 
Using DHA contributes to indicate how diverse local, national or regional 
discourses exist and their contradiction to different forms of change and 
transformation. 
– Linguistic realisations on all levels of language in their specific context 
in which they were made address the origins of power relations, specifically 
the problems of inequality and discrimination; thus the context dependent 
discursive analysis provides the secret key to decoding the presentation 
strategies employed in production and reproduction of these kinds of 
stereotypic and unequal socio-political relations. 
-  DHA enables to see pluri-perspectivity (Wodak 2009, p.39) related to 
various differing positions and voices in a certain socio-political field. 
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1.4. The Methodological Critics and Limitations 
 
One of the main questions in the critic of Critical Discourse Analysis
7
 is 
about what motivates selection of a fragment for the analysis. Widdowson 
(2004, p.63) argues that pretext in CDA forms making the selection of 
features for special attention in the discursive action. He identifies it as 
‘interpretative partiality’ that causes pretexually positioned reading based on 
the purpose of analysis. To what extent what is unaccounted in the analysis 
matters to particular textual feature come into play in interpretation? Is CDA 
imposing a selective attention as Widdowson perceived? He claims that 
readers follow analysts’ samplings and leading to confirm their findings by 
imposing interpretation (ibid. 166). Surely, the textual analysis depends on 
the relationship between the text, context and pretext (ibid. p.166). Thus, 
different contexts and pretexts might give rise to diverse interpretations and 
analyses. What Widdowson is suggesting, then, is that (ibid. 169) CDA might 
be more critical about its practices in consideration of different readings of 
the text, different social-cultural backgrounds and ideological positions of 
readers to understand the text (ibid. p.170). These assumptions are perceived 
as irrelevant, if one looks how the method of CDA is improving. Here it is 
thought that CDA is critical in regarding not seen the findings conclusive or 
definite which invites researchers to an inspiring re-evaluation of the data. 
For interpretations, giving a general account of the historical context of the 
focus period does not necessarily drive to a correlation or a certain analysis 
of discourses. On one hand, pretext given demonstrates the sources of a 
specific language usage; on the other hand, tracing the discourse can drive 
new insights to reading social practices and historical process. By following 
the principle of triangulation of Discourse Historical Approach (Weiss and 
Wodak 2003, p.22), rather than simply focusing on linguistic dimension, this 
research incorporates historical, sociological and international dimensions of 
construction of Turkey's identity in different three case studies. Therefore, it 
                                               
7 See also: Pedro Santander Molina (2009): Critical analysis of discourse and of the media: 
challenges and shortcomings, Critical Discourse Studies, 6:3, 185-198. 
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is nourished and advanced from a multi-case discourse analysis and 
multidisciplinary work, including Politics, History, Sociology, Nationalism, 
and Media Studies. DHA enables to show how the media narrative realise 
representational and actional meanings of discourse in different intertextual 
relations in particular content and construct specific understandings of 
Turkey’s Kemalist and post-Kemalist identities and positions.  
 
Widdowson also notes that unstabilized and unfixed methodology in using 
synthesis of different theories compromise institutional and pedagogic 
disadvantages. But, this point can be seen as a progressive hand of the 
methodology in its break usual traditional procedures in doing social 
sciences, leaving the tendency to fit studies unequivocally into one box of 
paradigm or a school (Waever 1997, p.2). This has been already argued in 
The Future of International Relations (Neumann and Waever 1997) in saying 
‘No more masters!’ with the attempt to trace unboxable persons in the 
discipline of IR and presenting comprehensively some authors who are 
difficult to be labelled. Moreover, CDA does not offer systematicity in doing 
analysis, but it brings a new epistemic order based on a moral stance. 
Working against unquestioned inequality and status quo in social relations as 
a mission, not drawing concrete lines for working encourage to improving 
limits of open ways in doing analysis without stabilizing or normalizing 
‘given’ principles is also parallel with its socio-political stance. Additionally, 
this moral position works in the parallel way of doing social science. 
 
 
1.5. The Media and National Identity: Imagined Communities and Banal 
Nationalism 
From this research’s perspective, the roles of media in expressing, 
reproducing and spreading ideologies and values to wider social and 
international structures or supporting/confronting them constitute a crucial 
relationship between society and the media (Richardson 2007, p. 114). These 
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roles make them ideological instruments that produce meanings and 
naturalise power relations; thus, they become the means to realise domination. 
Thus, the role of media discourse is crucial in the expression of ideas 
regarding how people think about themselves and others and, moreover, how 
they live in a particular way. Language structures our thinking, reflects and 
produces meaning and arguably defines all social phenomena (Finlayson 
1999, pp. 47-48). Thus, different worldviews operate within a certain 
framework of language habits. In a nutshell, different discourses constitute 
meanings about social relations and different forms of life. Secularist or 
Islamist, Europeanist or Eurasianist, all perspectives are internal to a variety 
of ways of thinking and living in the world. With respect to this assumption, 
this research looks at how different discourses in the Turkish media represent 
the way people think about their nation and identity. In addition, it maps the 
distinctions of challenging discourses and the way such distinctions may be 
mechanisms of the reconstruction of identity politics in both Turkey’s 
domestic and international relations. 
 
In the literature, the media’s power in politics is discussed widely, 
particularly in terms of construction and distribution of the images of 
political actors and building a global civil society, public sphere and political 
activism (De Jong et al. 2005). Essentially, local, national and international 
news agencies circulate information and images between countries and form 
relationships between people from the local level to the international level 
(Boyd-Barrett and Rantanen 2001, p. 127). Correspondingly, the media have 
contributed significantly to the social construction of images of the nation 
and its place in the world (ibid. p. 142). As a tangible illustration, in the case 
of the US print media's influence on its international relations, Van Dijk 
(1999, pp. 21-64) demonstrates the description of the positive in-group and 
negative out-group in US foreign policy based on the discourse of the New 
York Times. In his analysis, in the American prestige press, Israelis represent 
the “we” group in a favourable light and the Hamas leaders, Muammar 
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Gaddafi and Saddam Hussein typically represent enemies, and “them”. 
Consistent with this line of thinking, an analysis of Turkish media can 
determine how Turkey under the Islamist AKP government maps itself and 
others in its changing relations with its strategic allies, the United States and 
the EU. 
 
According to Nye (2004), increased information flows through the media 
have caused the loss of government’s traditional control over information in 
relation to politics. The speed in moving information has created a system in 
which power over information is much more widely distributed, which 
means decentralisation and less official control of government agendas (ibid. 
p. 53). In that spirit, the media are not just the means of reproduction of 
power relations, but also pluralizing forces which work against the 
government’s ability to influence and control. Moreover, the media are 
powerful channels for the 'soft power' (Nye 2006) of the states in setting the 
political agenda in politics, distributing the foreign policy discourse and 
convincing people to improve cultural, political and economic cooperation 
among nations. Thus, in 21st century world politics, the new communication 
and mass media are increasing the importance of soft power, specifically, its 
ability to achieve desired outcomes in international affairs through attraction 
rather than coercion. These developments encouraged a strengthening of the 
non-state-centric discourses and the entry of Media Studies into the 
discipline of International Relations (Golding and Harris 1997).  In Taylor’s 
(1997 pp. 58-9) summary of the historical development of the media and 
international political relationships, the television station CNN
8
 is presented 
as being a direct channel of diplomacy among politicians, the public and the 
rest of the world: 
“Much has already been written by historians about that increasing 
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 For three different approaches to the CNN effect in international politics, see Livingston 
(1997). “The Al Jazeera effect” (Seib 2008) takes the media influences a significant step 
further. The concept encompasses the use of new media as tools in every aspect of global 
affairs, ranging from democratization to terrorism. 
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role, from the Anglo-German press ‘wars’ in the build-up to the First 
World War to the role of newspapers, the cinema and radio in the 
program of ‘moral rearmament’ prior to the Second World War. A 
growing amount of literature also now exists about how the media 
came to be deployed as a psychological weapon, at home and 
abroad, first between 1939 and 1945 and then subsequently during 
the Cold War. Today, however, if a statesman wants to make a public 
statement or send a message across the world, he has the option of 
doing so on CNN rather than through traditional diplomatic 
channels.” 
 
As Taylor noted, government departments, individual officials and ministers 
use mass media as direct channels to societies with the purpose of explaining 
policy to their nation and overseas publics to advance or conceal policy 
opinions. Therefore, the media seems to enable the evaluation of 
international society by distributing information that builds bridges between 
groups and individuals around the world. This makes the media an integral 
part of diplomatic relations. Robinson (2004, p. 31) suggests that the media 
play four roles in the policy-media interaction: a supportive media, an 
uncritical role for official policy; non-influential and non-supporter of any 
side of the debate; critical media, having limited influence to change policy; 
and side taker media, effective in policy outcomes. News coverage can be 
useful for justifying state actions by shaping what people think.  For instance, 
after the events of 9/11 and the declaration of a “war on terror”, the war 
against Iraq in 2003 was defined as a war of liberation by the White House in 
the United States and the government produced a media campaign to support 
that policy. The media were a considerable ally in provoking the war and 
sustaining public support for it. The media helped the state to legitimate its 
power. With those points as guidance, the news media have an important job 
in defining issues, primarily to help the public understand the newest array of 
priorities and alliances. It can be argued that the media may affect through its 
power to shape public opinion and influence politicians (Cohen 1965).  
 
In the media and politics literature, some studies point out the role of the 
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media in political economy (Herman and Chomsky 2002), political 
communication (Semetko and Scrammell 2012), the state's propaganda 
(Jenks 2006; Taylor 1999), provoking war (Beck and Downing 2003), 
humanitarian crisis (Goving 2004; Shaw 1996; Seib 1992), justifying policies 
(Seib 2006, p. 22), legitimating the system (Gans 2003, p. 74), consolidation 
of democracy (Schudson 1999; Roselle 2006), mobilizing people and 
political activism (Cottle 2011; Taki and Coretti 2013), changing the state-
citizen relationship (Street 2011, p. 262-264), agenda-setting (McCombs 
2014; Boydstun 2013; Chaffee and Dearing 1996; Protess and McCombs 
1991) and some examine how the media affect on decision making and 
policy-making (Seib 1992;  Holsti 1992; Wolfsfeld 1997; Gilboa 2002; 
Cusinamo-Love 2003; Wolfsfeld 2004; Miller 2007; Robinson 2012). This 
literature confirms that the media has an important role in mapping a nation-
state's place in the politics and the world of nations. Instead of these various 
media influences on the politics, this study limits its scope and focuses on the 
media's role in identity politics, namely its function in the re/construction of 
national identity discourse. 
 
As widely acknowledged in the literature (Mcnair 1998, p. 6), the media as 
an ideological communicative vehicle do not just transmit the facts to 
audiences but also the contested assumptions, attitudes, beliefs, values and 
worldviews of society. Thus, the media represent agents of socialisation and 
powerful sources of social meaning. Put together, they reproduce the social 
norms and ideologies in the social construction of reality for audiences 
(Devereux 2009, p. 15). In shaping people’s understanding of social reality, 
the media constitute a primary source for the definition of and image of 
social identities with respect to culture (McQuail 2000, p. 4).  Despite these 
facts, the role of the media was ignored in the most of the writings on 
nationalism and identities (Madianou 2002, p.28). Early studies in this area 
did not directly address the relationship between the communication and 
nationalism. Karl. W. Deutsch's (1953) Nationalism and Social 
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Communication is accepted as the most prominent study in the area. Later, 
Elizabeth L. Eisenstadt's (1979) The Printing Press as an Agent of Change, 
Ernest Gellner's (1983) Nations and Nationalism and Benedict Anderson's 
(1983) Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism point out the role of the print technology and their contribution 
to the emergence of nationalism: 
 'The convergence of capitalism and print technology on the fatal 
 diversity of human language created the possibility of a new form  of 
 imagined community, which in its basic morphology set the stage  for 
 the modern nation'. (Anderson 1983, p.46) 
 
For Anderson, the print media, in particular the newspapers and novels 
standardised the language, played a role of creating a sense of belonging to 
same community for the readers and considering themselves as parts of this 
imagined community. Newspapers remind readers that they are members of a 
particular nation and belong to a homeland through the nationalist thinking 
reflected in the content of the newspaper text. In routinely repeating habits of 
language in using small words (Billig 1995, p. 93) such as 'we', 'our' and 'us', 
the daily ritual of reading newspaper reproduces and distributes the national 
discourse and creates different ‘imaginations’ (Anderson 1983) of the nation. 
Micheal Billig (1995, p. 97) points out that 'banal nationalism' as people’s 
daily nationalism is established by social arrangements that appear 'natural' 
or unnoticed. The nation is reminded, indicated and 'flagged' (ibid. p. 6) in 
the daily lives of citizens. Newspapers play a particularly important role in 
building the daily national discourse and production of nationalism by 
nationalizing the news with their various messages and stereotypes.  
 
Here, it must be noted that this thesis is not interested in relationship between 
audiences and media, in particular, in the questions of how audiences 
interpret and appropriate media messages and how do media texts have any 
nationalist effects. With a consideration of massive literature on the issue
9
, it 
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can be argued that as the media represent ideological dilemmas, 
controversies and debates as people engage in sense-making and debate with 
different ideological and cultural positions. Regarding this point, Billig (2009) 
argued that people use the rhetorical tools of 'common sense' for thinking and 
sense-making. The stress here is information-processing is a public activity. 
That means individuals are not simple passive receivers of information and 
messages of the media, thus the media audience is not homogeneous. By 
underlining the link between argumentation and thinking in his psychological 
perspective, Billig (ibid p.348) explained that his study on the unconscious 
aspects of nationalism is based on a psychology of the unnoticed, which 
presents the daily world as belonging to the world of nation-states. In this 
context, on one hand this thesis accepts the diversity of perspectives both in 
the media and in the public; on the other hand it limits its interest in how the 
concept of Turkish identity is negotiated in the media. That is to say, it does 
not analyse how the media affect the public. As it is noted in Reading Media 
Theory: Thinkers, Approaches, Contexts (2009, p.288), the media tell the 
person in the mass who he/she is, they gave him/her identity; even they tell 
what she/he wants to be, how to get that way, how to feel she/he is that way:  
'the media bring the reader, listener, viewer into the sight of larger, higher 
reference groups -real or imagined- which are looking glasses for his self 
image.' 
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Sabina Mihelj makes a critical revision of Benedict Anderson's Imagined 
Communites in her Mediated Nations (2011) as an appropriate starting point 
to develop an alternative approach to nationalism and the media with an 
emphasis on their link with power and politics. Mihelj comments on the 
reasons of Anderson's theory's worldwide appeal and popularity. First, the 
idea of nations as imagined communities had its 'iconoclastic potential' (ibid 
p.12) in post-1989 Europe due to rising anti-nationalist sentiments after the 
Cold War. This process urged people to think about alternative, post-national, 
global or cosmopolitan forms of collective imagination and belonging. 
Anderson's book was used for critical reflections about nationalist claims and 
ultimately, rejection of nationalist appeal. It was meant to inspire the option 
of a universalist identification or the option of not belonging to a specific 
group (ibid p.13). The second reason for the iconoclastic potential of 
Imagined Communities was what it offered in contrast to exisiting  modernist 
theories of nation and nationalism. Rather than seeing nationalisms as 
reflections of fundamental realities in the modern world like industrialisation, 
decolonisation or revolution, Anderson's theory provided an examination of 
the cultural aspects of nationalism and different forms of national imagining 
over a variety of historical contexts (ibid p.14). However, Mihelj argued that 
the link between national imagination and its genesis and distribution by the 
power of print capitalism in the particular social and economic contexts was 
neglected and unexplored (ibid p.15). Mediated Nations challenges this trend 
by exploring how nationalism structures the world we live in and becomes 
embedded in institutionalised categories, routines and expressions in ordinary 
life. In this context, drawing on the theory of alternative modernities, 
comparative media research and historical research on national belonging, 
Mihelj looks at multiple political projects of modernity and their multiple 
configurations of nationhood and mass-communication. Her case studies 
show that the media transmit competing conceptions of histories and 
nationhood, whilst general themes of nationalism seem virtually universal 
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and taken for granted. In addition, Mihelj shows that Billig's theory can be 
applied to non-Western and non-democratic nation-states and their banal 
reproduction of national symbols. It can be done in different levels such as 
national, sub-national, supranational and non-national. Therefore, she offers a 
discursive approach to nationalism which allows explaining multiple 
attachments to collectivities, complex and hybrid webs of cultural and social 
formations in the international context and beyond existing boundaries of 
nation-state system. This approach enables to unpack various social, political 
and economic mechanisms shaping national imagination and operating 
through micro level and macro level relationship of power, structures and 
state policies. 
 
As this study argues, Mihelj points out that nationalism is much more than a 
political doctrine, movement or sentiment (ibid p.17). In this discursive 
approach, nationalism is a way of seeing, interpreting and structuring the 
world, which can be constructed or represented in several different ways by 
various social agents, structures and power relations. That means, as the 
social world fundamentally divided and structured along power relations and 
perspective differences, there are different national imaginations and 
nationalist visions of the world. To be accepted and institutionalised, these 
nationalist perspectives would compete for acting as a representative of the 
nation and serving the nation's interests. Thus, there would be a struggle for 
achieving legitimacy (ibid p.19). This introduces new questions about which 
social norms, values and memories are fundamental to the nation in 
interpretation and justification of being a nation and in definition of ongoing 
struggle both within and between ideological groups to dominate others.  
 
In answer to some of these new questions, Michael Skey (2011, p.10) 
explores which interpretations and categorisations of nations are taken for 
granted by particular groups and how they are accepted as 'common sense'. 
Each group may seek to stabilise the benefits that community membership 
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accrues (ibid p.29) and privilege their own definition of what the nation is 
physically, culturally and historically (ibid p.12). The dominant group defines 
and regulates the conditions of belonging within the nation-state.  In order to 
secure a sense of self, community and place, a power struggle would happen 
between the dominant group and other groups. Each would struggle to 
maintain a knowable and manageable sense of identity and community in 
response to social and political transformations due to the fear of uncertainty. 
All aim to be dominant in order to reduce uncertainty and provide an ongoing 
secure sense of place in a threatening world.   
 
The nations construct their narratives from past experiences to the present, 
with a will to live together in the future; their existences are happening, 
changing, developing or vanishing among the traces of the history. This is 
why the nation cannot be treated as a stable entity to observe its 
characteristics. Both continuity and change should be accounted for when 
reproducing the meaning of nationhood.  With an intention to conceptualize 
ongoing struggles of perpetuating or challenging nationalist discourses, Skey 
(2011) offers to use the concept of 'sedimentation' (ibid p.12) which enables 
the perception of bifurcation in perspectives of national identity entailing a 
diversity of interests. With an agreement on these points, as articulated in the 
previous section, this thesis uses the concept of 'narrative' (Wodak et al 1999) 
in order to shed light on discourse-historical process to exhibit how a 
particular discourse (Post-Kemalism in Turkey) became established, 
regulated, institutionalised and became dominant generating hierarchies of 
status associated with the identities. 
 
Among important contributions to the existing empirical works in the 
literature, Clary-Lemon (2010) used DHA in analysing oral-history 
interviews with fifteen members of the Irish Association of Manitoba to 
explore how national and subgroup identities such as immigrants are 
discursively constructed in the context of assimilation and dissimilation. 
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Within the Romanian context, Tileaga (2005) examined the notions of 
ethnicity, racism and ideology to provide a critical investigation of the taken-
for-granted forms of prejudice and discrimination about ethnic minorities. In 
order to challenge existing stereotypes, Prentice (2010) studied social 
attitudes towards Scottish independence by analysing historical debates on 
British and Scottish identities through structured survey methodology. Some 
studies utilized the corpus techniques in CDA, in particular corpus linguistic 
method, namely automated semantic tagging
10
. Rather than this, DHA's the 
establishment of the main themes is taken as the starting point in this study 
and the newsprint media discourse is analysed for searching different 
perspectives on the nation in Turkey. 
 
Beside these studies, a significant amount of research has been undertaken on 
discourses of identity in the newsprint media from a variety of geographical 
contexts.
11
 Li (2009) compared discourses of two daily newspapers in the US 
(The New York Times) and China (China Daily) in two selected events to find 
out which particular discursive strategies employed to construct national 
identities. Dekavalla (2010) analysed the discursive construction of national 
identity in Scottish and in English/UK newspapers. With a focus on the UK's 
two general elections after devolution, in particular the 2001 and 2005 
campaigns, she compared an Anglo-British perspective and Scottish 
                                               
10 For the methodological discussion on this methodology see: Baker, P. and McEnery, T. 
(2005) ‘A Corpus-based Approach to Discourses of Refugees and Asylum Seekers in UN 
and Newspaper Texts’, Journal of Language and Politics 4(2):197–226; Paul Baker, Costas 
Gabrielatos, Majid KhosraviNik, Michal Krzyzanowski, Tony McEneryand Ruth Wodak 
(2008), 'A useful methodological synergy? Combining critical discourse analysis and corpus 
linguistics to examine discourses of refugees and asylum seekers in the UK press', Discourse 
&Society,19: 273. 
11
 John Flowerdew, David C.S. Li and Sarah Tran (2002) 'Discriminatory news discourse: 
some Hong Kong data', Discourse&Society,13: 319; Mariana Achugar, (2004) 'The Events 
and Actors of 11 September 2001 As Seen from Uruguay: Analysis of Daily Newspaper 
Editorials', Discourse&Society,15: 291; Majid KhosraviNik (2015), 'Macro and micro 
legitimation in discourse on Iran’s nuclear programme: The case of Iranian national 
newspaper Kayhan', Discourse & Society, Vol. 26(1) 52–73; Elaine Burroughs (2015), 
'Discursive representations of ‘illegal immigration’ in the Irish newsprint media: The 
domination and multiple facets of the ‘control’ argumentation', Discourse & Society,Vol. 
26(2) 165–183. 
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perspective in the coverage of the issues. However, the case of Turkish 
national identity has not been studied yet. A number of studies have 
examined discourses of Turkey's bid for EU membership in the newsprint 
media in the UK, Greece, Slovenia, Germany, France and Spain (Aksoy, 
2009; Koenig et al., 2006; Negrine, 2008; Negrine et al., 2008; Schneeberger, 
2009; Tekin, 2008, 2010; Buckingham 2013). Tekin's study (2008) pointed 
out the French media’s negative portrayal of Turkey’s candidature; moreover 
it showed the discourse that constructs Turkey’s EU membership also 
constructs a collective European identity. Connectedly, Buckingham's 
findings (2013) indicated that despite the official support, the media narrative 
in the most respected newspaper of Spain, El Pais depicted Turkey as 
Europe's cultural other with references to Turkey's democratic deficits, 
historical cultural differences and the place of religion in Turkey's society. In 
the terms of 'national identity' and 'religion', a CDA of discourses of 'national 
piety' has been carried out by Hjelm (2014). Hjelm's work challenged with 
the privileged position and hegemony of the 'folk church in Finland by 
deconstructing the discourses that reproduced the status quo of religious 
inequality and national identity. 
 
This study aims to both build upon these works benefited from CDA, in 
particular Wodak's DHA and to address a gap in the literature by examining 
how Turkey constructs its national identity and as the other of Europe in the 
Turkish newsprint media discourse. This will be undertaken by revealing the 
competing discourses that actively construct Turkey's 'Muslim', 'secular', 
'European, and 'Western' identities. 
 
 
1.6. The Main Assumptions of the Thesis and the Application of DHA to 
the Case of Turkey 
In theoretical context, two prepositions underlie the framework of this 
research. The first central assumption is that the media's role in identity 
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construction demonstrates the daily construction of nationalism and its 
discourse-historical production (Wodak et al. 1999). In particular, analysing 
newspaper discourses is useful for understanding ideological relations in 
society and how the relations and structures of power are embedded in 
everyday language. The second assumption of this study is that identities are 
dynamic; thus, there can be different, unstable discursive constructions of 
national identities depending on the different contexts. In other words, since 
nationalism can shift with different ideologies and contexts, there is no single 
national identity.  This means that diverse concepts of national identity can 
coexist (Wodak et al. 1999). 
 
Based on these assumptions, this research argues that there is no ‘single’ 
Turkish nationalism (Ozkirimli 2011, p. 89) and that there is a struggle 
between different interpretations of post-Kemalist Turkish national identity in 
the first decade of the 2000s. As the main object observed in this project, this 
can be analysed by performing a search on how the competing discourses of 
Turkish nationalism are expressed, regenerated and employed in the Turkish 
media. 
 
Two prepositions are built on the 'imagined communities' concept of 
Benedict Anderson (1983) and 'banal nationalism' of Micheal Billig (1995).  
According to these prepositions, belonging to a nation means imaging the 
‘we’ opposing the ‘other’ in terms of domestic and external relations. The 
imaginations of the nation map its place in the world and define its 
conception of insiders and outsiders, allies and enemies. Departing from 
these points, this study argues that the media, particularly the press, are one 
of the main sources of nationalist beliefs; therefore, the influential forms of 
institutionalised nationalism reside in the media discourse, which may 
produce a sense of belonging to a nation but also the stereotypes and 
prejudices in everyday lives towards other nations. Analysis of media 
discourse is a useful resource for studying ideological and identity relations 
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in domestic and external relations to develop an understanding and 
awareness of how self and other relations are embedded in the everyday 
language (Bell and Garret 1999). Therefore, in this research, the leading role 
of Turkish media is considered in representing different ideologies of 
nationalism (Keyman and Kadioglu 2011) as well as interpreting and 
constructing power relations in the Turkish political sphere. 
 
As noted before, interpretation of contradictory memories of the past 
embodies different meanings and perspectives regarding the present, national 
days, rituals and matters; thus what people know or how people look at the 
history determine today's struggles to secure a nation's future. That is, the 
past is interpreted based on how they want to live, justifying their ‘normal’ as 
a continuation of what has occurred before (Inthorn 2007). That means there 
would be competing narratives (Wodak et al 1999), which are used to justify 
their own national imaginations and current interests.  
 
In this conceptual context, this thesis reveals that the main problem for 
Turkish nationalism is dealing with its hybrid character and history (Canefe 
2002). In a paradox, the attempt to create a ‘democratic society’ has 
reiterated the past traumas of traditional ‘others’ within Turkey that were, 
until then, locked in the pages of the past. In the terms of religious and ethnic 
identities, different versions of national narrative have been spoken in 
dealing with the ‘common past’. Reinterpretation of the past has also urged 
many to rethink the definition of citizenship and the situation of minorities in 
Turkey. The demands for equal, civic, democratic and constitutional 
citizenship push authorities to do something in legislation. Although many of 
the secular elites and the military have been uncomfortable with the political 
reforms promoted through EU conditionality (Tocci 2005), the harmonisation 
packages which came into force by the AKP, brought significant changes 
(Keyman 2007; Ozbudun 2009; Parker 2009) to the minority rights, religious 
freedom and right to life and retrial. 
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This process prompts and embodies the limits of domination, exclusion and 
inclusion in the concept of the nation and citizenship. More importantly, it 
determines the struggle over economic, political and symbolic resources and 
who owns and controls national, cultural, material, even natural capital. With 
this emphasis on and interest in differences, discourse analysis renders a 
more dynamic framework for studying the clash of different world views and 
identities, which can acknowledge the wider socio-political relations and 
structural changes. Thus, this study applies discourse-historical approach to 
map out a range of Turkish national identities, their power struggle in 
reconstruction of new Turkey's identity, their perspectives on Europe and the 
West in general.   
 
As noted, the collective memory of the nation is based on a selective 
remembering and forgetting of past events.  In the aftermath of the collapse 
of the Ottoman Empire and National Independence War, Mustafa Kemal 
Ataturk and his friends established the Turkish Republic in 1923. Despite the 
fact that the country’s population was overwhelmingly Muslim, the Kemalist 
revolution embraced a secular identity to build a modern nation like the 
European states in the West. In addition, the military and the legal system 
were structured to protect this Kemalist secular identity. However, three main 
factors have triggered a reconstruction process of Turkey's identity since the 
end of the Cold War: the paradigm shift in the international relations with 
9/11 events and its influence on Turkey's international identity; Turkey's 
Europeanisation efforts; and a fundamental change in Turkey's domestic 
power relations with the rise of the Justice and Development Party (AKP).
 12
 
In November 2002, AKP with Islamist roots won more than a third of the 
vote and formed a single-party majority government in the Turkish Grand 
                                               
12
 AKP’s historical success in Turkish politics doubled when it managed to increase its vote 
to 46.5 per cent in the 2007 general elections, despite the economy playing the biggest role 
in determining voter preferences (Kalaycıoğlu 2010, p. 29), followed by religiosity and other 
cultural factors that help determine party identification. 
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National Assembly (TGNA). Although almost half of the general vote was 
left unrepresented (Sen 2010, p. 60) due to a ten per cent national threshold, 
the AKP changed the internal power relations and struggle for hegemony in 
Turkey by gaining almost two-thirds of the seats and the legislative apparatus. 
This gave Islamists and Kurds, two groups that were traditionally outside 
Kemalist nation-state identity, now had power in Ankara against a secular 
military-civil bureaucracy (Casier and Jongerden 2011). This was the 
beginning of a silent counter-revolution that transformed Turkey's identity 
and reconstructed the post-Kemalist nation-state identification.  This thesis 
argues that this struggle more than the centre-periphery cleavage (Mardin 
1973), it is a clash of different Turkeys. In this regard, the empirical part of 
the research sets out to answer these questions: How do these different 
Turkeys engage, converse and struggle with each other in defining Turkish 
national identity? What impact, if any, did the governmental transition in 
November 2002 have on Turkey’s identity in terms of domestic and 
international relations; namely, in its Turkish, Muslim, European and Western 
identity? 
 
Instead of the Kemalist-Republican secular construction, AKP's Islamic 
conservative nationalism is transforming Turkish nation-state identity at the 
level of state institutions and public culture (White 2013), which also 
indicates there is an on-going struggle between different definitions of 
national tradition. The logic of post-Kemalist transformation is a worldview 
constructed on the basis of a selective reading of the Ottoman and Turkish 
history of religious, cultural and ethnic identity. Newly emerging Islamist 
ideology is repositioning and reconstructing Turkey’s political terrain in 
foreign policy in terms of creating a new macro-identity among populations 
that share the Ottoman Islamic heritage (Davutoglu 2006). 
 
In the case of Turkey, the argument of the research is twofold based on the 
political and historical context of the last decade. The first part of the 
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argument is that Turkish Kemalist nation state identity has been redefined by 
the new Muslim conservative political elite and Kurdish identity by using the 
post 9/11 international politics, European integration process (Zucconi 2009, 
p. 25) and its democracy discourse. Remarkably, the EU adaptation process 
has been served to anchor and guarantee the legitimacy of the AKP and its 
policies. The second is that Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister Ahmet 
Davutoglu’s effect in Turkish foreign policy has directly targeted the 
Kemalist worldview. Identifying a reimagined Ottoman imperial project 
(Fisher-Onar 2012, p. 63) has become more effective in conditioning and 
shaping the state’s policies and the society’s Islamic perception of ‘self’ 
(Saracoglu 2013) and non-European identity. In a nutshell, both the 
developments in domestic and international politics enhanced the AKP 
government’s power for construction of Turkey’s post-Kemalist nation-state 
identity. 
 
To follow the post-Kemalist transformation of Turkish nation-state identity 
and its challenges, four contested main discourses of Turkish nationalism 
(Ozkirimli 2011) can be observed in Turkish media: Kemalist nationalism; 
Islamist nationalism; ethnic-nationalism; and liberal nationalism. In the 
selected three case studies, different ideological perspectives on the Turkish 
nation will be compared in order to show how and why they struggle to resist 
or maintain the post-Kemalist reconstruction of Turkey's identity. Primarily, 
media discourse contributes to understanding the ways in which Turkish 
national identity and its place in the world is imagined, discussed and 
embodied through daily practice of reading newspaper. It illustrates different 
yet common forms of Turkish nationhood in their continuity and change. It 
also provides a better articulation of the ways in which particular discourses 
are stabilized or challenged through daily routines and discussion patterns 
which offer multiple clues to a population’s sense of nationality and how this 
reflects their imagination of their nation's collective past, present and future. 
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Consequently, the aim of this research is not just to identify multiple 
discourses of Turkish nationalism and their struggle to shape their own 
unique Turkish nation-state identity, but also to develop a deeper reading of 
historical and political production, negotiation and evolution of these 
competing identities in the nation's narrative. It explores the privileged and 
disadvantaged status of particular groups within the Turkish national setting 
and discovers which discourses contribute to the realisation of the ongoing 
construction of the post-Kemalist sense of Turkishness as the new national 
self. It especially focuses on how Islamists justify their new status and 
benefits, how secularists challenged their dominant position and how other 
nationalist discourses contribute to this power struggle in redefinition of 
Turkey's identity. Finally, the case studies are examined to allow a 
comparative element that enables the transformation of self/other relations to 
be analysed systematically in the national and international context. By 
seeing the symbiotic nature of antagonisms in Turkish nationalism, the 
results also impact considerably contemporary attempts to cultivate a Turkish 
nation-state identity in the process of writing a new constitution, which is 
needed in order to allow a post-secular and pluralist understanding. 
 
In the national media, the linguistic processes and strategies in the creation, 
negotiation and establishment of identities construct how people and nations 
define who they are (De fina et al. 2007, p. 18) and how they map their 
nation in the world of nations. In line with these assumptions, this study 
attempts to analyse the Turkish identity discourse in the national media 
considering national and international factors, with a specific focus on the 
domestic actors’ ideologies, values, beliefs and perceptions. With these points 
as guidance, this dissertation examines how the meanings of a particular 
national identity and nationalism are constructed in newspaper discourse, 
which serves to justify positions and interests of particular groups in their 
relation with each other, the EU and the West. Thus, Critical Discourse 
Analysis is used as the method for the media research to find links between 
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changing power relations and empowering ideological discourse in Turkey. 
 
Using this method clearly shows the link between power relations and 
empowering ideological discourse in the three case studies, which 
demonstrate the shifting constructions of Turkey, the EU and the West as 
represented in the Turkish media in the first decade of the 2000s. The first 
case study demonstrates the multiple articulations of Turkishness in complex 
constellations of competition and interaction of definitions. The second case 
study illustrates the media discourse regarding the debate over Turkish 
national identity and its particular challenge with the Kurdish issue, which 
reflects European influence and contention over the integration process. 
Lastly, the third case study examines how discursive construction of Turkish 
nation-state identity in the media can be projected on the ‘West’ by 
understanding the way the ‘USA’ is articulated in the case of 9/11 and Iraq 
War. Media analysis investigates how foreign policy discourse works as an 
identity-making tool that erects boundaries and specifies what constitutes the 
self, its allies and enemies (Messari 2001, p. 227) and their changing 
meanings in the construction of post-Kemalist nation-state identity. 
 
With a consideration of these points, this thesis asserts that a discourse 
analysis of the common national political past, present, and future can reveal 
why Turkish people think as they do about themselves and others. The 
research assumes that the different narratives on nationhood are different 
imaginations of the nation, and these contested imaginations determine the 
nation's identity and power relations. Therefore, it offers a discoursive 
historical approach to the Turkish case by paying direct attention to the 
power struggle over redefinition of Turkey's identity in the 2000s through 
multiple discursive constructions of national identity in different narratives 
of nation that identify Turkishness in competing perspectives. Thus, a 
discursive approach is assumed to be a fruitful and beneficial method for 
studying and contemplating the dynamic and complex character of Turkish 
61 
nationalism. 
 
 
1.7. Searching for Competing Discourses of Turkish Identity in the 
Turkish Press 
In the last section it is argued that DHA is used in this study as a method for 
analysing political discourse in the media to find links among changing 
power relations and empowering ideological discourse in Turkey in the last 
decade, between 2001 and 2011. This method can demonstrate how the 
media discourses create meanings about national identity of Turkey that 
serve to justify persons' positions and interests of them and to criticise others 
in relationship with each other, with the EU and the West. In turn, the crucial 
question is 'which media?' 
  
In fact, in the history of media and politics in Turkey, the subject of political 
pressure on the media has usually been the armed forces, the elected 
government and the judiciary (Baris 2005). The Turkish state’s control over 
the media discourse has become a part of its construction of a particular 
citizenship and civil society-state relationship. The laws and regulations draw 
the borders of the media discourse, based on the state’s vision of an ideal 
citizen, and hinder the media’s ability to deliberately promote plural, 
opposing voices in society. 
 
For example, this is obvious when looking specifically at Turkish television.  
Gencel Bek's study (2004), titled News Reporting in Turkish Television and 
Tabloidisation, examines the structure of private television broadcasting in 
the 2000’s (Akkor Gul 2011 p.34) and the media autocracy in Turkey (Akser 
and Baybars-Hawks 2012). In order to protect economic interests in other 
sectors such as education, construction and telecommunication, the big 
businesses in the television sector dramatically drive self-censorship and fail 
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to develop a presence independent from the state.
13
 Therefore, the big media 
patrons lack the ability and will to function properly as the ‘fourth estate’ that 
challenge the state’s interests and policies. In particular, Turkey has 
witnessed new ownership and control relations in the media economy-
politics of the last decade.
14
 Beside the neoliberalisation of political Islam, 
the neoliberal media have become conservative under the AKP government 
(Cam and Yuksel 2015, p.67). Based on these findings, it is clear that the 
goal of this study cannot be achieved by analysing television discourse. 
 
Nevertheless, Turkish newspapers are very helpful in identifying various 
discourses based on different ideologies and in understanding the struggle of 
power and strategies of logics of equivalence and difference within identity 
constructions. Of course, even newspapers present certain difficulties, and 
there are certain features of journalism in Turkey that must be taken into 
account. One encouraging characteristic that makes this study feasible is that 
Turkish newspapers have very courageous columnists who regularly run the 
risk of being sent to jail, as Noam Chomsky expressed in an interview in 
January 2012.
15
  Despite the fact that the journalists and columnists are 
citizens and members of the public, Turkish national dailies are not purely 
opinion newspapers of regular writers and journalists; they rank citizens 
                                               
13 See more: Ceren Sozeri and Zeynep Guney (2011) The Political Economy of the Media in 
Turkey: A Sectoral Analysis, TESEV Democratization Program Media Studies Series – 2 and 
Christian Christensen, (2007) “Breaking the News: Concentration of Ownership, the Fall of 
Unions and Government Legislation in Turkey,” Global Media and Communication, 3 (2), 
pp. 179-99.   
14  Before the AKP government in 2001, six media group dominated the sector: Dogan, 
Medya, Cukurova, Rumeli, Ihlas and Dogus. Currently, the media industry is divided into the 
biggest six of the media groups in Turkey: Dogan, Calik, Cukurova, Dogus, Fox and Ciner. 
On the transformation of Turkish media industry in the last decade, see: U. Uraz Aydin (ed.) 
(2015) Neoliberal Muhafazakar Medya (Neoliberal Conservative Media), Istanbul: Ayrinti 
Yayinlari. 
15  According to 2012 data from the International Press Institute (IPI), more than 700 
journalists are on trial in Turkey in cases brought on the basis of several provisions of the 
Press Law, the Penal Code and the Anti-Terror Law. The International Committee to Protect 
Journalists report (2014) points out that Turkey is the world’s leading jailer of journalists; for 
instance, 232 journalists were behind bars in 2012 and 59 journalist lost their job just during 
the Gezi Park protests. 
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discourses that have different backgrounds such as students, political 
activists, poets, soldiers or doctors. Radikal newspaper remains a valuable 
source because it uses public discourses to speak out the socio-political 
matters, even when the editorial articles remain silent. Cumhuriyet 
newspaper also devotes its second page to this purpose. Thus, even though 
Critical Discourse Analysis requires knowing whose discourse is being 
represented, it is possible to apply this method to the Turkish media by using 
its daily newspapers. 
 
The language used by newspapers when referring to social actors, events,  
background, context or consequences tend to be influenced by ideological 
beliefs, which can lead to biased word choices dependant on particular 
interests, concerns and positions. This can subtly lead to misinformation. 
What is reported and how it is reported can change or maintain the 
understanding of nationalist narratives in a dynamic process. Even though 
narratives are supposed to be about reporting past events, they can impose 
certain meanings of world and stereotypical ways of thinking that serve the 
interests of those in power (Gillespie 2006, p.114-115). In this context, news 
reporting and opinion articles on the events that appear in the selected 
newspapers, provide essential clues in uncovering ideological fault lines and 
power struggle in the Turkish political sphere.  
 
Therefore, four daily newspapers have been chosen for surveying and 
comparing different discourses of Turkish nationalism in Turkish press. 
These are the secularist Cumhuriyet, right-wing Hurriyet, Muslim 
conservative Zaman, and liberal-leftist Radikal.
16
 In consideration of the fact 
                                               
16 According to their average daily circulations, the highest number,  969.775 is Zaman's, 
however it does not reflect the newsstand sales; 92% of Zaman's copies is distributed to 
subscribers. Second is Posta 436.656 and it is followed by Hurriyet 423.190. On the list 
Cumhuriyet has 50.277 and Radikal has 31.804. See more: http:// www.bik.gov.tr/istanbul/ 
ocak-2012-tiraj-raporu/ In addition, the Turkish Statistical Institute (TÜİK) shows (August 
2012) that 38% of the population uses internet regularly, and among them 73% uses it for 
accessing daily news: http://www.tuik.gov.tr/ PreHaberBultenleri.do?id=10880 
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that Radikal has lost its place in Turkish press since 2007, another liberal 
newspaper Taraf  has also been included in the data analysis in order to show 
how liberal press played a role in reconstruction of post-Kemalist nation-
state discourse.
17
 
 
Turkey's oldest newspaper, Cumhuriyet, was named by Mustafa Kemal 
Ataturk in 1924, and it still represents Republican Kemalist discourse. Thus 
it is chosen for analysing how the changing nature of Kemalist nation/state 
identity is perceived by this political circle.  Looking at the discourse of the 
one of the nation’s bestsellers, Hurriyet clearly exemplifies the populist, 
mainstream type of Turkish nationalism, especially since its slogan is 
‘Turkey for Turks’. To demonstrate the link between the AKP government 
and Islamist circles from 2001-2011, the religious Gulen movement’s 
newspaper, Zaman, has been chosen to analyse the discourse of the Islamist 
version of Turkish nationalism and its role in reconstruction of Turkey's post-
Kemalist nation-state identity. Lastly, Radikal and Taraf have been selected 
as the best examples of a liberal approach to Turkish nationalism, including 
voices of the leftist groups, non-Muslims, Kurds and civil protestors.
18
 
 
In order to properly analyse Turkish national identity discourse in the press, 
research must follow three stages: (1) the main themes of a specific discourse 
must first be established; (2) the discursive strategies must be investigated; 
and (3) the linguistic means and realisations of the discursive strategies must 
be examined (Reisigl and Wodak, 2009 p. 93).  Therefore, each case study 
                                               
17 Taraf launched to circulate in November 2007, thus, it is not used in the first case study. 
For more information about the fall of Radikal and rise of Taraf in the power struggle in 
Turkish media and politics, see: Esra Arsan (2012) 'Tarafta İstifa Depremi ve Medya'da 
2012' (the Resignation Eartquake at Taraf and the Media in 2012) Aralık, Günsonu Programı, 
IMC TV: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i2pEoiod_WI and Esra Arsan (2014) 'Radikal 
İki de Düştü' (Radikal II is lost, too),20.06.2014 http://www.evrensel.net/yazi/71622/radikal-
iki-de-dustu , accessed on 11.10.2014. 
18 In this project, the concept of ‘liberalism’ is used in meaning the world view founded on 
ideas of liberty, equality, pluralism and refers to the proliferation of opinions, beliefs and 
identities against the tyranny of the majority (Tocqueville 1835; Mill 1859) and the 
homogenity in the way that people think. 
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begins with a description of the key themes of the discourses. This is 
followed by an investigation of the discursive strategies used to develop 
Turkish nationalism as an ideology and the discursive construction of 
different national identities. Finally, each case study examines the linguistic 
means and realisations of discursive strategies in order to observe how 
particular themes can be argued to contribute the re-construction of Turkish 
nation-state identity. However, before presenting the case studies, it is 
important to discuss how main themes, discursive strategies, and linguistic 
means were identified.  
 
1.7.1. The First Stage: Establishing the Main Themes of Turkey’s 
Identity 
This study accepts that all aspects and complexity of Turkish identity cannot 
be covered in a thesis, and this is beyond the scope of it. Rather than, this 
study indicates the contested nature of Turkey's identity as a 'fluid and 
negotiated concept' (Inthorn 2007). In order to demonstrate how the 
distinguished discourses can be said to contribute to the establishment of 
post-Kemalist Turkish national identity, specific themes should be defined. 
After reviewing the case of Turkey, it can be seen that Kemalist construction 
of secularist Turkish nation-state identity has been challenged by Islamic and 
Kurdish identities in the last decade, both in national and international level, 
particularly in the means of ‘to be’ or ‘not to be’ a European or Western 
country. In order to examine different discursive constructions of Turkish 
nation-state identity in national and international context, three themes of 
Turkish identity are laid out in three selected case studies from the last 
decade (2001-2011): being Turkish, being European and being Western.   
 
Using both manual and digital search for key words reveals how elaborately 
and associatively ‘Muslim, Secular, Non-Muslim, European, Western 
identity’ themes are presented in the coverage of Turkey’s identity. To tackle 
the large body of these articles, these selected themes qualify and limit the 
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‘sampling frame’ (Bertrand and Hughes 2004, p.67). Related to the data 
collection,
19
 the selection procedures are developed parallel to the main 
research question that seeks to highlight the diversity and dynamicity of 
Turkish national identity discourse. 
 
To what extent and in what forms Turkish nationhood is flagged or 
reconstructed daily by the press can be analysed on randomly selected days 
(Yumul and Ozkırımlı 2000). However, in the case of the Assassination of 
Hrant Dink, the titles and discussions on the next day of the event, which 
was 20
 
January 2007 and following week days were given priority in the 
sampling. For the event of Presidential Elections in 2007, the weeks of the 
largest Republican meetings in April and those of the General Elections in 
July were the main focus of analysis. In the second case study, the milestone 
dates in Turkey and EU relations such as 17 December 2004 and 3 October 
2005 were viewed as the most important. Therefore, in order to see 
reconstruction of post-Kemalist nation-state identity through transformation 
of Turkey's discourse on Kurdish problem, the discussions of Kurdish 
Opening in the media discourse were given the most emphasis. In the last 
case study, the West and Turkey's Western identity discourse were 
emphasized by sampling articles addressing the events of 9 September 2001 
and 1 March 2003, the date of Turkey's decision regarding the Iraq War. 
 
The websites of the newspapers allow an archive search, in particular 
                                               
19
 Total number of the selected data is 197. Please see the numbers of the data in detail at the 
References part of the thesis. On account of the fact that the data collected from Turkish 
daily newspapers is all in Turkish, the example statements of discourses should be translated 
into English. Language and translation surely matter for the analysis in the issues of 
bilinguality. However, avoiding the semantic shifts and transformation in order to keep the 
meaning in two languages, are still possible in certain respects. First of all, translated texts 
can be double checked by the native bilingual translation experts, this is intended for this 
study as well. Secondly, the sources of original texts of the data will be added at the 
references section of the research. Significantly, the methodology of research, Discourse 
Historical Approach serves as very detailed historical background information for the social 
contexts and the cases. Therefore, with this given knowledge we can help to overcome the 
difficulty of studying in two different meaning worlds, thus it can be argued that the 
bilingualism will not affect research’s discourse analysis in the terms of meaning or content. 
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Cumhuriyet permits access to electronic copies from the 1920s to 2000s. 
Thankfully, Taraf was willing to post copies of the relevant newspapers. The 
other three newspapers provide online archives, but these are not like the 
printed versions. Therefore, in order to supplement electronic work, it was 
necessary to visit the National Library in Ankara to view the printed versions 
of the newspaper for the selected dates. For instance, in the first case study, 
the key word search of 'Hrant Dink Suikasti' (Assassination of Hrant Dink) 
on Hurriyet's website gives the number of times this phrase appeared: in 
2007, the year of the event, it was 58. However, it dropped to 21 in 2008 and 
to 11 in 2009. These results were further narrowed by searching 
simultarnesouly for the phrase 'Hrant Dink Suikasti' (Assassination of Hrant 
Dink) and 'Türk Kimliği' (Turkish Identity). This time, the number of 
appearances was only 17 in 2007, 6 in 2008, 3 in 2009 and only once in 2010 
(Table I, p.316). These numbers diminish even more by adding one more 
term to the key word search such as 'Muslim' or 'secular'. In this case, this 
means the sampling was completed while assuming that the idea of a Turkish 
nation is a discursive construct and in dialogue with other forms of identity, 
such as being non-Muslim, Muslim and/or secular.   
 
This study will focus on the most important contributors to this topic who 
consistently addressed this issue. The key word search method adopted 
above quickly revealed who wrote about this topic and how many times they 
did so. For example, Ozdemir Ince wrote about 'secularism and Islam' 125 
times; Cengiz Candar 24 times; Cuneyt Ulsever 22 times; Emin Colasan 21 
times; and Bekir Coskun 15 times. Most, but not all, of these columnists 
wrote in their newspapers every week during the last decade. The articles of 
each selected columnist are easily accessible online.The columnists were 
chosen based on their intensity of salience in the newspaper. Each of them 
used commented on the daily political agenda and openly identified their 
ideological view. This study does not seek to label or define the writers into 
specific categories, but to focus on what each writer said about his/her own 
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identity and ideology. I must note that I hesitate to label the writers. I think 
that it is not ethical. My priority is what the writer says about his/her identity 
and ideology. In addition, it should be kept in mind neither label, either 
‘Kemalist’ or ‘Islamist’, is meant to be limiting or insulting. Instead, these 
are accepted as handle concepts to catch and find out ‘dynamic’ meanings.  
 
To sum up, the specific dates of the events, the key words with the key 
themes and the key writers are taken into account in the samples used for 
analysis. Bearing in mind the different ideological standpoints, within non-
positivist qualitative research, the generalisation from the sample to the 
whole nation is not intended. However, on the assumption that repeated 
discourse in each newspaper would be representative of ideological 
argumentations in particular perspectives and privileging certain viewpoints, 
this ‘purposive sampling’ (Bertrand and Hughes 2004, p. 199) should 
establish a profile for distinguishing the perspectives of the main discourses 
of Turkish national identity. 
 
1.7.2. The Second Stage:  Investigation of the Discursive Strategies 
After designing the research, defining the themes and managing the data, one 
has to determine which discursive strategies are best for analysing and 
evaluating the data, which will demonstrate whether these achieved certain 
political, psychological or other kinds of objectives in national narrative. 
Strategies can be categorised as constructive, destructive, perpetuatory or 
transformatory (Wodak at all 1999 p. 33-42). According to the content of 
each case study, therefore, the discursive strategies in the constitutive process 
of national identity were investigated to demonstrate how these themes 
contribute to particular power relationships and/or ideological standpoints. 
This research, mainly seeks to reveal constructive strategies, which attempt 
to construct and establish new Turkey's post-Kemalist national identity. In 
order to show the challenges of this identity in the midst of domestic power 
struggles, it focuses on strategies of perpetuation, which aim to continue 
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Kemalist national identity; and strategies of transformation, which aim to 
transform Kemalist national identity and its components into a post-Kemalist 
identity. The discursive strategies employed are as follows: 
 Linguistic construction of common political past (with reference to 
the pre-Islamic; Islamic-Ottoman; Republican-Secular); 
 Linguistic construction of common political present and future in the 
representation of achievements and problems of citizenship and 
democracy; 
 Linguistic construction of common past with Europe/European Union; 
 Linguistic construction of common present and future in the context 
of Turkey’s bid of European - membership and Turkey’s Kurdish 
question. 
 Linguistic construction of being Western in the context of religion 
and secularism; 
 Linguistic construction of common past, present and future with the 
West/Europe/USA in the context of representation of the link between 
the 9/11 and Iraq war; 
 Linguistic construction of issue of ‘axis shift’ in Turkish Foreign 
Policy’s Western Orientation. 
 
 
1.7.3. The Third Stage: Examination of the Linguistic Means and 
Realisations of the Discursive Strategies 
 
After the definition of the content and strategies of the first case study, the 
last dimension of the analysis is looking at the linguistic means in the 
discursive construction of Turkish national identity. In the analysis, 
constructive strategies are chosen because they best allow observation of 
Turkish nationalism, that is, the developed sense of belonging together in the 
common past and future with a feeling of unity and uniqueness that defines 
insiders and outsiders (us/them) within Turkey. In this context, the first case 
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study attempts to identify how Turkish newspapers have constructed national 
identity in the last decade, within the debates of Presidential elections and the 
assassination of Journalist Hrant Dink in 2007. Perhaps the most obvious 
form of a developed sense of Turkish nationalism can be seen in the 
secularist and non-secularist identity contradiction, demonstrated in the ‘us’ 
versus ‘them’ rhetoric employed within this religious theme of Turkish 
national identity. This also serves to show to what extent minorities are 
included and excluded in the different narrative of the nation. In dealing with 
social inequality and racism (Wodak 1997, p.36-42), the problem of ethno-
religious prejudices and discrimination in Turkish national identity discourse 
will be located in the power struggle of competing self-definitions of Turkish 
nation. On the one hand, with regard to Turkey’s secular/Islamic identity, the 
case of the Presidential elections in 2007 demonstrates how perpetuatory 
strategies have been applied by Kemalist discourse actors in an attempt to 
maintain Republicanist state/nation tradition. On the other hand, it also 
shows how transformatory strategies have worked to change the secular 
component of Turkish national identity into another identity in Islamic 
discourse or liberal discourse.  
 
In order to find out the linguistic realisation of narratives of common past, 
present and future, the analysis should focus primarily on lexical units such 
as personal references, spatial references and temporal references (ibid. p.35). 
Discursive strategies of nomination in referring to people, events or objects, 
distinguishes the different collective representations via anthroponomy, 
personal deixis, synecdoche, metonymy and metaphors. Linguistic 
representation of social actors and events indicates sameness and difference 
between people in connection with constructive discursive strategies.  
 
Perhaps the most obvious form of a developed sense of Turkish nationalism 
can be seen in the secularist and non-secularist identity contradiction, 
demonstrated in the ‘us’ versus ‘them’ rhetoric employed within this 
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religious theme of Turkish national identity. This also serves to show to what 
extent minorities are included and excluded in the different narrative of the 
nation. In dealing with delete social inequality and racism (Wodak 1997, 
p.36-42), the problem of ethno-religious prejudices and discrimination in 
Turkish national identity discourse will be located in the power struggle of 
competing self-definitions of Turkish nation. For instance, particular ways of 
nomination of Hrant Dink such as ‘Armenian’ or ‘Turkish’ demonstrate a 
clear difference. Therefore, inclusive or exclusive, activated or passivated, 
personal or impersonal and specific or generic reference to the events, people 
and places is closely associated with the newspaper’s standpoint that 
empowers the voices of certain actors and silencing others (Li 2009, p.94).  
 
On the one hand, with regard to Turkey’s secular/Islamic identity, the case of 
the Presidential elections in 2007 demonstrates how perpetuatory strategies 
have been applied by Kemalist discourse actors in an attempt to maintain 
Republicanist state/nation tradition. On the other hand, it also shows how 
transformatory strategies have worked to change the secular component of 
Turkish national identity into another identity in Islamic discourse or liberal 
discourse. This clash of Secular-Muslim interpretations of nation can be 
traced through depicting the linguistic realisations of nomination of 
representative actors such as AKP’s presidential candidate Abdullah Gul or 
President Ahmet Necdet Sezer as a symbolic name for Republican 
secularism. 
 
In the analysis of the first case study, the use of personal pronouns such as 
‘we’ and ‘they’ to address the self/other relations, is important in 
understanding who are included in the definition of Turkish nation and who 
are excluded. Media coverage of the Presidential elections in 2007 gives 
fruitful material for the data analysis of the power struggle on re/construction 
of national identity discourse to those seeking to observe different 
perspectives of the nation and world in Turkish political discourse during the 
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last decade. Even the critical landmarks in this process are selected to narrow 
down the empirical source material of the case, the selection of the articles 
are further narrowed down in a qualitative manner based on the joint 
appearance of the words ‘Turkishness’, ‘Islam’ and ‘laicism’ (laiklik is a 
more appropriate word instead of secularism in the case of Turkey). 
 
For the last step of analysis regarding the second case study, the analysis 
focused on changing definitions within Turkey's sense of European identity. 
These can be seen both in the opposition and supporting argumentations 
through the representation of EU membership and nationalist conceptions 
constructed in the national press. Therefore, the focus of linguistic analysis 
of these themes is both constructive and deconstructive in the constitutive 
process of national identity in the context of European integration. The use of 
‘us/them’ provides the change to unpack the Turkish press’s discursive 
construction of Europe, with wider implications for the Turkish people’s 
imagined nation. Therefore, the use of pronouns (‘I’, ‘you’, ‘we’) implies an 
imagined ‘Europeanness’ or ‘non-Europeanness’. By providing context from 
Turkish nationalism and the origins of Turkey’s Kurdish problem with regard 
to Turkey’s will of EU membership, the data analysis will demonstrate how 
each diverse use of langauge exhibits the an embedded national and 
international identity discourse of Turkey, and to what extent this challenges 
or operates within the ever-changing power struggles of the last decade. To 
explore the linguistic means in the construction of Turkey and Europe’s 
common political present and future, the specific content of Kurdish problem 
is particularly important. Whether the European integration process has 
promoted unification, identification and solidarity, or has threatened national 
identity by supporting differentiation, will be put into question.  
 
The last case study for the searching on Turkey’s Foreign Policy identity, 
particularly Western identity, focuses on the events of 9/11 and Turkey’s 
decision on Iraq War in March 2003. Both of these events thematically serve 
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to analyse the vision of Turkish Foreign Policy from a social constructivist 
and identity perspective. This means that the study’s interest in the events is 
limited to how the Turkish press represents and constructs the self/other 
relationships in the means of Islamic and Western identity. Therefore, the 
security and military dimensions of the issue are not covered in the selection 
of the data. Specifically, the third case reveals the link between the events of 
9/11 and the way that the media linguistically represents the relationship 
between Islam and the West. It also considers how these representations 
discursively construct post-Kemalist Turkish national identity, contribute to 
the domestic power struggle and the debate of Turkish foreign policy shift. 
 
 
Conclusion 
In summary, this research relies on two key propositions. First, it does not 
accept that there has only ever been one narrative of Turkish national identiy; 
instead it assumes that there have been multiple narratives of Turkish 
national identity competing with each other for domination since national 
identity is a dynamic concept.  Second, it depends on DHA analysis of the 
Turkish media discourse as the means to explore these contested discursive 
constructions of Turkish national identity. On these assumptions, the thesis 
empirically shows that there is no ‘single’ Turkish nationalism. This thesis 
empirically shows that there has been an emergence of post-Kemalist nation-
state identity through the power struggle of between different narratives of 
Turkish nation in the last decade under the AKP government. All three of the 
case studies help to show how this post-Kemalist identity has emereged and 
contributed to a new, more diverse sense of Turkish nationalism The case 
studies also reveal both how the traditional others of Kemalist nation-state 
could create a common consent in the construction of new Turkey and how it 
has been challenged during the transformation.   
Shedding light on the process of this significant and  historical change, 
which has exposed Islamist nationalism and a non-European identity within 
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the Turkish nation-state instead of a solely secular and Europeanist one, is 
crucial for a deeper understanding of the contemporary Turkish politics.  In 
particular, this greater knowledge of the emerging new self/other relationship 
of Turkey allows for an increased understanding of the unique relationship 
between Islam, national identity and democracy in International Relations 
and European Studies. 
 
After clarification of the theoretical contexts, in order to explore the 
processes of ideological constructions in the media, the historical and socio-
political context for the emergence and challenges of Turkey's post-Kemalist 
nation-state identity are given in the next chapter of the research. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY: THE 
CONSTRUCTION OF TURKISH NATION-STATE IDENTITY 
 
'When your ‘identity crisis’ has lasted for 
 some 200 years it is no longer a crisis. 
It is your identity''
20
. 
 
 
Introduction 
This chapter reveals that the discourse of Turkish nationalism has had 
numerous evolutions and branches from its rise in the late nineteenth century 
to the emergence of post-Kemalist nation-state identity in the present.  At the 
time of the founding of the Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and his 
adherents set the goal of lifting Turkey up to 'the level of contemporary 
civilization' as expressed in his speech in 1924 (Lewis 2002, p.292): ‘The 
Turks are the friends of all civilised nations. Countries vary, but civilisation 
is one, and for a nation to progress is most taking part in this single 
civilisation.’ Their images of the civilised Turkish nation-state were modern 
and secular, thus the way of civilisation had appeared clear, distancing itself 
with the Islamic Ottoman past and the Eastern way of life and instead 
cooperating with the civilised and modern West. 
 
In this regard, Turkey is defined as a ‘torn country’ by Samuel Huntington 
(2002, p.139) in ‘the Clash of Civilisations’ in his interpretation of the world 
of civilisations and the remaking of the world order after the Cold War period. 
Turkey is torn due to its Kemalist leaders attempting to shift Turkey to 
another (Western) civilisation, even though it has a predominantly Muslim 
culture. But as Huntington argued (ibid p.147), in the post-Cold War era 
national, ethnic, and religious identification issues continued to emerge, and 
                                               
20
 Selim Deringil (2007) ''The Turks and ‘Europe’: The Argument from History'', Middle 
Eastern Studies, 43:5, p.721 
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Turkey’s Kemalist secularist identity has been under challenge at home while 
its Western or European identity has been questioned more internationally. 
Since a response to this challenge is required, Turkey has been in the process 
of redefinition of its national/state identity, which is complicated and painful, 
both culturally and politically. The common approach accepts that there is a 
cleavage between the Republican secularist bureaucratic centre and the 
conservative Muslim periphery (Mardin 1973) in Turkey. Rather than, this 
thesis argues that the secular (European-Western) and Muslim identities of 
Turkey are historically constructed and mutually constitutive (Turner and 
Zengin-Arslan 2013) due to their power struggle; therefore it concentrates on 
the diversity in existing understandings of Turkish identity and it reveals that 
changing domestic power relations have changed dominant discourse in 
Turkey's nation-state identity discourse and led to the emergence of a post-
Kemalist discourse. Therefore, it offers a discursive approach for 
understanding of new Turkey's identity and its place in the world. 
 
This chapter demonstrates that Kemalist Turkish state has not been neutral 
(ibid. p.207) in creating Muslim secularism, which makes Turkey as an 
original example in identity politics of International Relations Studies. Such 
a paradox, what divides and maintains Turkish national unity is Muslim 
identity and its secular interpretation. Despite the fact that it has highly 
polarised Turkey in the last decade, the both sides have benefited from this 
struggle, as Kadıoğlu and Keyman (2011) defined that these are symbiotic 
antagonisms. Therefore, this thesis offers an anti-essentialist 
conceptualisation of these identities, their difference and mutual relations, 
which open up possibilities of democratic interaction, post-secular pluralism 
(Connally 2000; Habermas 2008) and 'ethos of engagement' (Martin 2011, p. 
131) among different traditions, faiths and ways of living them. This 
engagement in becoming plural may be healing to Turkey's 'social and 
historical wound left open by the incompletion of the struggle of civil rights' 
(Finlayson 2011, p.17). 
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In order to shed light on the origins of contested discourses on Turkish 
national identity and the emergence of Turkey's post-Kemalist nation-state 
identity, this chapter will provide the historical framework for analysing 
different elements of Turkey’s identity such as Turkic, Islamic, secular, 
European, and Western. It invokes three major factors that have urged 
re/construction of Turkey's identity since the end of the Cold War: the 
international paradigm shift, especially with 9/11 events; Turkey's bid for EU 
membership; and the rise of the political Islam and transformation of 
domestic power relations with the pro-Islamist Justice and Development 
Party's (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi-AKP) government since 2002. 
 
In the last decade, reformist AKP aligned itself with the West/EU to 
consolidate democracy. This attempt legitimised its actions to transform 
domestic power relations, significantly Turkish self-image at the domestic 
and international levels. Throughout the last decade Turkey’s internal 
dilemmas and contradictions in identity politics have reached the top of the 
agenda of the country in its reflection into international relations of Turkey, 
particularly relations with the EU/West. Within this context of Turkey, the 
object of this chapter is to present a critical discussion on the national 
identity and foreign policy interactions that will assist in providing a 
historical framework to study Turkey’s post-Kemalist nation-state identity, its 
challenges and changing EU/West relations. To realise this goal, this chapter 
begins with a presentation of the historical roots of Turkish nationalism and 
its challenge with the Kemalist state’s traditional others: Non-Muslim, 
Islamist and Kurdish identities. Then, it seeks out the evolution of discourses 
of Turkish nationalism and its relations with the others in changing internal 
and international circumstance during the 1990s and 2000s. 
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2.1. The Origins of Different Narratives of Turkish Nation: Ottomanism, 
Islamism, Turkism 
This section deals with the concepts of Turkish nation while locating the 
perspectives on Turkish nationalism within the theories of nationalism. In 
Turkish nationalism studies, Nergis Canefe (2002) points out that the hybrid 
nature of the multi-ethnic, multicultural, and multi-religious Ottoman history 
and heritage constitutes one of the two obstacles hindering the examination 
of the Turkish case. Another obstacle is that the political and cultural denial 
of the Ottoman heritage since the Republican establishment. The Kemalist 
tradition of secular nationalism of the Republican era is formulated against 
the idea of a continuum that links the Ottoman legacy and Islamic Turkish 
history.  According to Canefe, ignorance of the Ottoman origins of the 
Turkish nationalist movement and an overwhelming modernist trajectory in 
analysing Turkish nationalism limit understanding of the Turkish case (ibid. 
p.134).  This is because this Kemalist narrative has been influenced officially 
and popularly by the counter-narratives, their reading of history and selection 
of events that differently built their imaginations of the nation. Thus, as she 
argues, the central problem of the construction of Turkish national identity 
can be identified as its dealings with its own history and hybrid character. 
Nergis Canefe (2002) offers an ethno-symbolic alternative (Smith 1999; 
Hutchinson 2000) for studying Turkish nationalism and its popular appeal. 
Canefe applies an historical ethno-symbolism method to the Turkish case in 
looking at the myths of the Turkish people's origins, memories, traditions, 
and ways of life in a distinctly Muslim Turkish Anatolian society in related 
symbols of its ethnicity.  She shows that Kemalist narrative and myths of 
nation selectively highlight the history of Turkish people in Asia Minor. This 
specifically Kemalist reading on the political past serves for imagining a 
secular nation by creating distance from the Islamic character of the Ottoman 
era. She overcomes the certain break between the Ottoman and the Kemalist 
Republican narrative that hinders seeing the social, cultural, and economic 
determinants of emerging Young Ottoman and Young Turks movements as 
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the birth of Turkish nationalism in the late Ottoman times.  Therefore, to gain 
a deeper understanding, the role of the national awakening, imperial legacy 
and power struggle in the nation-state building process are taken into account 
for a classification of Turkish nationalism in this section. 
 
The Ottoman Empire had a multi-religious, multicultural, and multilingual 
millet system21 that was organised on the basis of religion (Inalcik 1997). In 
the period of the Ottomans it was used to identify legally organised different 
religious communities such as Jewish millets, Armenian millets, or Kurdish 
millets. For the sake of the building of a nation-state, Kemalist modernist 
elites of Turkey rejected the Ottoman millet system and tradition (Bozdogan 
and Kasaba 1997), and instead invented a new tradition associated with an 
imagined Turkish ethnicity that had its roots, myths, and past in Central Asia 
(Neyzi 2002, p.141). With the intention of unifying the people, the nation-
state would be based on the Turkish language and culture rather than on 
religion. Turkish was accepted as the official language of the state due to the 
fact that it was the general language of communication of the Anatolian 
peoples. Thereafter, Turkish identity, history, and society were redefined, 
systematised, and centralised by the state institutions. For that matter, the 
words used to refer to ‘nationalism’ in the Turkish language are also 
ideologically differentiated by the users. Rather than using the term 
‘milliyetçilik’, Kemalists prefer to use the term ‘ulusçuluk’ (Ozkirimli 2011, 
p.95) or ‘ulusalcılık’ (Bora 2003) to identify their Turkish nationalism, which 
has a secular modern meaning. The origins of this difference of perspectives 
on Turkish nationalism will be clarified in this part of the chapter to tackle 
the complexities of the contested debated issue, which is how Turkish 
identity was constructed and how it has had other branches of doctrine. 
 
Although, the words ‘Turk’ and ‘Turkey’ were mostly used to refer to the 
                                               
21
 The word ‘millet’ comes from the word ‘milla’ in Arabic, which means Islamic 
community. 
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Ottomans in European literature, this usage covered not only Turkish-
speaking people but also other Muslims in the Empire as well (Kushner 1977, 
p.8). On the other hand, in Ottoman writings the word ‘Turks’ signified the 
peasants of Anatolia, Turkish-speaking Ottomans, with an insulting sense. 
This identification had changed by the time of the Sultan Abdulhamid Period, 
in the second half of the 1800s, when the term ‘Turk’ became widely used in 
Ottoman publications and even the newspapers were labelled as ‘Turkish 
newspaper’ (ibid. 21). Thus, in the pre-Hamidian period the term means 
‘Turks as the rulers of the Ottoman Empire,’ and then it was used to denote a 
historical, linguistic, and ethnic entity. It is worth noting that the ruling class 
and state officials had to know the Turkish language as a requirement for 
employment; however Turkishness did not hold a privileged position; for 
instance the state showed a definite lack of effort in spreading the Turkish 
language among the population and in dealing with public education. Umut 
Uzer (2011, p.113) supports that argument by noting that Turkishness and 
pre-Islamic Turkish history were ignored in the Ottoman Empire due to the 
goal of strengthening Ottoman and Islamic solidarity. 
 
In ‘The Emergence of Modern Turkey’ Bernard Lewis (2002, p.3) provides 
the literature with a much-needed general perspective for understanding the 
main stream of influence that gave rise to modern Turkey: the Islamic, the 
Turkish, and the local (Anatolian elements such as the Hittites, the Byzantine, 
the Seljuk, the Rumelian, the Balkans, and Perso-Arabic influences). In the 
debate over the emergence of Turkish national consciousness, Lewis 
develops his argument from the book by P. Wittek (1952) ‘Le Role de Tribus 
dans L’empire Ottoman’ which analyses the Ottomans’ descendents who are 
claimed as Turkish nomadic tribes, particularly the Oguz Turkish tribe of 
Kayi. Lewis (ibid p. 9) writes that at the time of Murat (1421-1451), Ottoman 
history and literature elaborated the Oguz legend. Significantly, a pure and 
simple central Asian Turkish language was used in literary schools in writing 
folk poetry (Kushner 1977, p.3) at the end of the fifteenth century. Indeed, 
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making Turkish the official state language in the times of the Ottomans, 
rather than Persian or Arabic language such as in other Turkish dynasties, as 
the Seljuks and the Mamluks did, contributed to maintaining the Turkish 
character of the Empire (ibid p.2). 
 
According to Lewis (ibid, p.9), the key here was that the sense of 
Turkishness was retained among Anatolian people in their folk literature, but 
a Turkish national consciousness bloomed in the nineteenth century as an 
outcome of Turcological studies, set off by Turkish emigrants from the 
Russian Empire. The growing interest in, and awareness of, Turkish history 
produced the first publications concerned with the genealogy of the 
Ottomans, such as Ahmet Mithat’s ‘History of Modern Times’ in 1877. 
According to this narrative, the state of Oguz Khan and the Turks were 
extensively accepted for pointing out the fathers of the Ottomans who were 
tribes of Central Asia (Kushner 1977, p.27). In the eighteenth century, the 
Turks had been influenced by Islam and, the language and culture of the 
Persian and Arabic. The Turkish Seljuks brought Islam from south-west Asia 
to Anatolia. Moreover, the transfer of the Caliphate from Abbasid Caliphs to 
the Ottomans gave the Sultans a mission to expand it to the borders of 
Western Anatolia. They protected and spread the power of Islam against the 
Christian West during the six centuries. Therefore, ‘Ottoman,’ ‘Turk’ or 
‘Muslim’ had been used to identify them in European literature, and the term 
referred to the territories of the Empire. Similarly, in the writings of Ottoman 
history, the country, the ruler, and its army were defined with a reference to 
religion as ‘the land of Islam,’ ‘the Padishah of Islam,’ and ‘the soldier of 
Islam’ (Lewis 2002, p.13). 
 
Under the ideology of Ottomanism, all communities in the Empire enjoyed 
their rights as long as they maintained their loyalty to the Sultan. During the 
collapse of the Empire different doctrines came to be known to hold the unity. 
During the same period, the non-Muslim public’s demands upon the Empire 
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and the secularisation by the Tanzimat (1839) pushed for reactionary anti-
Western attitudes (Kushner 1997), while Bulgarian, Serbian, and Greek 
nationalism and restlessness were growing like warning bells of separation. 
In the following decades, territorial losses made the Empire overwhelmingly 
Muslim; therefore the authorities and Sultan Abdulhamid emphasised 
Islamism and Islamic institutions of the state (Deringil 1991), particularly the 
symbolic power of the Caliphate among the Muslim world with the intention 
of strengthening the legitimacy of the regime between 1876 and 1909. It can 
be argued that nationalist movements among non-Muslim communities of the 
Empire and their positions in the First World War played a role in 
construction of Turkish identity as Muslim, both in the Kemalist and Islamist 
imaginations of the nation. 
 
The greatest historians of the time, such as Hayrullah Efendi (1817-1876) 
and Ahmed Refik Pasa (1823-1891) indicated the importance of the Islamic 
character of Ottoman history, culture, and religious affiliation to identify 
different groups and residents of the Empire in the millet system. Equally 
critical was the fact that as an outcome of Ottoman modernisation, the 
westernised Ottoman colleges and academies emerged with a new political 
culture and a new class that had a vision to do politics differently (Canefe 
2002, p.140).  Meanwhile, the Ottoman imperial system, tradition, and 
reforms began to be questioned by the rising military-bureaucratic elite. In 
the 1860s the Young Ottomans movement opposed the Hamidian politics and 
practices with an offer for new ideological and political answers based on 
Turkism. By the 1908 Young Turk Revolution, the new elite encouraged the 
formation of commercial companies fostering a Turkish entrepreneurial class 
and created a bourgeoisie class among the Turks in order to construct a 
society to cope with the capitalist economy (Ahmad 1993, p.45). Here it is 
useful to manifest the way in which their ideas of liberalism, 
constitutionalism, and nationalism (Poulton 1999) could reach the masses of 
the empire. On this point, Kushner (1997 p.14-19) supplies detailed 
83 
knowledge on the role of newspapers and periodicals of the Hamidian Press 
in giving rise to debates on Turkish nationalism, westernisation, Islamism, 
and secularism. He argues that surely the press caused increasing awareness 
of separate Turkish cultures among educated elites and a desire to westernise 
the country due to being aware of the scientific and technological power of 
Europe. Literature on Turkish nationalism supports the point on the existence 
of a growing body of Turkist publications in the Young Turks period, but 
there is common agreement in the literature (Hanioglu 1986; Deringil 1991; 
Kayali 1997) about whether the Young Turks of the CUP were Ottomanists 
due to their desire for the continuation of the Islamic Empire. This historical 
reading on the origins of Turkish nationalism as an emergence of imagination 
of being a part in a national community can be classified under the modernist 
approaches to nationalism, specifically in the means of Anderson (1983) who 
argued that print media contributed to the rise of national consciousness and 
the nation as 'imagined community' among people. 
 
Contrary to the Ottomanists, various ‘pan’ movements arose as pan-Slavism 
and pan-Turkism (Uzer 2011, p.114) during the collapse of the Empire. One 
of the first attempts to place Turkism as an ideology distinct from 
Ottomanism and pan-Islamism was Yusuf Akcura’s essay (1904) entitled, 
‘Three Kinds of Policy’ (Uc Tarz-ı Siyaset). His suggestion for ‘a Turkish 
national policy based on the Turkish race’ was inspiring for the formulation 
of Turkish nationalism and ideas. Akcura claimed that Ottomanism failed to 
create unity in the state due to the fact there was no Ottoman nation. Pan-
Islamism was challenging due to external obstacles and resistance by the 
Christian powers. But, a Turkist policy as the third choice could provide a 
base of unity and loyalty within the Empire among the many millions of 
Turks within and beyond the frontiers. 
 
These doctrines contributed to defining the nation’s linguistic, cultural, and 
political boundaries in the wake of the First World War. It was the time of the 
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War of Independence when Islam was used by Mustafa Kemal (1881-1938) 
and the Young Turks to mobilise the Muslim public (Poulton 1999, p. 119) 
against the old order and European imperialism in the Versailles system. 
Ozkirimli calls it ‘the short-term tactical alliance of the Kemalists with Islam’ 
(Ozkirimli and Sofos 2008, p.58). In the National Pact (Misak-I Milli) that 
drew the boundaries of Anatolia, the religion was the only legitimised 
unification element in that sense. It must be noted that the press was used by 
Mustafa Kemal to provoke Anatolian political mobilisation, to raise a 
freedom and independence voice against the foreign powers, specifically two 
newspapers, Irade-i Milliye and Hakimiyet-i Milliye played a role in 
spreading a national awareness and turning the resistance into a national war 
(Kologlu 1993; Yust 1995; Tamer 2010). After a national Turkish state was 
established in 1923, this alliance was severed by Mustfa Kemal Ataturk and 
the governing elite because Islam was seen as a link with the old order and 
Ottomanism. As Sami Zubaida (2009, p.118) notes, this break with popular 
religion was a deliberative part of the nationalist project designed to 
empower a 'progress' discourse against 'backwardness' to cope with foreign 
domination. In this context, it can be argued that anti-imperialism has been 
one of the main characteristics of Kemalist nationalism since the beginning, 
as a consequence of the war against European powers for Turkish nation-
state building. 
 
 
2.2. The Construction of Official Kemalist Nation-State Discourse 
For the governing elite, the word ‘Turk’ meant Turkish citizenship; it was a 
noun, not an adjective (Heper 2011, p.50). To be a Turk, it was enough to 
accept the principles of Kemalism, Turkish culture, and language. Nobody 
was excluded as long as that person was willing to be assimilated into 
Turkishness, similar to French nationalism (Oran 1997). Therefore, the 
concept of the 'nation' of the Turkish Republic had the roots of a legacy of 
the French Revolution, in the words of Ernest Renan 'the will to live together' 
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(Soysal 1999, p.12) rather than the ethnic or religious origins of the 
population. Based on this assumption, Soner Cagaptay notes (2002, pp.67-82) 
that the first definition of the Turkish nation was territorial. As declared by 
Ataturk, ‘The people of Turkey who have established the Turkish state are 
called the Turkish nation,’ and this nation was inhabited by different ethnic 
groups including Turks, Kurds, Jews, Arabs, Lazes, Armenians, etc. The 
second definition recognised all Muslims who were in the Turkish nation in 
terms of the emerging Turkish history thesis. The ethno-religious definition 
as the third definition accepted that those who were ethnically Turkish was 
designated by the policy of the ruling Republican People's Party between 
1935 and 1937. 
 
Cagaptay's work demonstrates the dynamic character of Turkish nationalism 
in the nation-building process. Ottoman historians, Sukru Hanioglu (2011), 
Halil Inalcik (1998), and Serif Mardin (2010) point out continuing state and 
society traditions and legacies from the Imperial times to the Republican 
times. Like Canefe, Hanioglu (2011) refers to the pre-Republican times for 
identifying and classifying Turkish nationalism and its origins. Mardin (2010) 
diagnoses an on-going problem in the centre-periphery relations in Turkey. 
He notes that Turkey has a strong state tradition that always led the top-down 
modernisation and transformation of society. What appears differently in 
Inalcık's article (1998) is that he argues Ataturk's legacy, the Ottoman world 
state legacy with poet Fuzuli, Yunus Emre, or Suleymaniye Mosque live 
together in every single Turk's national history and conscience.  He notes that 
not only conservative parties but also all other political parties, and Kemalist 
circles too, enjoyes living Ottomanist romanticism (ibid. p.13). 
 
Faroz Ahmad in 'The Making of Modern Turkey' (1993, p. 2-3), emphasises 
the army’s role from Ottoman times to the present in Turkish history and 
politics. He suggests an institutional continuity that demonstrates contested 
world-views and their historical origins in modern Turkish politics.  By the 
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last quarter of the nineteenth century, some military officers had been 
politicised against the sultan, Abdulhamid II (1876–1909), which launched 
the Young Turk revolution, which continued for a decade until the defeat of 
the Ottoman Empire in the First World War.  The Ottoman administration and 
the sultan Vahdettin were not capable of resisting the Great Powers and 
imperialism; therefore the old regime agreed to sign the Treaty of Sèvres in 
August 1920. The Turkish nationalists and the army expected the sultan to 
stand up for Turkey’s rights, but he was collaborating with the external 
powers. 
 
That was why the army gave their loyalty to the movement led by Mustafa 
Kemal (ibid. p.8). Not the least, the army's intervention in politics continued 
under the Republican system with the three experienced military coups in 
Turkish political life.  Related to this, Metin Heper (2011, p.51) points out 
that the state elites, especially the army officers, traditionally do not trust the 
political elite in Turkey.  They attempt to change or form the way of doing 
politics when they see it is required, because they believe that the politicians 
might pursue their own profits rather than the national interests. This point is 
significant for a better understanding of the current power relationship in 
Turkey. In addition, looking at the political fault lines drawn during the 
establishment times of the Republic contributes to completing other parts of 
the puzzle of the power and identity politics of Turkey.   
 
For Ayse Kadioglu (2011, p.45) Turkish nationalism was not an outcome of 
national awakening; it was a project constructed from above by the Kemalist 
state elites.  Fuat Keyman (2011, p.20) argues that nationalism dominantly 
affected the features of the process of making modern Turkey, and it still 
influences the Turkish state ideology and society in different contents and 
articulations. In his analysis, the state-based transformation of traditional 
society into a modern nation aimed to reach the level of 'western civilisation' 
in order to save the state and secure its existence. Such as a Gellnerian 
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modernist explanation, Keyman introduces that the Kemalist elite fostered a 
rapid industrialisation and socio-economic modernisation in a Weberian 
fashion (ibid. p.17) and constructed a secular and modern national identity by 
instrumentalisation of Western reason and rationality. He makes an 
outstanding distinction between two state-based modernisations, from the 
Empire to the Republican times. To compete within the European state 
system, the Ottoman state employed modernisation, especially within the 
military
22
, as the expediency to the empire's decline.  Similarly, with 
modernisation the Republican elite aimed to have a more secured and 
powerful state, but their understanding of the concept was not just martial or 
technological. They believed that Western advancement and its institutional 
political structure could be achieved by requiring a regulation of state-society 
relations in supplementing Western cultural practices. So this time, the state 
designed reforms to change every aspect of societal relations and everyday 
practices of individuals. In this context, Islam was identified as the main 
obstacle to progress, and thus secularism was seen as one of the most 
important reforms to enlighten people and make progress in society. In 
Mardin's words (2006), it was a transition from a religious community 
governed by a sultan to a secular nation-state. In this regard, Keyman notes 
(2011, p.18) that 'Turkey did not rise phoenix-like out of the ashes of the 
Ottoman Empire'. In making modern Turkey, the Islamic identity and 
Kurdish identity, or the Ottoman past, were excluded as ‘others’ to create a 
nationalist identity. The Republican system was established by the Kemalist 
imagination and its victory against foreign invaders and the old regime 
supporters. 
 
As noted, after the victory of the resistance, the Turkish Republic was 
proclaimed on 29 October 1923, and Mustafa Kemal became its first 
president. There were rivals and opponents to the new regime, from the sides 
                                               
22 The ‘New Army’ (Nizam-i Cedid), which replaced the army of the Janissaries in 1826, was 
the creation of Sultan Mahmud II (1807–1839); his aim was to create a modern fighting 
force along European lines (Ahmad 1993 p.4). 
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that wanted to maintain monarchy and the Caliphate or seek an American 
mandate for Turkey.  Since the beginning, Islamists would always be able to 
manipulate the symbols of religion as counter-force to the Kemalists and new 
regime (Ahmad 1993, p.49). Moreover, the religious reaction and counter-
revolution movement unleashed a Kurdish rebellion in the eastern Anatolia 
and influenced the region in February 1925. As a result, the Law for the 
Maintenance of Order was passed by the national assembly to silence the 
opposition. In the following two years, over 500 people were sentenced to 
death by the special courts known as Independence Tribunals (ibid p.58). It 
can be argued that this period and how it is remembered by the Kemalists, 
Islamists and Kurdish people has a significant place in their imaginations of 
Turkish nation-state. After elaborating the general breaks and institutional 
continuities from the Ottoman past to the Republican times, in the context of 
Kemalist nation-state discourse and its historical challenges, the next sections 
elucidate the place of Non-Muslim, Islamic and Kurdish identity in Turkey 
and Turkish identity in detail. 
 
2.3. Non-Muslimhood in Turkish Nation and Nationalism 
M. Kemal Ataturk's nationalism was a kind of pluralist one in order to realise 
the goal of having the support of all communities in Anatolia for the newly 
established nation-state. Moreover, this was a ‘genius’ nationalism (Smith 
2005, p.437) in its ability to mix the organic/ethnic and the civic/territorial, 
even though there were almost fifty different ethnic groups in the country. In 
the first decades of the Turkish Republic, Turkish nationalism looked like a 
‘civic nationalism’ based on the constitution, but in its application to practice 
it was ethno-religious nationalism. The state had taken actions to legalise the 
exclusionary practices. These applications were described as ‘racist’ by some 
authors (Maksudyan 2005), while some (Aktar 2000) preferred to say it was 
simply a cultural homogenisation process without targeting any different 
‘race’ motif, but it was certainly a discrimination of non-Muslims as an ‘out’ 
group from Muslims as a group who did belong to the According to the 
89 
Lausanne Treaty, only non-Muslim people were recognised as minorities 
(Ors and Komsuoglu 2008, p.409). The treaty was signed in 1923 between 
the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan, Greece, Romania, the Serb-Croat-
Slovene State, and the Grand National Assembly of Turkey after the Ankara 
government’s abolishment of the Peace Treaty of Sèvres of 1920 that was 
between the Ottoman Empire and the Allies of World War I. Article 40 of the 
Treaty stated that Turkish citizens belonging to non-Muslim minorities shall 
enjoy the same treatment and security in law and in fact as other Turkish 
people. In particular, they shall have an equal right to establish, manage, and 
control, at their own expense, any charitable, religious and social institutions, 
any schools and other establishments for instruction and education, with the 
right to use their own language and to exercise their own religion freely 
therein. 
 
All citizens were defined as Turks in the Article 88 of the 1924 Constitution. 
This looked like a civic understanding of citizenship; however, its application 
to social reality in the 1930s was different. It was even a ‘volkish nationalism’ 
in Kieser’s (2008, p.ix) words, meanings an undemocratic, unequal, elitist, 
discriminative interpretation of identities by favouring Turkish-Sunni identity. 
Being a part of the Turkish nation for the non-Muslim citizens included some 
conditions for assimilation such as internalising the Turkish language as their 
mother tongue, adopting Turkish culture, and loyalty to the ideal of Turkism 
(Bali 2008, p.43) based on a willingness to live together. These provisions 
were still not enough; they had a strong struggle against discriminative laws 
in the 1930s like the law on Settlement in 1934. These laws meant that non-
Muslim citizens were differentiated from the Turkish self. 
 
From the perspective of the Republican elite, there were reasons for this ‘de 
facto discrimination’ (ibid p.48). Non-Muslims were insider foreigners, in 
other words, ‘strangers whose loyalty was suspect’ (ibid p.49). Their past was 
not commonly shared; for instance, they did not fight in the National War of 
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Independence, and some of them even became allies to ‘others’. Relations 
between the state and non-Muslim citizens turned to a harder situation based 
on the attempts of writing Turkish national history and the reading of 
common history from different perceptions. Some historians chose to 
emphasise the discourse of ‘We lived together for more than five centuries’, 
while others chose to focus on just a selected part of the history, specifically 
the last century of the Ottoman Empire. In the 1930s Turkish nationalism was 
still a cultural nationalism (Ozkirimli and Sofos 2008, p. 167) that motivated 
and worked by a massive process of homogenisation through the 
Turkification of names and surnames; forcing citizens to speak Turkish with 
‘citizen speak Turkish!’ campaigns; Turkifying minority schools; dismantling 
their communities and non-profit organisations; and finally nationalism took 
on an economic tone in the Turkification of the economy via the Capital Tax 
Levy in 1942 (Bali 2012; Bali 2000; Aktar 2000). In addition, the National 
Consumption Society was established in order to encourage people to buy 
national products and goods. Consequently, Turkish nationalism spread in 
various aspects of socio-economic life. 
 
When Ataturk died in 1938, the war and the extension of German power over 
Europe had already brought a defensive attitude to Turkey in order to secure 
the country by following a policy of neutrality. Given this external threat and 
circumstances of instability, considerable inflation and economic crises 
emerged in Turkey. Therefore, the government decided to approve the capital 
tax in November 1942 for the sake of maintaining control over the national 
economy. In fact, the categorising of taxation rates for taxpayers was based 
on their religion and nationality (Lewis 2002, p.298). Non-Muslim citizens 
had to pay up to ten times as much within fifteen days, and people who could 
not pay the tax levy within a month were even deported for forced labour to 
Askale to be used in breaking stones for the new roads. Greek, Jewish, and 
Armenian defaulters were subjected to punishment and were sent to Askale 
in early January 1943. 
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Bernard Lewis quotes the failure of the capital tax to achieve its economic 
objectives in the book by the Finance Director of Istanbul, Faik Okte (1951), 
which was titled ‘The Catastrophe of Capital Tax’. In Okte’s evaluation of 
the results of taxation, it caused the collapse of the price policy and benefited 
the black market while it had ended with an atmosphere of ‘lawlessness and 
disorder’. More significantly, with this kind of classification of unjust and 
discriminatory taxes on foreign and non-Muslim citizens, the confidence of 
the citizens in the state and society, financial probity, and religious tolerance 
were shattered (ibid p.301). Non-Muslim citizens’ presentation as a threat to 
the Turkish self, homogeneity, and socio-economic interests was not just 
sneaking into policies of the state, but also into everyday discourse as ‘the 
enemy within’ (Neyzi 2002, p.146). 
 
Tragically this was seen in ‘the Events of September 6-7th’, when the Greek 
minority in Istanbul became targets for racist attacks in 1955. In the outbreak 
of violence, the populist manipulation of national sentiments by politicians, 
the Turkish media, and the intelligentsia contributed to the fearful 
atmosphere and radicalising and mobilising of the discontented public 
(Kuyucu 2005, p.375-376). Turkish press coverage of the Cyprus issue and 
the false news coverage that Mustafa Kemal Ataturk's house had been 
bombed - where he had been born in 1881 in Thessaloniki, in northern 
Greece- caused great nationalist aggression in Istanbul and made non-
Muslims open targets. These events documented how the politicisation of a 
foreign policy issue by the power of the press resulted in domestic crises. 
More specifically, it underlined the definition of being Turk through being 
Muslim. 
 
 
 
 
92 
2.4. Competing Nationalisms in Turkey: The Secularist versus Islamist 
Turkish Nationalisms 
A deeper search in the literature shows that there are different readings on 
Turkish history and the evolution of secularism from the imperial times to the 
republican times
23
.  As widely accepted in the literature, for the sake of being 
at the level of modern civilisations, the Republican system put the concept of 
the nation in the place of the religion. Based on the concept of Turkishness 
instead of Islam in the establishment of the Republican system, the old order 
was replaced by the new one with signifiers such as the removal of the 
Caliphate and abolishment of the fez that were the bastion of Islamic 
identification, and, in M. Kemal Ataturk’s words, the emblem of 
uncivilisation, ignorance, and hatred of progress (Lewis 2002, p.268). In 
other words, to be secular meant to be modern (Yavuz 1998, p.11). The idea 
and normative-ideological state project of secularism was inherited from the 
Enlightenment that required constructing an anthropocentric change 
(Casanova 2011) in the understanding of the world through a process of 
maturation, emancipation, positivism, and scientific reasoning. 
 
The struggle against Islamists emerged and intensified during the single-
party period (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP) between 1923 and 1946. Hale 
and Ozbudun (2010, p.22) call it ‘assertive secularism’ that bans or limits the 
aspects of Islamic identity in the public sphere and individualises the religion. 
This was not a passive secularism that implies state neutrality to the religion.  
However, this specific tone of secularism was accepted by large segments of 
society, particularly among the supporters of the CHP. The fear of ‘Islamic 
reactionism’ (Azak 2010) became the fundamental characteristic of Turkish 
                                               
23
 Sociologist Niyazi Berkes (1964) in The Development of Secularism in Turkey analyses 
the evolution of the Ottoman-Turkish modernisation and secularisation from the 18th century 
to the 20th century in focusing on three originators of the ideas, Ibrahim Muteferrika, Namık 
Kemal, and Ziya Gokalp. According to him, before Atatürk, Ziya Gokalp had already 
idealised a secular religion and culture for the Turks and triggered a break between the state 
and religion. Berkes argues that the Ottoman system was not theocratic or feudal, but had an 
Eastern despotic character. This character had to be left inevitably and naturally due to the 
effects of European modernisation and nationalisation. 
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secularism. Reproduction of this fear by the political and intellectual elites 
spread the securitisation of secularisation (Bilgin 2008) to everyday life in 
Turkey. In this context, these listed Kemalist reforms in the regulation of 
political, cultural, and social life served to rapidly eradicate the ties with the 
Islamic Ottoman legacy (Karasipahi 2009, p.22): 
 
· The abolition of the sultanate in 1922 by a decree of the Grand National Assembly (prior 
to the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923). 
· The abolition in 1924 of the caliphate, which had symbolised the unity of Muslim 
ummah. The origins of the caliphate went back to the period after the death of Prophet 
Muhammed; Ottoman sultans had assumed the title of caliph in the sixteenth century. 
· The abolition in 1924 of the office of Seyh’ul-Islam, the highest religious authority in the 
administration of the Ottoman Empire, one of whose functions had been to oversee the 
suitability of political decisions to Islamic law. 
· The abolition in 1924 of the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Pious Foundations (Seriye 
ve Evkaf Vekaleti). 
· The abolition in 1924 of the Seri’at courts, religious courts based on Muslim law. 
· The abolition in 1924 of the medrese, which had been important centres of religious 
learning in the Ottoman Empire. 
· The interdiction of religious brotherhoods (tarikat) in 1925, and the ban on all their 
activities. 
· The passage of a law in 1925 outlawing the fez in favour of the western hat; the 
republican regime also discouraged the veil for women although it did not outlaw it. 
· The adoption of the Gregorian calendar in 1925, replacing the lunar Hicri and solar Rumi 
calendars. 
· The adoption of the Swiss Civil Code in 1926, giving equal civil rights to men and 
women. 
· The adoption of European numerals in 1928. 
· The change from Arabic to Latin script in 1928. 
· The deletion in 1928 of the second article of the 1924 constitution, which stated Islam to 
be the state religion. 
 
 
Under the cloak of the multi-party system, not only was the Kemalist elites’ 
secularist nationalism represented in politics as happened in the single-party 
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period of the Republican Peoples Party (CHP), but also conservative versions 
of Turkism integrated into Turkish politics. In the 1950s, the Democrat Party 
(DP) changed the tone of secularism through a discourse of rejection of the 
statist, elitist, and military-dominated political tradition of the CHP. The DP 
was opposed to the ‘militant secularism’ in the vocabulary of religious 
conservatism (Kuyucu 2005, p.371-372) and had overwhelming popular 
support. Under Adnan Menderes the DP opened the Imam-Hatip schools, 
which were the first religious state-sponsored schools for training religious 
leaders. They also added an optional religion course to the curriculum of 
elementary schools. 
 
The DP’s successive Justice Party (Adalet Partisi, AP) represented the 
conservative-right in the 1960s. The political Islamism benefited from the 
rising political and economic importance of villagers and town peoples’ votes 
in multi-party politics (Noyon 2003, p.69). Local notables and rural 
conservatives supported the economic aspects of modernisation and social 
conservatism that fed political Islam on the periphery (ibid p.70). It was 
noteworthy that Necmeddin Erbakan was the first leader of political Islam 
(Kavakci et al. 2010, p.44) in the Republic and who established the National 
Order Party (Milli Nizam Partisi, MNP) in the late 1960s. Erbakan later led 
the National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi, MSP) in 1973 and the 
Welfare Party (Refah Partisi, RP) in 1987; however, each party was shut 
down by military intervention owing to religious agitation and the aim of 
destruction of the existing state order. In the times of military interventions, 
Islamists challenged the state’s dominance of religion even more. For 
instance, in a 1971 military coup 85 students (aged between 8 and 20) were 
arrested due to ‘studying Arabic and Islam’ and wearing religious garb (ibid. 
p.184). 
 
Without an understanding of the post-1980 period, the legacy of Turgut Ozal 
and Turkey’s embedded politics to neo-liberalism in his time; there would be 
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a lack in covering the rise of political Islam in Turkey. This also provides 
clues for how in the first decade of the 2000s the Justice and Development 
Party (AKP) became the successor of conservative right parties’ votes of the 
1990s, the ANAP and the DYP. Turkey’s transformation of its economy to a 
free-market economy with the January 24
th
 Decisions by the 1980 military 
coup continued with Turgut Ozal’s policies of opening up the Turkish 
markets to international market and foreign competition. The elimination of 
leftists and ultranationalists by the military regime and the adoption of the 
Turkish-Islamic Synthesis (TIS) as the state ideology of Turkish 
nationalism’s mixture with Sunni Islam emerged as a political opportunity 
structure (Eligur 2010, p.226) to power the Islamist social-economic 
movement in Turkey. Basically, the military’s solution to the political 
polarisation of the country and the leftist communist threat was the TIS 
(Oktem 2011) that opened the doors to organisational and mobilisational 
activities for the Islamist activists and entrepreneurs. 
 
Turgut Ozal’s alliance and social networks with the Islamists, particularly the 
Naksibendi Islamic Brotherhood, encouraged cooperation with Saudi and 
Kuwaiti finance and played a vital role in the establishment of the Islamist 
capital and wealthy business class (Eligur 2010, p.227). Ozal’s main goal 
seemed to be to promote a modern society with a liberal economic rationality 
and the conservative values of traditional society (Kalaycıoglu 2002 p.46).  
Nilufer Gole (2000) defined Ozal’s policies as 'engineering pragmatism with 
cultural conservatism' by making use of Ozal's academic background in 
engineering. His party’s (ANAP) ideology was a combination of Islam, 
nationalism, economic liberalism, and social democracy. Regarding this 
developments, Kamrava argues (1998) that the success of Islamist parties in 
the 1990s was based on the interplay of three factors: the nature and 
evolution of the Turkish political system backed financially by the country’s 
growing Islamist business sector; the generally acknowledged failure of most 
political parties and politicians in the post-1980 coup era; and the 
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organisational capabilities and populist platforms of the Islamists and their 
dedicated party activists capitalised on the failures of others. 
 
In 1993, Ozal died suddenly of a heart attack, so under the leadership of 
Mesut Yılmaz in the 1990s, ANAP moved towards a right-wing position 
committed to free-market capitalism and nationalism (Onis 2004). Süleyman 
Demirel assumed the position of president in June 1993, and simultaneously 
the next leader of Demirel's True Path Party (Dogru Yol Partisi: DYP), Tansu 
Ciller, ascended to become Turkey's first female prime minister. This was the 
time of the end of the Cold War when the discourse of liberalism and 
democracy was utilised by the Islamists to articulate and expand their Islamic 
message of ‘Just Order’ (Eligur 2010, p.278) to the voters, and more 
significantly to the socio-economically aggrieved masses, in other words, the 
‘excluded’ voters. With the rhetoric of ‘Just Order’, the return of Necmettin 
Erbakan ended the Islamist voters’ mass support of the ANAP. Erbakan and 
the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi: RP) had begun that gradual process since 
the 1991 national elections (Yesilada 2002, p.67). 
 
In 1995, for the first time in Turkish history, the RP under the leadership of 
Necmettin Erbakan became the leading party in the country by claiming 21% 
of the total vote of the general election. Erbakan headed the coalition 
government of the DYP/RP after charges of corruption brought down the 
ANAP/DYP coalition in 1996. However, the Islamists could rule the 
coalition government for just one year. The Turkish military pushed 
Erbakan’s party out of office on February 28th 1997, which is called a 'soft 
coup' in the literature of Turkish politics. The RP was banned on January 16, 
1998, after the Constitutional Court ruled that the party's religious platform 
contradicted Turkey's secular constitution and ‘Turkey's philosophy of life’ 
(Hale and Ozbudun 2009, p.22). This was not just a state or regime matter 
but it concerned a way of living in a secular society based on separation of 
religion and worldly affairs. It means separation of social life, education, 
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family, economics, law, manners, and dress codes from religion. 
 
Basically, Turkish secularism was based on a Kemalist world-view and its 
project of modernity in the form of a legal constitutional and institutional 
separation of the secular state and religion. This sounds like a democratic 
secularism with state neutrality toward the space of religion. However, 
looking at the history of state regulation and management of religion 
demonstrates a problem of religious pluralism in Turkish society. If laicism is 
the separation of religious and state affairs as mostly expressed in Turkey, it 
requires the autonomy of religious organisations, the absence of state 
intervention in their organisation, and independence of the state from every 
form of religious legitimisation of its own power. Legal secularity should 
provide civil and political equality for all Muslim, non-Muslim, and non-
believer citizens, along with the prohibition of discrimination.  
 
The secular and religious distinction and its hand in juridical, institutional 
and every day practices in Turkey cannot guarantee the individual religious 
freedom of the members of the majority and minority religions. Turkish 
republican laicism forced a secular public sphere free from religion, like the 
means of a Habermasian concept of ‘rationalisation of the life-world’, but the 
state highly securitised secularism and politicised the majority’s religion. The 
Kemalist state banned religious parties and symbols in the public sphere; it 
controlled all religions, but only financially supports Sunni-Islam (Stephan 
2011, p.120). According to 2010 annual data from the department of 
Religious Affairs (Diyanet İsleri), the number of mosques (81.984) was 
higher than the number of schools (67.000) in Turkey, while the construction 
of religious spaces and places of worship for minorities was illegal. The 
Turkish state employed 117.541 people under the Diyanet, including the 
clerics in the mosques. The capacity of all mosques was 25 million; however, 
the number of people who regularly prayed in the mosque every morning 
was 2 million. These numbers additionally show that Turkish secularism 
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means a synthesis of Islam and the secular nationalism (Mardin 2000, p.16) 
by the establishment of state control over religion and a bureaucratisation of 
Turkish Islam from the top down (Kocan and Oncu 2004, p.466). 
 
This research advocates that these contradictory policies and the historicising 
and politicising of secularism by the Kemalist state created the 
secular/religious binary (Hurd 2011, p. 176-181), which specifically has been 
seen in the rise of the AKP in the 2000s and its challenge with secularist 
institutions of the Kemalist state. Thus, it can be argued that recent 
developments in Turkish politics can be well conceived with a projection on 
Kemalist imagination of the Turkish state-nation. So, this part of the chapter 
is devoted to highlighting the origins of the secular/religious binary in Turkey. 
 
 
2.5. Competing Nationalisms in Turkey: Turkish Nationalism versus 
Kurdish Nationalism 
Kurds are one of the main Muslim indigenous people in Turkey, particularly 
in Southern region, but being Kurdish is not a singular identity in the region. 
The Kurdish population constitutes major enclaves in Turkey, Iran, Syria, 
Iran, and Armenia; thus it can be argued that Kurdish nationalism is a product 
of the interaction between local and global politics in the twentieth century 
(Yavuz 1998, p.10). Some authors note that Kurdish political consciousness 
in terms of having a separate language, history, and culture as an ethnic 
community dates back to the early 1890s (Natali 2007, p. 384; Ozoglu 2009, 
p.63), with the movement of Kurdish Teali Cemiyeti (Society for the 
Advancement of Kurdistan). Yegen argues (2007 p.119) that the Kurdish 
issue has constantly bothered the Turkish nationalism of the same era since 
the beginning of the twentieth century. However, this second largest 
'territorial-linguistic community' of Turkey was triggered to assert its ethnic 
identity beyond resisting Turkification (Yavuz 1998). 
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This research's literature accepts that the concept of Kurdish problem is 
context-dependent and dynamic. It looks at the Kurdish question in the inter-
state paradigm of identity and power politics with a consideration of regional 
and transnational frames of analysis. In this context, this section shows the 
historical evolution of the Kurdish question in Turkey and the complexity of 
identifying the problem and the solutions offered through the competing 
perceptions. 
 
This identification of the dominant factors in the evolution of Kurdish 
identity in historical stages (Yavuz 2001, p.2) provides its challenges with 
Turkish national identity formation: 
 
1878-1924: Resistance against the centralisation of the Ottoman state within 
Nakşibendi and Kadiri Islamic networks and identity differentiation 
1925-1961: Kurdish identity formation as 'reactionary', 'tribal', and an 
outcome of regional 'backwardness' to the nation-building project of 
Mustafa Kemal and the denial of the existence of the Kurds. 
1962-1983: Secularisation of Kurdish identity within the framework of the 
broader leftist movement in Turkey between the 1960s and 1970s. 
1983-1998: The PKK-led violent insurgency, internationalisation of Kurdish 
problem 
1999-2008: The arrest of Abdullah Ocalan, the head of the PKK; 
Europeanisation of Kurdish problem. 
2009-present: AKP government’s Kurdish Initiative 
 
 
In Turkey, depending on how one perceives the nature of the struggle, this 
recognition problem has been identified as the South-east question, the terror 
problem, or the Kurdish question (Argun 1999, p.90). Different definitions of 
the Turkish nation and national identity portray the problem from different 
discourses through various inclusion and exclusion perceptions. In words it 
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remains diverse, but what has not changed is the Kurdish problem that has 
emerged with continuous tragic results. Forty thousand people died and 
nearly one million people from south-eastern Turkey had to emigrate from 
their lands. Moreover, thousands of soldiers and PKK
24
 militants lost their 
lives in the armed struggle. 
 
According to Icduygu et al. (1999, p.993), the aggressive assimilationist 
policies of the newly founded Turkish Republic towards other ethnicities 
hindered the expression of other identities and languages in Turkey. In 
particular, the state and nation building deficiencies in Turkish identity 
caused an exclusion of Kurdish identity and the birth of the problem. On the 
other hand, Islamist groups claim that the main cause of the Kurdish Problem 
is the Republican policies of secularisation that caused the destruction of the 
Islamic brotherhood between peoples (Sarigil 2008). Constructing common 
Islamic ties in the country can end the conflict by weakening the ethnic 
separatism (Cizre-Sakallioglu 1998). 
 
After the 1980 military intervention, the depoliticisation of against the left 
and right movements and the promotion of the role of religion to cement the 
consolidation of nation and society was the state project that also provided an 
atmosphere for growing and politicising identity politics. Although the 
Constitution of 1982 defined a Turk by stating, 'Everyone bound to the 
Turkish state through the bond of citizenship is a Turk' in a civic nationalist 
sense, the existence of a separate Kurdish identity was not recognised. The 
Article 89 of the 1982 Constitution stated that 'no political party may concern 
itself with the defence, development, or diffusion of any non-Turkish 
language or culture; nor may seek to create minorities within our frontiers or 
to destroy our national unity'. Moreover, the Article 3 of the Law 2932 
                                               
24 It is acronym of Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan in Kurdish, means Kurdistan Workers' Party, 
which is listed as a terrorist organization internationally by several states and organizations, 
including the NATO and the EU. 
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declared Turkish as the 'mother tongue' of all Turkish citizens and prohibited 
the use and dissemination of other languages as a mother tongue, which, in 
reaction, turned the Kurdish language into a symbol of Kurdish nationhood 
(Yavuz 1999, p.14). As a reaction to the Turkish-Islamic synthesis of the new 
interpretation of state policy, Kurdish ethno-nationalism intensified the ethnic 
struggle (Donmez 2006, p.558). On the other hand, Turkish nationalist 
perception of the Kurdish question, in particular the MHP's perception was 
based on denial until the 1990s.  For its followers, ‘Kurdish-Turks’ were 
open to the manipulation of external separatist powers, and the solution was 
Turkification by building the consciousness of belonging to the Turkish 
nation, because ‘Kurds are the Turks who have forgotten their Turkishness’ 
(Bora and Can 2004). 
 
Commonly, the Kurdish problem has been seen as an issue of regional 
economic development or a military security matter rather than an ethno-
political problem (Saracoglu 2009, p.240). The Kemalist state authorities 
claimed that their citizens of Kurdish descent enjoyed full rights as Turkish 
citizens (Gunter 2000, p.849). The official refusal of the existence of a 
Kurdish problem defined it as a terror problem. In this perspective, if there 
was a struggle for the human rights, it was a democratic demand for every 
citizen. Connectedly, this perception within the official discourse tended to 
ground the militarisation of the Kurdish problem and the securitisation of the 
Kurdish identity in the 1990s on the outcome of the Cold War bipolarity and 
the rising leftist discourse. Thus, when it became a national security concern 
(Ozcan 2011), the state discourse addressed it in a militarised and 
authoritarian manner. 
 
This literature on Turkey's Kurdish question exhibits the existing diversity in 
understanding and nomination of the problem. It can be said that different 
definitions of the issue bring out different solutions. Yegen (2011) elaborates 
the Kurdish problem perceptions of three distinct Turkish nationalisms: 
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mainstream, extreme right-wing, and left-wing Turkish nationalism. The 
mainstream version views the discontent of Kurds and their rebellion of 1925 
as the resistance of pre-modern tribal social structures to the foundation of 
the nation-state. In other words, it was nothing, but the resistance of the logic 
of revolution and resistance of the past to the present. With the cessation of 
Kurdish revolts in the 1950s, the component of mainstream perception had 
new focus through the discourse of massive underdevelopment in south-
eastern Anatolia and the lack of economic integration between the region and 
the national market. The left-wing Turkish nationalism referred to the 
problem with the same vocabulary such as regional inequalities, feudal 
relations, and regional backwardness; however, this perception also 
recognised the ethno-cultural aspect of the Kurdish question. At the same 
time, a racist version of Turkish nationalism appeared and became a political 
movement in the 1960s and the 1970s. Yegen (ibid p.236) cites from this 
perspective's spectacular intellectual representative, Nihal Atsız, who 
suggested that the reason behind the Kurdish unrest was foreign incitement 
and that they had no alternative but to leave the country as the Armenians 
had. One of the most noteworthy findings of Yegen is that all of the Turkish 
nationalisms perceived that Kurds could become Turkish; therefore Kurds 
did not experience massive discrimination in citizenship practices like non-
Muslim citizens did. That was because the Kurds were expected to be Turks 
under the umbrella of a homogenised, mono-linguistic Muslim nation. 
Significantly, he concludes that both the Turkish state and ordinary Turkish 
citizens have been revising their perception of Kurds. They used to believe 
the problem could be solved by means of re-Turkification in a massive 
assimilation, but not anymore. Yegen concludes that building connections 
with non-Muslim inhabitants by saying 'Jewish Kurds' (ibid p.240) or 
'Armenian Kurds' indicates Turkish nationalists perceive Kurds as a disloyal, 
untrustworthy people on Turkish territory. 
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2.6. The Challenges of Turkey's Kemalist Identity in the Post-Cold War 
Era: Transformation of the Domestic Power Relations and the Rise of 
the AKP 
In regard to the emergence of Turkey's post-Kemalist identity, this section 
considers the developments brought by the military coup of September 1980 
that transformed Turkey beyond the paradigm of the ‘first modernity’ 
(Atasoy 2009, p.70). First of all, the Kemalist paradigm has been faced with 
challenges under the neo-liberal restructuring of the Turkish economy after 
1980. The consequence of neo-liberal globalisation led to the emergence of 
an ‘ideology of the excluded’ (Onis 2001, p. 282) in demanding economic 
and political power from the Kemalist state. By reference to social injustices, 
two traditional ‘others’ of the state participated in the identity politics that 
were the growing concerns of Islamic rich capitalist religious groups over 
political rights, and the emergence of Kurdish claims to cultural rights in the 
1990s. 
 
In the 1990s, it seemed that Islamic orientation to the politics of neo-liberal 
social and global transformation had been more successful than the Kemalist 
paradigm’s adaptation to globalisation (Gambetti 2009). Turkish Islamic 
groups have participated in the institutionalisation of neo-liberalism, and 
some of them have even moved beyond the national borders and turned into 
global movements by enlarging civic engagement in the economy, 
particularly the Naqshbandi religious order, the Nurcu community, and the 
Gulen community (Atasoy 2009 p.108). 
 
By the 1990s, one of the results of the Gulf War was the appearance of the 
tragedy of Iraqi Kurds in the news media, which caused economic and social 
internationalisation of the Kurdish question (Yegen 2007, pp.135-136). The 
post-Cold War ideas of liberalisation and globalisation concerning identity, 
difference, culture, and human rights contributed to visibility of the 
discontent of the Kurdish masses and the rise of Kurdish demands. Turgut 
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Ozal, the prime minister of Turkey between 1983 and 1999 and president 
from 1990 until 1993 acknowledged the Kurdish reality. He responded to the 
international and domestic developments of the 1991 Gulf War and the 
Kurdish question; in this regard he met with the leaders of two Iraqi Kurdish 
factions, Mustafa Barzani and Jalal Talabani. Ozal’s liberalisation of the 
country’s policy transformed the discourse of Kurdish nationalism, 
demanding their collective identity in a democratic context (Donmez 2006, 
p.561). Kurdish parties could enter parliament, representing Kurdish 
demands though non-violent means, although members of the parties had 
close relationships with the PKK (Guney 1999, p.126). 
 
After the Cold War, the ideology and discourse of the PKK had a mutation 
that was shifting towards concepts such as 'democratic solution' and enjoying 
human rights within the existing borders of Turkey (Romano 2006, p.124). In 
1999, the capture of Abdullah Ocalan, the leader of the PKK, and becoming a 
candidate country for membership in the EU opened the door to 
constitutional liberalisation in line with EU requirements relating to the 
Kurdish problem in Turkey. 
 
Since 2003, the US occupation of Iraq has changed the discourse of Kurdish 
nationalism by the establishment of Kurdish self-administration as a federal 
state in Iraq. Due to increasing sympathy with the Kurdish political authority 
among Kurds (Yegen 2007, p.178), the scenarios of demands of rebels for 
independence of the Kurds in Turkey added a new dimension to the Kurdish 
problem (Saracoglu 2009, p. 655).  That is an anxious prospect for Turkey, 
sourcing a fundamental change in Turkish nationalism’s image of Kurds. 
 
There are diverse opinions on how the Kurdish national demands are being 
articulated within the discourse of democracy, and what is the political 
project of the Kurdish national movement that is seek to build (Gunes 2009, 
p. 262). A federal type solution for Kurdish demands in Turkey is debated 
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(Icduygu 1999; Ergil 2009). Accordingly, Canefe (2008, p.394) notes that 
Turkey's Kurds prefer to identify themselves as a part of Turkey in the 
European Union, instead of as citizens of a possible united Kurdistan. 
Contrary, Laciner (2012) argues that taking liberal steps on the issue 
demonstrated that the problem is beyond human rights and democracy; 
whether the PKK espouses a separate Kurdish state is clear. 
 
Furthermore, the rising tension of the reactions towards the attacks of the 
PKK and spreading anti-Kurdish discourse in popular media and the internet 
have caused the Kurds to become the 'primary other' (Arsan 2012; Yegen 
2006) of the Turkish nation in daily life, with the recognition of them as 
separatist people. The link between the Kurds and the PKK has become more 
visible. The attachment between the Kurds and the PKK separatism 
marginalised attitudes against the Kurdish people in everyday life (Saracoglu 
2009, p.653). In this context of regarding Turkish people's views on the issue, 
Mesut Yegen (2011) argued that Turkish nationalism's perception of the 
Kurdish question has had an evolution from 'banditry to disloyalty'. 
 
However, a liberal discourse on the question has been strengthening in 
academic and political debates in terms of democratisation in the last decade. 
The historical steps towards recognising certain political and cultural rights 
of Kurds have now been taken in reality. The amendments on cultural rights 
with the candidacy of Turkey to join the European Union provided the 
instruments for the massive production and reproduction of Kurdishness in 
Turkey, and thus the Kurds gained a status that has a possibility of hindering 
their assimilation into Turkishness (Yegen 2007, p.178). But, since 2006, the 
national disappointment regarding relations with the EU has triggered the 
anxiety of Turkish nationalism regarding the Kurdish question in Turkey 
(Tocci 2007, p.141). In this context, Celik and Blum’s workshop study (2007) 
demonstrated that the failure of the EU process would lead to a re-emergence 
of a more aggressive Turkish nationalism with a mixture of anti-Western and 
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anti-imperialist sentiments (ibid p.577). But, an EU process that goes well 
would create a stable political environment within Turkey (ibid. p.575). The 
EU would be a national project that both Turks and Kurds could support and 
create an environment in which moderation and mutual accommodation are 
possible with a construction of the ‘self-confidence’ of both the Turkish state 
and the Kurdish community. 
 
In addition, different perspectives of Kurdish nationalism position Turkey's 
Kurds differently in the power struggle. For instance, the PKK and the BDP 
can be seen as the manifestation of a secular and leftist version of Kurdish 
nationalism. As the other type of Kurdish nationalism in Turkey, traditional 
elite nationalism and religious-conservative nationalism have mainly been 
represented under the mainstream centre-right parties in relation to socio-
economic reasons (Sarigil 2010). They were seen as 'loyalists' or 'pro-state' 
(Somer 2011, p.273) in Turkish political life. Looking at this profile of 
Kurdish nationalism demonstrates why the AKP has benefited from rising 
Islamic conservatism in the south-east and the weakness of opposition parties 
that adopt a security-orientated approach to the Kurdish conflict. Before the 
AKP came to power, secularist CHP was a supporter of a democratic 
resolution. Their sentiments against the government's conservative agenda 
failed their social democrat approach in the means of the freedom of religion 
and ethnic pluralism. The PKK's control of the BDP creates a security 
dilemma for Kemalist secularists; hence they could not cooperate with 
Kurdish leftists in order to cope with the AKP's Islamic conservative political 
identity. It seems that Kurds have prefered to ally with the Islamists in the 
transformation of the Kemalist nation-state identity for the consolidation of 
democracy in the last decade. In this manner, polarisation over secularism 
contributed to the complexity of the Kurdish question. 
 
Although Islamist groups and the RP came out against Turkey's application 
for the membership in the European Union in the 1990s, Recep Tayyip 
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Erdogan’s newly formed party, AKP emphasised its strong support for 
Turkish entry into the EU in its election campaign of 2002.  Although the 
party had Islamic roots and supporters, they changed their discourse to form 
an ideological moderation in domestic politics. Sayari notes (2007 p.201) 
that Erdogan and his group were convinced that the state elites would not 
permit a pro-Islamist party with anti-system tendencies to stay in power even 
if it controlled a plurality of seats in the parliament. Discursive moderation of 
the party ideology strengthened the party’s credibility and legitimacy with 
the Turkish voters, winning support from the conservative and nationalist 
voters. In 2002, the election was a victory for the AKP by gaining 34 percent 
of the total vote. Indeed, the weakness and fragmentation of the political 
opposition of the 1990s has played a beneficial role in the emergence of the 
AKP’s dominance in the post-2002 Turkish party system. 
 
The development of Turkey in the 2000s led by pro-Islamist AKP has 
affected many core problematic areas of national policies, discourses, and 
identities in Turkey, such as the representation of Islamic groups in politics 
and the acknowledgement of cultural and political rights of Kurds and non-
Muslim minorities. The AKP has recently brought an alternative form of 
modernity to Turkey in regard to Islam and democracy relations (Kaya 2011). 
The process of Turkey’s integration with the European Union empowered the 
ruling party AKP’s legitimacy in transforming Turkish domestic and foreign 
policy, particularly Kemalist state structure and identity politics, such as 
highly sensitive issues involving religion, the military, and minorities (Toktas 
and Aras 2013). EU membership process required the broadening of 
individual and liberal freedoms and consolidating European norms and 
values in Turkey. In order to satisfy the EU criteria, Turkey had to integrate 
the demands of identity politics into the national identity. 
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2.7. European Identity and Turkey's Europeanisation Process under the 
AKP Government 
One of the main assumptions of this study is that national identities are 
defined by the actor's interaction with, and relationship to, other actors in 
international and domestic politics. In the context of European identity, it can 
be argued that here is no single European identity (Katzenstein and Checkel 
2009, p.213); this is because of the various nations of Europe have very 
different mean levels of European identity (Bruter 2005, p.135) and very 
different experiences in European integration (Kaiser and Elvert 2005). A 
topic in European affairs as identity would take a reference for definition 
between the various and confusing meanings of ‘identity’ (Cerutti and 
Lucarelli 2008, p.3-4); thus European identities should be understood in a 
broader sense in the terms of pluralism, multiculturalism, and unity in 
diversity (Delanty and Rumford 2005). The purpose of this section is to give 
an overview of the socio-cultural aspects of Turkey-EU relations and to 
highlight the findings of some of the previous studies that were conducted to 
address the cultural debates of Turkey's place in Europe. 
 
The image of the Turks in Europe has been formed and reformed for 700 
years due to socio-political and cultural reasons. During the expansion period 
of the Ottoman Empire, particularly the fifteenth century, the time of the 
conquest of Istanbul by Fatih Sultan Mehmet, the image was of 'threat', 'fear', 
'grand', 'enemy', 'barbaric' and 'cruel'. Muslim and Turk had no differences in 
the Middle Age perception of Europe and they were considered to be the 
'enemy of Christianity'. As significant historical events, the expansion of the 
Balkans and the occupation of Vienna had a negative impact in the minds of 
the Europeans (Tilly 1990, pp.273-276). Kula argues (2006, p.308) that 
newspapers such as 'Neue Zeitung' and 'Türkendrucke' printed the events, 
conquests, and occupations that spread the fear of Turks and created a mass 
fear and common perception of Turks that was dominant in the memories of 
Europeans during almost two centuries in Eastern Europe. 
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After the eighteenth century, the fall of the Ottoman Empire caused changes 
in the perceptions of the Europeans regarding the Turks. Reformation, 
Enlightenment, and Colonialism movements transformed the social, 
philosophical, and political relationships of Europeans with 'others' (Kula 
2006). Turks had not been a 'threat' anymore in the eyes of the powerful 
bourgeoisie of Europe and, had been more of a mystery of the Orient (Said 
1977) to discover. The spread of the movement in the works of art, music, 
and literature that was called Turquerie was a main indicator in the early 
Modern Age. The Turkish culture, way of life, and dressing became 
fashionable, especially in France, where people had their portraits done in 
Turkish robes and kaftans. In the diaries of travellers and merchants, and the 
reports of envoys and consuls, the Turks were represented from both a 
positive and a negative perspective according to the influence of romanticism 
and exoticism (Soykut 2007, p.203). They were ‘religion-wise’ the ‘others’ in 
the Middle Ages; this situation changed slightly, and they became ‘culture-
wise’ the ‘others’ (Delanty 2001; Goody 2005). 
 
The nineteenth century visual representation of the Turks was the image of 
‘the sick man of Europe’ that dominated the main character of the East 
Question with the collapse of the Ottomans. Another important phenomenon 
that had a vast impact on European perceptions of the Turks was the Turkish 
Independence War that took place after the First World War and the image of 
M. Kemal Ataturk, 'the founding father of modern Turkey' (Ozyurek 2006, 
p.1) was printed in the newspapers of many countries of the world (Gursoy 
1989). As indicated before, Turkey had taken Europe as a model of 
modernisation (Kamali 2006) long before even the founding of the Republic. 
Turkish history has in some respects a striking number of parallels with that 
of Western Europe (Zurcher and Linden 2007, p.68). Turkey's modernisation 
and westernisation have been the continuous state identity policy of Turkey 
since the construction of an official discourse by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk in 
the 1920s. The impartiality policy of Turkey during the Second World War 
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was followed by the western alliance foreign policy during the Cold War 
period.  In this foreign policy context, the relations between the EC/EU and 
Turkey date back to 1963, which was the year of the signature of the 
association agreement. Moreover, in the 1960s Germany and the central 
European countries required a workforce from Turkey to repair the damage 
of war and strengthen their industries. The migration of Turkish guest-
workers who came from rural areas with economic woes had a negative 
impact on hosts' perceptions of the Turks (Kaya and Kentel 2005). Although 
there has been the development of good impressions and friendships between 
the groups, the image of migrant workers in Europe has become a stereotype 
of the general image of the Turk in Europe (Burcoglu 1999). Turkey’s 
strategic significance during the Cold War encouraged its definition as 
‘European’ (Coban 2012), but since at least the early 1970s, Europe sought to 
develop a collective identity based on shared civilisational values, thus, the 
definition of ‘European’ has shifted to what has been described as the 
‘democratic tradition’ of European integration (Smith and Wright 1999).  
Although signing the Ankara Treaty was recognition of Turkey's Europeaness, 
the paradigm change at the end of the Cold War caused an increase in debates 
on democracy, human rights, and identity in international relations that 
triggered reinterpretation of Turkish identity in Turkey and Europe (Yilmaz 
2007). 
 
The economic, political, and social factors have gained importance in 
Europe’s approach to Turkey in regard to the EC and the EC has begun to put 
greater emphasis on standards of the candidate countries to have institutions 
guaranteeing democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, and respecting 
and protecting minority rights, formulated by the Copenhagen Summit of 
1993. As Verney points out (2007) Turkey’s image has not corresponded with 
the democratic European ideal in the 1990s. Turkey applied for full 
membership in the EC in 1987. After the Customs Union agreement was 
signed between Turkey and the EU in 1995, Turkey adopted a major package 
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of constitutional change for democratic reformation and finally the European 
Council granted Turkey candidacy in 1999 in Helsinki. 
 
After the Cold War, European decision makers started to construct their own 
security culture beyond the NATO security agenda. For instance, migration 
has been seen as a challenge for European Integration in regard to it as a 
source of new insecurities. This has had major implications for Turkey's 
accession to the membership. In particular, Turkey's large population and its 
cultural differences have been questioned after the Eastern enlargement. With 
the dissolution of the communist regimes of the Central and Eastern 
European Countries, the Turkish application for full membership lost its 
significance for the EU with the emerging process of integration of Western 
and Eastern Europe. Turkey was pushed to the back of the queue as the post-
Cold War Europe redefined itself (Bilgin 2007). This period made more 
apparent the issue of human rights in crystallising the difference between 
perceptions of security in Turkey and Europe in the individual, societal, and 
national dimensions of the term. In a nutshell, before the Cold War, Turks 
were the significant ‘other’ of Europeans over which they defined their own 
identity strategic considerations. During the Cold War period Turkey 
occupied the buffer state role as a barrier to the Soviet threat; thus this 
perception of Turks as the others of Europe lost its significance. Since the 
end of the Cold War era, the debate about Turkey’s identity, culture, and 
place in Europe has been raised once again (Redmond 2007, p.306).   
 
After the trauma of February 28th 1997, the Islamists has been back with 
new defence tactics (Keyman 2012) with the discourse of democracy and 
utilizing European Union membership as a political opportunity and a liberal 
tool kit for the Islamist demands (Eligur 2010, p.278). Turkish nation/state 
identity has been reconstructed by new emerging political elites of pro-
Islamist AKP and Kurdish parties through using the EU as a legitimate power 
(Zucconi 2009, p.25), and it has shaped what constitutes Turkish Foreign 
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Policy.  In the 2000s, EU accession process provided a much-needed 
legitimisation of the pro-Islamist AKP government, and democratic reform 
would also guarantee the party’s political power, given the unlikelihood of 
the party being banned like its predecessors (Narbone and Tocci 2007, p.239). 
The EU conditionality triggered a process of structural change in the Turkish 
political system that is a response to the policies of the European Union. 
Changes that were closely identified with Europe have been made to direct 
attention to the problems of democracy as human rights and its consolidation 
(Keyman 2007; Ozbudun 2009). However, many of the secular elites, the 
military and Turkish nationalists were uncomfortable with the political 
reforms promoted through Europeanisation process (Muftuler-Bac 2005, 
p.21). The harmonisation packages entered into force by the AKP, brought 
significant changes (Parker 2009, p.1093) to the freedom of association, and 
deterrence against torture and mistreatment; and they also amended the Penal 
Code, the Law on State Security Courts, the Press Law, the Law on Political 
Parties, the Law on the Use of the Right of Petition (Gunter 2007, pp. 117-
123; Cizre 2004 p.109). In addition to these they introduced significant legal 
changes expanding the freedom of expression, religious freedom, and right to 
retrial. A state-centric, security-orientated vision of Turkey that had a number 
of serious problems (Oktem et al. 2010), such as democratic deficit, a 
legitimacy crisis, human rights violations, minority rights, torture, the rule of 
law, and economic instability showed unexpected fundamental developments 
to create a more rights-based citizenship regime. 
 
Despite the fact that the years between 2001 and 2005 were very significant, 
from the adoption of the National Program for membership to the launch of 
the negotiations at the end of 2005, public survey reports found that there has 
been a dramatic drop in the support expressed by the Turkish public
25
 since 
                                               
25
 According to the Survey of Turkey's EU Perception that was published in 2007 by the 
International Strategic Research Organization, the rise of the 'privileged partnership' debate 
and sentimental issues on Cyprus engendered the fall of support of Turkish citizens for EU 
accession (from 75 percent to 45 percent) since the negotiations started in 2005. The 
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continued dispute over Cyprus suspended Turkey's EU negotiation talks on 
eight chapters in December 2006. In 2007, the Turkish Foreign Minister and 
chief negotiator with the EU, Ali Babacan, claimed that ‘certain negative 
statements’ and perceptions of European officials and politicians led the 
Turkish people to think that they were ‘not wanted’ in the EU. EU leaders' 
expression of a 'privileged partnership' instead of full membership in a deal 
with the arguments on Turkey's population, geography, and culture ‘would 
weaken the Turkish public's trust in the EU'. Similarly, in September 2013 
Turkish EU Affairs Minister Egemen Bagis argued that Turkey would 
probably never join the European Union because of prejudicial attitudes by 
the bloc's existing members. In this context, some factors were underlining 
this downward trend of the Turkish people's perceptions of the EU. As an 
important factor, asymmetrical relationship with the EU increases negative 
perceptions in Turkey (Taraktas 2008, p.254). For instance, the Customs 
Union agreement established an asymmetrical relationship, in that Turkey 
had to comply with decisions but could not participate in the decision-
making. In addition, Turkey’s exclusion from the list of candidate countries 
in 1998 has strengthened the public impression that the EU was using 
‘prospective accession’ to exploit Turkey through the Customs Union. 
Moreover, EU reforms’ effects on breaking Turkey’s taboos play role in 
Turkish Euro-scepticism, specifically in the issues of the Cyprus policy, 
Kurdish Problem, civil-military relations, Armenian genocide claims. One of 
the significant factors is mutual rise in negative perceptions of the Muslim 
and Western world in post 9/11 process. In this context, European reluctance 
to include Turkey is not negligible. The ‘privileged partnership’ and ‘open-
ended process’ debates raised by the EU leaders as well as vocal rejections 
                                                                                                                         
percentage of people who think 'the EU does not treat equally towards Turkey' was 81 
percent in November 2006. Similarly, Hakan Yılmaz's research project (2009), which was 
financed by the EU, aimed to uncover the European perceptions of Turkey and trace the 
Euro-sceptic narrative. The research found that 60 percent of the respondents agreed with the 
view that the EU treated Turkey with double standards. In addition, in September 2013 a 
German Marshall Fund report indicated that support for EU membership among the Turkish 
public is still around 44 percent. 
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by the public to Turkey's EU membership contrast with the Kemalist idea of 
the ‘grandeur’ of the nation and produces a feeling of being undermined 
(Taraktas 2008, p.255). 
 
In light of the historical indicators that draw a general portrait of a Europe 
reluctant for inclusion of Turkey in the Union, on the other side of the coin, a 
deeper understanding of Turkish perspectives should also be considered in 
explaining both new Turkish self-identification and cultural debates in the 
context of Turkey’s place in Europe. Thus, this study challenges the 
argument that Turkey wants to be an EU member and argues new Turkey's 
post-Kemalist identification does not locate it in Europe. In this regard, as 
Canefe and Bora’ (2005, p.126) suggested, the debates should go beyond the 
accession issue: 
'Europe constitutes a key part of Turkey’s relations with the outside 
world. However, it would be a mistake to reduce the Turkish society 
and state’s relations with Europe to the issue of inclusion in the 
European Union. Turkey has a long history of opposing, admiring, 
copying, denying, naming and judging things European. In this 
regard, the Turkish modernization project and its defenders as well 
as its critics have a complex relationship with the idea of Europe 
and what constitutes European identity. The current state of 
relations between European states and Turkey, revolving primarily 
around the issue of inclusion in the EU, thus has to be examined in 
light of this cultural background and the political debates that lie 
beyond the accession debate.' 
 
 
2.8. The Paradigm Shift after September 11
th
 2001 and Redefinition of 
Turkey's European/Western Identity 
Although Turkey became a candidate country for EU membership in 1999, 
the 9/11 attacks in 2001 changed the paradigm yet again. In the aftermath of 
the Islamic terrorist events of 11 September 2001 and the later bombings in 
London and Madrid that resulted in the association of terrorism with Islam in 
Europe (Canan-Sokullu 2011). The events provoked mutual aggression and 
cultural conflicts, in other words, like 'the clash of civilisations' (Huntington 
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2002) that defined 'Islam' as a civilisation confronting the West or Europe. 
The identity and security concerns of Turkey and the EU diversified in 
definition of the threats in and outside the community. The EU has put more 
focus on the military and technological dimensions of security as it is seen in 
border management. On the other hand, Turkey's political transformation had 
consequences for the redefinition of national security and formulation of 
Turkish foreign policy in general. The EU accession process encouraged a 
change of the tools that are used in foreign policy-making (Altunisik and 
Martin 2011, p.579).  For instance, the military’s power (symbolic and actual) 
in Turkey's political discourse has decreased (Bilgin 2011, p.78). Parallel to 
this, Turkey put more emphasis on diplomacy in foreign policy and less 
emphasis on the use of force in prioritising its economic interest. Moreover, 
in the shadow of the clash of civilisation thesis, Turkey's conservative elites 
benefited from the post 9/11 atmosphere and U.S advocacy of moderate 
Islam as a state model for the Muslim world (Eligur 2010, p.282). 
 
The Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoglu’s (2009-2014) Strategic 
Depth approach (Davutoglu 2006; Duran 2006; Sozen 2010), has been 
blended with five new principles: balance between security and freedom; 
zero problems with neighbours; multidimensional and multi-track policies; a 
new diplomatic discourse based on firm flexibility; and rhythmic diplomacy.   
Based on a new geographic imagination (Aras and Fidan 2009) and 
cilivisational geopolitical vision (Bilgin and Bilgic 2011), the AKP’s 
conservative ideology has repositioned and reconstructed Turkey’s political 
terrain in foreign policy in terms of creating a new sense of a macro-identity 
among populations that share the Ottoman Islamic heritage and targeting zero 
problems with Turkey’s neighbours. In the new geographic imagination 
Turkey is located outside Western civilisation and it is imagined as the leader 
of its own civilisation, which changes the definitions of 'us' and 'others' (ibid 
p.173). The logic of this transformation is a world-view that is constructed on 
the basis of a selective reading of Ottoman administrative practices in the 
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issues of religious, cultural, and ethnic identity. In this regard, it offers a 
rearticulating of Turkish nation-state identity from a post-Kemalist 
perspective. 
 
There has been more emphasis on using soft power with dialogue, economic 
liberalisation and economic interdependency, which led to an increase in 
efforts towards engagement with other regions, especially with the Middle 
East due to the rising Euro-scepticism in Turkey since 2006. In addition to 
the anti-EU discourse, a nationalist reaction with an anti-USA and anti-
globalisation discourse began to appear in Turkish public discourse due to the 
growing instability and the human costs of the Iraq War.  Since the crucial 
March 1, 2003 decision not to allow US troops through Turkish territory 
during the invasion of Iraq, Turkey has moved as an independent actor in 
foreign policy (Ozcan 2011, p.74). The problematic relations with the USA 
have contributed to a major increase in anti-American and anti-West 
sentiments in Turkey
26
. 
 
The main axis of Turkish foreign policy before the AKP government in the 
2000s was the Turkey–United States–Israel triangle27.  In opposition to that, 
during the AKP era, Israel has become the most unfriendly country to Turkey, 
according to 40 percent of the people (TESEV 2010) due to the events in 
Gaza in late 2008 and early 2009, the Davos incident between Prime Minister 
Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Israeli President Shimon Peres, and the flotilla 
episode with Israel’s military intervention on the flagship Mavi Marmara in 
March 2010. The United States is also seen as the second most unfriendly 
country to Turkey by 33 percent of the people of Turkey, followed by Greece 
and France. On the other hand, the countries considered most friendly 
                                               
26 Nasuh Uslu, Metin Toprak, Ibrahim Dalmis, and Ertan Aydin, “Turkish Public Opinion 
towards the United States in the Context  of the Iraqi Question,” MERIA 9, no. 3 (September 
2005): 6 
27 Soner Cagaptay, “Where Goes the U.S.-Turkish Relationship?” Middle East Quarterly 
(Fall 2004): 3 
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towards Turkey are Iran (13 percent), Azerbaijan (10 percent), the US (10 
percent) and Pakistan (9 percent). Consequently, it seems that EU 
membership and alliance with the West has lost its attraction in Turkey while 
interest in the affairs of the East and Muslim countries is rising. Turkey has 
improved its relations with its regional neighbours and involvement in the 
Middle East in increasing economic and political relations with the Muslim 
countries. 
 
Turkey’s improving relations with Iran and its vote against the resolution of 
the UN Security Council about the Iranian nuclear program caused 
questioning of whether it was shifting its axis, moving away from its 
traditional Western orientation to the East or the Islamic world. Since 2008, 
indicators of Islamisation of international relations increased (Criss 2010, p. 
53). In July 2008 during the African summit, Ankara hosted Sudan’s 
president, Omar al-Bashir, who is responsible for the massacre of 200,000 
non-Arab Africans. Moreover, the deterioration of Turkish–Israeli relations 
after the Gaza War (2008–09) created a scandal at the Davos World 
Economic Forum on March 2, 2009. Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan in 
anger shouted insults at Israel’s President Shimon Peres in the meeting. The 
AKP government's relationship with Hamas also strengthened the view that 
Turkey is diverging from Western orientation in its Middle East policies. The 
AKP’s emphasis on Turkey’s geopolitical position and its cultural and 
historical connections with an aim of being a regional and global power has 
changed the axis of its relations with regional powers. But internal and 
international dynamics create new challenges to follow a democratic project, 
as it was seen in the Kurdish issue. 
 
 
Conclusion 
In the Chapter 1, it is argued that self-imagination of a nation is about how a 
nation reflects on its identity in the presence of others; in other words, self-
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image is always constructed vis-a`-vis another.  In this context, throughout 
the Chapter 2, it is demonstrated that Turkey's self-image is often constructed 
vis-a`-vis the West or Europe. Kemalists imagined Turkey as a secular, 
modern, Western and a Turkic country with a specific focus on the 
Republican times.  The Republican elites’ perception of the Turkish "self" as 
European with a civilizing (Yavuz 1998, p.27) mission caused Turkey's 
inclusion in different Western institutions as NATO and the EC provided 
necessary institutional grounds for the statist elite to restructure domestic 
politics. In the terms of domestic others, Turkish nation-state identity is 
constructed against non-Muslim, Islamist and Kurdish identities. It is also 
indicated that since 2002, under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the 
reformist Islamists identified a reimagined Ottoman imperial project and 
searched for a non-territorially defined identity have become more effective 
in conditioning and shaping the state's policies and the society's perception of  
'self'. This Chapter revealed that the post-Cold War international paradigm 
shift, Europeanisation process and new civilisational imagination of AKP 
have emerged a reconstruction of Turkey's identity, which can be called as 
'post-Kemalism'. For a comprehensive understanding of this normative 
change in Turkish politics rather than just seeing different representations of 
the EU/West, this study contributes to existing literature by analysing the 
power struggle in the revision of Turkish national identity and Turkish 
foreign policy. In this manner, this thesis argues that there are different 
Turkeys with different imaginations of the nation and the state. In comparing 
the different discourses of Turkish nationalism via the case studies in the 
national and international context, it shows Turkish identity as a negotiated 
concept and deconstructs long-lasting polarisations in definitions of Turkish 
national identity, particularly essentialist, naturalised concepts of the nation 
that predominantly hinder the solutions to live together. In addition, the 
questions of how the ‘us/other’ relations emerge through these discourses and 
how various ideological positions are formed, are useful to shed light on 
Turkey’s place in the world and its international relations. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
NATION AND RELIGION: DISCOURSE ANALYSIS OF THE  
CONTESTED NARRATIVES OF TURKISHNESS 
 
 
 
Introduction 
This chapter explores the emergence of the post-Kemalist narrative of Turkey 
and its challenges through analysing different discourses of Turkish identity 
in terms of religion and nation. This thesis argues that ‘religion’ is a major 
constitutive content of Turkish nationalism and it has played a crucial role in 
the domestic struggle in redefinition of Turkey’s inter-national identity. As 
the main principles and components of Turkey’s Kemalist nation-state 
identity, secularism is seen fundamental for the conditions of democracy and 
modernity in Turkey. In this context, for the articulation of construction of 
post-Kemalist Turkish nation-state identity in Turkish media discourse, this 
chapter analyses the case of assassination of journalist Hrant Dink and the 
national tension during Turkey's Presidential Elections in 2007. 
 
 
3.1. The Importance and Background of the Case of Hrant Dink 
A human rights activist, Armenian
28
 journalist Hrant Dink, was shot by a 
seventeen-year-old Turkish extreme-nationalist on 19
 
January 2007 in 
Istanbul. Dink’s case and its trial became a unique symbol of anti-racism in 
Turkey (Goktas 2009).  At his funeral, more than 100,000 people chanted 
“We are all Hrant Dink. We are all Armenian.” However, this expression was 
responded to with “We are all Turks” slogans throughout the country. This 
                                               
28
 It should be noted that he had been on trial with the accusation of ‘humiliating 
Turkishness’ for three years because of the way Hrant Dink identified himself as ‘I am not 
Turk. I am from Turkey and I am Armenian’ in a speech that he gave in a conference that 
took place in Urfa in 2002. He was a Turkish citizen, but an Armenian, instead of using the 
term ‘Turkish Armenian’, ‘Armenian’ is used to identify since he preferred this identification. 
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was reiterated in a weekly published comic, Penguen, in the form of a 
sarcastic caricature. It was represented in an ‘alien’ story. In front of a 
spaceship, an alien says to a stubble and burly Turkish man: “Hello earthling! 
We are friends.” But the man says: “Not Earthling! We are Turks!” and in 
anger, “What’s wrong with you?” Frightened the alien apologises: “Well, 
Pardon,” and wants to leave the place. This comic summarises well the 
ethnic nationalist discourse and the anger of Turkey towards others, as 
Kerem Oktem (2011) called Turkey an ‘angry nation’. 
 
Within the media, this discourse of ‘angry nation’ has been reproduced, 
distributed and has become more visible. It is also important to note that the 
perpetrator of the assassination, Ogun Samast, said (Turkmen-Dervisoglu 
2013, p.680): “I am not guilty. Guilty are the headlines that showed Dink as a 
traitor. I learnt about Dink from newspaper headlines.” It can be argued that 
the media has played a role in reproducing nationalist discourse and 
portraying Dink as a political figure who was targeted (Goktas 2007) by right 
wing radical Turkish nationalists. Therefore, the media coverage on the event 
of the assassination of Hrant Dink is chosen in the first case of the project to 
represent inclusion and exclusion narratives of non-Muslim elements in 
definition of the Turkish nation. 
 
This case has a great significance to illustrate that the anger and hatred 
discourse in the media distribute the banal nationalism in the daily usage of 
language. Naturalising the hatred and anger discourse to the others and 
construction of Turkish identity by expression of discrimination or by 
strengthening alienated features of the others, transforms murderous actions 
to stories of heroism with legitimating strategies. The murderer, Ogun 
Samast was seen as being proud of killing the Armenian. He was held in high 
esteem. His pictures were taken with the Turkish flag behind him after he 
was taken to the custody; the posters of ‘Turkey lost one of its enemies’ were 
seen in the football stadium; even the news written that linked the jumping 
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white beret sales with the Samast’s clothes seen on his photos of the 
assassination day (Radikal 13.01.2008). 
 
What is more, Hrank Dink’s case gives fruitful evidence for the main 
assumption of the thesis, which is the dilemma in Turkish nationalism in 
dealing with its past and memories. Rather than acceptance of past victories 
and traumas as the different sectors of common past both in pre-Islamic, 
Ottoman and Republican narratives, selective reading of the national history 
in construction of various imagined collective memories leads to contested 
perspectives of Turkishness, but also exclusion and denying some ‘others’ in 
national discourse. Hrant Dink was deconstructing Turkish and Armenian 
nationalist discourses; his critical stand was unacceptable or easily 
misunderstood by Turks or Armenians. Thus, his identity and his world view 
challenged with mainstream Turkish nationalism. 
 
Dink had caught Turkish nationalists’ attention, which bothered them while 
expressing the problems of Armenian community; demanding for their 
cultural rights or expressing his own stance related to the debate of history. 
This was not liked by the official Turkish thesis, and had been the case since 
it first started publishing AGOS in 1996. The events that led to his murder 
were directly related to the competing narratives of nation and 
misinterpretation of his goal of construction, a new discourse for common 
future. On one hand one, Dink called the mass killing of Armenians in 1915 
in the Ottoman land as ‘genocide’, on the other hand he was critical of the 
ways in which two nations reflected this memory – rejection of Turks and the 
acknowledgment ‘obsession’ of Armenians (Turkmen-Dervisoglu 2013, 
p.680). In an article entitled On Armenian Identity (Agos, 13.02.2004), he 
suggested that Armenian diaspora’s hatred was deep-rooted in the past 
trauma towards the Turkish people which should be purified from the nature 
of the nation. However, his metaphoric expression allowed it to be 
interpreted in a totally different meaning when it was taken out of context: 
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“The clean blood that will replace the blood poisoned by ‘the Turk’ is present 
in the noble vein that will be established by the Armenian with Armenia.” 
This sentence was read out as a representation of racism, degrading, insulting 
Turkishness in Turkish media (Goktas 2009), and of distortion of Atatürk’s 
words in his Speech to the Turkish Youth: “Oh, youth of Turkey’s future, (...) 
the strength you need to present in the noble blood that flows in your veins.” 
Therefore, he became an open target of Turkish nationalists. 
 
But the last straw that broke the camel’s back was the news about Ataturk’s 
daughter ‘Sabiha Gokcen’ that he published with the headline of ‘Sabiha 
Hatun’s Secret’ on 6 February 2004. In the report, Armenian relatives of 
Gökçen were mentioned and she was claimed to be actually an Armenian 
orphan taken from an orphanage. When this news was published in Turkey’s 
highest selling newspaper Hurriyet above the fold with reference from 
AGOS in 21 February 2004, what was done was done and Turkey became 
loose. All columnists made negative-positive comments related to this news 
for more than fifteen days. Statements were given from different parties. 
According to some of those, Dink was ill-intended in trying to create an 
earthquake in Turkish national identity by suddenly removing the 
‘Turkishness’ of a person, who was turned into a myth and symbol of Turkish 
woman. The most important of all these was the written statement of the 
Chief of General Staff on 22 February 2004: “Opening such a symbol into 
discussion is a crime against national integrity and national peace, whatever 
purpose it carries.” This interpretation of the case of Sabiha Gokcen shows 
that the identification of a historical Turkish character with a minority 
identity is perceived as degrading just by naming her ‘Armenian’, insulting 
nomination of social actor or insulting Turkishness. The statement illustrates 
an approach that being Armenian is imagined as the other of Turkish national 
identity and a threat to national unity. 
 
Based on the article 301, Hrant Dink was sentenced to six months in jail, 
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claiming that he publicly insulted Turkishness. In Dink’s decree of the 
Supreme Court Penal General Board, the concept of Turkishness was defined 
as it was related to the human element of the state and by this concept the 
Turkish nation was meant (Cumhuriyet 30.01.2007, p.1). So, what is in 
Turkishness that must be untouched? The ground of article 301, Turkishness 
is defined as the common entity generated by the joint culture unique to 
Turks. This entity is larger than the concept of the Turkish nation and 
includes societies living outside Turkey and who participate in the same 
culture. The intention of Turkishness is the whole humanitarian, religious and 
historical values generating the Turkish nation and national spiritual values 
composed of national language, national emotions and national traditions. 
Jurisdiction therefore decrees that ‘Turkishness’ is defined as ‘Turkish 
nation’. 
 
This explanation constitutes the content of Turkish identity appearing in the 
context of the article 301. It assumes a non-territorial and cultural Turkish 
identity on the one hand, however, it also connects it on the notion of ‘nation’ 
on the other hand. It imagines a Turkish nation in and beyond the boundaries 
of Turkey that has a common national past and present. Stressing on the 
national values, but not clarifying what those values are, makes the definition 
flux: If common religious values make Turks a nation, which religion is that; 
if common language as Turkish presents Turkishness, does it also integrate 
whom have different mother tongue as Armenian; if common historical 
values constitute Turkish nation, which historical period and memories are 
shared in and beyond Turkey? Therefore, this linguistic construction of 
Turkishness and Turkish nation produces an open reading and causes 
different interpretations based on the different understanding of persons. This 
point can be illustrated in the case of various identifications of Hrant Dink in 
the Turkish media. 
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3.1.1. The Identity of Hrant Dink: Non-Muslims in Turkish National 
Identity Discourse 
My homeland, the village who tries constantly to become a city, 
Here is another murder committed in the square of that village... 
Again in front of the eyes of everyone... 
Again right in the very middle of the big silence of the huge crowd... 
My homeland, now the wet-eyed giant shot from the Hrant Dink side of his heart... 
Everyone has his own We, inside of We, inside of us... 
Lots of small We scattered around with an evil We bigger than us... 
Who are we? Which of one us are inside which We? 
Which part of We inside of We? 
Well, the ones not wanting to hurt those who don’t think like them 
How many persons We are? 
In fact we are too many... 
More than we ever think... 
 
Yılmaz Erdogan, 20 January 2007 
 
 
 
On 20 January 2007, Turkish newspapers commented on the assassination of 
Hrant Dink. Among the writers and reporters, Turkish poet and author 
Murathan Mungan (Radikal 20.01.2007) caught the point made him a target 
of extreme Turkish nationalism, the reason was Hrant Dink ‘was seen’: 
“Hrant Dink ‘was seen’, to be seen to be visible is important. The 
thing that made him a target board was, first of all the fact that he 
could be ‘seen’ as an Armenian. In this country Armenians are 
usually ignored. They have been obliged to live without cutting a 
swathe.  Their names, surnames, identities have been grayed, 
blended into the crowd. To be seen means to exist, resemble, remind, 
which means ‘being watched’.  Either with the 301st article or 
barrel…  Minorities have also strong memory. They remember more. 
Not only remote history, but also 6–7th September events. Therefore 
their mutism is deeper. Moreover, a daily warning of the official 
language, which mentions even Apo as ‘Armenian offspring’, doesn’t 
even let memory go back that far.” 
 
In this quotation, Mungan identified Dink as “Armenian” and mentioned the 
difficulties of being a member of a minority in Turkey. He used the topos
29
 as 
being seen for referring the cultural and political situation of minorities in the 
country. As if they, their names, surnames and identities are invisible, they 
                                               
29  Or 'topoi': parts of argumentation which belong to the obligatory, either explicit or 
inferable premises in the shape of content-related warrants that connects the argument with 
the conclusion (Reisigl and Wodak 2001, p.74). 
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can survive. Since the DHA concern the notion of 'history' in the analysis of 
the text, in the excerpt the emphasis on strong memories of minorities is 
remarkable. Either the collective past experiences such as the events of 6–7 
September when Greek minorities in Istanbul were attacked by the extreme-
nationalists in 1955, either specific language use in the present keep their 
memories strong. Mungan took attention to discriminative language use by 
reminding Apo - the leader of the PKK- is called as 'Armenian offspring', 
which is used insulting to the Kurdish identity by making use of a non-
Muslim minority identity'
30
. As Reisigl and Wodak (2001) noted 
predicational strategies, namely what traits, characteristics, qualities and 
features are attributed to minorities indicate racist political discourse. Racist 
concepts which imply a kind of genetically-defined, imagined Turkishness, 
surfaced in nationalist discourses, and this has decisively contributed to the 
genesis of a national perception of Turkey. In this imagination, minorities are 
expected to be assimilated into Turkishness and to be unseen. 
 
From what perspective or point of view are these characteristics expressed is 
also important in analysing the exclusion, discrimination, suppression and 
exploitation of minorities. When the examples are overviewed, it is clear that 
religion works in essentialising and internalising manner for the purpose of 
Turkish national identity and examples mirror Muslim majoritarian 
perspective. In the newspapers, relating to Dink's funeral, by raising the 
questions such as ‘Is it appropriate or not to pray al-fatehah for Hrant Dink?’ 
(Hurriyet, 25.01.2007), the articles served to reproduce the discourse of 
Dink’s non-Muslimhood and difference. This reference to an Islamic worship 
at the funeral can be evaluated as a particularising synecdoche that is 
associated with the Muslim imagination of the nation and otherness of non-
                                               
30 In this respect, Yegen's work (2011, pp.240-245) points out that the usage of the term of 
'Jewish Kurds' in the Turkish media builts a some sort of connection between Kurds and 
non-Muslims. This connection can be summarised as the non-Muslim peoples are seen 
untrustworthy in Turkey; thus it shows the shift in the Kurdish image in Turkish nationalism 
and constructs the idea that the Kurdish question is one of disloyalty. 
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Muslims. As an important national ritual and practice, the form of the funeral 
was debated in the Turkish media. The representation of the routines of 
everyday life in the news also contributed to the nation's self-perception. The 
banal representation of daily life (Billig 1995), such as the shared religious 
and cultural habits, norms and values of Turkish people, not only linked 
private lives to the national public sphere but their mediation through the 
newspapers strengthened their identification as Turks and Muslims. 
 
The Prime Minister’s counsellor, AKP Deputy of Adana, Omer Celik’s 
statement published in Radikal was: “My friend Hrant was a patriot, his 
funeral must be covered by the Turkish flag.” According to this example, 
being a patriot is enough to carry the national symbol such as the Turkish 
flag, but, whether it is enough to be a Turk is still questionable. Regarding 
Dink’s patriotism, Perihan Magden (Radikal, 20.01.2007) wrote Dink was 
more Turk than her: 
“Brother, such a good man you were. Such a polite and clean, such 
a brave and straightforward, such a devoted, canonical hallal man 
you were, Hrant Dink. First of all, you were more Turk than I am. 
You were a real child of Anatolia (literally in positive meaning), a 
real patriot that loved these lands, these nations, these humans 
much, such a big hearted, brave man you were.” 
 
In this linguistic realisation of the national narrative, the expression of plural 
collectivities in Anatolia as ‘these nations’ is the example of imagining 
Turkey with other culture and nationalities different than Turkishness. The 
writer’s intentional choice of the words of ‘hallal man’ and ‘Turk’ to describe 
him, implies a hidden criticism of what was not accepted in Dink’s identity 
in the eyes of some masses who see themselves more Turk than others based 
on the distinction of religion and ethnicity. Distinctively, being Turk is 
defined through the love of the lands and peoples in Anatolia. Here, what 
makes a person a Turk is the desire to live in Turkey together with other 
nations. National membership is defined by citizenship and it is mostly 
thought that the fundamental condition of being Turk is the desire to be Turk, 
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particularly for the minorities. Being born in Turkey, growing up in Turkey, 
having ancestors who lived in Turkey, does not make every individual equal 
with others. The dilemma of Turkish citizenship for minorities appears here. 
Non-Muslims are accepted as Turk but not enough Turk. In this context, 
Yuval-Davis (2010; 2011) differentiates between belonging and the politics 
of belonging. Belonging tends to be naturalized through emotional 
attachments, about feeling a part of a land and a community, in other words, 
the senses of being ‘at home’. This feeling include struggles around the 
determination of who is involved in a community. Belonging is politisied in 
multi-layered structures of political projects such as citizenship, nationalism, 
religion, migration, globalisation and cosmopolitanism. In the state-society 
relations and everyday life relations, non-Muslims are reminded that they are 
different. The problem is that the majority determines what they should 
forget and remember about their identities. 
 
In Turkish media coverage, 'Is the slogan ‘we are all Armenian’ right or 
wrong for you' was another question associated with being Turk. Writer of 
Those Crazy Turks novel, Turgut Ozakman (Hurriyet 26.01.2007) noted that 
he did not approve shouting the slogan: ‘we are all Armenian, we are all 
Hrant Dink’. His justification of the argument was based on the idea that 
imagined Turkishness as a territorial identity in the boundaries of Turkey. 
According to this definition of the nation, in Ozakman’s words, most of the 
participators of the demonstration were not Armenian; thus saying ‘Hrant 
Dink was one of us’ should have been ‘Hrant was Turk too, he was an 
Armenian with Turkish origin’. This perspective echoes Kemalist 
imagination of the Turkish nation, such as Cuneyt Ulsever (Hurriyet 
21.01.2007) underlined the importance of recognizing him as a Turk: 
''Do they have any conscience? Those who don’t change 301 on one 
way or another, who still commemorate Hrant with a cold title such 
as ‘citizen of Turkish Republic’ and don’t have the heart to call him 
‘Turk’… who think they will get rid of the responsibility by saying 
‘There was no demand for protection.'' 
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According to Ulsever's expression, ‘citizen of Turkish Republic’ is a cold 
reference; it is therefore Dink should be identified as 'Turk'. In fact, how are 
persons named and referred to linguistically is a crucial question of studying 
the identity politics and politics of belonging. These examples revealed the 
complexity of how to call minorities in Turkey: Turk; Armenian; Armenian 
originated Turkish; Turkish originated Armenian; citizen; and patriot. From 
this thesis’ perspective, beyond different nominalisations, the point is how 
these identifications are used, in which perspective and discourse in the 
terms of exclusion or inclusion in maintaining or challenging existing power 
relations. Surely, ignoring the difference and individuality of the other is not 
the inclusion. But, calling minorities as Turks is not protecting or 
guaranteeing their cultural and political rights to live and exist in how they 
are and who they are. Therefore, the question is how to guarantee equal 
citizenship in practice and everyday life relationships in order to reduce the 
difficulties of being different than the majority identity. More significantly, 
Ulsever mentions about the negligence and the denial of Dink's demand for 
protection which address to an institutional and social exclusion. In this 
context, Yegenoglu’s (Radikal 28.01.2007) article argues that different ethnic 
groups are discriminated against and they become targets of racist attacks in 
Turkey; the case of Dink is not an individual case. Yegenoglu looks at the 
picture from a post-nationalist perspective by underlining the concept of anti-
racism not patriotism: 
 “Hrant Dink not only reminded us that he had an Armenian identity, 
 but also expressed the hardships of being Armenian and different in 
 this country, which means he criticised the ‘racism’, which we never 
 could name. Since he was right from here, he was one of the hosts of 
 this country, he wanted to criticise the racism to which both he and t
 he identity group he belongs to are exposed. Let’s name it. Hrant 
 Dink was an anti-racist fighter for freedom of expression. This is far 
 more important than how much he loved this country.” 
 
 
In the quoted paragraph above, Hrant Dink is described as an 'Armenian host 
of this country' which linguistically constructs the in-group membership 
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categorisation to denote territorial boundaries of the nation, furthermore, the 
discursive construction of difference between among Turks and Armenians is 
observed 'with the selective use of the plural pronoun of we' and 'the identity 
group he belongs to'. 
 
In a Cumhuriyet (23.04.2007) newspaper article published by translating 
from the German newspaper Der Tagesspiegel (20.01.2007) that was entitled 
‘Turks are living a lie’, Suzanne Gusten criticised Turkey’s constitutional 
citizenship for being just on paper and did not guarantee Christian and 
Jewish minorities could feel at home. She argued that Turkey presented itself 
as a country of tolerance at the crossroads of cultures, but this was not true. 
Non-Muslim minorities such as Armenians, Greeks, Assyrians and other 
Christians, together with Jews, did not even comprise 0.5 per cent of the 
country’s population and they constantly felt that it was a lie: 
“The belief that only a Muslim Turk can be a real Turk, still seals 
national identity. This belief is not just valid in the religious or 
nationalist part of the political spectrum. This view has strongly 
leaked into the Turkish state itself and sealed it. For example, the 
fact that inspection of Christian schools has always to be done by an 
ethnical – more clearly Muslim – vice principal has been reflected in 
law texts. Christian citizens are not real Turks for the Turkish state 
and they are not to be trusted.” 
 
The excerpt above demonstrates two cases of interdiscursivity (Wodak 2007, 
p.206) that need to be underlined. The first one entails the interdiscursivity 
with the discourse on Muslimhood which is considered as a cornerstone of 
the constructed Turkish national identity. The second one concerns the 
interdiscursivity with the state discourse that is influential in broader Turkish 
state-society relationships and conditions of Christian citizens. Construction 
of Turkish identity with Muslim identity excludes non-Muslims in state 
discourse and in the implications of the state institutions. Interdiscursivity is 
utilised to entail a integrative logic that suggest interconnectedness. The 
connection between being Turk and being Muslim in Turkish nation-state 
discourse, assumes a conditionality to call one as a real Turk. Gusten draws 
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out attention to the massive negative associations and connotations in 
illustrating ‘Christians are not to be trusted’. This negative representation 
also comes out with xenophobia. In the following text (Kaplan, Cumhuriyet 
31.12.2005), the prejudice to foreigners in Kemalist discourse is appearing in 
a direct accusation: 
“Former Land Office Deputy Director Ozkaya told of the 
disadvantages of property sale to foreigners: Shores will be closed to 
Turks… They polluted the lands of the world; now they graze our 
land to make agriculture. By using the power of the dollar now, they 
are trying to do what they couldn’t do in the Independence War.” 
 
In this quotation, the term of foreigners connected with the memory of the 
Independence War in the case of selling property to them refers to power 
abuse, domination or imperialism. This discourse also demonstrates the 
leftish tone of Kemalist nationalism and the main opposition party, 'centre-
left' CHP. In relation to the finance sector Cumhuriyet (19.01.07) reported 
that “Foreigners are establishing full sovereignty by buying the shares of the 
banks, whose small part they have bought”. This linguistic representation of 
the act portray that foreigners are sneaking into Turkish economy step by 
step for establishing domination. This idea is synonymous with the fear of 
‘This country is getting sold'. Ekrem Dumanlı (Zaman 23.01.2007) 
commented on this 'fear' and criticized the perception of 'suspected' and 
'disloyal' foreigners in Turkish society with a reference to the expression of 
'getting stabbed from behind': 
''Extreme statements are turning Turkey into a mental hospital and 
we are not aware of it. In saying ‘This country is getting sold’ many 
conspiracies are being put forward. In this regard ‘traitors, 
cooperators, inattentives’ appear. Fear of separation, break up, 
getting stabbed from behind date back to the Balkan Wars'' 
 
In this example, the reference to the memory of the Balkan Wars that 
appeared in the Islamist discourse represent their narrative and remembrance 
of national past different than the Kemalist discourse, their imagination of 
themselves as national community. It was the collapsing times of the 
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Ottomans and the birth times of the ideal of the modern Turkish nation-state. 
The emphasis on the continued fear shows the clash of different narratives of 
the nation. Using the metaphor of mental hospital while describing the 
present fear of Kemalist nationalists construct 'them' in opposition to 
'conservative democrats' as the rational or modern ones. The Kemalist 
nation-state discourse is portrayed as an old fashion perspective. This 
illustrates a transformation of anti-westernisation in Turkish Islamist 
discourse and their adaption to globalisation, at least in the context of 
economic relations. This sceptic discourse can be read as Kemalist 
paradigm's adaptation problem to neo-liberal transformation as Zeynep 
Gambetti (2009) argued that Islamic orientation to the politics of 
globalisation has been more successful in Turkey. In the big picture of 
contemporary Turkey this makes Islamists more effective and pragmatic in 
governance of changing dynamics of politics and establishing the post-
Kemalist nation-state discourse. 
 
 
3.1.2. The Crime and Punishment: Blaming Others or Saying 'We Killed 
Hrant Dink' 
While the murderer of Dink had not yet been named, the headlines of the 
newspapers mostly pointed to the external powers or evil powers being 
behind the action.  This section shows that the blaming others strategy used 
in linguistic representations of responsible actors is a common feature in both 
the pro-secularist and Islamist discourse. They referred the 'external forces' in 
the coverage of the 'evil' actions that promoted the nationalist discourse. The 
highest political representative of the country, Prime Minister Erdogan put 
emphasis on the same agenda: “I curse this villainous murder. It is 
meaningful that this murder took place while the so-called Armenian 
genocide claims are in the agenda.” This also points to the strategies of 
justification of the self-victimising Turkey. The newspapers did not only to 
aggregate the nationalist paranoia amongst Turkish people against 'foreign' 
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Armenians but also justified and legitimized their exclusion and being cast as 
the 'enemy' within the nation. Foreigners were seen as scapegoats, as it was 
obvious in this text (Zaman 20.01.2007): 
“Assassination of Armenian origin journalist Hrant Dink has been 
considered by intelligence officers and strategists as ‘the act of 
external forces’. Experts, who interpret the assault as a sign of an 
operation towards Turkey, point out that it was made in a period, in 
which the Armenian genocide proposal is on the agenda at US 
Senate.” 
 
From a populist nationalist perspective Hurriyet’s report (20.01.2007) was 
written as if it was verifying conservative newspaper, Zaman’s arguments: 
“American National Community of Armenians (ANCA), which 
embodies radical Armenian organisations, blamed Turkey for the 
murder of Hrant Dink in the armed attack and gave signs that this 
murder will be used towards the passing of the new ‘genocide’ 
proposal from the US Congress.” 
 
In this context, the connection between the murder, the 1915 debates of 
Ottoman Armenians in the First World War and the current conditions of 
Turkey are the negative aspects of present and the past and directly 
associated with historical stereotypes. The mentality of 'they will use it 
against us' can be evaluated from the perspective of the strategies of 
avoidance and blaming others. In this way, the media's representation can 
also influence Turkish peoples' attitudes and views against the non-Muslims 
and Armenians. This perspective is common in the Turkish media and can 
also be seen in the following text from a pro-secular discourse: 
''Let us look at the atmosphere in Turkey in which these murders are 
committed. 1) A constant deterioration in political relations and 
conditions in Turkey both inside and outside. a) Exclusion from the 
EU and disappointment. Single-sided and unfair pressures of the EU 
on the Cyprus issue. b) Path to the dissolution in Iraq and the 
composition of Kurdish state. Depending on the shift of the Kurdish 
issue in our country to a different channel, this time to political 
ground. EU support to the Kurdish issue. Growing struggles with 
the US in this field. c) Growing political support to claims of the 
Armenian genocide on political grounds, moreover legal supports 
coming into the agenda also in the US.'' (Cumhuriyet 20.01.2007) 
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This text is written by Orhan Bursalı on the Dink case implies a 
rationalisation strategy. This strategy functions to present this murder as a 
nationalist response to deterioration in Turkey’s political, economical and 
social conditions; however it banally naturalizes the violence and the hatred 
to other nations.  In this example, the rhetorical devices employed to enhance 
the persuasiveness of Turkish discourse. The EU and the US are presented as 
the supporters of Turkey's Cyprus problem, Kurdish problem and Armenian 
problem. Moreover, Bursalı argues that ‘Islamist-racist’ politics possess a 
ground that carries violence into the agenda in order to grow. This discourse 
presents the clash of ideologies in Turkey. This point turns the examples to 
debate ‘blaming imagined internal others’ for the negative actions and 
events. On one hand, Kemalists blame Islamists; on the other hand Islamists 
blame Kemalist nationalists. For example, Ihsan Dagi (Zaman 23.01.2007) 
claimed that whoever invented the 301st article of the Turkish Penal Code 
and supported it, had a share in the preparation of this attack. This denotes 
the Republican People’s Party who wanted to maintain the article against the 
insulting nominations of Turkishness. It is important to remember that by this 
date the face and identity of the murderer was known; and therefore the 
debate focused on the searching ‘someone inside to blame’ as an opportunity 
to create a platform to political speculation instead of emphasising the 
identity or mentality of the young murderer Ogun Samast. According to the 
given text Cumhuriyet addressed the Islamist racist politics responsible; 
contrary to that, Zaman (23.01.2007) viewed Kemalists and leftist groups 
responsible for the violence in the streets of Turkey: 
“The sage of nationalists (‘ulusalcılar’) is determined to divide 
Turkey. Kemalists, natural born supporters of the NATO, Special 
Warfare experts, anti-West nationalist movement completed its 
composition three years ago and now they are making appearance 
in the streets under the leadership of trotskyist, marxist and maoist 
Dogu Perincek.” 
 
Here, the topos of 'dividing Turkey' appears in blaming others discourse 
again. This portrays leftist, Kemalist and anti-West nationalists as the 'others' 
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in the imagination of post-Kemalist Turkey. The deliberations in the 
discourses tacitly indicate the new positions of the political actors in 
changing power relations of Turkey. What is more noteworthy in these 
examples is that the discursive construction of the event in both Kemalist and 
Islamist discourse link with scepticism towards an international actor and an 
in-group allied with out-group. Beyond these discourses of blaming others, 
Radikal could face with another ‘We’ inside ‘We’; for instance Ismet Berkan 
titled ‘We killed Hrant Dink’ (20.01.2007). 
“First of all, this is a racist murder. I used to recall ‘deep state’ in 
such murders, now I don’t. I don’t, because those who created the 
nationalist environment in Turkey fed such a beast, that there are 
hundreds of ‘Valley of the Wolves’ children, who try to concern 
themselves with the situation by thinking that deep state is not 
nationalist enough. This atmosphere was created in Turkey step-by-
step and with consciousness. Among those who have created this 
murderer nationalist atmosphere, there are advertisers and 
politicians, so-called opinion leaders, journalists and producers of 
movies and serials. Blood that leaked out of Hrant’s dead body has 
smeared on all contributors.” 
 
References imply that Turkish populist nationalism, supposedly shared by 
the majority of Turks, is naturalised, produced and reproduced in the media 
and political discourse in the variety and range of realisations. This 
perspective also supports the idea of ‘the killer is one of us’, a member of our 
family, friends and neighbourhood as Cem Erciyes (Radikal 28.01.2007) 
wrote: 
“From now on we see that Ogun Samast is one of the noncompliant, 
hopeless, aggressive and ‘nationalist’ youngsters of our 
neighbourhood. He is one of the teenagers who exist in every 
neighbourhood, whose numbers reach incredible heights as they 
reach into Anatolian cities. Those who define themselves as 
nationalist, patriot, who can adopt every kind of pressure, torture, 
murder and militarism ‘for the sake of the homeland’ are right near 
us. In our family, friends and neighbourhood. They are the natural 
ground of the state that pressurises every kind of opinion against 
dominant opinion, they are the natural supporters of the media, 
politicians, who can do anything in the name of populism.” 
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In this representation of Ogun Samast, Erciyes criticises the populist 
nationalist discourse that is constructed naturally with ‘anything can be done 
for the sake of the nation and the land’ mentality. This nationalist world view 
is used for justification of torture, murder and militarism and turns the 
teenagers of the angry nation to the killers. In this context, the worst thing 
might be the attempt of exculpation of the killer or making a hero out of him, 
transforming him into a national role model for the youngsters, which might 
spring up new Oguns from every corner of the country who are ready to 
protect the nation, ready to die or kill. 
 
When one analyses the discourses of the four newspapers, it is seen that only 
Radikal did not hesitate to define the assassination of Hrant Dink as a racist 
attack.  Neither pro-secular nor Islamist discourse construct a pluralist post-
Kemalist discourse for the non-Muslims of the country. Rather than finding a 
scapegoat, alienating the responsibilities of the bad events in Turkish society, 
ignoring the origins of the problem, even making a conscious selection of not 
seeing, hearing or writing would be seen in the Turkish media for the sake of 
keeping the unity of the nation (!). 
 
In order to have a better understanding of dynamic nature of Turkish national 
identity and why people think what they think about themselves and others, a 
historical perspective is required to see how common political past, present 
and future are imagined in different competing discourses of Turkey. To do 
this analysis of competing perspectives, firstly the multiple narratives of past 
will be taken into account in the following part of this chapter. This will be 
followed by analysing discourses on the difference between then and now 
with regard to imagining a future. Numerous examples will be given to show 
symbolic boundaries of the national body of Turkey through the variety and 
range of linguistic strategies of construction of self as the Turkish nation and 
others as internal or external foreigners.   
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3.1.3. The Discursive Construction of Common Political Past of the 
Nation: ‘Those Crazy Turks’ 
‘We are of people that are living in the hell but willing to change 
there into Heaven. Staying and living in Turkey are both our real 
desire and our requirement for our respect to thousands of friends 
whom we know and don’t know that struggle for democracy in 
Turkey and support us for that. We would stay and resist. But if we 
were obliged to go one day... We would set out just like in 1915… 
Like our ancestors… Without knowing where to go... By walking 
through the paths they walked… By suffering, living the agony. But 
while all this is happening I am going to regard this truth as my only 
guarantee. Yes, I can see myself in the sole anxiety of a pigeon, but I 
know that in this country people do not touch pigeons. Pigeons keep 
their lives going even right in the middle of cities, among the crowds 
of people. Yes, little bit fearful, but yet free.’ 
Hrant Dink, Agos, January 2007 
 
 
These lines are taken from the last article of Hrant Dink who believed in 
transforming Turkey into heaven where everybody can live in peace and safe 
in democracy. Despite the fact of the fearful living, he never wanted to leave 
from Turkey as their ancestors had to go. On 24 January 2007, Hurriyet gave 
its first page to cover 'Dink’s funeral under the title of ‘Turkey became one 
heart’ and wrote his wife, Rakel Dink’s words: You did not leave your 
country, my love.'   
 
This confirms that the memory of the past is still alive in the minds; therefore 
this thesis assumes that analysing diverse discursive construction of the 
common political past of the nation is useful for a deeper understanding of 
the origins of current political polarisations in Turkey. Observing different 
readings on the history, pinpoints naturalised conceptions of the nationhood 
and how ideological perspectives drive problematic ways of dealing with the 
common experiences and hinder the spirit of living together. On this context, 
the discourse analysis shows that Islamists glorify the period of the Ottoman 
Empire and blame the Republican period for current problems of the nation. 
On the other side of the discourse, the Independence War and Republican 
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period in Kemalist memory is essential to the survival of the nation from the 
ashes of the Ottomans. On this clash of memories, the Kemalist newspaper 
Cumhuriyet’s image of the Turkish nation appears clearly in the selection of 
their words.  Comparing the times of before Ataturk and after Ataturk gives 
concrete evidence for how secularist, Republicanist people imagine Turkey. 
 
In 2006, a historical novel about the establishment of the Republic and 
national revolution, the sale of Turgut Ozakman’s Those Crazy Turks reached 
a record high, something which had not been seen for long time. Its timing 
was crucial to its success as it was a symbol for resistance to deconstruction 
of Kemalist nation-state identity. Kemalists referred to this book for gaining 
new inspiration and power for a second independence war. By using the 
passages from this book, Oktay Akbal wrote an article in Cumhuriyet 
(27.10.2005) indicating how Turks have been changing from crazy Turks to 
bewildered Turks. Using information inherited from the Ottoman times in 
1922, it justified why Kemalists chose to remember the Republican times as 
sacred and glorious to their nation: 
“The truth about Turkey in 1922: ‘The population is 13 million. 
Primitive agriculture. Almost no industry. Most of the mines, 
harbours and railways are under the administration of foreign 
companies. There are 153 second- and first-level schools with just 
one university. Only 7 per cent of the people are literate. It is not 
even 1 per cent among women. Half colony in the terms of economy. 
Income per capita is 4 lira, average public spending per capita is 50 
kuruş. Infrastructure is insufficient in every field. There are almost 
no scientific studies. Anatolia is in the hands of incapable religious 
schools. Religious communities, lodges and monasteries are 
everywhere. The laws are behind the necessities of the age. In 
principle, women have no social lives and rights. It is even harder to 
imagine women being doctors, engineers, lawyers, mayors, 
deputies, ministers one day. Women have no right to vote and stand 
for election. In summary they are counted as citizens. The country is 
almost in the medieval ages…” 
 
In Akbal’s quotation from Turgut Ozakman, the main emphasis is on the 
Kemalist revolution that established a modern nation-state from a failed 
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‘medieval’ state. In economical, industrial, educational, agricultural, legal 
and social areas, Kemalist revolutions and their influences on every aspect of 
social and political life are underlined and illustrated with historical 
references. Turgut Ozakman summarises the conditions of the first years of 
the Republic and adds how Kemalist policies made a progress in a few years 
in this poor country. Revolutions aimed at raising people to meet the modern 
age, giving priority to science and logic, enlightening Anatolia. When 
Ataturk died, Turkey had iron, steel and national industries. It could 
manufacture planes and submarines. Harbours and railways were 
nationalised; 3000 km of new railways were constructed. The average 
development rate of the last fifteen years was 10 per cent. Community 
houses and Public Schools were established, university reform was realised 
and modern laws were put into effect. The new state paid its debt to the 
women and women had equal rights to men. 
 
In the quotation, before Republican system, Turkish society is described as if 
it was in medieval times in the 20th century, with a specific emphasis on the 
existence of religious communities everywhere, no science and no equal 
rights for women. Akbal writes what Turkish Revolution brought to Anatolia 
in fifteen years between 1922 and 1938 with the quotation from Ozakman 
that are ‘modern laws’, ‘enlightenment’, ‘science and logic’, ‘woman rights’, 
‘national education and economy’. These are also hints on how to read 
Kemalist nationalism and its narrative of the nation. In this reading, there is a 
strong emphasis on Islam and its influence on the education and social life in 
the society, making it the reason for underdevelopment. As the guarantor of 
modernism and democracy, secularism is the one of the central terms in this 
understanding of the Turkish nation. Therefore, Kemalist nationalists use the 
references from the period of Ataturk to lead the secularisation of their 
society. This discourse shows the milestone of Kemalist Turkish national 
history, before and after Ataturk. This narrative of the past argues that the 
Republican system has provided the citizens with equal rights anywhere in 
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the country. In relation to the discursive construction common political 
present, this modern, secular image of Turkey is under threat again; in his 
column Akbal calls Turks ‘crazy’ against the ‘others’ who are willing to live 
in the times before Ataturk: 
“Ozakman's ‘The Crazy Turks’ warns us once more... the confused, 
cowards, flatterers, heresiarchs, deniers and those who are willing 
to divert the country to the old ways!... Just as the crazy Turks 
created a new, lively, strong and new Turkey out of defeats and 
despair we have a duty that awaits us; to combine our crazy ideas 
with logic and science, to destroy retrogressivism and closed-minded 
thoughts with the lessons of the history… Tens of thousands of 
citizens should absorb ‘The Crazy Turks’! They should find 
themselves, their honour and identity in the pages of the book. They 
should be willing to come together again under the idea of Turkish 
Revolutionary Forces.” 
 
This text exhibits a strategy of persuasion and Kemalist resistance to change 
and distinguishes between ‘crazy Turks’ who are modern, open-minded, 
enlightened citizens with logic and science,  and others 'the confused, 
cowards, flatterers, heresiarchs, deniers' who aim to take the country to the 
old, dark days. This directly targets the domestic power struggle for 
redefinition of Turkish nation-state identity under the AKP government. As 
noted before, the collective memory of social groups is of particular 
significance for the construction of the national identity. In this context, we 
find a diversity of interpretations of the Republican revolution and the 
narrative of crazy Turks. For instance, Islamist readings of national past and 
present are used to blame Kemalist construction of national identity and the 
‘crazy Turk’ model citizens as the origin of the extreme nationalism and the 
assassination of Hrant Dink. In this context of different narratives of the 
nation, in Zaman newspaper an article titled 'Rethinking on Nationalism' was 
written by Ihsan Dagi (Zaman, 21.01.2007). In this example, the discourse of 
Crazy Turks and modern politics of nation-state are perceived as the causes 
of destroying the culture of living together and the recent problems of 
Turkey. In this narrative, the times of the Ottoman Empire are idealised in the 
account of living in a heterogenic society in the terms of multireligious, 
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multilingual and multiracial features. Republican national identity and 
citizenship discourse is also represented as the obstacles of the 
democratisation process due to its perception of religious and ethnic 
minorities: 
“In the framework of those efforts a ‘crazy Turk’ model has been 
invented, who fights against the whole world, who is alone, 
aggressive and reactionist. Crazy Turks are called to hold arms by 
the army, jurisdiction and politicians with cries of ‘We are losing the 
motherland’. Abandon this ‘defensive’ psychology. The harm you 
have caused by crying, ‘We are losing this country’ has accessed its 
limit. Try to be more in peace with your society and history. Stop 
seeing citizens of this country as enemies and a threat who are with 
headscarf, tarigah, Kurdish speaking and Armenians and Greeks. 
Let’s face it: This attack took place in the productive ground that 
was created by the chauvinist nationalism that is rising in Turkey. 
Values before the arrival of the CUP, which means before ‘modern 
politics’, have to be found again. Culture of living together must be 
built again just like what we had before the idea of single race, 
single language, single religion based homogenous national state 
turns modern society into a ‘society of extremism’.” 
 
In the expression of ‘who are with headscarf, tarigah, Kurdish speaking and 
Armenians and Greeks’, the Islamists, Kurds and non-Muslims are portrayed 
as the ‘others’ of Kemalism's homogenous nation-state identity construction. 
To sum up, this text functions to resist this mentality and aim to construct a 
post-Kemalist nation-state identity. Similarly, in the next quotation made by 
Ali Unal, the strategy of transformation is employed to challenge 
Turkishness based Kemalist nationalism: 
“In the beginning of the 20th century, anti-Arabism and 
Turkishness-based nationalism movements, together with ‘minority 
rights’ which Europe constantly stressed, fastened the break up and 
collapse of the Ottoman Empire and severed the ties of Turkey with 
the Islamic world for a long time. Today Kemalist nationalists 
(ulusalcılar) are serving the same goal in the same way by bringing 
ethnical and sectarian sensibilities into agenda somehow. From one 
side Sunni majority are silenced due to the fear of recession and 
reactionism and on the other side Alevis are being put in front of 
them as a different identity.” (Zaman, 23.01.2007) 
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Here, what is noteworthy is that he has chosen to come up with Islamism and 
the power of Islam in Ottoman Empire's multiculturalism as an argument 
against Kemalist Turkish nationalism. If we remember the origins of 
different narratives of Turkish nation that are outlined in the Chapter 2, we 
see three main ideologies behind existing Turkish nationalism: Islamism, 
Ottomanism and Turkism. Unal refers to the Ottoman times, but he 
underlines the place of   Islam and relations with the Islamic world. Viewed 
in the passage, opposing the Kemalist secular discourse, the threat of 
collapse in current day Turkey is defined in the context of weakening the 
power of Islam as the results of secularist policies in domestic and foreign 
relations. These different images of Turkey based on different world views 
present contested doctrines in their challenge with collective historical 
experience and formation of post-Kemalist nationalism. 
 
 
3.1.4. The Discursive Construction of the Common Political Present and 
Future: The Banalisation of the Extreme Right and Violence 
For living in a peaceful and pluralist society, the discourse of democracy is 
suggested by Hrant Dink as a condition for building mutual understanding 
and confidence between Armenians and Turks in Turkey. However, Dink's 
death entailed a milestone in the Turkish and Armenian relations. Rhetorical 
strategy in the media strengthened the Otherness by connecting the strategies 
of predication (Tekin 2008) to the historical images of the sides still alive in 
their imaginations. Attaching positive values to the Self and negative values 
to the Other played a crucial role in the construction of identities and 
banalisation of hatred. 
 
In the next example from the Zaman newspaper (22.01.2007), after the 
assassination of Dink, Armenian columnist Etyem Mahcupyan used a 
pessimist discourse to live in the future together in using the expression of 
'not holding the hand of other Turk’: 
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“We will not hold the hand of the other Turk that cannot tolerate 
Hrant and cannot even stand his existence, and reaching out to the 
murderer. We are not in the situation of understanding him. They say 
the murderer is not mature yet. If it was Hrant, he would say: ‘That’s 
it. Are Turks mature?’ We are already aware of the fact that we live 
in a society whose maturation has been hindered, but maybe it is 
time to ask this question: Is this a society ‘whose age is lessened’ for 
the actions that turn its own identity problem into acts of violence 
towards the other and ritualise it?'' 
 
In Mahcupyan’s article, ‘we’ identifies Armenians and Turkishness is 
expressed as the ‘other’ of Armenian identity. The negative predication 
indicates that the Turkish Other in this discourse is derogated. On the debate 
of reducing murderer Ogun Samast’s age, he paid attention to strategy of 
avoidance from responsibility by a topos of immaturity of the nation and 
meant that it was a deliberate action utilizing it for the acts of violence. A 
few days later, in the same newspaper (Zaman 25.01.2007), a response was 
given by Alev Alatlı to Mahcupyan’s statements associated with the relations 
between Armenians and Turks and their common future: 
“They must be made to understand that what Mahcupyans call 
‘boasting’ is in fact ‘dignity’ of Turks, what they call ‘hostility’ is 
‘heroism’, what they call ‘immaturity’ is humbleness. As Turks, we 
are also wondering which Armenian will determine our 
relationships for tomorrow. Is it the Armenian who lost his heart 
with his face turned towards to the European diaspora, or the 
Armenian whose face turned towards ‘his life comrades’, with his 
heart beating in his place? Is it the Armenian who ritualises his own 
identity problem by turning it into an act of violence/ humiliation/ 
insult towards the other/Turks and relies on the support of Europe to 
continue his attitude, or the Armenian who will take no offence from 
the ‘change’ that will be the undoing of his memory related to 
‘Turks’?” 
 
In Alatlı's sentences, the discourse of 'disloyalty' of Mancupyans, namely 
Armenians of Turkey, is underlined. In two opposing discourses what is 
apparently seen is the strategy of blaming others. Members of groups tend to 
think of themselves with in-group favouritism and portray the nation as 
better than the other nations (Tekin 2008, p.739). In this context, positive 
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Self presentation manifests itself as references on the Turks with positive 
lexical such as 'dignity', 'heroism' and 'humbleness'. Contrary to that, 
negative representation of Armenians constructs differences and Armenian 
identity as the out-group.  Discursive construction of Other is fed by 
historical xenophobic stereotypes. Contested memories and the role of these 
memories in problematic identity constructions and ‘Other’ imaginations 
demonstrate the obstacles for linguistic construction of collective political 
future. 
 
In the leftist newspaper Radikal, Ahmed Gokcen (18.02.2007) goes beyond 
the debates of being Armenian or Turk and the debates of being conservative 
or not, he stresses on the culture of justification of any violence in Turkey. 
He uses the neologies to identify new types of nationalism by uniting two 
words as ‘kimlik+keş’; kahra(man)yak; şiddet+perest: 
“However we, who have some ‘Mediterranean’, some ‘Eastern’ 
characteristics, had prepared our cultural infrastructure hundreds of 
years ago to impose violence anytime, anywhere. Because our blood 
flowed ‘hot’, we were ‘excited’, we were ‘emotional’, we were 
‘larky’ and we had countless ‘sensibilities’… We, getting jealous of 
violence of the neighbour, are watching with great admiration the 
appearance of violence in front of us with as an esteemed 
gentleman/lady in black jackets… Violence, which is becoming 
legalised thanks to our admiration today, are causing 
‘identityaddicteds’,‘heromaniacs’ and ‘violencephilias’ to come 
into existence not only from the nationalist conservative side, but 
also from all sides living in Turkey. Consoling words of yesterday 
such as ‘It is your father. It is normal that he beats’ are today 
replaced by words such as ‘He is the cop he beats’, ‘He is your 
husband he beats’, ‘He beats because he has problems’, which are 
not consoling at all.” 
 
 
In this text, the group of ‘we’ refers to the Turks. ‘Mediterranean’ and 
‘Eastern’ identical descriptions are used for addressing typical Turkish 
national character which implies cultural features such as being hot-blooded, 
excited, emotional and sensible. This imagination of the Turkish nation urges 
to naturalization and banalisation of the violence. Gokcen criticises 
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glorification and normalisation of violence through the power relations from 
the family level to the state level. Without targeting any specific group of 
people, he notes everybody is responsible for reproduction of this violence 
culture in Turkey. 
 
Hasan Bulent Kahraman (Radikal 28.01.2007) contributes the debate of 
violence culture in Turkey, linking its roots in the state culture and power 
relations. He uses the term of fascism for explaining the case of Hrant Dink, 
a view not often expressed in Turkish media. In his discourse, the 
construction of ethnic Turkish nationalism and its engagement with religion 
constitutes the parameters of fascism. Crucially, the state itself creates it and 
from state discourse to everyday discourse, ‘the banality of evil’ spreads and 
reproduces fascism: “Famous definition of Arendt is now known to 
everyone: ‘the banality of evil’. Hrant is just the victim of this!” Kahraman 
widens his argument in noting that the state is directly a tool of violence in 
Turkey and society is closely engaged with fascism. He underlines an intense 
and interactive relationship between elements on which fascism sits and 
rules: 
'If we say that women beaten at home, students exposed to violence 
by their teachers at school, civil servants experiencing domination 
of their chiefs are direct addressees of violence, we will say that no 
one in Turkey will be excluded from violence. Let us widen it in an 
abstract plan: Individuals without social security, a claimant who 
cannot take his right at court, a citizen who cannot transmit his 
political view to the parliament, are those who are exposed to secret 
types of violence. Let us look at this from a different orbit: Those 
who can’t talk in their mother language, those who are forced to 
keep their cultures under pressure, those who are deprived of the 
expression of their identities.” 
 
 
Here, Hasan Bulent Kahraman’s definition of violence addresses its social, 
economical and cultural dimensions. He portrays it as a matter of domination 
that privileges certain expression of identities. That is to say, certain power 
relations from the family to the state reproduce violence and normalisation of 
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violence in everyday relationships of individuals. His remarks on social 
security and representation of views in the national parliament are quite 
crucial, if one considers the election threshold is ten per cent to have a seat in 
Ankara and that almost half of the votes are not represented in parliament. 
The remainder of the votes are shared among the ruling and opposition 
parties, but the government has the majority of seats that dysfunctions the 
opposition. As Kahraman expressed, there are different forms of violence 
towards the minorities who are disadvantaged in the power circle. Although 
every individual is constitutionally accepted as Turk, different practices and 
perspectives on identity politics brought about long-lasting problems in 
Turkey. Some are accepted as less ‘Turk’ than others. Some social, 
economical and cultural rights of minorities, particularly non-Muslim 
citizens' are neglected. However, the case of Hrant Dink indicates that 
Turkey is far from the protection of the fundamental human rights of 
minorities as the freedom of expression and the right to life. Regarding these 
identity politics, Cirakman (2011) argued that Turkish self-image has had a 
transition from secular and/or civic to ethnic nationalist in the means of 
politicisation of Turkishness. 
 
Throughout the section, the discourse analysis shows that there are tangled 
up conceptions and use of language for identification of non-Muslims in 
Turkey, whether or not they belong to the Turkish nation. The difference in 
multiple narrations of nation, selective and ideological reading on common 
history are indicated as sources of current understandings and definitions of 
the others of the nation-state. More noteworthy, politicisation and 
instrumentalism of the themes used for othering do not get to the roots of the 
problems. Linguistic expressions of othering minority identities in saying 
‘Armenian offspring’ or implying ‘she is a member of a Christian sect’ are 
employed for enervating opponent groups. Highly common in contested 
narratives, blaming others strategy hides the depth of the problem, 
normalises, turns the criminals into the heroes and reconstructs the political 
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atmosphere for racism and hatred crimes. 
 
The situation of human rights, especially with regard to political freedom, 
ethnic and religious minorities remains an issue of great concern that may 
undermine Turkey’s democracy discourse. In this context, the year of 2007 is 
a crucial milestone in the last decade due to the assassination of Hrant Dink 
and for reviewing the place of non-Muslim identity in post-Kemalist Turkish 
nation-state discourse. 2007 is also clamorous, compelling and momentous 
for examining the pro-secular and Islamist identities of Turkey during the 
national tension of presidential and general elections. The following part of 
the chapter examines the fault lines among the divided Muslim majority of 
Turkey through the case study. It observes the different discourses on the 
problems of Islam’s place in Kemalist nation-state building and it reveals the 
anxiety of Republican population that internalises secularism and does not 
want to be forced to change its secular way of life. This comparative 
perspective helps to overcome dogmatic, naturalised and imposing 
understanding of nationalist perspectives, lifestyles and political 
polarisations. It is believed that uncovering these multiple, contested 
conceptions of the nation and problematic identity politics opens a 
negotiation platform for an alternative way of searching a practice of living 
together with a new perspective of social contract and diversity management. 
 
 
3.2. The Case of the Presidential Elections of Turkey in 2007: Secularism 
and Islam in Turkish Nation-State Identity 
In this section, Secularist-Islamist nationalist polarisation will be analysed in 
the case of the Presidential elections of Turkey in 2007. It can be argued that 
every election resulted with the victory of the AKP used to legitimatise the 
power of government in questioning Kemalist tradition and reconstructing 
the post-Kemalist nation-state identity on a non-securitisation of Islamic 
identity. Arguing as being representative of the majority of Turkey, the AKP 
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has managed to change the way of doing some ‘national habits’ which have 
never been touched by any other previous governments. Topics such as 
abandoning the celebration of the Commemoration of Ataturk, Youth and 
Sports Day in the stadiums on 19 May which is the symbol of the start of 
National Independence War; or giving more importance to the 
commemoration of Sultan Abdulhamid rather than Ataturk in the 
parliamentarian agenda. Moreover, using democracy discourse for 
emancipation of religious ‘freedoms’ in order to live in an Islamic way in 
every aspect of social life, and using governmental support, brought about a 
deep polarisation in the terms of secularism debates in the 2000s in Turkey. 
In particular, stressing on secularism and defence of Republican values raised 
a sharp contradiction of Islamists-Rebuplicanists in the society in 2007. 
 
With the influences of this circumstance and tension, a nationwide political 
crisis was provoked by secularists and the army when Turkey’s Foreign 
Minister Abdullah Gul was nominated as presidential candidate by the ruling 
the AKP in April 2007.  As a response, the e-memorandum on the website of 
the military was published to warn that it would intervene if secularism was 
put at risk. The main opposition party, the CHP brought the issue of the 
presidential election to the Turkish Constitutional Court, arguing that the first 
round of voting in parliament was invalid on procedural grounds. This 
caused serious unrest among the AKP followers. Society was fragmented to 
the camps. Kemalist secularist masses with the discourse of protecting the 
Republican state system organised mass demonstrations against the AKP’s 
hidden agenda to islamise Turkey (Hojelid 2010, p.468). In opposition to that, 
the AKP and Islamists complained about the non-pluralist and illiberal form 
of secularism and state-society relationship that discriminated against 
religious people and inhibited religious freedom (ibid. p.476). The gap 
between the incumbents and the CHP has continued to widen (Ciddi 2008 
p.438) before the election of July 2007 which affected the results. The 
Republican Party came in second with 20.8 per cent of the vote, trailing 
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behind the AKP’s 46.5 per cent which represented a slight increase in the 
vote share of the CHP from 2002 (19.4 per cent) and a large increase for the 
AKP (34.4 per cent in 2002). It shows that the political polarisations in 
Turkey are used for maximising the political profit from the turmoil by 
sharpening the political party affiliation. What is missing and forgotten in 
this political calculation is that it is not a win-win game. Politicisation of 
identities jeopardises the mutual respect and confidence among people. Both 
the ways of dealing with assertive secularist practices and religious pressure 
on people are threatening and ominous; whereas the main point is 
guaranteeing the pluralism in the society. This section of the chapter 
demonstrates how Turkish media represents this power struggle between 
secularist and Islamist circles through this selected historical political process 
in order to see how they imagine Turkey and the Turkish nation in the terms 
of religion and secularism. 
 
 
3.2.1. On Understanding of the Nation and National Identity: Which 
Turkey? 
The events in 2007 showed that the secularisation project of the Kemalist 
elites reached to the level of the broad masses and had a strong influence on 
Turkish society in terms of modernisation. According to Merve Kavakcı 
Islam’s point of view (2010, p.41), the Kemalist reforms as ‘forced 
modernisation’ caused a fragmentation of society in Turkey into two camps: 
one modern Turkey and the other Turks who lived, thought, and dressed 
differently. In the case of dressing, her volume on ‘headscarf politics in 
Turkey’ discovers the linkage between politics, a woman’s body, and clothing. 
She argues that the Kemalists’ strict anti-veil politics created ‘a war waged 
by women against women’ (ibid. p.42). Kemalist women perceive the black 
veil as embarrassing for a modern image of Turkey in the eyes of other 
nations (ibid. p.44), which is seen humiliating or undermining the way of life 
of the ‘other Turkey’. It is also evidence of how the top-down invention of a 
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tradition expanded to the masses and was internalised. If one accepts that 
women in particular are the main reproducers of the nation biologically, 
culturally and symbolically (Yuval-Davis 1993), the importance of divided 
perceptions on ‘womanhood’ in Turkey can be well understood. 
 
Alev Cinar’s Modernity, Islam, and Secularism in Turkey: Bodies, Places, 
and Time (2005) provides an even deeper account of Turkey’s revolutionist 
break from the Ottoman-Islamic way of living with a specific focus on the 
concepts of ‘clothing the national body’ and the appearance of women in 
public places. Through the regulation of clothing, the categorising of gender, 
class, status, and religion, a public-private distinction was operating through 
different interventions upon the body. Clothing is one of the most effective 
signs for recognition and differentiation (ibid 2005, p.55) that determines 
these identity categories, most crucially the national identity. States and 
nations are represented by their people in the body of man and woman. Thus 
as it is noted by Cinar (2005, p.53), ‘the body is metaphorically employed 
not only as a symbol of the nation and its boundaries, but also as a material 
space where the boundaries of the public and the private are drawn toward 
the construction of the national public subject’. 
 
In other words, the politics of body serve to form a sense of belong to a 
nation. In the case of Turkey, unveiling the female body during the formative 
years of the Republic constituted the public realm as a secular domain. This 
gendering intervention legitimated with the rhetoric of liberation of the 
body/nation (ibid. p.62) from the Islamic covering, closing or hiding culture. 
The state encouraged the visibility of women representatives in various jobs 
such as pilots, lawyers, and politicians, wearing elegant European dresses in 
the public sphere and in the media as national signifiers of western-oriented 
secular modernity. By this way, Turkish woman had a distinctive body, face, 
and voice. This emancipation of the female body generated a new order of 
power relations and made the secularists’ elite circles advantaged groups in 
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the centre. The state elites’ particular interpretation of modernity sneaked 
into the state’s citizenship regime (Donmez and Enneli 2011, p.1) as an 
inclusion/exclusion mechanism for managing society. Beyond the 
constitutional discourse, it functioned to gain privileged positions for 
secularist Kemalist identities and pushed others, namely conservative Islamic 
identities, into a secondary position. This point elucidates the origins of the 
power struggle in Turkey's last decade. Imagining Turkey as secular or 
Islamic is not just a matter of state regime, but also a matter of life style that 
determines how the Turks want to live. 
 
In the last decade, the argument that AKP’s islamisation of the country and 
state institutions is mostly supported by pro-secularist Cumhuriyet’s news 
reports with the numerous examples of negative connotations of political 
continuation driven by the ruling party. For instance, a report titled ‘the 
headscarf ban is not operational’ noted that  ‘Hacer Yıldırım, who is working 
as a teacher in the Narlı town of Lacin a sub-province of Corum, enters the 
classroom wearing a headscarf since the AKP came into power’ (Cumhuriyet, 
27.10.2005). These kinds of news were used for verifying their 
argumentation of what changed by the AKP. In another example, the ban on 
alcohol was regarded as an attack on ‘the secular and democratic Republic, 
fundamental rights and freedoms’. It was reported that the ban on alcohol in 
Lake Mogan and Goksu Park of Ankara met with a strong reaction. Moreover, 
it was identified in negative connotations by using the words of ‘a disgrace 
for the capital’ (Cumhuriyet, 20.10.2005). Similarly, in a report titled 
‘Waiting for God for Help’, the argumentative scheme which was used as a 
strategy of transformation indicated a change in the AKP period: 
“Are we in the modern times? The municipalities of AKP who are 
busy with the alcohol ban disregarding human health... Diarrhoea 
continues in Malatya... The situation is clear... Applicants to the 
hospital have reached eight thousand. The number of infected 
people has reached to forty thousand...” (Cumhuriyet 03.12.2005) 
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The adverbial expression of ‘the modern times’ in the question is employed 
for establishing an oppositional discourse to the government's local policies, 
which argues AKP is not doing the necessities of modern life, instead it is 
taking the society to the premodern times. The argument is supported by 
illustrations of AKP’s alcohol, ignorance of the public’s health and raising an 
epidemic in Malatya. A common activity in negative predication is to 
compare and contrast the positive traits with the negative traits. The pro-
secular media discourse exhibit a resistance against the transformation driven 
by the pro-Islamist AKP. With the metaphor of ‘TRT, AKP’s farm’ 
(Cumhuriyet, 08.06.2006), it was claimed that the state-owned television and 
radio institution, the TRT turned into the media organ of the AKP with their 
programmes propagandising the sharia. The ‘farm’ in the lexical structure of 
description of TRT addresses to a relationship between the word and some 
aspects of the material world (Fowler 1991, p.81), where the AKP does what 
it wants as it owns this state institution. 
 
In the debate of Islam and modernism, in Hurriyet, Ozdemir Ince writes an 
article entitled: ‘Headscarf and Semiology’ (24.08.2007) which claims using 
Islamic symbols in the public space such as in the academia or hospital does 
not indicate the interdependence of modern public and private life in a 
society, but shows the ‘fragmented individual’ and Islamic society: 
 “The headscarf should not be conceived as a ‘modern privy’ as 
Nilufer Gole is trying to sell. The headscarf of a woman who uses 
the computer and microscope, who works as a doctor or a CEO, 
does not represent a modern and secular individual or society but 
signifies a fragmented individual and a totalitarian Islamic 
community which uses technology.” 
 
 
Given that content, the last passage also serves to see how some ideological 
groups perceive the relationship between Islam and modernism in terms of 
science and secularism. Frequently visible in the articles are the signs that 
belief in religion and modernity cannot operate together. In this orientalstic 
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approach, scientific and religious identity causes a fragmented body of a 
nation. This perspective can be accepted as a Kemalist positivist approach as 
well. Moreover, Ince (Hurriyet, 26.08.2007) underlines the objections of 
stressing on Muslimhood of the population: “Nobody is even aware that 
sentences beginning with ‘a country in which 99 per cent of the population is 
Muslim as in Turkey’ are a violation to secularism and killing secularism.” In 
this anthropomorphic presentation of secularism, it is clear that Islam is seen 
as a direct ‘threat’ to the Republican secular system by Kemalists. In April 
2007, this topos of threat was widely used in the pro-secular discourse of 
newspaper Cumhuriyet. Its columnist Erdal Atabek described this threat as 
Turkey’s transformation and separation: 
“Turkey is being transformed to two separate countries: ‘Secular, 
independent Republic of Ataturk’ and ‘religion axial moderate 
Islamic republic’. Secular, independent Republic of Ataturk is 
clearly in danger. It is now clear that Turkey is aware of the danger.” 
(Cumhuriyet 23.04.07) 
 
Atabek warns against heteronomy in using the words of ‘two separate 
countries’ with a comparison.  Positive Self presentation is a remarkable 
strategy in making a selective use of lexical and adjectives such as 
'independent' character of the ‘founding generation’ (Wodak et. al 2006, p.41) 
and M.Kemal Ataturk. In addition, there is a negative connotation of political 
continuation in the state-religion relations. The warning against the loss of 
national autonomy and secularism is emphasized with the topos of danger, 
which demonstrates a resistance to Islamic transformation of Turkey.  In this 
example, 'Turkey' appears as a metonymy, first it implies the country, then in 
the last sentence it refers to the nation or the people. Moreover, 'Republic of 
Ataturk' is a synecdoche of the state, 'Turkey'. These examples of language 
use show that the meanings of the state and the nation overlap in the 
discourses. Thus, the pro-secular circles interpret the recent changes in the 
state discourse as the threat to their identities and nation. Ersin Kalaycioglu 
(2007) explains how this threat is perceived by some circles, particularly by 
‘young officers of the army’: 'These people do not only consider their 
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lifestyle under threat, but that their lives are also under threat. They are afraid 
that those without headscarves will be attacked with acid and hanged as in 
Iran.'  The point made by the example of Iran is highly important to see how 
some groups have internalised secular system and ways of life in Turkey. It is 
therefore the pro-secularist discontentment is more than a resistance to a 
regime change, but a deeply rooted fear of death. 
 
In this context, Turkish President Ahmet Necdet Sezer (Radikal,14.04.2007) 
stated that the political regime had never been in more danger since the 
foundation of the Republic and added: 
''However, there are three important facts that these circles need 
to be aware of: First bringing the theocratic state – whether it is 
moderate or radical – and democracy is an approaching 
violation to history and science. Second, it is inevitable that the 
moderate Islam will quickly turn into radical Islam. Third, the 
Republic of Turkey made her choice of regime 84 years ago with 
the foundation of the Republic. This regime is an enlightened and 
modern regime bound to the principles and revolutions of Ataturk 
and the nationalism of Ataturk based on a secular, democratic 
and social state of law.'' 
 
 
In this speech of President Ahmet Necdet Sezer, three aspects of ‘critique’ 
(Wodak 2006, p.8-9) can be examined in the search of specific characteristics 
of the Turkish case.  'Text imminent critique’ uncovers contradictions in 
different discourses of Turkish nationalism, namely Kemalist nationalism 
and Islamist nationalism. ‘Socio-diagnostic critique’ explores the functions 
of discursive practices in aiming persuasion or resistance. The emphasis on 
positive characteristics of secular regime such as being enlightened, modern 
and democratic intends to maintain Kemalist nation-state identity and resist 
to an Islamic transformation. Furthermore, ‘retrospective critique’ reveals 
how a narrative of the collective past plays a role in the ways of dealing with 
its consequences and effects. The stress on 'Turkey made her choice in 84 
years ago with Kemalist principles and revolutions'  illustrates the present 
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way of dealing with Turkish history and the pro-secular perspective on 
present problems. 
 
Radikal also gave place to opinions on the side of the government. Abdullah 
Gul commented on the concerns of the President: ''I am not fully aware of 
what Mr. President said but the Turkish people do not believe that. On the 
contrary, it is not only Turkey but also foreigners trust Turkey today.'' 
Zaman’s (14.04.2007) report took the line of supporting Gul’s statement that 
noted Turkish people did not agree with Sezer’s ideas on the regime. 
According to Zaman, President Sezer’s statement given one month before the 
end of his term had been met with strong reactions. Sezer described 
democratisation as a threat and claimed that the regime is in danger, but he 
could not put forward tangible evidence. 'Most of the people' did not share 
Sezer’s views. This news coverage demonstrates the AKP government's 
claim that they represent the majority of the Turkish people. They claim that 
Turkey governed by a Kemalist elitist minority who were not aware of the 
Turkish people’s demands and sentiments. Hence, the AKP government and 
new elite in-state bureaucracy aim to change the old image of Turkey and 
offer to do things in their own way. 
 
Although there was a rising tension on the side of Kemalist circles against 
Islamisation, the members of the AKP opted to use the concept of 
conservatism. Consistently and insistently they were saying that they were 
not Islamists but conservative democrats. Therefore, liberal and some leftist 
circles were supporting the changes driven by the government. On the other 
side, the opposition around the CHP produced the discourse of Islam was 
coming. Using the terms ‘threat’ and ‘anti-revolution’ caused  politicisation 
of Islamic identity and its holders, including those who never intended, even 
thought about opposing the state’s regime and secularism. While describing 
the turban as an ideological weapon of political Islam, the masses with any 
kind of ordinary headscarf were pushed towards the polarisation discourse 
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that took Turkey to an early general election decision driven by the 
Presidential election crisis. 
 
 
3.2.2. Being the President of Turkish Republic: Who Should Represent 
the Turkish Nation? 
President of the Turkish Great National Assembly, Bulent Arınc, stated 
(Hurriyet, 14.04.2007) that “We will elect a religious president” and harshly 
reacted to President Ahmet Necdet Sezer’s statement of “The political regime 
has never been in more danger since the foundation of the Republic.”:  “It is 
not the regime that is in danger but the power of the status quoists that is in 
danger. This is a bitter and relentless claim.” In this expression, there is a 
presupposition claiming the Republican system created the status quo of its 
advantaged and disadvantaged groups in construction of power relations. 
Arinc’s sentences represent the views of Islamists who think the Kemalist 
nation-state system requires a change in existing power relations. The AKP 
transforms the nature of central administration and bureaucracy by bringing 
the voices of the religious masses to Ankara. Zaman (22.04.2007) illustrated 
this resistance to change in the context of President Sezer’s attempt to veto 
power. Emine Dolmaci claimed that Sezer’s definition of the President was 
‘a shield to state, a barrier to action’. She compared Sezer with Kenan Evren 
who was the President of Turkey at the time of the 1980 military coup: 
''Sezer who has vetoed fifty-nine laws during his four years with the AKP 
government, double the amount achieved during the coup when President 
Kenan Evren vetoed twenty-six laws.'' Comparing the negative aspect of the 
past with Sezer’s present acts also portrays the opinions of people who think 
the opposition parties are preventing AKP’s attempt to consolidate 
democracy. 
 
What kind of President should represent Turkey? Author Ayla Kutlu 
answered this question for Cumhuriyet (30.01.2007). She expressed her 
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belief that the first six articles of the Constitution defining “the form of the 
state, the characteristics of the Republic, unity of the state, official language, 
flag, national anthem and capital and irrevocable provisions, fundamental 
objectives and duties of the state, sovereignty” simultaneously defined the 
beliefs, philosophical thought system and protective notion of the President 
of the Republic of Turkey. Kutlu noted regarding the concerns about the 
spouse of a President who is wearing a headscarf as a role model to women: 
“The spouse of the President should at least have a modern identity.” This 
expression demonstrates the Kemalist understanding of modernity and its 
links with the nation’s secularist identity; therefore the wife of the President, 
as the female face of Turkey, should have a modern appearance. 
 
Cuneyt Ulsever (Hurriyet, 26.08.07) transcended the symbolic power of the 
headscarf and its usage in the public area with a specific focus on how social 
policies could influence the other ways of life and how Islamic dress might 
be politicised and used for putting pressure on the sameness of some citizens 
and the differentiation of others: 
“While social policies determined how to behave, dress and eat, 
they also determine how we think, whether we are aware of it or not. 
The dominant life style gradually affects the ‘other’. For example a 
lady who basically covers her head with a headscarf may begin to 
use turban just because of the interrogative looks she receives. The 
National Vision, which thinks that it is seizing control of the state by 
electing Abdullah Gul as President, may further increase the social 
imposition in this term.” 
 
Ulsever's text is useful to tie the nationalist discourse and power. If a certain 
discourse becomes dominant, it has the power of control people's ways of 
thinking and behaving.  As noted in previous chapters, nationalism is a way 
of seeing, thinking and structuring the world we live in, thus it is much more 
than a political doctrine (Mihelj 2011, p.17). The social world fundamentally 
divided and structured along power relations and perspective differences. 
There are different national imaginations and nationalist visions of the world 
and for achieving legitimacy these perspectives would compete for acting as 
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a representative of the nation. Each group may privilege their own 
perspective of what the nation is physically, culturally and historically (Skey 
2011, p.12). By the example of the headscarf issue, Ulsever expressed the 
anxiety of the secularist circles and their struggle to secure a sense of Self 
and maintain a knowable and manageable sense of identity and community 
in response to the social and political transformations due to the risk of 
Islamic imposition. 
 
 
3.2.3. The Republican Demonstrations in Turkish Media 
This section articulates that there are different interpretations of Turkish 
nationhood and nation-state identity. In the articles, how in-group and out-
group presentations are constructed by using the words of ‘we’ and ‘you’ 
show different identifications in Turkish society. In addition, the analysis of 
mood structure (Reisigl and Wodak 2001, p.83) of the comments serves to 
understand the struggle for the power between the pro-secularists and 
Islamists during the Republican meetings in 2007. Moreover, the examples 
highlight interference of concepts of 'nation' and 'state' in the Turkish case. 
For instance, Cumhuriyet (14.04.2007, p.1) underlined the significance of the 
secular Republican regime and the Islamist 'danger' towards to the 'Republic 
of Turkey': 
“The Republic of Turkey, for the first time in its history, is in such 
great danger. Hundreds of thousands of people meet in Ankara 
Tandogan square to manifest that the Republic is not without 
ownership. We are aware of the danger.” 
 
 
This expression implies that the pro-secularist community imagines 'we' as 
the guardians of the Republican system and rhetorically its owners. On this 
context, during the spring of 2007 Cumhuriyet newspaper called people to 
the squares of the country for the demonstrations against the AKP 
government and its 'Islamic' policies. Mustafa Balbay (Cumhuriyet, 30.04.07) 
stressed the co-responsibility of everyone in Anatolia to protect the 
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modernity of the country, secular regime of the state and the unity of the 
nation: 
 
“We are in a time in which Ataturk’s statement ‘If the issue is 
country, the rest are details’ fits perfectly. At this point, it is not 
about the left-right, the military-civil, but just Turkey. Everybody 
willing to preserve the national unity, secular structure and 
modernity of Turkey should take part. In this context, the left-right 
political circles, the NGOs originated in Anatolia, the professional 
chambers, the military, civilians, everybody has a duty. Tandogan-
Caglayan is the manifestation of this responsibility.” 
 
In contrast to the pro-secularist Cumhuriyet’s discourse, Vahap Coskun 
(Zaman, 14.04.2007) used a different rhetorical perspective towards the 
Republican demonstrations, in noting 'Please admit that you are having 
difficulty in absorbing democracy.'  He added that there was rising tension in 
the society for the Presidency in such a central position in the system, made 
by others who consider themselves to be 'the real owners of the state and the 
landlord of the people'.   
 
According to Radikal's coverage, the participants at the meetings, most of 
who were coming from other cities, chanted the slogans: “We are not pro-
coup; we are revolutionist”, “We do not want an Imam in Cankaya”, 
“Cankaya is secular and will remain so”. The crowd objected to Prime 
Minister Tayyip Erdogan’s ascension to the Presidency and targeted the USA: 
“Damn American imperialism!” Radikal reported that Ataturkist Ideas 
Organisation vice Director Nur Serter said: ''Turkey says ‘stop’ to those who 
treat the democracy as a tool and who seek alliance with the peshmarga 
camps. We are nationalist, Kemalist and patriots. We are the enlightened 
future of Turkey, the real children of the country and follow in the footsteps 
of our Ataturk.'' This speech reflects the mentality of the Kemalist 
nationalism. Kemalists’ definition of ‘we’ is an example of positive Self 
presentation, which is seen in the lexical units as ‘enlightened future’ and 
‘real children of the country’. The hidden meaning in Serter’s speech is 
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participants of these meetings think that democracy is not the real destination 
for the government; but it is a vehicle to arrive at the other intended 
destination. In this text, combination of propositions supplies a typical 
narrative of Kemalist nationalists who argue that the AKP has an agenda of 
Islamisation Turkey. This instance implicitly constructs sameness within the 
group and cannot avoid the usage of ‘we’ meaning ‘the Turks’ but 
‘Kemalists’. The statements are used as an important device to express the 
views that Kemalists do not want a person with an Islamists past in Cankaya, 
where the house of Ataturk and Republican system is symbolised. This 
discourse aims to promote a certain, secular image of Turkey. Here,  
Kemalist self-identification as 'the real children of the country', the 
expression of Islamist critic on Kemalist mentality in the previous example 
as 'the real owners of the state and the landlord of the people' and 'the real 
child of Anatolia' in the case of Hrant Dink point a repetition and constitute 
an intertexuality. 
 
By referencing Nur Serter in lexemes with semantic components 
constructing difference and exclusion, Zaman (17.04.2007) establishes a 
different narrative on the meetings associated with non-Muslimhood and 
anti-headscarf discourse. It is claimed that Serter is a member of a sect who 
believe they have encountered the spirit of Jesus. This argumentation 
employs a trivialisation strategy that has the function of degrading 
Republican protests. Zaman reminded that Nur Serter established persuasion 
chambers in the university against the headscarf protests when she was the 
vice rector of Istanbul University
31
.  What people know or how people look 
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at the experiences and struggles in the past is based on a selective reading of 
the history (Inthorn 2007), but this determines present struggles to secure 
their future as how they want to live it on their ways of life and perspectives 
of world. Reminding to readers her role in the headscarf protests and 
labelling her with a membership of the sect, construct a discourse of 'they are 
not like us' and build an opponent discourse against the secularist protesters. 
What is forgotten here is people who call themselves as secularist in Turkey 
are the members of Muslim majority in Turkey. What divides Muslims are 
the ways they want to live their life and beliefs. 
 
Zaman (14.04.2007) used massive negative associations and connotations to 
describe the participants of the pro-secularist meetings: “Ataturkist Ideas 
Organisation members are uncomfortable at being called pro-coup.” Linking 
the AIO with the military coup was also supported by a visual means of 
realisation, a photograph showing one of the banners in the meeting read: 
“The laws of the military intervention shall be in effect.” Zaman argued that 
the leftist, revolutionist groups -according to Islamists these are non-religious 
groups- organised the demonstrations: “The only right-wing to attend the 
meeting was Yasar Okuyan”. This example corresponded with a trivialisation 
strategy in presentation of the meetings.  More noteworthy, was that the 
modality of Zaman appears in a first page report by just giving a small detail 
from the meeting of thousands of people in Tandogan. Without noting why 
this event was organised or what its the agenda and content was, 
demonstrations were directly connected with the AIO with negative other 
representations: “Tuncay Ozkan’s provocation angered even the AIO. 
Ozkan’s speech, even if he was not in the programme, caused chaos.” With 
limited knowledge and making personal references to the leftist, revolutionist 
or pro-coup masses, this coverage let different readings on the events and 
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what was actually going on in the country. In this context, Radikal’s 
(15.04.2007) interpretation on the meetings was entitled ‘important warning 
for Erdogan’ by giving details of the aims and discourses of the participants. 
 
As is seen in these examples, Islamist and Kemalist discourses construct, 
deconstruct and reform each other. Beyond the Islamists-Secularist 
polarisation, Baskın Oran (Radikal, 20.05.07) noted that the other 
participants in the meetings defended the third way in the discourse of 
‘neither the patten (medieval shoe) nor the army boots’. According to his 
observation, one of the most important slogans of the republican meetings 
was anti-imperialism. What were common and easy to observe in these 
meetings were the direct and indirect forms of marginalisation of non-
Muslims and the West: 
“They aim to found the Pontus, they will turn Fener into Vatican, 
and they divide us by using missionaries, Armenians demand land, 
transsexuals are everywhere, etc. More direct ones are: The EU will 
divide Turkey. One of most common banners is: ‘Neither the USA 
nor the EU’… Of course there are those in the meetings who say 
‘neither the patten (medieval shoe) nor the army boots’. But the 
majority of those say: ‘If we are losing secularism, our Army will be 
our crown’.” 
 
 
 
3.2.4. Turkish Media Coverage on the Results of 2007 National Elections 
AKP has achieved a rare success of having 46.5 per cent in the general 
elections of 2007 held under the tension of the discussion on the Presidency 
and the memorandum. Radikal’s (23.07.2007) comment on the results was 
‘the memorandum of the people’. It was supported by the quotation from 
Erdogan’s speech: Upon the question 'Did Mr. Gul’s ineligibility affect the 
result?' Erdogan replied: 'Of course. People reacted both to the Constitutional 
Court and the barriers on the way of Mr. Gul.' 
 
Mahfi Egilmez (Radikal 23.07.2007) demonstrated the main reason for the 
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AKP’s success was the economic performance following the economic crisis: 
the decrease in inflation, sustainable growth, decrease in budget deficit, 
decrease in debt burden and tolerable current deficit rate and direct foreign 
investment in Turkey all contributed greatly to AKP. In opposition, Emre 
Kongar (Cumhuriyet, 30.07.2007) argued that it was surprising that  the AKP 
could not get more votes; only reaching 46.6 per cent due to the AKP using 
both religion and money as election tactics and also the fact that it had these 
powers behind it : “international capital, national capital, the USA, the EU, 
international media, national media, central bureaucracy, municipalities, 
religious communities, some of the minorities, Northern Iraq Kurd 
Administration, Iraq’s Kurdish origin Head of State, Greece, Cyprus Greek 
Administration.” 
 
In addition, Cumhuriyet (24.07.2007) reported that AKP had increased its 
votes mostly in Eastern and South-eastern regions. AKP received 60 per cent 
of the votes in the region and this was mainly due to the fact that AKP 
resisted the Army’s operations in Northern Iraq before the elections and 
thereby gained the support of the people. Another reason was that the 
community leaders of the region – where the religious communities are quite 
strong – steered their followers towards AKP which meant that illiterate 
voters could not be organised to vote for the independent deputies of DTP. 
This information argues that the general increase in AKP’s votes was based 
on the Kurdish people’s support in Eastern and South-eastern regions of 
Turkey. It was a fact that the alliance of Kurdish and Islamists for 
reconstruction of the Kemalist nation-state identity has been a crucial factor 
in reconfiguration of power relations during the last decade. 
 
In order to challenge with the Kemalist state legacy, there was a populist 
support to the AKP.  Some liberal and leftist writers also joined this camp for 
the consolidation of democracy in Turkey. Hadi Uluengin (Hurriyet 
24.07.2007) wrote that it was a civil victory against the militarist, secularist, 
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and old Kemalist paradigm. The newest paradigm was born on July 22. 
Mehmet Barlas (Hurriyet 28.07.2007) supported this argument in noting the 
elections of 2007 changed the power relations in Turkey. The centre, the 
power and the cities were shared by the both urban and rural populations. 
Cengiz Candar (Hurriyet 24.07.2007) declared that the election result was a 
glory of democracy. He added that this made him happy to be a part of this 
country and nation. Bekir Coskun (Hurriyet, 24.07.2007) interpreted the 
AKP’s success and its overwhelming victory as the acknowledgment of the 
Turkey's changing face, which he described as the transformation of secular 
Republic into a moderate Islam through these elections. The high level of 
votes meant that the support for the AKP enabled it to realise its imagination 
of Turkey.  From a bigger picture of the results, Haluk Sahin (Radikal 
23.07.2007) noted three discourses on Turkey associated with the election 
results: “I have thought that this election would have three messages before 
we started to get the results: if the AKP reaches a majority more than 40 per 
cent ‘Do not touch my democracy’, if the total votes of the CHP and the 
MHP reach to 40 per cent ‘Do not play with my Republic’…And of course 
depending on the votes of the independent deputies: ‘We are here as well!’. 
This demonstrates that different priorities constitute different messages and 
answers to what comes first for Turkey, namely, Islam, democracy, secular 
Republican system, equal constitutional citizenship or pluralism. It refers to 
the political polarisation in Turkey and constructs intra-national difference; 
in other words, internal sub-national differentiation between Turkish people. 
 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter showed that the national media do not only symbolize and 
represent the nation but also construct it by speaking for and to the nation. 
The media coverage of the events from 2007 demonstrated the national 
tension and power struggle for maintaining Turkey's Kemalist nation-state 
identity and challenging post-Kemalist discourse. The newspaper texts 
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regarding two politically and culturally important incidents for examination 
of Turkey's post-Kemalist identity were chosen and the data was tested based 
on the content, strategies used in the discursive construction of national 
identity and the linguistic means employed. The ideological stance of the 
newspapers was a determinant in the national imaginings they represented. 
Therefore, the presentation of the actors, the political past and present in the 
texts were primarily between the strategies of perpetuation and of 
transformation depending on the ideological, political affiliation of the 
newspapers. 
 
The study confirmed that there are competing narratives of the Turkish nation. 
The power struggle was fundamental among the secularist and Islamist 
versions of Turkish imagination of the nation. During the struggle, the AKP's 
post-Kemalist official discourse of national identity was challenged by the 
discourse of Kemalist and ethno-nationalist people. Yet, in some cases both 
challenging discourses were presented in the same newspapers. However, the 
case of Hrant Dink revealed that the discourse of otherness of non-Muslims 
was dominant in the newspapers, which revealed its impact on popular 
discourses and its power in the all Turkish nationalist ideologies while 
Muslim identity appeared as the main component of Turkish national 
character. The examples confirm that being Muslim constructs a unity in 
Turkish people, but the ways of living it divide them. In this context, the 
nation-state’s foundation and formation of secularism are problematic 
components which diversely appear in the competing narratives of the 
nation’s history. 
 
What is very much alive in the Kemalist imagination of the Turkish nation 
are the memories of the Independence War and Republican legacy of M. 
Kemal Ataturk. In the present, its ideologists are constructing a new 
independence war discourse with a strategy directed against the AKP and its 
transformation in Turkey's Kemalist domestic and foreign policies. It points 
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out that the negative aspects of the present have to be confronted and a 
continued fight for a change aimed at the AKP; therefore Kemalists 
organised Republican demonstrations and called Turkish people for a rising 
up. Common to all Kemalist discourse is their belief that the Republican 
system and their secular life is under Islamist threat. In Cumhuriyet, certain 
political continuities are portrayed in a negative way that presents the 
achievements of the Republican system as being in danger. In the selected 
texts, the fear is interwoven that Turkey could again become a ‘dark’ country 
by the supposed proof that reactionism has always been there, today more 
than ever, and, of course, it is strongest within an international alliance of 
internal and external enemies of the Republican system. The main strategy in 
the Kemalist Cumhuriyet newspaper underlines the threat against the secular 
system and the aim for maintaining the Kemalist narrative of the nation. This 
perpetuation strategy, which has been used several times, is the strategy also 
used by the columnists of the Hurriyet newspaper in the simultaneous 
emphasis on secularism. On the other hand, Islamists use the strategy of 
transformation and express a perception that sees these opponent movements 
as the resistance to change and democracy. Therefore, Zaman writers stress 
that Kemalist opponents seek for the status quo that perpetuates their 
privileged positions against ‘Muslim majority’. Islamists address that there 
has been a downward Kemalist pressure on their way of life since the early 
years of the Republican system. On the whole, it can be said that the strategy 
of self-victimhood and ‘we are the victims’ thesis are common in both sides, 
referring to ‘others’ as being very one-sided. On one side, Kemalists blame 
others that they have threatened the secular and modern character of the 
nation in expression of a concern about a possible loss of significance of 
Kemalist Republican structure; on the other, Islamists blame others that they 
have controlled their expression, Islamic ways of living and raise concerns 
that Kemalist nationalism ended the multicultural legacy of the Ottoman 
Empire; thus the Republican state feeds racism and racist event towards 
others which is seen in the case of Hrant Dink. Again, the victim thesis was 
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put forward in the different discourses as in the case of Hrant Dink. ‘Turkey 
is targeted’ argumentation is present in most of the texts that have been 
investigated. In some articles, the past experiences with Armenians are 
mentioned, drawn upon strategies of justification and relativisation. Liberal 
leftist newspaper, Radikal is the only one that openly named the event as 
fascism and criticised the national character and climate that reproduced 
naturalised violence. It can be said that the analysed texts from Dogan Media 
Group’s Radikal and Hurriyet show that these newspapers covered 
oscillating news reports during these events. Where it occurs in the texts, it 
frequently not only serves the purpose of self-representation but is also part 
of an aim of promoting national identification and emphasis on the difference 
between secularist, Islamists and liberal interpretations of Turkish nation-
state identity. It can be easily identified through the analysis that there is a 
common problem. A critical feature of these different discourses of Turkish 
nationalism is their failure to promote an alternative language to live together 
without exclusion of any other different lifestyle or world view. They harshly 
compete for hegemony. Once they have the chance to get power, they use 
this power to oppress others. Beyond the main clash for reconstruction of 
Turkish nation-state identity, the most disadvantaged group seems to be the 
non-Muslims whose future and identification depends on highly polarised 
and politically divided Muslim majority. It can be said that new Turkey's 
identity constructs a post-secular, privileged, modern Muslim identity and 
builds xenophobic relationship with non-Muslims and seeks pragmatic 
relationship with the 'Christian' West. Thus, post-Kemalism as the new 
dominant nationalist discourse fails to challenge with the shortcomings of 
Kemalist nation-state identity and citizenship formation. Nevertheless, top-
down neo-conservative social engineering reproduces and sharpens the 
domestic antagonisms between different discourses of nationalism in Turkey. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
NATIONAL AND EUROPEAN IDENTITY: THE CASE STUDY OF 
TURKEY'S KURDISH QUESTION AND EUROPEAN 
INTEGRATION 
 
 
Introduction 
This thesis argues that the last decade witnessed a political struggle on rede-
fining Turkish nation-state identity on both national and international levels. 
On this preposition, the Chapter Three focused on the concept of religion and 
empirically showed there are competing discourses of Turkish national iden-
tity in the emergence of post-Kemalist transformation. This chapter observes 
how these different discourses and their power struggle for the domination 
reconstruct the Turkish debates on European Integration and Turkey’s Euro-
peanness. It is devoted to challenge the massive literature that place the 
country in Europe and focus on Turkey's 'possible' or 'prospective' EU mem-
bership, rather than it goes beyond the membership debate and shows dis-
course-historical construction of different non-European identity of Turkey 
by finding out how contested perspectives on the nation-state imagine Turkey, 
its regional and civilizational belongings. For that purpose, this part of the 
project reveals the national and international embedding of post-Kemalist 
Turkish national identity construction in analysing how Turkish media repre-
sent Kurdish question in dealing with the domestic power struggle on redefi-
nition of Turkish nation-state identity and its relations with the EU.   
 
4.1. Reimagining Turkey's Place in Europe 
In the Republican history of Turkey, Kemalist secular nationalism became 
the Turkish state’s official ideology and Turkish army was the main state 
institution where Kemalist ideology is guarded. Being in favour of westerni-
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sation and modernism, engendered Kemalist state elites cooperated with the 
European/Western institutions.  More than four decades after its application 
for an association with the European Economic Community in 1959, Tur-
key's status as a candidate country was recognised in December 1999. Eco-
nomical, political, strategic and pragmatic arguments based on an essentialist 
reading of Turkey's bid for EU membership dominated the Turkish debate. 
However, the question of whether Turkey is European and its belonging to 
European civilisation has continued as a centuries-old discussion about its 
identity (Tekin 2008). 
Within the post-Cold war international politics, European integration process 
meant something much more related with changing power relations and re-
construction of nation-state identity in Turkey.  Paradoxically, changing 
power relations with pro-Islamist AKP government forced Europeanist Ke-
malist nationalism face up to Republican history with its traditional others in 
the 2000s. Likewise, this chapter indicates that Kemalist nationalists joined 
the Eurosceptic camp due to the international developments and amendments 
for EU membership which empowered Islamism and Kurdish rights whilst 
eroded the power of the army that was the guardian of secularism and regime. 
Under the leadership of Deniz Baykal, the Kemalist nationalist CHP’s policy 
of opposition was increasingly marginalised after the year of 2002. The party 
members argued that their mission was protecting the unity and the secular 
character of the Turkish state against the threats, and the way the AKP drove 
Turkey towards the moderate Islamic state. The CHP transformed its dis-
course to fear politics that were based on securitisation with the rigid under-
standing of secularism and national sovereignty (Onis 2009, p.24-25). Even 
representatives of the party showed an ultra-nationalist tendency with a posi-
tion of opposition to democratisation reforms and Europeanisation (Carkoglu 
and Kalaycıoglu, 2007). The CHP generally criticised the EU policy of the 
AKP government in terms that the AKP tried to manage the EU process 
alone. Concerning the membership issue, CHP officials raised the claim that 
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both opposition and governing parties in the parliament should participate to 
decision making instead of how the AKP acted, bypassing parliament during 
the EU membership process (Gulmez 2008 p.430). 
According to CHP, AKP policies for the bid of EU membership jeopardised 
Turkey’s national interests, driving Turkey onto a different path from full 
membership. Baykal criticised some expressions in the EU Commission’s 
Progress Report of 2004 saying that it was unacceptable that the negotiation 
process was stated to be ‘an open-ended process’ and a suspension of the 
negotiations by a qualified majority vote (ibid p.428). It can be argued that  
CHP followed soft Eurosceptic policies by raising opposition with the aim of 
preserving national interests while they supported Turkey’s full membership 
with the pretext of being treated equally by the EU. The report welcomed 
adopting 261 new laws from October to July 2004 which meant a remarkable 
improvement was observed in fundamental rights and freedoms. On the other 
hand, the CHP presented a reaction to the AKP’s policies with regard to the 
claim that the government tended to use the EU accession process to recon-
struct the secularism principle of the state and foster spreading of an Islamic 
way of life over Turkish society (Gulmez 2008, p.426). 
The chapter also presents that under the AKP government Muslim national-
ists were particularly willing to go along with Turkey’s alignment with EU 
requirements in terms of religious rights and normalisation of the civil-army 
relations against military's traditional omnipresent role. But, AKP's Turkey 
changed gears in consolidation democracy. From one vantage point, it was a 
tactical decision which proved that Turkey had to slow its pace until the 
Islamist decision-makers could get more from this alignment, as was seen in 
the head scarf issue. As an important example, when the AKP attempted to 
introduce a proposal for recriminalizing adultery
32
 in the new Turkish Penal 
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Code which was called a ‘very worrying development’ by European officials, 
which forced the AKP to withdraw their proposal. 
This section seeks to answer one essential question by working on Turkish 
media discourse: How do different Turkish political discourses portray op-
posing European and Turkish imaginations through the debate of Turkey’s 
EU integration? Turkish nationalism, its representatives in Turkish media and 
parliament in the 2000s can be categorised in four main discourses: Secular-
ist Kemalist Discourse (Cumhuriyet and the CHP); Islamist Discourse 
(Zaman and the AKP); Ethno-nationalist Discourse (Hurriyet and the MHP) 
and Liberal (including left) Discourse (Radikal, the BDP and others). On this 
classification, a sub-categorisation is needed to manage the data and observe 
the different perspectives on Turkish identity. First, the pro-secular dis-
courses of Cumhuriyet and Hurriyet which aim to preserve the Republican, 
Turkish identity construction is analysed under the Kemalist discourse title.  
Secondly, Islamist and Liberal discourses of Zaman and Radikal are ob-
served together due to the fact they employ the strategy of transformation for 
reconstruction of post-Kemalist identity and citizenship. The first group 
represents the oppositional and challenging discourses to post-Kemalist nar-
rative of the AKP. The second group shows the domestic alliance to destruct 
Kemalist nation-state identity. This distinction also lets us see the intermedi-
ate colours and shades between main discourses of Turkish nationalism. 
Each of the discourses in the first group is proved to be homogeneous on the 
issue of national sovereignty and Euroscepticism in arguing the EU process 
is a ‘threat’ for national unity. But the Kemalist discourse excels in claiming 
secularism is endangered as well. The data additionally demonstrates that 
each of the discourses in the second group presents the views seeing the EU 
process as a chance to challenge the Kemalist state, particularly the army-
state. However, Islamists give high importance on Islam and the freedom of 
religion in consolidation of democracy in Turkey with the support of the EU. 
Liberal argumentation encapsulates the demands from the EU process on a 
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large scale with regard to democracy and the rights of others in the nation-
state. All these differences and similarities in interpretation of outcomes in 
Turkey’s EU integration reveal the shades of understanding being Turkish 
and Turkey’s place in Europe from different perspectives of Turkey. The fol-
lowing sections show how specific discourses in the newspapers in formu-
lated two groups contribute to the post-Kemalist construction of Turkish na-
tion-state identity with relation to EU integration discussions. 
 
4.1.1. Representation of Turkey’s European Integration in the pro-
Secular Media Discourse 
In this section, instances from Hurriyet’s and Cumhuriyet's framing of the 
EU, exemplify Eurosceptic nationalist discourse in the Turkish press and 
how they demonstrate the process against Turkey’s national interest in terms 
of domestic issues. In the week of 3 October 2005, the decision of the EU 
was mentioned on the front pages of all newspapers. The given launch to 
membership negotiations was portrayed with a metaphor of journey. Never-
theless, perception and description of this journey was expressed differently 
based on their different ideological stands. The EU as 'them' versus Turkey as 
'us' discourse was constructed in Cumhuriyet (04.10.2005, p.1), employed a 
negative presentation with the adjective selection such as 'challenging and 
open-ended': “Turkey's EU journey beginning in 1959, has taken a challeng-
ing and open-ended turn. Negotiations began... As a result, in case of enter-
ing an ‘open-ended’ process in order to see Turkey with them and to have 
Turkey at their hands, the EU bosses will not lose anything, but rather gain.” 
This quotation can be viewed in connection to a tangible feeling of Euro-
scepticism. For Eurosceptics, specifically, the debates on ‘open-ended proc-
ess’ and ‘privileged partnership’ of Turkey instead of full-membership in the 
EU, brings into being a feeling of ‘it is not a fair game for Turkey’. In this 
example, the syntactic choice in ‘Turkey at their hand’ has a significance by 
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aiming disparagement of Turkey’s status as a passive subject in the Turkey-
EU relations. Metaphorically, the EU politicians and decision makers are 
mentioned as ‘the bosses’ that decisively contribute to the national perception 
of EU identity whose content is a ‘company’ seeking for maximising its prof-
its through Turkey’s journey. This linguistic designation seems suitable in 
distinguishing Cumhuriyet’s leftist, Kemalist ideology which corresponds to 
anti-capitalism and anti-imperialism. 
Anti-imperialism in Kemalist nationalist discourse can be evidenced by a 
look at the books of Cumhuriyet columnist Erol Manisali who strongly pre-
sents the EU process with the concept of ‘colonisation as liberation’ (2009, 
p.109). In his book A Process of the EU or Serves?, Manisali notes that 
Western imperialism aims for establishing a Moderate Islamic Republic in 
Turkey; neither a democracy nor a modern civilisation. He adds “on the 28 
February, some of Islamist politicians who were first soldiers think that sol-
diers can be taken from their way with the help of the EU and the USA” (ibid. 
p. 104). At this point, it should be pointed out again, for Kemalist nationalists 
and its representatives such as the Cumhuriyet newspaper or Cumhuriyet 
Halk Partisi (CHP), the Turkish army's powerful position in the state is an 
essential fact in order to maintain its mission in protecting the regime and 
secularism. Therefore, Kemalists have discontents due to EU effect on the 
ala-turca civil-military relations offering new understanding of nation-state 
relations, namely a post-Kemalist one. 
Therefore, analysing Kemalist nationalist discourse from Cumhuriyet’s cov-
erage serves to see how and why Kemalists turn out to be Eurosceptic in 
changing power relations in Turkish politics. As has already been mentioned 
in the previous chapters, Kemalist nationalists imagine Turkey as a European 
and secular nation, but by holding a democracy discourse with regard to EU 
relations, pro-Islamist AKP government’s stress on the religious freedoms in 
Turkish public life accommodates a ‘threat’ narrative against the process. In 
order to have a deeper understanding of this power struggle on reconstruction 
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of nation-state identity and everyday life nationalism, these passages with 
secularism component from Cumhuriyet demonstrate narratives about Ke-
malist portrayal of the EU which identify the Turkish nation through certain 
linguistic means. 
For instance, in Cumhuriyet’s front-page (04.10.2005 p.1), among the many 
European politicians commanded on the EU’s decision on Turkey, British 
Foreign Secretary J. Straw is chosen for the news report, who identified Tur-
key as ‘European’ in his speech. Under the title of 'I congratulate the secular 
Turkey', it was reported that Straw said Turkey was a Muslim and secular 
country. Turkey was a European country, which was very definite and noted 
there was a difficult process with Turkey. Here, the title of the news is re-
markable due to the fact that it puts forward the adjective of ‘secular’ which 
is the privileged principle of M. K. Ataturk. Being European is discursively 
constructed in self-identifications of Kemalists.  At a broader level, interdis-
cursivity can be discerned with national identity constructs whereby secular-
ism is linked with the condition of being modern and European. This is how 
Kemalists define and want to see Turkey. As noted before, by the Kemalists, 
Europe and the West are always seen as the place of modernism, civilisation, 
scientific and rational thinking, all of which were Ataturk’s main targets for 
Turkish society. Therefore, Turkey’s bid for the EU membership corre-
sponded with the Kemalist ideas. Emre Kongar’s excerpt assumes that Euro-
pean and Turkish identities do not exclude each other as long as Turkey’s 
democracy, secularism and social justice are protected in the national and 
European levels: 
“Kemalism is the way of modernity, science and civilisation for Tur-
key; the present expression of this is ‘Democratic, secular and social 
law state’ written in the Constitution. As long as the European Union 
continues to be a Union for the realisation of this goal both in itself 
and in Turkey, joining of Turkey to the Union is, of course, suitable 
to Kemalism.” (Cumhuriyet 10.10.2005, p.3) 
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That is to say, Kemalists place Turkey in Europe just as if the specific princi-
ples of Ataturkism are guaranteed. Otherwise it would be a ‘betrayal’ to the 
inheritance of him as Dursun Atilgan warns: 
“The ones who seem to undertake the discipleship of some of the 
members of the EU parliament are those who make expressions and 
suggestions such as: ‘You cannot join the EU with Kemalism’. With 
such behaviours: ‘Remove the photographs of Ataturk from the pub-
lic offices’ exhibits that they are ready to fulfil their orders. Yes, a 
‘Betrayal Side’ is at work in our Turkey. This side is in a struggle for 
expunging the person who wrote history from the history. However, 
the dynamic forces taking care of the ‘consignation’, that’s ‘Honour 
Side’, cannot tolerate and will not tolerate the mullah-minded min-
isters and their offices that are in such a betrayal.” (Cumhuriyet 
13.10.2005) 
 
In this text, Atilgan calls ‘honour side’ to fight against the ‘betrayal side’ that 
supports ‘You cannot be a part of the EU with Kemalism’ idea of some 
European parliamentarians and their attempt to erase Ataturk from the history 
of the nation. He points to the AKP government and describes their ministers 
as ‘mullah', in other words with Islamic mentality. This particular way of 
language use in relation to Turkey’s relations with the EU simultaneously 
constructs difference discourse in division of ‘we’ as Kemalists on the 
'honour side' and ‘they’ who are in power on the 'betrayal side'. This example 
is the aspect of the power struggle in the changing balance of power since 
AKP became the leading party in the parliament in 2002.  
 
In this context, Erdal Ataberk’s article demonstrates why Kemalists hold a 
Eurosceptic discourse in relation to the claim AKP uses the EU integration 
process and democracy discourse to conceal their intention to spread 
religiosity to whole state institutions. Atabek uses the allegory of umbrella 
implies the belief that the EU support is used in making ‘contra-revolution’ 
towards Republican revolution: 
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“Everything clearly shows that Turkey is living a ‘contra-revolution’ 
under the guise of democracy...The religiosity organised from 
bottom to top and supported by foreigners acquires all of the state 
institutions... This foreign-backed planning is step by step walking 
towards the success... The bribe given by rulership to the EU doesn’t 
prevent the application of this plan, but rather it is changing into an 
umbrella hiding the contra-revolution.” (Cumhuriyet 23.04.2007, 
p.3) 
 
With reference to the Sevres Treaty and the topos of separation threat, the 
strategy of perpetuation is used in Hurriyet report (09.11.2007, p.17): “Ninth 
Naval Forces Commander and former Prime Minister Bulent Ulusu said that 
the decisions of the European Parliament (EP) include the decisions of the 
Treaty of Sèvres.” In terms of discursive construction of common political 
past, this reference to the treaty - designed to divide the Ottomans and 
prompted the national resistance to European forces after the First World War 
- tacitly positioned the ‘we’-group (Turks) against ‘they’-group (Europeans). 
This imagined group of Europeans is also associated with negative represen-
tation of the collective present which refers to ‘they’; Europeans want to in-
vade and divide ‘us’ again. This has the function of resistance to possible 
change driven by the European integration process. Euroscepticism clearly 
appears in both newspapers’ coverage of the EU; particularly presenting the 
memory of Sèvres Treaty reminds us of the common past in the First World 
War, which has an identity constitutive function to strengthen the Otherness 
of Europe by relating it to the historical image of nation still alive in the 
Turkish social and political imagination. What is different in Hurriyet and 
Cumhuriyet is the Kemalist nationalist Cumhuriyet highlights the fear of loss 
in Kemalist principals, predominant secularism of Turkish Republic, and 
gives importance to the role of the army in both the state and politics. In this 
context, Cumhuriyet directly targets the pro-Islamist government AKP’s EU 
politics. Kemalist discourse represents a belief that the Islamists are instru-
mentalising the EU adaptation process in order to change the secular regime. 
Ethno-nationalists seem not to share these concerns. Additionally the leftist 
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tone of Kemalist nationalism puts an emphasis on anti-imperialist characters 
in Cumhuriyet’s discourse in opposition to Turkey’s EU membership. Inevi-
tably, due to the mentioned economic sanctions, most of the time Hurriyet 
seeks a balance between opposition and government discourses, and covered 
different opinions. There is no doubt it had a great struggle in doing journal-
ism. 
There are clearly different modes of interpreting Turkey’s EU integration and 
redefinition of Turkish national identity in the 2000s, which corresponds to 
the different political mentalities and identities. As can be seen, pro-secular 
discourse uses the strategy of perpetuation to maintain the status quo in col-
lective Kemalist identification of the Turkish nation. By the critical analysis 
of this discourse, the Kemalist resistance to change in Turkey's nation-state 
identity in the EU integration process is pointed out. 
However, critical discourse analysis requires more, and in the following sec-
tion, the examples of opposing discourses from pro-Islamist newspaper 
Zaman and liberal-leftist Radikal contribute the evidences of why Kemalists 
and ethno-nationalists resisted against Turkey's post-Kemalist transformation 
and changing power relations in the first decade of 2000s. This serves to clar-
ify the Islamist perspective and liberal perspective in Turkish nation, and 
shows the diversity and extent of the demands and expectations from the EU 
membership of Turkey. 
 
4.1.2. Representation of Turkey’s European Integration in the post-
Kemalist Discourse 
In this section, discourse analysis reveals how Islamists pragmatically shifted 
to be Euro-supportive. It also provides clues about limits of their support. On 
European Union's Turkey's accession decision in October 2005, Zaman ad-
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dressed Turkey’s bid for EU membership with the reference of the East/West 
binary as the representative of Islamist nationalist discourse: 
“The East and the West have the same concern: It would be a 
mistake to exclude Turkey. EU-Turkey membership negotiations will 
start tomorrow. However, contests of some countries raised concerns 
about the process...  The scenes bringing together the Eastern culture 
and Western values implied these comments as ‘Turkey is the 
intersection point of civilizations’.... Turkey as a member of EU will 
be a solution for Middle East countries.” (Zaman 02.10.2005 p.1) 
 
Here, Turkey’s identity is introduced in combination with East culture and 
West values which places it as a part of both civilisations. A Muslim country 
with Western values is also a model for the Middle Eastern and Islamic coun-
tries. It is additionally presented that ‘misunderstanding of Islam will be cor-
rected’ (ibid. p.12). According to this, the symbolic meaning of Turkey’s 
membership in the EU is shown by the justification strategy and argument of 
its possible positive achievements such as correction of negative imaginings 
of Islam in Europe. The negative outcomes of Turkey’s exclusion from the 
Union are presented in connection with the ‘concern’ that would send the 
message of ‘ongoing Crusade mentality’ (ibid p.13) or the clash of civilisa-
tion between Christian and the Islamic world.   
According to Ali Bulac’s (Zaman, 10.11.2004, p.5) argument, Europe’s 
anxiety is rooted in Turkey’s different mentality and symbolism, in one word, 
Islam. He holds an argumentation of difference in Turkey’s and Europe’s 
ways of life and thinking. The argumentation is empowered with 
interdiscursivity in the quotation from author Cemil Meric (Zaman, 
27.10.2004 p.6): ‘Either we burn all Quran or we demolish all mosques. We 
are still the Ottomans in the eyes of Europeans, Ottoman; so Islam. A mass, 
dark, dangerous enemy!’ 
Bulac notes that if the EU process is cut, ‘Turkish Jacobean elites’ at their 
privileged status will go on to employ inequalities and pressures on the great 
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masses of believers in Turkey (Zaman, 06.11.2004 p.6). However, he 
criticises the EU process with regard to new identifications as minorities 
while there is no development in the life of ‘the great mass that has been 
living under pressure for a century’. In his evaluation, these definitions might 
destroy Islamists’ historical identification framework that is based on the 
religion which is: “Islam has one nation; a Muslim community cannot be 
governor of another Muslim community.” He argues that the EU does not 
consider the millions of Muslims’ demands of fundamental religious rights 
and freedoms in social and public sphere; but the EU recognises “the 
shamelessness of homosexuals and lesbians who commit against Allah, their 
nature and the essential principles of Genesis as the rights and freedoms 
should be protected by the state ” (Zaman, 03.11.2004, p.5). 
The concrete symbol of his critic on the EU adaptation process is seen in the 
headscarf issue: “EU Progress Report does not refer to the ban of head-
scarves in Turkey, and Turkey supports these limitations in fundamental 
rights and freedoms in the meantime while sitting on the negotiation table by 
not mentioning it” (Zaman, 12.11.2005 p.7). Moreover, he defines the 
ECHR’s supporter decision on the issue as ‘biased’ to Muslims (Zaman, 
06.12.2005, p.6). He concludes that this circumstance drives an opinion 
change in the minds of millions of people about the EU and Turkey’s mem-
bership. They think that there is no sense in supporting the EU integration as 
long as it does not guarantee their religious life and freedoms. Bulac calls 
it‘disingenuousness’ of the EU (Zaman, 16.12.2006, p.7). 
What is noteworthy in Ali Bulac’s statements is that he thinks he expresses 
his opinions as a representative of ‘great Islamist masses’ or ‘millions of 
people’ in Turkey. In this context, secularist Kemalist elites are called ‘Turk-
ish Jacobean elites’ by him in the narrative of common past and present, par-
ticularly in connection with the religious freedoms. Apparently, he imagines 
Turkey as a Muslim nation. He does not emphasise on being Turk, but being 
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Muslim and religious. This Islamic world view also shows itself in the dis-
course of relationship with the EU. On one hand, when he mentions about 
Europe’s concerns he quotes from Cemil Meric in order to argue: “They do 
not want us in the Union, it is because we are Muslim, we are different.” On 
the other hand, when he mentions about Turkey’s bid for EU membership, he 
illustrates it with the headscarf issue and means: “We want to be in the Union 
because we are Muslim and we want the EU guarantee of Islamic religiosity 
in public life.” Although his reference to the ECHR’s decision in 2005 on the 
headscarf problem portrays a distrusted EU image in making use of  ‘biased’ 
and ‘disingenuous’ adjectives. Thus, if one looks at Zaman’s coverage, it 
occurs how Islamists rationalise why the EU lost Turkish public support in 
2006.  More importantly, Bulac’s comments and critics provide clues in de-
coding the AKP’s adherents’ demands from government and the EU process. 
It shows why the AKP has taken concrete steps in the Islamic agenda to sat-
isfy its voters, not the EU, since 2006. This point simultaneously contributes 
the explanation in origins of secularist Kemalists rising and mass demonstra-
tions during the Presidential Elections and Cumhuriyet’s slogan of “Are you 
aware of threat?” in 2007 which is widely indicated in Chapter 3. 
In relation to Turkish national identity discourse, such as ‘religion’, another 
theme, ‘modernism’ is frequently mentioned in relation to Turkey’s EU 
membership. It can be said that there is a broad consensus concerning the 
modernity theses among Kemalist and Islamist nationalist discourses in Tur-
key. But they have contradictory perspectives of modernism. While Kemalist 
understanding of modern Turkey’s position in the civilisation of West-
ern/European, Islamists do not necessarily place it in Europe, in other words, 
'beyond Edirne’: 
 “Turkey needs to be a modern and developed country, not to join the 
 EU. Even if Turkey doesn’t have the needs in his noble blood to be a 
 modern country, it has these needs in his brain between his two ears, 
 not beyond Edirne.” (Zaman 02.10.2005, p.9) 
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This perspective of 'non-European' modernism clearly appears in Zaman’s 
remarks. It also challenges Kemalism with the selection of words of ‘noble 
blood’ which is an indirect quotation from Ataturk’s ‘Speech to Youth’. In his 
speech, Ataturk declared that Turkish youth had the power in their noble 
blood to save their country against internal and external enemies. By con-
fronting this Kemalist discourse, it is noted what Turkey needs is in its head, 
not in Europe. This illustrates how a discourse on foreign policy simultane-
ously reflects the internal power struggle on reconstruction of national iden-
tity. 
From a different perspective than the Zaman newspaper, the following ex-
ample in the liberal left Radikal (04.10.2005 p.6) newspaper portrays a Turk-
ish self-image as the other of Europe: 
“All of the newspapers were very nice yesterday. Blue, blue, deep 
blue. European colour. Each of the newspapers was rightly so angry 
at Austria... Many people asked the same question yesterday: ‘Why 
Austria? What are their problems with us?’ The first thing that comes 
to mind is that we threatened them to occupy Vienna. To be Muslim, 
to be Turkish, to be dark and hairy... Austria doesn’t want Turks be-
cause of cultural reasons... If we take into consideration that the only 
country in Europe where the racists have come to power in recent 
years is Austria, I think we may easily understand this attitude called 
‘cultural racism’... But, our society mostly consists of good and in-
nocuous people. Composed of hard-working and honest people, 
happy in kindness, sad in misdeed. Secretly crying for rueful films. 
Just like the Austrians. Like everyone.” 
 
In the selected passage it seems that adopted constructive strategy aims to 
promote the determination of the difference between Turkey and other Euro-
pean countries in making use of the example of Austria and its opposition to 
Turkey’s EU membership. He ironically states that Europe rejects Turkey, ‘us’ 
because of ‘we’ are ‘Turkish, Muslim, dark skinned and hairy’. This is a self-
portrait of the Turkish nation. What defines the difference between Turkey 
and the EU members is demonstrated through ethno-cultural references, es-
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pecially to the image of Turkish people, in other words, the dark, hairy body 
of the nation. He justifies his Turkey as an unwanted country thesis with a 
reference from history. His usage of the topos of Vienna Invasion of Otto-
mans verbally constructs a negative image of the common political past of 
two countries that refers to historical hostility positioning Turks as a ‘threat’ 
to Austria’s national territory or political space. In the terms of construction 
of common political present, Alkan questions why Austria does not want 
Turkey in the EU and explains it with the reference to ‘cultural racism’ rising 
in Europe nowadays. These argumentations are followed by a conclusion in 
what is common culturally in Turkish and Austrian people. He uses the topos 
of similarity in emphasising that Turks are like Austrians and all human be-
ings in joy and sorrow. Alkan’s discourse can represent a human perspective 
in this coverage of Turkey and the EU relations. This means that ethno-
cultural or national difference cannot be a topic in the future of Turkey’s in-
tegration with the Union. But the common goal and values may lead the 
common political future as Kurdish politician Osman Baydemir addresses: 
“Baydemir: ‘We will solve the Kurdish problem together.’ While 
replying to the questions of journalists, Baydemir said that Turkey is 
a country having the conscience of the EU. Baydemir, noting that 
the history of the EU is a reflection of a painful process to emerge 
into the daylight, said that: ‘They had great pains. But people 
managed to meet on a common currency, flag and borders. We, as 
Turkey, as Turks, Kurds, Circassians and Lazes may benefit from 
this experience.” (Hurriyet 26.09.2005, p.8) 
 
Baydemir mentions about the ‘great sorrows’ in Europe’s past in linking how 
they achieved construction of common values as currency, flag and borders 
learnt by the lessons of war. In negative representation of Europe’s past and 
positive representation of Europe’s present, Baydemir suggests that we use 
this experience to build a unity in Turkey among Turks, Kurds, Cherkessk 
and Lazes. Surely, using the pronoun of ‘we’ and identifying all as ‘Turkiye-
liler’ (people from Turkey) has a solidarity-enhancing function (Wodak et al 
1999, p.100). He signals the distinct identities of these communities and pre-
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fers to employ ‘Turkiyeli’ for common identification instead of ‘Turks’. In 
this case, the distinction in being a part of a people and being a part of the 
state/land is accounted. However, as noted in Chapter 4, the nomination of 
‘Turkiyeli’ linguistically seems problematical owing to the fact that ‘Turkiye’ 
means ‘the land of Turks’. This example leads to the observation of Turkey’s 
EU integration debate in terms of reconstruction of national identity and cit i-
zenship. Specifically, Turkey’s Kurdish question provides numerous in-
stances associated with Turkey’s tension in the preservation and redefinition 
of national identity in the last decade. Keeping in mind this point, the next 
two sections are devoted to seeing how the Turkish media address the links 
between Kurdish Question and Turkey’s bid for EU membership surrounded 
by this tension. 
 
4.2. The Kurdish Question and European Union Membership Debates in 
Pro-Secular Discourse 
As might be expected, the Kurdish issue is an important topic in the EU and 
Turkey relations due to the fact they would be considered as minorities. In 
the context of democratic consolidation, this issue requires their cultural, 
social and economic rights to retain their own group identity. For instance, 
the right of education in their mother tongue is a crucial part of it. As noted 
in previous chapters, the Turkish state did not recognise Kurds as a distinct 
group when nominating all Muslim communities of Turkish Republic as 
Turks. Kemalist discourse in the media supports this state argument. As in 
this example, in coverage of the problem they mostly call them ‘Kurdish 
originated citizens’ which means they are Turks. The Progress Report (Cum-
huriyet 27.10.2005) emphasises that 'Kurdish originated citizens' don’t have 
enough cultural rights. Concerning the Progress Report, it is reported that 
neither Kurds nor Alevis want to be nominated as minorities in Hurriyet: 
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“Both DEHAP representing the Kurds, and the representatives of the 
Alevis are angry with being implied as ‘minorities’ in the Progress 
Report of the EU. DEHAP administration said that ‘Kurds are the 
primary founders of the republic’ by emphasizing that they don’t 
consider themselves as ‘minority’. The leaders of the Alevi commu-
nity said that: ‘We are the primary component of this country’ by 
stating that they see themselves as secular Turkish citizens devoted 
to Ataturk.” (Hurriyet 08.10.2004) 
 
Hurriyet quotes their justification strategy with reference to a common po-
litical past. The narrative of ‘we established Turkey together’ is used to keep 
the solidarity and demand for continuity. They express their loyalty towards 
the Republican system. But it must be interpreted as a message to demand 
equal position such as the majority, Sunni Muslim Turks. This requires rec-
ognising their cultural rights and sharing power equally. However, Hurriyet 
does not mention this dimension of the issue. This text enhances the ethno-
religious version of the Turkish nationalist discourse with the idea of ‘we are 
all Muslim and Turk; there is no problem, but the EU wants to separate us’. 
This definition of ‘we’ does not include Non-Muslim citizens of Turkey. This 
distinction also glosses over ‘our Kurdish brothers’ in Emre Kongar’s Ke-
malist discourse: 
“In the framework of the EU, the extreme elements of the groups 
such as Armenian, Greeks, our Kurdish brothers have attempted to 
impose their demands rooted from historical problems that are 
against Turkey’s interests and sometimes these attempts succeed like 
the decision of European Parliment on ‘Recognition of Armenian 
Genocide’.” (Cumhuriyet 10.10.2005, p.3) 
As an example for the ethno-nationalist perspective on Kurdish issue, in col-
umnist Ozdemir Ince’s expression (Hurriyet 10.03.2007, p.11), personifica-
tion of Kurdish nationalism is realised by the use of verbs and nouns such as 
‘twaddle’ and seditious’. He justifies his argument in illustrations and warns 
about the possible consequences of education in the mother tongue such as 
autonomy, federation and separate state. By means of discursive construction 
of common future, this is presented as a problem for the unity of the nation. 
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In order to keep the status quo, he adopts a strategy of perpetuation. The is-
sues of honour killing and resistance to learn Turkish are addressed as nega-
tive representation and hasty generalisations of Kurds. Ince complains that 
despite the fact these problems are all made by the Kurds, they are shown as 
the Turks caused them. This strategy of avoidance functions the argument 
that Turks are not the ones to blame for Kurdish issue. Ince notes that Euro-
pean countries where Kurdish nationalism grows in are also responsible of 
the problem. 
Despite the fact that the AKP government has tried to solve the Kurdish 
problem, the armed struggle of PKK consists the dark side of it which 
increases the complexity of the power struggle on nomination and 
recognition of the issue. It puts forward the idea that Euopeanisation of the 
problem or a democratic solution is not enough and that the PKK and 
external allies of it want more and more from the Turkish state. Regarding 
this idea, Mehmet Ali Birand from the Hurriyet newspaper interprets 
intensifying PKK attacks in 2006 as a resistance of organisation towards 
normalisation and democratisation of the region: 
“Once upon a time the PKK would see the European Union as an 
advantage. It would believe that it could obtain the democratic 
rights more widely and more quickly thanks to the EU. It is seen that 
this approach has begun to change in recent months. It is pointed 
out that when the PKK see that the life of the region is more rapidly 
normalising than their estimates, the PKK started marginalisation 
and tried to prevent this normalisation. There is a truth in this.” 
(Hurriyet 11.04.2006, p.6) 
 
Surely, the European Integration process contributed to the visibility of 
Kurdish culture and identity in the public sphere of Turkey. Paradoxically, as 
much as civic understanding of citizenship has been realised in providing a 
feeling of unity and solidarity to the state, the awareness of being Kurdish 
and having a separate identity have been reproduced and formed Kurdish 
nationalism towards Turkish nationalism. It may not pretend to be an 
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obstacle for living under the umbrella of the same constitution if the equality 
of these nationalisms is guaranteed in the law and its application. However, 
the problem remains in questioning how some Turks insist on keeping their 
privileged identity and how some Kurds reflect on unforgettable denial of 
their identities in the last century. Moreover, it matters the ways in which the 
mutual loss and sorrows in the discursive construction of common past can 
be replaced with positive representation of common present and future. The 
following section traces how Islamist and Liberal versions of Turkish 
national identity discourse in the Turkish media represents the Kurdish 
problem, its origins and the solution in dealing with Turkish identity. 
Interestingly, observed data indicates that all three selected discourses signify 
‘Turkish state’ as the source of Turkey’s Kurdish issue. Rather than blaming 
external others, they face off collective past against the Kemalist nation-state. 
 
4.3. The Kurdish Question in the Post-Kemalist Discourse 
In terms of narrating the national history of Turkey, particular historical 
events and facts are portrayed through certain linguistic means. These 
linguistic realisations identify exactly how Turkey imagines itself as a nation. 
Inevitably, a nation’s origin and foundation are mostly addressed (Wodak et 
al 1999, p.83) in these narratives. Regarding this point, Islamist, liberal and 
leftist discourses refer to the established time of the Turkish nation-state to 
indicate the historical and political roots of the Kurdish problem, specifically 
the denial of Kurdish cultural rights in the nation-building process of the 
Republic. In both the Islamist and Liberal discourses, there is a common 
factor which determines the way in which the origins of Kurdish Question is 
referred to and which actors and institutions received attention from these 
explanations. Islamist Zaman’s columnist Mumtazer Turkone and liberal 
Taraf’s author Ayhan Aktar, focus on the exclusion of Kurdishness in the 
discursive construction of common political past of the nation. Turkone 
adopts the topos of ‘fear’ to demonstrate the causal relations in the evolution 
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of the Kurdish problem and their exclusion in the nation-building process. 
He reminds Turkey was built like a Simurgh mixing the ashes of the empire 
and underlines the way to get rid of the fear of losing was to create a nation 
who would live within the state. He argues that the ones who attempted to 
create the nation with this fear were unfair to the Kurds: 
“They ignored their native languages and identities because they 
thought that these would make them ‘another nation’, and tried to 
destroy them. Today, we are looking for the consent of a nation 
consisting of the honourable and equal individuals, and the state in 
which the Kurdish will live with their native language and identities 
based on this consent. Now we are in a moment that means fate can 
tip the scales for hope. Perhaps, we will change the history 
continuing for 210 years, in 2010... This year will be the starting 
date of a civilised life in which the armed tyranny will end, this 
beautiful country will get rid of the gangs forever, and everyone will 
be on his own way, self-and-future-assuredly.” (Zaman, 01.01.2010, 
p.7) 
 
In the article, Turkone reminds the collective past of the nation and how the 
fear of intervention and the loss of the homeland motivated the independence 
war against external others. This even reflected the first words of the Turkish 
national anthem as ‘Do not fear’, which calls on the sovereignty and flag of 
the nation to be defended until the last man dies in the homeland. Then he 
notes how this fear turned to create ‘internal others’ in the construction of the 
Turkish nation-state. The lexical units in the text, particularly the personal 
pronouns give clues in blaming ‘other’ strategy.  He uses a negative 
connotation, metaphor of the ‘armed tyranny’ to present ‘them’, the 
foundation elites of the Republic, namely the Kemalists. On the other hand, 
‘we-group’ is formed in the argumentation of ‘we will change the history 
continuing for 210 years, in 2010’.  By the strategy of transformation, a 
necessary discontinuation is referred to in the representation of the common 
present and future with the will of a civilized life for everyone.  
Significantly, this example confirms how Muslim conservatives and Kurds 
became succesfull in creation of a common consent for challenging 
‘Kemalist army-state’ and construction of post-Kemalist nation-state identity. 
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In the second chapter, the citizenship status of minorities in Turkey is given 
to provide background information for a variety of possible nominations for 
minority identification. It is also noted that Muslim communites, including 
Kurdish people are not considered as minorities in Turkey. If one looks at the 
empirical studies, the majority of Kurdish people (75%) identify themselves 
as the citizens of Turkish Republic and view themselves (65%) as a part of 
the large Turkish nation (Yilmaz 2014). These idenfications are followed by 
religious Muslimhood with 34 per cent and ethnic identity with 8 per cent. 
Turkish as a common language has been a significant factor in contributing 
to the national feeling and construction of a common culture and identity in 
Turkey. This idea makes some Turkish nationalists critical against the 
argumentation of supporting the linguistic distinction of Kurdish language 
and culture. Certainly, language is the most important element of Kurdish 
ethnic identity. Therefore, the debates on the Kurdish problem constantly 
involve the discussion on the right of education in their native language. 
 
In this context, just as Turkune, Ayhan Aktar mentions how the foundation 
elites of Turkey imagined a ‘unique’ nation and criticises the Kemalist 
perspective’s Turkist ethnic interpretation of citizenship and exclusion of 
other languages due to their fear of heteronomy and collapse of the state: 
“I guess, the people who have the Turkist ideology within the 
founding of the Republic are nowadays turning over in their graves. 
They have mainly had the dream of a nation consisting of a people 
who are involved in the Turkish ethnic identity or a people who are 
ready for going up in smoke in the consciousness of Turkist. 
According to them, it is out of the question for other ethnic groups 
‘speaking languages other than Turkish’ to be in the Turkish nation. 
The formula of ‘one language=one nation’ was true for pure-
blooded Kemalists. Speaking another language among people would 
cause the foundation of a nation in the state and separatism, 
‘maazallah’ (God forbid).” (Taraf, 08.06.2009, p.8) 
 
 
 
He employs a sarcastic language use with idioms like ‘turning over in their 
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graves’ and punctuation marks like an exclamation (!) in order to strengthen 
his power of critic. Through this discursive representation of the past, he 
emphasises the difference between before and now that contributes to the 
change of status quos and reconstructs the common pluralist national identity 
with recognition of other ethnic differences. 
 
Ahmet Altan’s following remarks in Taraf demonstrate why liberals 
supported Islamists for construction of a post-Kemalist state citizenship and 
identity politics. He addresses the main problems in recognition of freedom 
in Turkey through the illustration of Kurdishness, Aleviness, Muslimhood 
and individuality: 
“We are in the same fight since the founding of the Republic. There 
are four major topics. The religion problem is symbolised by the 
headscarf. The Kurdish problem is symbolised by the mother tongue. 
The Alevi problem is symbolised by the compulsory subject. The 
individualisation problem is symbolized by the military service issue. 
The source of all these problems is based on the same place and the 
same reason. Sunni pious says to the state: ‘Accept may existence’ 
while saying ‘Accept the headscarf of my child’. Alevi says to the 
state ‘Accept may existence’ while saying ‘accept the djemevi as a 
place of worship and don’t forcibly teach my child Sunnism’. Young 
people say to the state ‘Accept that I’m an individual, I have a life’ 
while saying ‘Don’t impress me, don’t intervene with the course of 
my life’. The state gives all of them the same answer: ‘I do not 
accept; you do not exist’.” (Taraf, 23.10.2010, p.5) 
 
In Altan’s presentation, the personal pronoun of ‘we’ is used in the meaning 
of people or public in Turkey. The topos of ‘we are in the same boat’ 
positions people of Turkey against the Kemalist state. He adopts an 
anthropomorphic usage for referring to the position of the state as the ‘other’ 
that is responsible for the problems and power struggle in the country. By 
noting the problematic issues created by the state system, such as seeing all 
of the people as a potential ‘criminal and enemy’, he contends that: “it’s time 
to found a new republic by burying this one.” (Taraf, 08.01.2011 p.11) The 
strategy of dissimilation in argumentation directly demonstrates the will of 
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reconstruction of Turkish nation-state identity in the ‘new republic’. He 
presents it as everybody’s demand for the change which supposes a state for 
people’s life, not people’s life for the state: “The public started to say ‘what 
kind of regime, brother’.” 
 
As the examples point out, liberals and Islamists share a consensus on the 
opposition to Kemalist system’s imagination of Turkish nation-state and the 
Army’s position within it. According to these perspectives, the largest 
common denominator of the Kurdish political movement was ‘hostility to the 
state’ due to Turkish state prohibiting their language, torturing them, 
murdering people was almost the only reason for a harsh Kurdish rebellion 
(Zaman 31.07.2011 p.13). However, the components of the Kurdish issue 
have been changing. It was argued that the power against PKK was not 
armed authorities or military-state anymore, therefore the weapons and 
terrorist acts could not be effective in the face of legitimate power. With this 
argumentation, Zaman contributed to construct the AKP's discourse of new 
Turkey. On the Kurdish rights, Islamists build their arguments on the 
emergence of a new paradigm and destruction of the old Republican one in 
the context of Kurdish problem: 
“The Republic tried to ‘create’ a nation in which the Republic 
thought that the state would be safe in the use of all of its 
possibilities. The Kurdish language was banned. The Kurdish 
identity was denied. Here is the reached point: This paradigm 
completely broke down. Today, this policy thought to portray the 
state as one piece, is the most serious threat against the existence of 
the state. We need a new paradigm.” (Zaman, 28.10.11 p.15) 
 
In the passage, it is argued that the old Kemalist paradigm has been changing 
and the perspective of enemy-state is replaced by the AKP that has gained the 
votes of half of the general population and forty per cent of the Southeast 
region where the Kurds mostly live in. If one looks at the numbers of the 
Kurdish seats in Ankara (more than 100 in 550), this is a valid argument. As 
the main aim of the thesis, for a better understanding of the ‘process’ of the 
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power struggle of redefinition of Turkey’s identity, it is crucial to reveal how 
Islamist version of Turkish nationalism looks at the Kurdish problem. 
Moreover, it must be underlined that this thesis reveals the essentialist 
understanding of Turkish national identity in the search for different 
discourses of Turkish nation-state identity. It accepts different levels of 
identifications and belongings to the nation; thus it does not exclude Kurdish 
or Armenian voices in Turkish media.  
 
Regarding the last point, in the next article, the leftist BDP’s Kurdish Deputy 
Aysel Tugluk presents a disagreement on the AKP’s role in the solution of 
the problematic relationship between the Kurds and the state: 
“They met on a new state strategy as: ‘We will solve the problem on 
the basis of liberal state and individual rights’ with the approach of 
‘There is not a Kurdish problem; there are the problems of my 
Kurdish brothers’.... The Kemalist elites and traditionalist 
conservatives, who are the different faces of the same administrative 
device, played the role of the state on the Kurdish issue on every 
occasion. Nowadays, this is the issue... the actual effective actor and 
the projection in determining the work style and political 
perspective should have included the Imrali and the peace works 
and negotiations. That the meaning of it has never been achieved 
shouldn’t be drawn. I mean that it should be the main axis.” 
(Radikal 18.09.2011, p.6) 
 
As in the previous example, Tugluk emphasises ‘the role of the state’ in the 
Kurdish problem of Turkey. However, she rejects either Kemalist army-state 
and neo-conservative liberal state. She expresses a different solution which 
can be provided by the Kurds through negotiating with the PKK and its 
leader Abdullah Ocalan. The metonymy of Imrali is employed when 
referring to Ocalan, though it is the name of the place where he is a prisoner. 
In fact, there are sharp differences in perspectives on Ocalan in Turkey. The 
emphasis on ‘Imrali’ symbolises Kurdish fight for ‘freedom’; this is why it is 
noted that it should be the main axis for the solution. This discursively 
constructs a kind of heteronomisation and autonomisation in Turkey’s 
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national identification. In addition, it shows differences in some
33
 Kurds’ 
imagination of Turkey’s common political present and future.  
 
Like Tugluk, another deputy of Kurdish party Sirri Sureyya Onder writes for 
the leftist Radikal (08.11.2010, p.4). In the following quotation, Onder uses 
the strategy of justification and relativisation (Wodak et al 1999, p.36) in 
order to emphasise the difference and heteronomy of Kurds in Turkey. 
Specifically, he highlights the difference between the Kurds. He narrates this 
difference and different imaginations of the homeland by making use of a 
question in Kurdish “Tu ji kîjan welatê yi?” that means “Which village are 
you from?”: 
“The witnesses of the speaking of two Kurds who met in their 
province know that, the question is: ‘Tu ji kîjan welatê yi?’ This 
question means: ‘Where are you from?’ or ‘What is your country?’ 
But, both of them are actually from Urfa or Viranşehir, Siverek, 
Diyarbakır, Kahta... I mean they are both from the same town and 
city, but it is their village or lineage that determines them and makes 
them known. And this lineage or village is a kind of DNA chain, they 
are so important. It detects their movements, shames, prides, 
honours and all of the social behaviours... Each of them has their 
own ‘homeland’ habits, language, timbre, flavour, colour. Of course, 
this is different from the concepts of ‘homeland, country, and state’ 
that you know. Yes, there is no flag, no school, no mosque and no 
police station in this homeland. Let’s just say that there are water 
wells, sheep, kids wearing rubber shoes, women with colourful 
dresses, kohl-full eyes, cherry caftans, and men with shalwar-
keffiyeh.” (Radikal, 25.10.2010 p.8) 
 
The linguistic construction of ‘national body’ (Wodak et al 1999, p.30) in 
this text distinguishes Kurds’ ‘natural space’ and culture from each other in 
the sub-national level with a reference to their localities. A hyperbole is used 
in stressing different and colourful culture of the Kurds. The presentation of 
Kurdish homeland without the state and the state institutions demonstrates 
                                               
33 For an empirical study on different identifications and belongings to Turkish nation in the 
context of Kurdish problem in Turkey: Hakan Yilmaz (2014)  ‘Identities, Kurdish Problem 
and Solution Process in Turkey: Perceptions and Attitudes in Public Opinion’, Acik Toplum 
Vakfi ve Bogazici Universitesi. 
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the gap between Turkish state and Kurdish people in this example. This 
imagination of a stateless land of the Kurds is problematical in terms of 
institutionalisation of nationhood and everyday production of Turkish 
national identity in the means of the construction of ‘collective national 
consciousness’ (ibid. p.84) in their homeland. Especially, it identifies the lack 
of feeling of belonging to a Turkish nation-state. In this regard, what they do 
not have in their village is the constitutive of what is common between them. 
It can be seen as ‘recognition’ matter in the mutual relationship between the 
Kurdish society and Turkish nation-state. 
 
To point out his perspective on the Kurdish question and solution, S.S. Onder 
wrote (Radikal 08.11.2010, p.4): “Today, the AKP government and liberals, 
by their nature, do not work out with the exception of creating obstacles for 
peace... The solution can only be found with the common wisdom of the 
Kurds and socialists.” The use of linguistic expressions manifested that a 
democratic or a liberal solution is clearly repudiated by the BDP members. 
They distance themselves from this kind of liberation or emancipation. Their 
discourse implies that they fight for a socialist solution. In the terms of 
discursive construction of common future in relation to the problem, he 
makes a division between ‘we-group’ including the Kurds and socialists and 
‘they-group’ including the AKP and liberals. 
 
On this issue, the liberal and left perspectives offer to redefine a 
constitutional citizenship for guaranteeing the group and cultural rights to 
build the unity of the nation. Islamist perspective’s suggestion for the road 
map of the Kurdish solution is based on religiosity in the region that means 
establishing an ideological umbrella of Islamic political identity as an 
alternative to Kurdish nationalism. Since then ‘conservative democratic’ 
discourse has highlighted its Islamic shade more and more in the internal and 
external policies of Turkey after every national election victory of the AKP. 
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As noted before, Prime Minister Erdogan stated in his 2005 Diyarbakir 
declaration that: “There was a reality of Kurdish problem in this country.” In 
2008, Erdogan argued that they solved the Kurdish problem by the 
consolidation of democracy, but the PKK problem has not been ended. They 
have named and described it through a security perspective. In this process, it 
is not just the government that changed its discourse on the Kurdish question, 
but also liberals and leftists reviewed their perspectives on the problem. They 
have become more critical on both sides of the issue. In order to set up a 
basis in which peace can be achieved, the AKP launched a ‘Kurdish 
Initiative’ in 200934. This can be accepted as a milestone in the evolution of 
the issue. In the next section, the Turkish media’s Kurdish Initiative coverage 
is analysed in order to see how dynamically national identity has been 
referred to and how the process and meanings have been readdressed. 
 
4.4. AKP’s Kurdish Initiative in Turkish Media 
Although the main theme of this chapter limits the analysis of Kurdish 
question in the ethno-political dimension from a right-based perspective, it 
should be noted that Kurdish question’s security dimension has inevitably 
influenced the power struggle and contributes to the complexity of the 
problem. In fact, the PKK side of the problem is frequently covered by the 
Turkish media in respect to the attacks, military operations and the funerals 
of martyrs. Esra Arsan’s work (2013) points out that a revenge discourse and 
‘we versus them’ discourse is common in the coverage of the funerals. She 
argues that the Turkish media heroise the deaths for the Turkish side, but 
dehumanise for the Kurdish side. In her examples from Turkish newspapers, 
it can be argued that there is both a dehumanisation and misidentification 
tendency in the coverage of the PKK and its members. In the news report of 
martyr funerals, they do not use the word ‘Kurdish’ in a hesitation of linking 
                                               
34 See: F. Stephen Larrabee (2013) Turkey's New Kurdish Opening, Survival: Global Politics 
and Strategy, 55:5, 133-146 
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the PKK problem with the Kurdish problem. However, when the AKP 
government launched the Kurdish Initiative, the media could not avoid 
presenting this connection. 
 
As a part of disarmament of the Kurdish Initiative, thirty-four PKK members 
entered through the Khabur border gate in October 2009. In the news 
coverage of events, linguistic representation of the actors in using the 
concept of ‘terrorist’ or ‘people’ made a difference in the eyes and images of 
public in their identification of PKK members. Prime Minister Erdogan said 
(Radikal 22.10.2009, p.1): “We set out with good faith. We are saying that 
mothers don’t cry anymore. Look, thirty-four people returned to Turkey, and 
they were released within the framework of our laws. Hopefully we are 
looking forward to many more. I’m looking forward to returning all our 
people to the mountains, leaving their weapons behind.”  On the other hand, 
Hurriyet reported (22.10.2009, p.1) that in his press conference, CHP Leader 
Deniz Baykal criticised the return of the terrorists to Turkey and said: “The 
terrorists have become heroes.” The pictures created a tension in Turkish 
society due to they were ‘showing off’ such as this process was the PKK’s 
victory. 
 
Linguistic representation of ‘democracy initiative’ or ‘national unity 
projection’ in Turkish media was crucial for disarmament and peace-
building. In this respect, Cengiz Candar (Radikal 23.10.2009) warned “Do 
not be blind” to peace-building. Murat Belge (Taraf 24.10.2009 p.5) 
underlined that “there are no victory or defeat in peace.”  But MHP leader 
(Cumhuriyet 18.08.2011 p.1) called for government to abandon ‘the so-called 
demolition project’. Due to a massive opposition to the process, Turkey again 
went back to the strangulation of Kurdish problems by retreating government 
and intensifying attacks on the PKK in 2010. The data analysis in the 
following section gives a detailed account of the different discourses on the 
AKP’s Kurdish Initiative in the Turkish media. It demonstrates that since 
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2006 the matter of EU membership has lost importance in the political 
agenda of Turkey, the external ‘other’ in Turkey’s Kurdish Question has been 
replaced, going from ‘the EU’ to ‘global forces’, in other words, the USA or 
the West (Europe and the USA). 
 
4.4.1. AKP’s Kurdish Initiative in the Pro-Secular Discourse 
The data from the study of Cumhuriyet and Hurriyet newspapers 
demonstrates that Euroscepticism, anti- globalisation and anti-westernisation 
are closely connected with the reaction to the changing dynamics in the 
necessitated reconstruction process in Turkey. However, in the context of the 
AKP’s Kurdish Initiative in 2009, opposition to transformation is expressed 
with an emphasis on ‘globalisation’ in both discourses. As it can be seen 
below in Bahceli’s statements, external sources of the PKK problem are 
shown in aiming to bring about the downfall of Turkey. Moreover, the AKP 
is pictured as being an ally with the global forces: 
“Chairman of MHP Devlet Bahceli said that: ‘The AKP is a global 
political vendor. PKK is a global armed vendor. Both of these 
vendors have undertaken the tender of destroying our country from 
the same centre, but by using different channels by the global 
negotiation method and have already gone to work on this’.” 
(Hurriyet 22.06.2010) 
 
Similarly, a Kemalist writer, Suheyl Batum (Cumhuriyet 23.07.2010, p.9) 
nominates Kurdish Initiative as Barzani Initiative: 
“We always say, ‘a minority group’ drove out Turkey’s nail day by 
day… Moreover with ‘the support of international status quo’ this 
‘minority group’ went totally wild. All they wanted was to govern 
Turkey which could not govern itself, by taking advantage of this 
deficiency and this was supported by foreign policy, Armenian 
policy, Cyprus policy and the desire to seize the judiciary. There was 
also ‘Barzani Initiative’, written by the new bosses whom they tried 
to palm off as South East or Kurdish Initiative… The thing which 
was good for global capital was considered good for them as well. 
International scale bosses are still trying to write the ‘scenario’. 
Their ‘puppets’ that are in Turkey are playing.” 
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This passage portrays the leftist tone of Kemalist nationalism that describes 
the current political situation in Turkey as being highly dependent on the 
external powers. Warning of a threatened national interest in foreign policy 
issues and blaming ‘government’ tacitly for collaborating with the 
international bosses can be interpreted in reading the power struggle in 
Turkey. He adopts the strategy of blaming others using the idiom ‘driving out 
Turkey’s nail’ meaning an attempt to collapse Turkey. To trivialise 
‘government’ he calls it ‘a minority group’ in an effort to identify who are 
responsible in the present situation. He employs the allegory of puppets in 
order to argue the AKP and its foreign policy serve for the interests of ‘new 
bosses’ of ‘global capitalism’. Based on a similar argument, in a previous 
excerpt, it is shown that Dursun Atilgan (Cumhuriyet 13.10.2005) addressed 
Islamists as the ‘betrayal side’. Kemalists complain that ‘they’ who are in 
power get their power from global capitalism to maximize their interest. This 
also reflects their fear of globalisation of the Kurdish issue. The examined 
data demonstrates there is an axis shift in the subject of blamed ‘others’ in 
the problem, the European powers is replaced with the West and Middle 
Eastern actors. 
 
By the strategy of discontinuation Deniz Som (Cumhuriyet 17.01.2008 p.17) 
emphasises the difference between the times of ‘before’ AKP government 
and ‘then’: 
“The principles of the full independence and the national 
sovereignty of Kemal Ataturk are already buried and the funeral 
prayer of secularism is performed! Also, when ‘the strategic 
partner’ ends the trouble of terrorism, welcome to Moderate Islamic 
Republic of Turkey!... Turkey is sold, destroyed, burned and made 
Arab. While martyrs are described as head and the murderers are 
described as dear, he is a Prime Minister who says these things.” 
 
In this text, he warns against the loss of national sovereignty and 
independence principles of M. Kemal Ataturk. He pays particular attention to 
the laicism principle and the way it is personified. He makes his 
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argumentation with the topos of funeral prayer which points to laicism being 
murdered. Punctuation marks and bold characterisation of Mustafa Kemal 
signal the seriousness of the current situation. The fear of losing national 
sovereignty and independence of Kemalist principles is expressed. Ironically, 
‘Moderate Islamic Republic of Turkey’ is welcomed by Som. He refers to 
‘the government’ through the metonymy of the ‘strategic partner’ which 
marks AKP’s relationship with the USA and implicitly addresses its alliance 
in the Great Middle East Project. What is interesting to note is his warn 
against Arabisation of the nation. This can be read as a discontentment from 
the religiosity in Turkey, in other words, Islamisation of the nation. As 
mentioned in previous chapters, for the Kemalists, not Arabisation but 
Europeanisation of Turkish identity is frequently perceived as a positive 
component in terms of modernisation.  He also notes that the Prime Minister 
calls ‘the murderers’ as ‘dear’. Here, in a hidden meaning, he refers to the 
PKK’s leader Ocalan and expresses his disturbance of calling him as ‘Dear 
Ocalan’. It should be reminded that the PKK members are identified as ‘baby 
killers’ in Turkish media. Moreover, the nomination of ‘martyrs’ as ‘head’ is 
criticised by Som, which can be interpreted as him complaining about the 
trivialisation strategy in reducing it to quantisation for the function of 
alleviating the importance of the loss of Turkish army. Topos of changed 
circumstances and ‘threat’ indicate the resistance to the post-Kemalist 
transformation by a strategy of perpetuation. Kemalists challenge to Turkish 
state’s changing discourse on Kurdish identity and Islamic identity.  
 
In this context, Erol Manisali presents the Islamist developments and 
Kurdish initiative as the outcomes of global dynamics. In a tacit discourse, 
Manisali contends Turkey should keep its unique identity and policy without 
any influence from the external forces. Turkey’s external relations are 
portrayed with the negative connotation of ‘mandate’. In this text, neither the 
Middle East dependence nor Western dependence is recommended in 
Turkey’s foreign relations: 
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“It is an interesting paradox that a wide range of people who are 
troubled by the Islamist developments are now in a position 
supporting unilateral dependence about the EU. It is an implicit 
result of the global dependence on a situation which they have 
brought to a choice position between the Middle East dependence 
(mandate) and Western dependence (mandate)... While the right and 
the extreme right are strengthening in Europe and the USA, new 
policies for Turkey and the region are making the internal dynamics 
of the country more dependent. For example, Southeast (or Kurdish) 
initiative is completely carried out by global dynamics. In fact, it has 
become a global problem for Turkey's geography, not an internal 
problem of Turkey.” (Cumhuriyet 22.11.2010 p.13) 
 
This is an explicit warning of a threatened national sovereignty. However, he 
marks globalisation of internal issues, in the terms of internationalisation of 
Kurdish problem in the region. He names it ‘south-east’ which signifies the 
regional difference and identification, and uses a parenthesis for naming 
‘Kurdish’. This shows that Kemalist reluctance to define the problem as 
‘Kurdish’ has been changing. It was the official Kemalist discourse which 
has put forward the social and economic underdevelopment of the region as 
the origins of the problem and to justify Kemalist state’s identity politics. In 
general, there was not a consensus associated with the attempt of the AKP in 
Turkish press and society. Opposing the Kemalist and etno-nationalist circles, 
the liberals, leftists and Islamists were eager to have a consensus for the 
achievements in the Kurdish issue. This claim was validated by these groups’ 
‘Yes’ decision on the referendum for the new constitution in 2010 as Fuat 
Keyman wrote in Radikal: 
“The decision of ‘yes’ by 58 per cent and ‘no’ by 42 per cent is the 
appearance of the demand of the public on the solutions of social 
problems in the political area and the consent of public shown in 
this direction as a result of referendum. With this result, the society 
of Turkey ‘called for citizenship’ for (a) a New Constitution and (b) 
the solution of the Kurdish problem, and request the solutions of this 
problems from the political parties in the ‘political area’. The 
decision of 58 per cent ‘yes’ is a citizenship call for both 
symbolising the social consent for new Constitution and saying to 
political parties ‘we are ready for a new constitution’, and applying-
requesting the democratic initiative period to revive for the solution 
of the Kurdish problem.” (Radikal 26.09.2010 p.6) 
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Keyman interpreted the results of the referendum as the symbol of the social 
consent for new constitution of Turkey and the solution of the Kurdish 
problem. This discursively constructs a common consent for AKP’s 
formation of post-Kemalist nation-state identity. As might be expected, there 
were different motivations from the sides to try and achieve an agreement for 
a new citizenship definition. For instance, the leftist circles wanted to 
transform certain political continuities rooted by the military-coup 
constitution. They said, “not enough, but yes” to the draft due to the fact they 
were not interested in who were reforming the nation-state identity, but they 
were interested in the aim of erasing the political traces of 1980. In this 
context, how Kurdish identity should be represented, included or excluded in 
the new constitutional citizenship is one of the main contents of new 
Turkey’s national identity. Although, the general intention seems to solve the 
gangrenous issue, the political culture, the way of doing politics and the 
political struggle cannot bring about the building of mutual confidence on 
both sides. With the aim of finding out how the Turkish media represented 
and reproduced this political struggle through supporter different discourses 
on the Kurdish Initiative based on different ideological stands, the following 
section focuses on the coverage of Islamist Zaman, leftist Radikal and liberal 
Taraf on this topic. 
 
 
4.4.2. AKP’s Kurdish Initiative in the Post-Kemalist Discourse 
Islamist nationalist discourse in the Turkish press is apparently a supporter of 
AKP’s Kurdish Initiative. In terms of discursive construction of collective 
‘we-group’, Zaman’s columnist Mumtazer Turkone uses a positive self-
representation strategy for integration of Kurds in ‘we all’ and ‘ourselves’: 
“It’s the Kurds themselves who will eradicate the terrorist swamp and we all 
need to trust Kurds and I mean we need to trust ourselves.” He (Zaman 
17.01.2010, p.12) adds in the bold characters to highlight that “The initiative 
on the other hand deserves constructive and enriching language and 
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contribution. As terror is a result, if the agents disappear the terrorism 
will be vaporised by itself.”  The strategy of rationalisation appears by 
indicating terror as a result of the problem not just the problem itself. The 
causal reasons should be found out and fought against to end terror as the 
outcome of the Kurdish problem. More significantly, he underlines the 
necessity of the specific positive language use in discussion on the Initiative 
in order to have positive results. 
He questions the strict and aggressive discourse of the MHP through the 
argumentation of the MHP profits arising from the ‘Kurdish uprising’ and 
‘the blood of terror’. Here, discursively, ‘uprising’ is a remarkable 
nomination of the Kurdish problem. He (Zaman 25.06.2011, p.13) justifies 
his argument in noting they use the mosque courtyards where the funerals of 
martyrs are held, as a meeting place, and claims ‘how many votes does a 
funeral cost?’ question is the main reason for the escalation of terrorism. 
Therefore, he (Zaman 09.01.2011, p.10) presents that MHP ethno-
nationalism and Kurdish leftist nationalism are constitutive of each other. 
They feed and reconstruct each other: “Kurdish question nurtured and raised 
the Kurdish nationalism (ulusalcilik). Yet would not the Kurdish question 
and nationalism massificate the MHP as an anti-thesis? Aren’t these two 
contradictions getting power from each other?”  As it has been demonstrated, 
argumentation patterns are based on the strategy of emphasising the negative 
common features of both sides. Apart from him, Turan Alkan (Zaman 
25.12.2010) directly stated: “Kurdish Initiative was a right policy.”  He noted 
what was targeted was right; but why it could not reach its destination due to 
the government did not prepare the society and there was a panic of the 
opposition, 'what if the initiative works'. 
 
This argument can be deduced from the leftist author and academician Murat 
Belge’s comments on the nature of opposition in Turkey: ‘The whole aim of 
‘opposition’ in today’s crisis is by any means to remove this government, the 
party of this government and the social population who created them from 
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power.’ He amalgamates this point with why the government’s intention to 
find a ‘peaceful’ and ‘democratic’ solution for the Kurdish problem came 
across with non-striking intense opposition. Without any exceptional 
viewpoints, they were opposed to whatever the government had to offer on 
the solution (Taraf 25.12.2009, p.7). In addition, he addresses the impatience 
shown on the government’s ‘democratic initiative’: 
“I had said that the people who expect results from the ‘initiative’ in 
two days couldn't think of asking ‘What did you do? What did you 
succeed?’ to the ones who bring the events to these days, for twenty-
five years, by making ‘cross-border’ operations, by burning a village 
in one day and a forest in another day, by making laws.” (Taraf 
28.12.2009, p. 9) 
 
In Murat Belge’s article the temporal dimension of the problem is touched by 
the negative narrative of the past experiences of twenty-five years. By 
illustrating what had been done before, he justifies his critic on the 
impassionate attitude of some sides about the government’s attempt to sort 
out the longstanding historical problem in a few days. For many reasons, one 
can assume that he is right on this argumentation if one looks at the negative 
representations of AKP’s initiative in the context of the common political 
future in both Turkish nationalist and Kurdish nationalist discourse. By 
examining Aysel Tugluk’s expression (Radikal 18.09.2011 p.8), it may be 
argued that not just the MHP and the CHP (ethno-nationalists and Kemalist 
nationalists), but also Kurdish nationalists did not contribute to the discursive 
reconstruction process of the will to live together: “No one deceives himself, 
this process leads to civil war. And at the end of the process, will the desire 
and the ideal to live together remain? Do not remain! A famous phrase: 
‘When the blood is shed, the redemption must be paid!’”  In this expression, 
the language of war is justified by the strategy of balancing one crime with 
another. Causal explanations such as the lack of living together are shifting 
responsibility to the ‘others’. The ‘redemption’ metaphor refers the cost of 
violence as retaliation. This discourse reproduces the never-ending cycle of 
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violence in the Kurdish question and legitimises it by blaming others. 
 
In this context, the liberals, leftists and social democrats turn debating on the 
AKP’s and the PKK’s U-turn to the non-functional military solution which 
has been tried for twenty-five years. While negotiations beyond the closed 
doors are not working for the peace, the last circumstances spring to mind, 
more polarisation and crystallisation in Turkish politics. Ahmet Altan 
presented this point with the allegory of hungry cavemen in order to criticise 
other political parties copycatting the extreme nationalist MHP politics in the 
peace-building process: 
“They are making a hash of peace, dipping their hands into the 
peace like three cavemen trying to share a cake with cream. As in the 
fights of those hungry moments every time, ‘the most wild’ one likens 
everyone to himself. As the most wild in this fight is the MHP, it is 
common attitude to be like the MHP. The AKP, CHP and PKK 
imitate the MHP.” (Taraf 25.08.2009, p.5) 
 
 
In addition, Altan commented on his disappointment of Kurdish contribution 
to the ‘democracy initiative’ with the argument that it is just a representative 
of a particular region or ethnic group and it is silenced on the common issues 
of Turkey: 
 
“While there was a cut-throat ‘battle of democracy’ in Turkey, it was 
breaking our hearts that the Kurds were standing aside and did not 
get involved in the fight as if the democracy was only interesting the 
Turks. Kurdish politicians were just expressing the problems related 
to their race and their regions, and they were keeping silent in the 
face of our common problems, just like Erbakan lovers before 
February 28 with a strange ‘communitarianism’.” (Taraf 28.02.2010, 
p.9) 
 
Interestingly, he uses the illustration of Islamists before the postmodern 
military intervention of February 28th for describing the present Kurdish 
politicians. The matter with Kurdish politicians is pointed out as not being a 
Turkey's party, merely a regional party. As noted before, the Islamists could 
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become the majority party with the AKP’s revisionism and conservative 
democracy discourse. Otherwise they would keep on being representative of 
a specific Islamist community. Tayyip Erdogan’s AKP succeeded by being 
the voices of others with the discourse of ‘democracy for everyone’, which 
was also convincing both the liberal and leftist sides. During the last decade 
Prime Minister Erdogan has been arguing that they are against ethnic 
nationalism. But their tone of Sunni Islamism in their discourse has become 
more ocular day by day. Finally in 2012, he declared their four principles in 
Adana: “one state, one nation, one flag and one religion.” He underlined that 
he did not include ‘one language’. After the opposing comments, the party 
members said, ‘one religion’ might be a tongue slip. 
 
More problematically, the dominance of security and its fight against 
terrorism discourse turned Turkey’s democracy into a downhill battle, using 
the cases of Ergenekon, Balyoz and KCK to apply the general term of 
‘terrorism’ to the new Penal Code effectuated in 2006. In the cases of 
Ergenekon and Balyoz, hundreds of people (mostly army officers and 
journalists) were taken into custody
35
. In the case of the KCK, the same 
happened to the Kurdish people (mostly politicians and journalists). The 
polarised political situation in ‘the war of all against all’ lost them the chance 
of peace-building once again. As Ahmet Insel writes in Radikal, questioning 
of the legitimacy of violence is difficult in Turkey due to the fact that both 
parties – the state and the PKK – are becoming anti-politics in the case of the 
Kurdish problem: 
“The idea that the solution to this ‘gangrenous problem’ will be 
achieved with an extremely bloody fight seems to have dominated 
both parties. Both parties are demanding an absolute allegiance to 
itself. Both parties are firmly hugging the concept of ‘just war’. The 
politics of violence is destroying the politics.” (Radikal 23.10.2011) 
 
                                               
35 For how these pronlematic cases discredited the Turkish judiciary and how the media 
played a role in that, see Dani Rodrik (2011) ‘Ergenekon and Sledhammer: Building or 
Undermining Rule of Law’, Turkish Policy Quarterly, Spring, Volume 10 No:1 
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In contrast to blaming ‘others’ strategy used in most of the media discourse, 
in the Radikal newspaper, Fuat Keyman (11.09.2011) strategically employed 
constructive discourse on the topos of ‘responsibility’ which has a unity and 
solidarity-enhancing function in the Kurdish issue. He underlined the 
importance of a new constitution writing process for equal citizenship as a 
chance to build democratic and peaceful collective present and future of 
Turkey. He invited the AKP and the BDP to behave responsibly towards the 
Kurdish problem, to establish the will of a common present and tomorrow on 
the basis of ‘peace, democratic negotiations/ equality/ justice/ conscience/ 
language’, by taking lessons from the pains and mistakes of the past. The 
necessity of learning from common past experiences was expressed by 
Keyman in making use of the transformation strategy. On how to change the 
ongoing struggle, from a social democracy perspective he offered a specific 
language use in peace-building, a language of equality, justice and 
conscience. Beyond others, this is an alternative, pluralist imagination of 
Turkey. 
 
 
Findings and Conclusion 
The thematic content of discourses on Turkish national identity contains the 
construction of a collective past, present and future; a common psychical 
geography and borders; and a common culture. The concept of a Turkish 
nation as an imagined community is built on these elements in the different 
discourses. Using this perspective of the nation, in this chapter, the discourse 
analysis as the methodological framework of study is applied to investigate 
how these contents of Turkish national identity are generated and reproduced 
through Turkish media discourse in the context of Turkey’s European Union 
membership and Kurdish problem. This assumes to reach the multiple faces 
of Turkey from a national and an international level; official and oppositional; 
constitutional and cultural models of identity in relation to the internal power 
struggle in the 2000s, particularly giving rise to the power of two traditional 
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others of Kemalist state: Islam and Kurds. Based on this essential assumption, 
it is discovered that there is not one simple understanding of the EU and 
Turkish identity construction depending on the context of Turkey’s Kurdish 
question. Here, the main argumentations of different discursive constructs of 
Turkish national identity are outlined and the strategies applied in these 
constructions are summarised as the findings of the detailed linguistic 
analysis of the case study. 
The detailed discourse-analytical investigation of Kemalist discourse of 
Turkish nationalism from the Cumhuriyet newspaper provides the Kemalist 
conceptualisation of nation and self-perception in the selected, specific to the 
EU context. Europe is seen as a symbol of modern life and thinking by 
Kemalists, they tend to argue that “we are not against the EU; but we have 
conditions: Kemalist principals and national sovereignty must be preserved.” 
With regard to issues such as the common national past, they refer to 
Kemalist legacy and its institutions. In the discursive construct of the 
common present, they address Turkey’s membership of the EU with regard 
to preserving secular identity of state and its guardian army. With the belief 
in the AKP’s instrumentation of the EU adaptation process in order to 
Islamisation of the country cloaked in the discourse of freedom and 
democracy, they perceive the EU process as a ‘threat’ to the regime of the 
state, to unity of the nation, its independence and sovereignty. Moreover, 
they argue that the EU harmonisation is misappropriated by the Kurds for 
realisation of their opposing demands to Turkey. With regard to the Kurdish 
question, the EU was represented as ‘external other’, while European 
integration was at the top of Turkey’s agenda. While non-European and 
Muslim identity discourses were becoming dominant in the last decade, the 
public support and political agenda for the EU were lost attention in Turkish 
media. In addition, the ‘blamed others’ have been redefined in 2009 as the 
USA, the West or global actors.  
 
Kemalist discourse addresses to ‘homogenisation’ under Turkish identity and 
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citizenship by the strategy of perpetuation and justification. This 
homogeneity point is also common in the ethno-nationalist discourse of the 
MHP. However, the ethno-nationalists do not underline secularism or 
Kemalism; but Turkic and Muslim characters of the nation which can be 
called as populist nationalism. The best seller Hurriyet newspaper is chosen 
to illustrate this perspective of Turkish nation. Despite the fact that some 
Hurriyet authors criticise what is happening in Turkey from different 
perspectives, Hurriyet tends to be more populist in parallel with government 
policies in assuming representing majority mentality and an imagined 
collective everyday life culture in the focused timeline.   
 
In contrast to Kemalist discourse, the self-perception of Islamist discourse 
positions Turkey culturally as a part of the Muslim world. They focus on 
Muslimhood in the discursive construction of their difference from the West. 
However, they argue that they are in favour of Turkey’s bid for EU 
membership in terms of common values; mainly democracy. In the data 
analysis, it is seen that this democracy discourse is instrumentalised by the 
Islamists in order to justify transformation of Kemalist nation-state with 
regard to secularism and citizenship policies. With a reference to 
Muslimhood, ‘Islam has one nation’ discourse is used in opposition to the 
Kemalist state’s unequal identity policies, particularly its relationship with 
the Kurds. Therefore, they seem to be supporters of EU conditionality in 
consolidation of the Kurdish rights. However, Zaman’s coverage of the head-
scarf issue apparently indicated that they lost interest in being a part of the 
Union due to the fact that they could not get what they expected from the EU, 
namely support of religious freedom in Turkey.  Certainly, they put Islam at 
the heart of their view of the world and relationships with the others. 
Because of that, secularist politics of the Kemalist state is defined as ‘armed 
tyranny’ to Muslim people. They make a distinction between the Kemalist 
state and the Muslim nation. Based on this, they offer a commemoration and 
reconstruction of the state’s Islamic identity as a solution to Turkey’s 
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problems. They even see the AKP’s self-identification of ‘conservative 
democrat’ rather than ‘Islamic’ as the problem; it is not enough to provide a 
common identity and sense of belonging among Muslims. In a nutshell, they 
argue that ‘Islam is the answer’ in relation to the internal and external others 
of Turkey. Although this concept of the nation still maintains the situation of 
‘all animals are equal, but some animals are more equal than others’, in 
particular, for the rights of the secularists, non-Muslims and LGBTs. It is 
therefore, this thesis makes an original contribution the literature through 
analysing Turkey’s new identity with a specific focus on the concept of 
‘national identity’ and power struggle of different Turkish nationalisms. It 
reveals that how the notions of Turkish nation-state identity is naturalised 
with the references to the majority’s religion.   
In addition to the other findings, this chapter found out that as Islamists, the 
liberal-leftists’ main motivation in supporting Turkey’s EU membership is 
the necessity of transformation in the Kemalist state structure. Therefore, 
they endorse the AKP’s attempts in the reformation process. Indeed, all 
discourses of the Turkish nation identity claim to be in favour of 
democratisation. However, the content of the concept is diverse in to what 
extent they want it for the ‘others’ who do not think, do not live, or do not 
wear, as them. Reformation in the state-society relations, the state-military 
relations or the state-minorities relations requires redefinition of power 
relations. This inevitably points out who resist and who encourage the 
changes in discursive construction of Turkish nation-state identity while 
empowering traditional disadvantaged groups of the state. In this point, the 
pluralist perspectives of liberal-leftists and social democrats, as it is seen in 
Taraf and Radikal, do not exclude some specific groups or define new others 
in the nation formation for the sake of satisfying the majority’s identity 
demands. Related argumentation patterns demonstrate that this pluralist view 
of the world reverberates through the developments both for EU membership 
and the AKP’s Kurdish Initiative. This is why these groups have been 
supporters in the AKP’s pro-EU, pro-Kurdish Initiative and pro-
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reconstitution campaigns. Recently, what is particularly remarkable is the 
AKP’s emphasis on Islamic character of Turkey and reluctance in vitalising 
the EU reforms have shifted the perceptions of liberal-leftists, social 
democrats and the socialist wing of the Kurdish movement in the changing 
power relations in Turkey. Unfortunately, new process widens the fault lines 
between the sides; namely Turks versus Kurds; Islamists versus Secularists; 
Turkey versus Europe. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
TURKEY'S NEW IDENTITY: 9/11 AND IRAQ WAR IN 
TURKISH MEDIA 
 
 
Introduction 
Based on the international circumstances in the last decade, the third case 
study in this chapter turns to a closer analysis of Turkey’s Western identity in 
international relations. In the broader international level, the debates of Islam 
versus the West after 9/11 events and the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 
influenced the importance of Turkey’s Muslim and secular identities. In the 
post-9/11 process, Turkey's pro-Islamist AKP government internationally 
became more of an issue in the terms of its role in Iraq intervention, 
transformation of radical Islam, the West-Islam world relations and in 
particular the USA’s relationship with Islam. In relation to the USA’s 
occupation in the region, Collin Powell’s ‘moderate Islamic formulation’ 
(Oktem 2013, p.82) triggered a debate using Turkey as a model for moderate 
Muslim democracy. However, ‘America’s loyal Muslim ally’, Turkey’s 
negative decision on the Iraq war in March 2003 was unexpected and 
interpreted as the turning point in reorientation of Turkish Foreign Policy. In 
this context, interconnectedness of domestic and foreign identity categories 
in the events of 9/11 and the invasion of Iraq, serve a comprehensive reading 
case on competing discourses of the Turkish nation in the domestic struggle 
on the construction of post-Kemalist nation-state identity. 
Regarding these points on Turkey’s international identity, this chapter traces 
the themes on Turkey’s Muslim identity, Secular and Western identity in the 
representation of the events of 9/11 and the Iraq War in Turkish media. The 
discourse analysis of the media texts also provides clues to the deeper 
understanding of Turkey’s 'no' decision to the war against Iraq on 1 March 
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2003
36
 in terms of rising anti-Americanism and the final debate on whether 
Turkish Foreign Policy shifted its Western orientation. The comparative 
perspective observes the articulation of Turkey’s post-Kemalist identity 
across multiple discourses, not just within official discourse. It empirically 
presents that national identity and foreign policy discourses are reproductive 
and constitutive of each other. The time period of the discourse analysis ends 
in 2011, and therefore does not cover emerging challenges of Turkish 
democracy and Turkish Foreign Policy during the political uprisings of the 
Arab world. 
 
5.1. The Constructed Link between the Events of 11 September 2001 and 
Iraq War in the Media 
The events of 11 September 2001 – the terror attacks on the World Trade 
Centre in New York and on the Pentagon near Washington DC – changed the 
construction of US national security paradigm and the containment-plus 
strategy for Iraq (Ritche and Rogers 2007, p. 53-54). It rapidly evolved 
through a number of stages to take the Bush administration to the military-
led regime change in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. The first part of the new 
strategy was based on ‘war against terrorism’ by attacking and eradicating al-
Qaida in Afghanistan. The second part of the paradigm targeted the states 
that harboured and assisted terrorist organisations. By December 2001, the 
administration had expanded the new war on terrorism in the third step of the 
post-9/11 paradigm by the inclusion of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). 
In October 2002, neo-conservative administration declared the doctrine of 
pre-emptive war against WMD-armed ‘rogue states’ (ibid p. 105) in the 
National Security Strategy. The suggestions on 9/11 were sponsored and 
supported by the Iraq administration (ibid. p.73) and its WMD programmes 
                                               
36 Despite the oposition of Turkish public opinion, the final decision at the TNA surprised 
both Turkish and American governments. See more: Oran, B. (2013) Turk Dis Politikasi, Cilt 
III: 2001-2012, Istanbul:Iletisim, p.269-276 
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confronted to comply with UN demands for disarmament, presented Iraq as 
the main threat in the definition of the war on terrorism. These suggestions 
were used by means of the domestic and international justifications for a 
possible war with Saddam Hussein’s regime. The White House showed its 
determination on taking pre-emptive action in signing the ‘Authorisation for 
Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002’ on 16 October 2002, 
which was followed by the resolution of UN Security on 8 November 2002. 
Iraq’s failure to comply with all UN resolutions, rid itself of weapons of 
mass destruction, and its support for terrorists did not give them a second 
chance as it was considered a ‘hostile’ country; then on 19 March war began 
(ibid p. 110). 
 
Most of America’s traditional allies, especially European states, opposed its 
attack on Iraq but it did not wait long before building a consensus for action 
with the expectation that it should be followed (Sarwar 2006, p.26). The 
removal of the Iraqi dictator was seen as a liberal war that had the right 
motives in pursuit of universal values (Cox and Kitchen 2010, p.82). It was 
the destruction of liberal internationalism (Sniegoski 2005, p.116) in the 
rejection of international cooperation and international law, or in its 
unilateralist stand on pre-emptive action by ‘the abuse of America’s 
intelligence agencies’ (Bamford 2005); although there was no proven link 
between Saddam and 9/11. However, the Bush administration could convince 
American public opinion. Therefore, the outbreak of the Iraqi War was not 
just about the power of ideas but about the alliance of ideas with power as 
Cox and Kitchen noted (2010, p.83). President George W. Bush quoted from 
George Marshall (Kaplan and Kristol 2003, p.135) that “our flag will be 
recognised throughout the world as a symbol of freedom on the one hand, 
and of overwhelming power on the other.”  The question in this case was 
how the USA could gain the public’s support. Certainly the media had a 
major role in the result. Public opinion matters regarding the decision on war. 
The importance of public opinion in foreign policy making was already 
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given in the theoretical chapter in the terms of domestic sources of foreign 
policy. In the academic literature the role of American media in ‘selling the 
war on terror’ (Mackiewicz 2008) was indicated in the various attempts 
(King and Wells 2009; Bennett et al. 2007; Dadge 2006; Nikolaev and 
Hakanen 2006; Rampton and Stauber 2003; Miller 2003; Gupta 2002). 
Among these contributions, King and Wells (2009, p.158) indicated how 
narrative of the Iraq War was framed by the Bush administration. Given the 
title of the New Way Forward, the administration’s surge morality tale 
offered all the components of a complete and substantive frame: it defined a 
problematic situation (upswing in sectarian and al Qaeda-sponsored violence 
in Iraq), identified its causes (beliefs and actions of terrorists and those who 
harbour them), conveyed a moral judgement of the players involved (a heroic 
new protagonist confronting the evil enemies of democracy), and endorsed a 
remedy (a military build up that would lead to victory both in Iraq and the 
war on terror)… From the moment of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, President 
Bush articulated a highly consistent narrative that the United States had been 
forced into a monumental struggle representing nothing less than a battle of 
the civilised and democratic good against the forces of terrorist evil. Integral 
to this frame was the struggle’s difficulty and length, but Bush always 
reassured his audiences that the forces of good would eventually prevail. 
While admitting mistakes had been made in the past, throughout 2007, the 
administration would continue to insist that success was still possible in Iraq. 
 
Inevitably, this narrative was followed in the media. The 9/11 terror and the 
images of the planes hitting the World Trade Centre towers and their collapse, 
were mediated repeatedly by the mass media which was claimed to be ‘the 
most documented event in history’ (Kellner 2003, p.144). The narrative was 
constructed, reconstructed and rereconstructed (Gupta 2002, p.12) in the 
media discourse. Kellner argues that the United States media coverage of this 
traumatic event increased the feeling of insecurity and war hysteria, while 
failing to provide a coherent account of what happened, why it happened, 
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and what would count as responsible responses. Moreover, the discourse in 
the news demonstrated a ‘clash of civilisation’ model in the linkage of Islam 
and terrorism that led to call for a ‘justified’ war against Iraq. The March 
2004 poll of the University of Maryland found that 57 per cent of Americans 
believed that Iraq provided substantial support to al Qaeda before the war 
and 60 per cent of people believed that pre-war Iraq had WMD (Dadge 2006, 
p.2). More worryingly, Bennett et al (2007, p.43) brought up the matter that 
nearly 70 per cent of people in America maintained to believe that Saddam 
had assisted the 9/11 terrorists, despite credible challenges shown within 
months of the invasion. 
 
All these numbers of misconception reflected that the media’s reporting 
failed to provide the truth to the public. At this crucial point, Dadge (2006) 
asked “Why the media failed us?”, in other words why did the watchdog fail 
to bark in the US? In his account, the reasons laid behind the media’s 
contribution to preparing the public to go to war were given in regard to the 
US media-politics at the relevant time. First, the climate of patriotism after 
the attacks was easy to be manipulated by the Bush administration while 
dissent was seen unpatriotic. Second, the difficulty of reporting and testing 
on intelligence issues when the media have no access to the original source, 
left the information area to the Bush administration’s own message. Finally, 
private commerce to uphold the official discourse and the pressure on 
journalists from other elements of the media and American society in the 
atmosphere of heavy politicisation and partisanship caused the press to be 
drifted (ibid. p.144). 
 
Surely, after 9/11 and the invasion of Iraq, responding to the demands of 
national and international security in using force by the licence of democracy 
discourse caused a significant rethinking of strategies (Weiss et al 2004) for 
maintaining international order and peace. US unilateralism to go to war had 
a negative impact on the legitimacy and credibility of the UN (Ayoop 2004, 
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p.160). These events remapped the global politics (Ferguson and Mansbach 
2004) and reflected the general importance of identity politics in declining 
the distinction between foreign and domestic definition of ‘inside’ and 
‘outside’ in contrasting identifications of the ‘self’ and ‘other’. 
 
The consequences of the US-led coalition invasion of Iraq, created an anti-
Western Muslim transnational support base and the politicisation, 
radicalisation and mobilisation of a segment of Muslims worldwide 
(Gunaratna 2010, p.110). Significantly, the anger in the Arab and Muslim 
world came from American support to Israel in Palestinian issues doubled by 
the result of the Al Jazeera television’s real-time coverage of Iraqi civilian 
casualties and the destruction of Iraqi infrastructure (Seib 2008; Ayoop 2004). 
In this context, Rampton and Stauber (2003) gave the numbers of world 
opinion on the war with Iraq. On 18 March 2003, the Pew Research Centre 
for the People and the Press published a survey showing the percentage of 
people in France who held a favourable view of the United States had 
dropped from 63 to 31 since the beginning of 2002. In Italy, the percentage 
had fallen from 70 to 34; in Russia, from 61 to 28; in Turkey, from 30 to 12 
(ibid. p.6). Even in the long time US ally, England, the percentage decreased 
to 48 from 75. In the Turkish case, rising anti-American sentiments in the 
Turkish public formed problematical perceptions of the West in general and 
the US in particular.   
 
5.2. The 9/11 Events in the Turkish Press 
To see the construction and everyday production of ‘we’ and ‘them’ 
distinction in Turkey’s external relations, a search on different meanings of 
September 11th events in Turkish public discourse is a fruitful case that can 
lead to discussions on the Iraq War and whether Turkish Foreign Policy is 
losing its Western orientation. In this section, the linguistic representation of 
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political actors in the discourse analysis is driven by the main question which 
is basic and clear: What is September the 11th? There are various answers to 
this single question, but one of them was repeated and became quite 
remarkable in the pro-secularist Turkish media discourse (Cumhuriyet 
15.10.2001, p.12; Hurriyet 11.09.2002, p.5): It is the day when the American 
dream died away with the terrorist attacks.   
Similarly, in the pro-Islamist Zaman’s coverage (13.09.2001, p.8), it was 
mentioned as American legend destroyed. In these instances, the verb 
choices as 'destroy' and 'died away' were used to mean the end of ‘American 
legend’ and ‘American dream’. This strategy of discontinuation serves to 
discursively destruct the hegemony of the USA and its ideal in the 
international power relations. In these coverages of 9/11, deleting agency or 
the exclusion of participants as those responsible for the attacks and 
nominalisation reduces a whole clause to its nucleus (Billig 2013, p.25). 
In addition, the ‘war’ discourse was covered by Turkish media since the day 
following the attacks. They accentuated that the USA was trying to save the 
ones buried under the wreckage while seeking for those responsible at the 
same time.  President George W. Bush stated that it was going to be a long-
lasting war between ‘the good and the bad’ (Hurriyet 12.09.2001, p.1). 
Hurriyet (13.09.2001, p.1) used a manhunt metaphor for addressing the 
investigation of the USA for the responsible people: 'The USA started a 
manhunt.' It was reported (Hurriyet 29.01.2002, p.11) that Bush claimed in 
his address to the nation that Iraq, Iran and North Korea, which he described 
as the ‘devil axis’, were trying to obtain weapons of mass destruction, and 
could attack against the USA and its allies. Linguistic choices of Hurriyet in 
the coverage of the USA’s response to the events were remarkable as it 
reproduces the discourse of war between 'good and bad' or the war against 
the ‘devil axis’. 
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Related to the last point, the pro-Islamist Zaman’s coverage focused on the 
meanings of events and results for the Muslim world in addressing American 
President George W. Bush’ statement that this was a crusade against 
terrorism and barbarism. Ali Bulac (25.09.2001, p.7) asked whether this 
controversial term was used coincidentally as a slip of the tongue or it was a 
purposeful reference to mean that the Christian world aimed to start a holy 
war against Islamism and Muslims. This religious reference to negative 
aspects of the common political past and its traces in the present problems 
discursively constructs the American image as the ‘other’ in Islamist 
imagination of the nation. There was a tendency of scepticism on what was 
behind the attacks in Turkish press coverage of the 9/11. Newspapers 
portrayed a distrusted and unreliable image whilst the strategy of 
euphemising worked for blaming the USA in linguistic representation of the 
responsible social actors and circumstances which fed terrorism. 
In both the pro-secularists and pro-Islamists newspapers, the metaphor of 
movie manifested the stereotypical image of the USA in Turkey. With a 
reference to American movies under the title of ‘Death fiction reality’, 
Zaman authors argued that the terrorists gained their inspiration from 
American culture (13.09.2001, p.8) and added: 'They were prepared for the 
Star Wars but they had an unexpected beat.' Karakis and Kutay described the 
September 11th event as a scenario which the USA had also participated in, 
and claimed that the assassination was reported to authorities in advance.  
More interestingly, they referred to a special expression from the Ottoman 
times for using an allegory in reminding and judging American power in the 
Gulf War: 'Do not be supercilious my sultan, there is an Allah greater than 
you!' This Islamic reference to Allah and connection to an ‘evil’ past event 
with a present one (the 9/11 attacks) reminded a heavenly justice in relation 
to using a super power like a sultan. 
Ataol Behramoglu (Cumhuriyet 15.10.2001, p.6) wrote on 9/11 from a supra-
national perspective: 'All the wars in the world, all the pain or happiness are 
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our common experiences. Or they shall be… Even though this is just a far 
dream for now, it is worthy of imagination.' In Behramoglu’s expression, 
9/11 was mentioned as a common experience of humanity.  He addressed the 
pain and happiness, in doing so, he pointed to the importance of human 
dimension in the war, the victims of the attacks. This reminds us of what is 
generally ignored in the analysis of international relations.. In linguistic 
expressions of the wars, ‘the state is targeted’ discourse is used which 
functions to justify the interests of nation-state, despite what it takes; 
however the fact is the individuals are real victims or responsible of wars. At 
the first anniversary of September the 11th, Cumhuriyet (11.09.2002, p.4) 
commented on the issue of internationalisation of terrorism and the attacks 
proved how necessary international cooperation was in order to overcome 
terrorism. It was noted that globalisation in economy revealed some 
economic imbalances more clearly and it would be a great fault to ignore 
injustices. Using linguistic expressions to emphasise the social and economic 
injustices demonstrates the social democratic side of Cumhuriyet and the 
leftist tone of Kemalist nationalist perspective that was clearer until the AKP 
came into power in November 2002. 
Moreover, regarding Turkey’s interests, Kemalist coverage launched to form 
a direct link between Turkey’s domestic and external relations in the context 
of 9/11. America was blamed by using a sceptical discourse.  Orhan Bursali 
(Cumhuriyet 11
.
09.03, p.06) argued that the USA utilised what happened on 
September 11th by saying it was the greatest excuse of history which helped 
the conservatives who had totally got hold of Bush to start putting their 
attempts to make the 21
st
 century the ‘American Century’ into practice. With 
regard to these attempts, it was sceptically questioned whether the USA 
avoided preventing this attack on purpose of Americanising the Middle East 
and around. More importantly, Bursali commented on the relation between 
11 September 2001 and Turkey's military coup of 12 September 1980. By 
constructing a linkage between two events, he address to 'the pawns of 
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Washington' and 'betrayals' in the land of Mustafa Kemal who played a role 
in serving to USA's ‘Islamic blockade’ plan by supporting Islamism in 
Turkey against the Soviet Union: 
“Turkey has been suffering from the 11th September of the USA. At 
the same time, from its own 12 September. The 12 September 1980 
had two faces; the first one was the USA behind the coup and the 
second was the incapability of our politicians to rule the country. At 
the same time, members of El-Qaeda and the Taliban of Afghanistan 
were the greatest friends of the White House brought about by itself. 
The ‘Green Belt’ in other words, ‘Islamic blockade’ plan was in 
force against the Soviet Union and Turkey was among the most 
significant players of this plan. The ones who grabbed power 
started to apply American Islamism propaganda in the country by 
working as the pawns of Washington. This was one of the greatest 
betrayals of ‘the most Kemalists’ to the land of Mustafa Kemal and 
to his basic principles. The things we have experienced are the 
results of this policy. The bond between September 11th and 
September 12th is not an irony of fate.” 
However, Zaman newspaper and Islamists make different readings on history. 
Bulac identified ‘Islamophobia’ as being constitutive of new ‘others’ of the 
Western world (Zaman 21.01.2004, p.7). According to him, the hatred 
against Communism and the Soviet Union in the Cold War period has now 
been directed against Islam as a religion and to the Islamic world as a block. 
The order that governs today’s international relations has been shaped based 
on othering Islam. During this time great tragedies will take place on Islamic 
lands under the deep influence of the West and its ‘blind hatred against 
Islamism’. He grounds these argumentations with negative representation of 
Western culture in the terms of racism, ethnocentrism and hegemony: 
“The Western world doesn’t have the experience to live together and 
share things with the others due to its history and the cultural codes 
it has today. The only thing that human life understands from the 
deep wisdom it possesses is to establish hegemony. A self-centred 
culture always has the potential to turn into racism or ethnocentrism. 
The Western world has always sought an ‘other’ that is a source of 
threat to it, brought a policy to cover it and established hegemony 
over that.” 
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Contrary to this character of the Western world, Ali Bulac (Zaman 
12.02.2004, p.6) paid attention to the feeling of ‘belonging to a whole’ in the 
Islamic world, which he based on no country’s claim that it is different from 
or superior to another. By making use of this strategy of justification he held 
the allegory of Hadj, he claimed that totalitarianism was opposite to the spirit 
of Islam.  Man, woman, young, old, black, white, northern, southern... Many 
people around the world come together in the Holy Land to perform their 
pilgrimage duties. Thus, he assumed that an observation on Hadj might show 
characteristic differences between the Western and Islamic world: 
“When hajis come out of ihram you see many different clothes. It is 
as if the international fashion show of the culture of humanity has 
started on the streets of two cities. Then you will understand that 
Western life style is totalitarian and paranoid actually, that it can’t 
tolerate another lifestyle, differences and orders an aggressive 
attitude at the level of official policies to eliminate all colours and 
lines.” 
 
As it has been demonstrated, the Islamist press was interested in the effects 
that 9/11 had on the Islamic world. On the other hand, liberal leftist Radikal 
took a different position in the terms of individual rights and freedoms. 
Haluk Sahin (Radikal 10.09.2003, p.9) elaborated that ‘the entire world’, and 
particularly the USA, keep on paying the cost of September 11
th
 and that this 
will continue for many more years. He named these costs as restricted 
freedoms, tensed nerves, increased bigotries and social paranoia... From a 
liberal nationalist perspective, ‘we are all in the same boat strategy’ was 
presented in the terms of international paradigm change after 9/11. Ahmet 
Insel (Radikal 30.12.2002, p.4) also point out the costs of ‘following the 
track of new imperial interventionism’. In his analysis, not just Americans, 
but also around 1,000 civil Afghans who paid such salvage to Afghanistan 
with their lives, were also buried under the wreckage of the twin towers. The 
rapid collapse of the Taliban regime and the short term results of the military 
intervention organised by the USA, justified the ones supporting the policy 
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by using a greater violence against violence. Therefore, his side, which 
consists of people who were against war as a principle, was worn down by 
the things experienced after September 11
th
. Paying attention to the general 
costs of the events and change in the world contribute to the debate from an 
internationalist approach. It did not reduce the problem to a national one by 
warning about the negative results and the continuity of the common future 
of all the nations. 
In the context of rejection, the adoption of the hegemony of violence, using 
terrorism as a political means of struggle, Aydin Engin (Cumhuriyet 
11.09.2002) criticised the general perspectives on the meaning of September 
11
th
 in Turkey. He gave tangible examples of answers if one asked what 9/11 
is: “It is the final date for the submission of the candidate parliamentarian 
lists to the Supreme Election Board.” or “It is Wednesday; are you asking 
that?” These statements illustrate ordinary perceptions of time in the 
individual or national level, portraying an ignorance of international events. 
The Islamist perspective was: “It is the holy jihad of Islamism against the 
American devil. It is a perfect lesson taught by Muslim warriors to the ones 
who were conspiring against Islamism… If September 11th is not celebrated 
as a feast, this is because of the cruelty of a presuming state; it is because 
people were forced to be without imams.” In his linguistic designation, 
parallel to Cumhuriyet’s secularist perspective, Engin sarcastically criticised 
the Islamist view of the world by his lexical choices and exaggeration of 
typical Islamist arguments against the Kemalist state. This corresponds with 
the domestic power struggle on redefinition of Turkish nation-state identity. 
In the last decade, Islamists have justified their efforts in challenging the 
Kemalism tradition and secularist policies by making use of suppression 
discourse in blaming Kemalists for assertive policies that limited their 
freedom of expression or religion. Specifically, the post-modern military 
intervention process of 28 February and its consequences employ a past 
trauma which unites Islamists like cement. This is why Engin deconstructed 
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this blaming of others or self-victimisation strategy with giving a sarcastic 
example of Islamic discourse: “If September 11th is not celebrated as a feast, 
this is because of the cruelty of a presuming state, it is because of people 
were forced to be without imams.'' Kemalists believe that Islamists misuse 
the discourse of suppression, that is to say, the state intervention is related to 
the regime and fundamental principles of the Republican system, the 
secularist policies do not touch people’s beliefs or way of life. They 
contrarily justify it in arguing that the Turkish state supports Diyanet (has the 
largest budget among other state institutions) and provides religious service 
(imams are state officers) in every mosque in every corner of the country.  
That means the nation is not without imams or religion and has never been. 
This point in this example illustrates how a media coverage of an external 
issue (9/11 events) simultaneously reproduces ideologies, contested 
understandings of the nation in discourse and, last but not least, the domestic 
power struggle on identification of a nation-state identity. 
Engin went on to give other examples of answers to the “What is 9/11” 
question which he defined as ‘reasonable’ answers based on knowledge: “It 
was a blind reaction sourced by misery against the horrible attacks of 
American imperialism against the modest communities of the Middle East 
and Middle Asia.” This is can be seen as a leftist perceptive which he was 
opposed to “considering the terror of the modest as righteous”. Instead of this, 
he offered defending peace for the sake of peace without bending in front of 
the power of terrorism and the terrorism of power. Lastly, he demonstrated 
the pragmatist, in-humanist approach seeking to maximise national interests: 
“Certainly it is a milestone in the new world order… In this sense, Turkey 
must take a really delicate approach to foreign policy. We shall not forget that 
the world is being re-designed and Turkey must have a most advantageous 
strategy in this process.” After all these possible answers and perspectives, he 
invited the reader to come up with their own answers in the anniversary of 
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September 11
th
 and ask once more what could be done for peace in a time 
when the clouds of war were gathering above the country. 
 
5.3. Decision-making on Turkey’s Role in Iraq War 
In this part, Turkish media’s coverage of Iraq War exemplifies how 
competing memories of the past would accommodate different perspectives 
on present problems of domestic and foreign policies. Moreover, analysing 
different perspectives on the war in Iraq as a foreign policy issue 
demonstrates ongoing clash of contested narratives of the nation for 
domination. 
On the morning of 1 March 2003, the day of decision-making on the Iraq 
War in the Turkish National Grand Assembly (TNGA), the concept of 
American invasion was used in the pro-secularist discourse against the 
government’s will of allying with the USA. In Cumhuriyet, it was argued that 
once the TNGA permitted foreign soldiers, the USA would have the chance 
to settle its soldiers in the most strategic areas of the Turkish land. In the 
following passage from Cumhuriyet (Cetinkaya, 01.03.2003, p.3), the 
linguistic construction of common political past was realised in temporal 
reference to M. Kemal Ataturk and Turkey in his presidential period. The 
notion of national independence was emphasised in comparison between the 
1930s and 2000s: 
“The issue Mustafa Kemal Ataturk was most sensitive about was 
independence. Ataturk preserved his independence even against his 
closest allies. Ataturk’s Turkey is now under invasion by American 
soldiers. 60–70 thousands of soldiers will stay in Turkish land for 
six months. There is 1930’s Turkey and here is 2003’s Turkey. You do 
the evaluation!” 
 
In Kemalist discourse, 'intertexuality' commonly appears with references to 
the times of M. Kemal Ataturk. Linguistically, the most noteworthy detail in 
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this example is the usage of pronouns with regard to Ataturk. Without any 
meaning lost in translation from Turkish to English, 'Ataturk preserved his 
independence even against his closest allies', shows nation-state identity’s 
incarnation in Ataturk’s identity in the Kemalist perspective of the nation.  
The continuity of ‘Ataturk’s Turkey’ from the 1930s to 2000s expresses the 
immortality and eternity features of Kemalism in their understanding of the 
nation. The strategy of perspectivation is remarkable in the expression of 
'Ataturk’s Turkey is now under invasion by American soldiers.' Here, 
America is constructed as not only threatening Turkey in general terms, but 
also as a danger for 'Turkey in the Kemalist imagination.' This example 
strengthens the Otherness of America in the Turkey's national imagination. 
Moreover it helps to the writer to transfer a resistance discourse to a change 
from Ataturk's Turkey to a different Turkey in the 2000s. 
Apparently, Kemalists tend to refer to the times of founding the Turkish 
Republic to define the concepts of ‘we’ and ‘them’. The next quotation from 
Ilhan Selcuk’s article reminds this Republican narrative and affirms that the 
historical struggle is still alive in Turkey today, which might be seen in the 
case of the Iraq War (Cumhuriyet, 01.03.2003 p.2): 
“Kemalism is the Anatolian style of ‘Enlightenment’ in European 
civilization history; it has been the first in an Islamic community. 
Are there any other countries in the world which were founded by 
fighting against both internal and external powers?… Unfortunately, 
the Armenian and Greek diasporas still continue their struggles in 
Europe and the USA today. The struggle between the powers of 
Lausanne and Sevres is updated… The USA is persisting on settling 
in Iraq. One question: Will the USA settle in Northern Iraq to be 
friends with Turkey, or to divide Anatolia? … The question becomes 
hotter day by day; does the USA want to found a puppet Kurdish 
state in Iraq which would be affiliated to it in fact? Does our 
‘strategic partner’ persist on dominating Iraq to set the Anatolian 
people at odds with each other? … Is the Iraq War of the USA an 
implicit war against Turkey in fact?” 
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The common intertexuality in Kemalist discourse again works in this 
quotation. As shown in the previous case studies, particularly in the case of 
Turkey’s EU integration, Kemalism is supposed to be the ideology as a 
mental framework that transforms Anatolian Muslim society to an 
enlightened, secular, rational, European society. In the article, Selcuk 
mentioned how Kemalists succeeded this transformation despite the internal 
and external enemies. In a nutshell, in the Kemalist narrative of nation 
building, signing the Sèvres Treaty after World War One by the Ottomans 
was a betrayal as the acceptance of selling and dividing the country. By the 
victory of the Independence War against external European powers and 
internal powers such as Armenians, Greeks, Kemalists replaced it with the 
Lausanne Treaty in the 1920s. At the same time, they were faced with local 
Islamic resistance to state authority and Kemalist central government. With a 
departure from this national history, he questions whether the USA, with its 
allies in Europe and Turkey, implicitly are in a war against Turkey to try and 
divide the country. What is more, his way of adverting the 'Armenian and 
Greek Diasporas ' gives evidence of how Kemalists perceive non-Muslim 
citizens of Turkey, essentially as the treacherous enemy within. This 
discourse analysis reveals that this specific Kemalist identification and world 
view reflects their interpretation of Turkey’s current internal and external 
relations. Findings strongly verify the interconnectivity of national identity 
and foreign policy discourse, and demonstrate how they reproduce each other. 
 “This is illegal and inhumane in every sense. The people who put 
Turkey in the position of a beggar, bargainers, that means war 
provocateur and a hired soldier, and their supporters are not 
patriots, rather, they degrade the country, stain the national 
honour… Though these values may have no meaning for some, the 
man on the street, the ordinary citizen takes breath with them; if 
they are still upright despite all the economic troubles, this is 
because they possess such values… So, let’s shout ‘NO WAR!’ in the 
great demonstration to be held in Ankara today! … And call the 
political, military and other administrative powers for giving an ear 
to this wish.” 
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In the excerpt above, Ataol Behramoglu (Cumhuriyet 01.03.2003 p.6) wrote 
that the Turkish Grand National Assembly’s decision would cause an 
invasion of the country by American soldiers; therefore he called people for 
demonstration to say 'No' to war. Moreover, Behramoglu insinuatingly 
expressed the economic political dimension of allying with the USA in Iraq. 
In expression of ‘they’ and ‘some’, he implicitly blamed the government and 
its supporters for putting national honour behind the economic interests. He 
claimed that national honour and patriotism were more important than 
material benefits to Turkish people. He naturalised these nationalist ideas in 
his words of the man on the street takes breath with these values. In this text, 
‘no’ decision on the ‘illegal and inhuman’ war in Iraq is represented as a 
general opinion of ‘the ordinary citizen’. The passage also points out the 
Kemalist idea that Ankara does not represent what the Turkish people want 
for their country and nation. 
The Cumhuriyet newspaper justified opposition discourse to the 
government’s policy on the Iraq War by referring to the Turkish public 
opinion. It was reported that according to the survey of SONAR, 83 per cent 
of the citizens did not want American soldiers in the country (Cumhuriyet 
01.03.2003 p.6). The opposition was covered including both Kemalist CHP 
and Islamist AKP supporters’ protests (ibid. p.8): “Since yesterday evening, 
‘Peace Guard’ members of youth branches of CHP have started keeping 
‘Peace Guard’ in Guvenpark opposite the Turkish Grand National Assembly 
where the war license will be negotiated”. “Islamists protested against the 
AKP government for the first time because of its Iraq policy... The first 
‘Friday Protest’ since the AKP government was made in Beyazıt yesterday.” 
Cumhuriyet reported that at the end of the Friday prayer, a young group of 
500 people, most of whom were Islamists, gathered around the mosque and 
shouted “Allahuekber!”. The group who had just come out of the mosque 
and the turbaned women that had been waiting at the square, shouted against 
the USA, UK and Israel with the slogans they held in their hands: “No War”, 
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“We won’t be the soldiers of the USA”, “We won’t be an enforcer!”, “No 
bargaining over the blood of brothers.” It was claimed that demonstrators 
accused Recep Tayyip Erdoğan of being a partner to the co-conspirators and 
cruelty. 
In the last example, both Islamist and secularist discourses are portrayed as 
they opposed the Iraq war using the Peace Guard or Friday Protest. It can be 
said that common motivations and concerns as being against American 
imperialism or intervention to a Muslim country, constitute a collective voice 
of ‘No War’. The USA image as a foreign ‘threat’ unites the opposing 
domestic powers. That is because anti-Americanism is a popular discourse in 
Turkey. 
Relevantly, the Hurriyet newspaper (01.12.2002, p.4) informed that the ‘No 
War in Iraq’ demonstration was organised by the ‘No War in Iraq 
Coordination Council’ with the participation of 140 civil society 
organisations which included various unions, trade associations and political 
parties and more than ten thousand citizens. What was prominent and 
significant in the coverage of the protest was its concern with a speech made 
in the demonstration. In the cited speech, it was claimed that the process 
which started on September 11
th
 brought the war closer, and the USA, which 
accused Iraq for having weapons of mass destruction which posed a threat to 
all humanity, was the greatest manufacturer of these weapons in fact. The 
USA wanted to use Turkish soldiers for its aims in Iraq. 
Beyond this anti-war discourse, in Hurriyet’s coverage there were some who 
considered the war as a ‘means of profit’. In related to these profit 
calculations, Yalcın Dogan (Hurriyet, 11.12.2002, p.10) argued that it was 
time to persuade Turkey due to the fate of the country linked to the triangle 
of the USA–EU–Turkey and the binary of Islam-Christianity after the events 
of 9/11. This point also demonstrated why the AKP was reluctant to say ‘no’ 
to the USA’s demands: 
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“There is a single title for the bargaining between Bush in 
Washington and Tayyip Erdogan: ‘Take the bases, give the EU!’ or 
‘Take the EU, give the bases!’… Turkey will open its bases and the 
USA will increase its pressure on the EU! … It is evident that, 
Tayyip Erdogan doesn’t show a negative attitude against these 
wishes of Bush in order to empower himself for the EU. In the 
meantime, Bush considers Tayyip Erdogan within the perspective of 
September 11
th
, and mostly within the framework of a meeting and 
consent between ‘Islamic-Christian’ civilizations … Soldier, base, 
land, here’s the issue, here is the fate.” 
 
The excerpt above introduces three cases of interdiscursivity that need to be 
underlined. One concerns the interdiscursivity with the discourse on 
'pragmatism' which is considered as a cornerstone of Turkish foreign policy 
regarding its relations with the USA, including the EU. The second one 
entails the interdiscursivity with the post 9/11 paradigm that reviews the 
importance of Turkey's Muslim identity in the international politics and its 
meaning for Christian West civilisation seeking a moderate role model for 
other Islamic countries. It changed Turkey's position within the framework of 
'the clash of civilisations' (Huntington 2002) and main references changed 
from being Western and secular to being Muslim and democratic (Tank 2006 
p.468). The third one relates to the realism is found to be in Turkey's rational 
approach towards the West where foreign policy is seen as the arena of 
seeking to maximise nation-state interests. This realist perspective on foreign 
policy reproduces the hegemony of the USA power in the international 
politics and its role in Turkey's relations with the EU, which does not 
challenge it. 
In this sense, the best seller Hurriyet newspaper columnists seemed to be 
taking a realist, interest-based approach to Turkey’s role in the Middle East 
and the world. For instance, Cuneyt Ulsever noted (Hurriyet 26.12.2002, p.7) 
that life meant energy and trade. This portrayed as the ‘inevitable logic’ in 
the emerging global world at the beginning of the 21st century. He believed, 
whether Turkey participated or not, the USA’s efforts would determinate new 
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geographical borders. Based on these arguments, he suggested that the right 
question was not whether Turkey would join the Iraq War. The right question 
was whether Turkey would take an active role in the new order that 
established in the Middle East, even a better question was at which side 
Turkey wanted to be in the newly established order of the Middle East. This 
example shows Turkey's search for a new role and identity in changing 
international circumstances of the last decade. 
Like Ulsever, Mehmet Ali Birand's (Hurriyet, 09.01.2003, p.5) contribution 
to the debate supported the realist perspective on the Iraq War. Birand 
believed that the USA was establishing the new order and that this operation 
would change the Middle East, making it unrecognisable. Washington settled 
into a region of the world with the Afghanistan operation made after 
September 11th. Now it’s the turn of the Middle East. He underlined Turkey 
had to think ‘great’ and see all the dimensions of this situation. With a 
departure from this point, he draws attention to the fact that Turkey was face 
to face with a basic preference: 
“Turkey will either cooperate with the USA in accordance with its 
own interests and not participate in unproductive bargains and thus 
will have a voice in the new order; or will be stuck within in-party 
conflicts, unproductive reactions of Arabic countries and ideological 
incentives. There is not a middle way for this. Policies to please all 
haven’t been discovered, yet. If it is desired to put restrictions and 
coquetry into practice that will make Washington feel sorry, if there 
is that much courage, if a suicide is desired for both the party and 
the country, then we shall at least take side with Saddam and the 
Arabs… Foreign policy won’t work with half-expectancy.” 
 
In the expression of topos of new order, Birand imagined Turkey as a pivotal 
country in its neighbourhood and defined taking sides with the Arabs as 
suicide for the AKP and Turkey.  Apparently, it was not an identity-based 
approach to foreign policy. He stressed on that Turkey should chose its side. 
Contrary to this Westernist perspective, the Islamist writers disagreed with 
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Birand by defining that the red line of Turkey was fighting against the 
Muslims and Arabs. As my study defines the historical process of emergence 
of the New Turkey and reveals that it has been emerging through the power 
struggle of contested perspectives on Turkish nation-state identity, these 
examples effectively demonstrate different perceptions on Turkey, Turkey's 
place in the world and its relationship with the neighbours and other 
international actors. 
Ali Bulac (Zaman, 08.11.2010 p.6) constructed a collective ‘we’ discourse 
for Muslims in noting Turkey could take decisions against the Islamic and 
Arab world or participate in such opposing alliances, but could never be a 
fighter against the Muslims. He addressed to the common past for 
justification of his argumentation: “Mustafa Kemal, who knew what Yavuz 
meant to do, was aware that Turkey had to avoid fighting against the 
Muslims and Arabs despite the fact that the New Turkish Republic put its 
Islamic history aside and put great distances between itself and the Arab 
world.” This statement reinforced the Islamic character of the Turkish nation 
and its continuity from Ottoman times to the present day. This was because 
Muslimhood of Turkey was not negligible, even secularist Republican 
policies ignored the importance of the Muslim world. On these opinions, he 
concluded that the same ‘reflex’, religious sentiments caused the rejection of 
the Permit of 1 March 2003 in the Turkish Grand National Assembly. 
It is important to note that this culturalist discourse and blaming Kemalists, 
positions Turkey far from the Islamic world and reconstructed the AKP’s 
foreign policy, particularly after 2007. This world view of Islamists was 
similarly used for redefinition of Turkey's role in the region and world. In 
Zaman it was argued (26.05.2007 p.7) that the USA, or another power, 
cannot shape Iraq and the region. Certainly Turkey can; but Turkey can 
manage this by trying other methods and ways. It can be said that this 
argument represents Davutoglu (2006) influence on Turkish foreign policy, 
particularly his principle of 'zero problems with neighbours', improving 
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economical, cultural and historical relations. The importance of soft power 
and diplomacy in new Turkish foreign policy is indicated with a stress on 
developing other methods and instruments in relation to Iraq. More 
noteworthy, 'Turkey can do what other powers cannot do' argumentation 
signals how Islamists map Turkey as a regional pivotal power that is capable 
of reshaping Iraq and the region. In this context, it can be argued that a 'new 
geographic imagination' under the AKP government is based on the concepts 
of civilisational geopolitics. In this new geographic imagination Turkey is 
located outside Western civilisation and it is imagined as the leader of its 
own civilisation, which changes the definitions of 'us' and 'others' (Bilgin and 
Bilgic 2011 p.173). 
Beyond all these interest-identity accounts on the war against Iraq, the 
ethical and legal dimensions of the war were taken into account by Radikal 
newspaper authors. Fuat Keyman (Radikal 23.02.2003 p.5) assumed that 
Turkey might not choose the way of supporting American policies in Iraq. 
Keyman criticised America’s foreign policy’s discourse on the global fight 
against terrorism which was just security and military based, while the USA 
was disregarding the serious global problems for economic, cultural and 
humanitarian reasons. He rationalised his ethical argument based on a 
consideration of international law and norms. According to him, the USA 
divided the world into two polar as ‘we/friends’ and ‘others/enemies’ in order 
to empower its hegemony and unilateral world vision. After 9/11, American 
foreign policy makers in the Bush period imposed a mentality of ‘I am 
powerful, I am right’ on international organisations and actors such as the 
United Nations and the NATO.  What was more outstanding in his remarks 
was the point that addressed the lack of legitimacy in the USA’s intervention 
in Iraq. Based on this, he argued the matter was not just peculiar to the case 
of Iraq, but also this illegitimate war constituted a problem for existence and 
the role of international organisations and law in the new world order and 
new power relations. This can be summarised as Talat Seringul (Zaman 
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09.12.2001, p.10) noted what was remarkably lost in New York was not the 
Twin Towers; it was seeking for peace lost in political blindness. 
All in all, the data analysis demonstrated that the USA image as a foreign 
‘other’ can unite different discourses of Turkish nationalism. Apart from the 
fact that they had different motivations for opposition to the USA hegemony 
in the Middle East, dominant discourse was also an anti-war discourse. Thus, 
the interest-based approach of realists and pragmatists could not work to 
integrate Turkey into the war, at least on 1 March 2003. 
 
5.4. Iraq War in Turkish Media 
The USA Senate issued a report on Iraq in July 2004 and stated that all 
information the intelligence services, such as the CIA, revealed as an excuse 
for the invasion were false. Neither weapons of mass destruction nor any 
bond between Saddam and El-Qaeda were detected. The New York Times and 
Washington Post newspapers somehow confessed that they had become an 
instrument in an unfair invasion and manipulated the society (Zaman 
20.11.2004, p.7). As noted before, while these newspapers published the 
news coming from the White House on their front pages, they didn’t give 
much attention to counter information or opinions, thus they played an 
important role in the invasion by influencing and manipulating public 
opinion for supporting the war in Iraq. Considering these facts and news 
from Iraq, Turkish newspapers kept anti-American discourse during the Iraq 
War. Different than others, the leftist Radikal (Alkan 03.09.2004, p.4) 
newspaper held a different stand with a 'we are in the same boat' 
argumentation in its understanding of the responsibility against the tragedies 
experienced in the world: 
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“We must show reaction against the tragedies experienced in the 
USA, Iraq and Russia. It is  not enough just to criticise the war and 
the pains the USA keeps going in Iraq. We must be able to criticise 
the children taken hostage in Ossetia, in the same manner. If we 
keep praising Hitler and Osama bin Laden when it serves our 
benefits, we’ll witness the slaughter of more children and the murder 
of workers from Nepal, just because of the fact that they are 
Buddhists, destruction of the twin towers, Madımak Hotel and the 
expansion of the belief that Islamism is a religion that hugs 
terrorism. And we’ll be responsible for all these to some extent.” 
 
As was indicated in the last section, Hurriyet columnists seemed to support 
allying with the USA in shaping newly emerging Iraq and Middle East. 
However, the news reports in dealing with Iraq turned out to be critical of the 
situation. It was highlighted that the bond between El-Qaeda-Saddam, which 
the USA showed as an excuse for its invasion of Iraq, was never revealed. 
The number of soldiers the USA army have lost in Iraq had extended beyond 
the number of the people killed in terror attacks organised in the USA on 11 
September 2001 (Hurriyet, 27.12.2006, p.7). It was questioned how the USA 
had turned the world upside down for eight years after the attacks of 
September 11
th, and that the world still had doubts about this ‘greatest 
destruction’. USA’s President Bush invaded this country claiming that it 
brought 'freedom and democracy to Iraq'. But the situation was that more 
than one million people lost their lives in Iraq in five years, more than four 
thousand American soldiers had been killed and more than thirty thousand 
were injured (Hurriyet, 11.09.2008, p.6). 
 
Ergun Yildizoglu’s (Cumhuriyet 11.09.2007, p.4) approach to the USA’s 
‘invade’ in Iraq constructed a specific Western image of Kemalist Turkish 
nationalism. He used the metaphor of  the ‘white men’ with a ‘noble duty’ to 
describe the USA's role in Iraq.  According to his perspective, due to its 
inability to invade and become imperial in this century, the USA both had to 
harmonise the economic systems of underdeveloped countries with its own 
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economic system and form a political system that would enable leaders to 
allow this ‘project of being civilised’ to come into power, by the way it 
created cultural conditions that reproduce imperialism. It can be said that this 
coverage of the Iraq War from the Cumhuriyet newspaper demonstrates 
controversy faced of Kemalist Turkish nationalist imagination, which is 
having a love-hate relationship with the West. Adoring the West, arguing 
about being Western and in the West, but permanently and inevitably 
sceptical to it. 
Similarly, Emre Kongar (Cumhuriyet 11.09.2006, p.3) argued that Americans 
were trying to understand how the largest public opinion against the USA 
was formed in Turkey. He explained this phenomenon was in fact, the result 
of the USA’s faults. The first wrong step they took was in Turkey in 
empowering Islamists and bringing them to power. The coalition government 
under the presidency of Ecevit, forced this government into an election, 
when in fact it was planning to remain in force for two more years, and 
brought the AKP to power. Thus, the secular and democratic governmental 
structure in Turkey was sacrificed to the ‘Moderate Islamic State model’ for 
short-term interests. Islamists already had anti-American political and 
ideological feelings. In the meantime, they faced the opposition of modernist 
groups in favour of a secular and democratic governmental structure as they 
supported the Moderate Islamic State model. As a result no one was left to 
look at the USA through objective eyes. This image of the USA refers to a 
direct connection with the domestic power struggle in Turkey while 
portraying the AKP as a part of the USA’s strategic project in the Middle East. 
Therefore, anti-imperialist Kemalist nationalists tend to be anti-American 
with a belief of the Islamist government is backed by the USA. 
On the Islamist side, the Iraq War was covered by Zaman from an anti-
American Islamist perspective, but with different political motivations and 
justifications from the pro-secularist newspapers. Ali Bulac noted that the 
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situation was sufficient to meet the legal definition of genocide in Iraq 
(20.11.2004, p.7): 
“The cruelty a Muslim society is exposed to, has now reached 
horrible levels. Occupation forces are slaughtering kids, women, 
elderly and civil people regardless of any religious day. They invade 
the mosques, destroy Allah’s homes and cruelly kill the ones 
crawling on the ground in pain. While leaving Vietnam, American 
soldiers had raped hundreds of thousands of women. Now they are 
raping tens of thousands of Muslim women in Iraq.” 
 
In Bulac’s analysis, negative predication of Americans as the out-group is a 
dominant strategy that is othering the USA, even demonizing it. 
Intertexuality is incurred with a reference to the philosopher John Naisbitt’s 
opinions about Bush's fundamentalist Christian identity. It was argued when 
Bush mentioned the word ‘crusade’ twice, that he didn’t use this word 
coincidentally or for any other reason apart from its literal meaning. Bulac 
supported Naisbitt’s arguments by giving figures from Iraq such as American 
soldiers put crosses on their tanks, insulted the Q’uran or swept over the 
sacred feelings of Muslims disrespectfully and with hatred.  According to 
him, the battle between civilisations was realised on Muslim lands, on the 
basis of this ‘sick culture’ which was polluting their sacred beliefs. Bulac 
concluded in noting that these were all Muslims’ problems: 'We are all 
interested.' In these linguistic expressions, the Islamist ‘we’ identification 
was for Muslims as opposed to the ‘they’ identification as that of Christians. 
In representation of the Iraq War, referring to the Q’uran, Allah, mosque and 
Muslim women reminds the people that they are a Muslim nation and 
discursively strengthens this feeling. He defined what was sacred for 
Muslims and made a hasty generalisation about Americans and their culture 
(sick) prompted by his perception of what was happening in Iraq. 
Consequently, this Islamist discourse reproduced anti-Americanist discourse 
in Turkey through the Iraq War. 
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In order to have a deeper understanding of ‘We are all interested’ discourse 
and Islamist definition of ‘we’, the following text presents a justification of 
the argument in noting “we feel responsible for other Muslims in Turkey’s 
socio-cultural geography” (Zaman 27.01.2007, p.5). In the text, the borders 
of Turkey’s socio-cultural geography is mapped in the Balkans, Caucasians, 
Middle Asia, whole of the Middle East and the middle of Africa. This 
definition of geography is based on the Islamic historical past of the nation in 
the Ottoman Empire lands of Anatolia, Middle East, North Africa, Balkans 
and the Caucasians. Otherwise, this map would include Malaysia or 
Indonesia which have Muslim populations too. But, Turkey’s interest in the 
defined land seems the idea of Muslim brotherhood in given examples such 
as the people of Bosnia, Chechnya, Palestine, Lebanon and Iraq. The USA, 
as a non-Muslim power, is called an ‘other’, a foreign power in Turkey’s 
historical geography: 
“Political geography of Turkey is as defined in the National Pact; 
socio-cultural geography extends to Balkans, Caucasians, Middle 
Asia, whole of the Middle East and the middle of Africa. All 
pleasant and unpleasant events on this geography have an influence 
on our people. We feel sorry for a Caucasian tribe, to the people of 
Palestine and Iraq just as we feel sorry for Bosnia. We feel 
responsible for all this geography. The region is under the invasions 
and pressures of foreign powers today; this increases anger in 
Turkey. What does feeling sorry for the people of Bosnia, Chechnya, 
Palestine, Lebanon and Iraq have to do with ‘ethnic nationalism’ or 
‘racist chauvinism’. 
 
This text discursively constructs Islamist understanding of ‘our people’ based 
on the aforementioned Turkey’s socio-cultural geography. This imagination 
of Turkey relocates it in its neighbourhood and inspires new Turkish Foreign 
Policy in redefinition of who are the foreigners of the nation. As noted in 
previous sections, Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu’s culturalist 
Strategic Depth perspective on Turkish Foreign Policy has brought 
redefinitions in Turkey’s international identity and its relationship with other 
nations. Davutoglu argues that Turkey should not insist on being Western 
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(Fisher-Onar 2013, p.64). It embraces Turkey’s position at the crossroads of 
civilisations and targets to embrace Turkey’s political, economic and cultural 
reach within multilateral foreign policy and rhythmic diplomacy. This vision 
entails rehabilitation of the Ottoman era in a way predicated on two pillars of 
historical depth and geographical depth. For an observation on how these 
redefinitions are negotiated in public discourse, the next section observes 
how the Turkish media represented the new discourse of Turkish Foreign 
Policy. 
 
5.5. Reimagination of Turkey: the Debate of the Axis Shift in Western 
Orientation of Turkish Foreign Policy in Turkish Media 
By highlighting linkages between domestic and foreign policy making, this 
section aims to demonstrate domestic debate on Turkey’s international 
identity and whether there is a shift in the orientation of the country, namely 
from Westernisation to neo-Ottomanism or Islamisation.  On the axis shift 
debate Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan answered the comments (Taraf 
11.06.2010, p9) : “We not only share the same geography with the Arabs, 
breath the same air or live the same seasons, we share the same history, we 
have the feeling of a common culture, common civilisation.” He further 
stated (Taraf 13.06.2010, p.8): “Foreign newspapers claiming this serve for 
Israel. Who are you serving for then?” Apparently, the definition of ‘we’ in 
Turkey’s official discourse has been changed by discursively addressing 
common political past, present and culture with the Arabs. The Prime 
Minister went to Kuwait and Qatar and also addressed to the common future 
with the Muslim countries (Hurriyet 16.01.2011, p.7): “We are together, 
that’s enough for us!” and added: “If obstacles are removed, fifty-seven 
Islamic countries will become self-sufficient with its production, technology 
and brain power.” The Prime Minister both caressed the soul of the hosts 
with these words and blinks at the conservative votes inside. Nevertheless, it 
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has been argued that Turkey has settled the Middle East as the place emptied 
by the EU in its foreign policy since Turkey’s European Union process has 
suspended in 2006. The Middle East politics has occupied a privileged place 
in Turkish foreign policy as the times of the Ottoman Empire (Walker 2013, 
p.156). On the issue, the President of the Turkish Republic, Abdullah Gul 
(Taraf 15.06.2010) stated that it is either ‘lack of knowledge or a bad will’ if 
one commented on Turkey’s relationship with Muslim countries as a 
deviation of axis. Turkey participated in 98 per cent of the decisions given by 
the EU in foreign policy. According to him, nothing was more nonsense than 
discussing Turkey’s axis by looking at its relationship with its neighbour or 
any other country in its region. 
Among the newspapers that are analysed in this research, the Kemalist 
Cumhuriyet claimed that there has been an axis shift in Turkish Foreign 
Policy’s Western Orientation. Cumhuriyet empowered this opposing stand by 
referring to oppositional political actors as Onur Oymen from Kemalist CHP 
declared Turkey was playing a leading role in radical Islamic countries 
(Cumhuriyet 12.06.2010 p.8). Deniz Bolukbasi from the MHP said that 
under AKP’s power, Turkey was experiencing a backbone deviation not an 
axis deviation. Ahmedinejad, Hizbullah’s leader Nasrallah and Hamas’s 
leader Haniye were in Erdogan’s photo frame. In related to the resistance to 
change in Turkey’s identity, it was not surprising that Cumhuriyet 
occasionally cited from the members of ethno-nationalist MHP, who had the 
same strong concerns in preserving Turkish national identity as the Kemalists. 
It was reported that the leader of MHP, Devlet Bahceli stated the centre had 
gone away from Ankara many years ago and that it had already become 
affiliated with the axis of Erivan, Erbil, Brussels and Washington. 
Whilst the official state discourse is changing and redefining the relationship 
with other nations, it is important to observe what alternative perspectives 
think about it in order to see the big picture of Turkey from a wider political 
discourse. Therefore, this section is devoted to doing a media analysis in an 
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effort to shed light on the power struggle on redefining Turkey’s identity in 
international relations. 
While opposition parties express their unrest against AKP’s relationship with 
the Islam world, some other political actors in Turkey’s big picture such as 
big business patrons, liberals, leftists and even most of the Kurdish people, 
were seen supporting government policies and positioning themselves in 
changing power relations up until 2011. For instance, it was reported (Taraf 
17.06.2010 p.10) that businessmen in the East Mediterranean thought that it 
was wrong to evaluate Turkey’s recent intense cooperation with the Arab 
world as an ‘axis deviation’. It was presented as Turkey's target was extended. 
Kazim Celiker (Taraf 15.06.2010 p.9) justified Turkey’s relations with these 
countries in the AKP period by noting the axis inevitably deviated towards 
the trade as the consequence of the global crisis. The developments in global 
economy played a great role in Turkey’s turning towards the Middle East and 
Far East (Taraf 20.06.2010 p.11).  It was reported that the Vice Minister of 
Foreign Affairs of the USA, Gordon said (Taraf 13.06.2010, p.12): “Turkey’s 
role in the Middle East is not a preference against the West; it is a part of its 
foreign policy.”  Liberal press supported AKP government's policies, in 
particular Turkish foreign policy activism, with such as the news entitled 
(Taraf 15.06.2010 p.11): ‘The EU approval to Turkey’s axis’, reporting 
Stefan Fule put an end to the comments on Turkey’s axis has deviated, it has 
moved away from the West’ with these words: 'I don’t think Turkey’s steps 
are in conflict with the EU membership process.'  In the liberal discourse, we 
see the strategy of justification and perpetuation for ongoing transformation 
in Turkey and Turkey's relationships with other countries. That means, the 
liberal press contributed to reconstruction of Turkey's post-Kemalist nation-
state identity. 
Concerning this new political atmosphere in Turkey, the following section 
analyses Kemalist arguments in the axis shift debate as the opposition 
discourse, then the paper turns to analyse other discourses advocating official 
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discourse and concludes with remarks relating to the new emerging 
challenges of TFP. 
 
5.5.1. Kemalist Discourse on the New Turkish Foreign Policy: 
Islamisation of Turkey 
In this context of Turkey’s partnership with other countries, Oztin Akguc 
(Cumhuriyet 25.07.2010 p.12) suggested Turkey should remain neither in the 
axis of the West nor Arab-Islam. Turkey shall be in its own axis and shall 
move in the direction of its own axis: “It cannot be successful in that if it 
follows the EU, obeys the USA or walks through the Arab-Islam states... 
Main theme of our National Anthem is in the line ‘I have lived freely for all 
eternity’. To live freely can be managed by forming its own axis, not by 
deviating towards the axis of the East.”  Lexical choices in the text underline 
the national sovereignty and the will of independence. This argumentation is 
justified with the lyrics of the Turkish National Anthem. The selected 
sentence of “I have lived freely for all eternity” discursively reproduces the 
image of the Turkish nation that has never lived under any other state’s 
political authority in its history. This also reconstructs the main motto of the 
Kemalist nation state: “Turks have no friends, but Turks.”  This discourse 
simultaneously serves to give us a deeper understanding why some argue 
there has been a paradigm shift in Turkey’s relations with others in terms of 
the new Turkish foreign policy’s principles of ‘zero problem with 
neighbours’. This point requires more analysis, thus, first the discursive 
construction of resistance to this paradigm shift will be revealed, and then the 
discourses with the strategy of transformation will be analysed to complete a 
bigger picture of the power struggle in maintaining and changing Turkish 
identity. 
Huner Tuncer (Cumhuriyet 31.01.2011 p.15) interpreted the so-called change 
in Turkish Foreign Policy as leaving Ataturk’s honourable foreign policy. He 
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asserted that ‘Ataturk’s Turkey’, which only trusted in its own power and 
stood on its own two feet in an international community, has been changed 
and taken its power from dependency on foreign countries. All Kemalist 
values are consciously neglected, internal and external policies are attempted 
to give a new shape in the direction of AKP’s Islamic values and beliefs. He 
confirmed this argumentation with the example of ignoring Ataturk’s ‘peace 
at home, peace in the world’ principle while being so close to the Arabic 
countries in the Middle East. 
On extending relations with Turkey’s neighbours, Cuneyt Arcayurek 
(Cumhuriyet 17.04.2010 p.10) reminded what Davutoglu said in a meeting 
with the Arabs: “Jerusalem will become a capital city in the near future. 
We’ll go there altogether and perform prayers in Al-Masjid Al-Aqsa.” 
However, he held a critical stand on where the new path in foreign policy 
might take Turkey: 
“There is no doubt the river is flowing again, but its bed has been 
changed. Now it is flowing towards the East not the West. Certainly 
the Arabs will say that ‘water’ (RTE) has found its way! Angrily he 
is asking: ‘What’s this hatred against the Arabs?’ Then he is trying 
to justify the Arabs. According to him, the historical fact that the 
Arabs cooperated with the British in the First World War and 
stabbed Turkey in the back is just a ‘local event’ in that period. Let’s 
think where the new way will lead us.” 
 
In this passage, the river metaphor is used to refer to Turkish Foreign Policy. 
The shift in the river’s bed and where the water goes are descriptive of the 
East regarding Turkey’s current relationship with the Arabs. More 
significantly, the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan is using the 
reference to water as those responsible for the change, reiterating this by 
using his initials, ‘RTE’ rather than his full name. ‘Water has found its way’ 
means Erdogan moves naturally towards the Muslim countries. Arcayurek 
opposes his discursive reconstruction of historical narrative on the Turk-
Arabian relations in repeating the Kemalist national history discourse that 
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argues the Arabs betrayed Turks in the First World War. Based on this 
treacherous image of the Arabs in the common political past, he raises a 
sceptical question on what these events may mean in the common political 
future. 
Similarly, Guray Oz (Cumhuriyet 30.01.2010 p.6) criticises the reinvention 
of the past, in particular, the relations between Turkish and Arab people. Oz 
identifies pro-Islamist reconstruction of common political past and present 
with the Arabs as an outcome of ‘consciousness deviation’, which is the main 
method of axis shift that has been realised step by step and sometimes 
silently since 2002. What is worth noting is that he makes a distinction 
between different dimensions of so-called ‘axis shift’ in Turkish politics. For 
him, it is not about improving trade relationship with Arab countries or the 
USA, Russia, and China. But, when the values, human rights, democratic 
rights are in question, it matters where Turkey heads. The situation of the 
journalists, intellectuals and the system of the law show that it heads to 
dictatorship governance in the Middle East: 
“If the journalists and numerous intellectuals accused of terrorism 
cannot be released and the judge of the court is not listened to, if 
more and more suits are brought against the journalists among 
whom is the author of what you are reading now, this means the 
human rights part of the axis deviation has greatly improved and 
has come a long way towards a quite acceptable dictatorship 
governance in the Middle East.” 
 
To justify his argument of ‘consciousness deviation’, he reminds how 
Erdogan has employed this in the case of Iraq. According to him, the people 
forget about AKP's submission of the Permit of March the 1st to the 
Assembly and now they support the shift in Erdogan's USA discourse. 
Erdogan brings to account and blames the USA: 'We haven’t forgotten the 
widows in Iraq, what you have done there?' This means Erdogan controls and 
manipulates what people know and believe about Turkey's relations with the 
other nations. It challenges with AKP’s new Turkey rhetoric.  
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Like Guray Oz, Emre Kongar (Cumhuriyet 12.06.2010 p.3) argued that 
Turkey’s axis has already deviated from a modern and democratic Western 
country to a ‘Middle Eastern authoritative-totalitarian country’ both 
internally and externally. He claimed that internal structural changes and the 
political facts experienced during the eight years of AKP government have 
driven Turkey to this shift. Concepts like Ataturk, Kemalist, Kemalism, 
laicism, struggle against reaction have started to be used in the same meaning 
with pro-coup mind-set and defenders of these concepts coming to be treated 
as criminals. ‘Conservative’ policies have clearly been put into practice from 
the dressing style of society to the food-beverage culture through central 
government, the state and municipalities; for example, drinking and buying 
alcoholic drinks have become a problem especially in small cities.  
Mechanisms have been established to track, listen to and record everybody 
anywhere and anytime. These tracking and listening records which are signs 
of an ‘authoritative-totalitarian’ regime alone have been leaked to the media 
sometimes in the form of a legal disguise and sometimes through completely 
illegal ways; nothing is left as the private life of an individual. These alone 
are enough to see that Turkey has deviated to an authoritative-totalitarian 
regime from a democratic one, but there are more other indicators. The 
media has been directed by economic and financial measures, a fully 
supportive media group has been created and a few independent media have 
been threatened with large tax penalties. Media members, intellectuals, 
university lecturers, rectors, educators, politicians and even jurisdiction 
members have been imprisoned and their period of detention has actually 
been transformed into a prison sentence despite the protests of all bars. 
Jurisdiction has become open to the pressures of the political power and 
media and suggestions that will put the superior organs of jurisdiction totally 
under the auspices of politics have been submitted for referendum. 
Emre Kongar’s points give comprehensive clues as to why the Kemalists 
want to maintain Turkey’s Western identity and resist ‘Islamisation’ of the 
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country by the AKP. This demonstrates how a discourse on foreign policy 
may work in preserving a national identity or provide a justification for a 
change. It is because a decision on the EU or cooperation with the Muslim 
countries is directly related to 'Which Turkey do people want to live in, a 
democratic or an authoritarian one?' or 'How do they want to live?' and 'With 
whom?' 
In this context, the next text illustrates the everyday production of 
nationhood through the debate of ‘axis shift’ in Turkish foreign policy. Deniz 
Kavukcuoglu (Cumhuriyet 27.04.2011 p.15) stated that the face of the AKP 
government has long been turned towards the Middle East instead of the 
West. He claimed this changed the image of national lands and cities. 'The 
pitch-black clouds the AKP government brought over Istanbul are 
overwhelming. Sheiks, emirs, sultans, kings allure them so much; and 
certainly those ugly skyscrapers in Istanbul, those seven star hotels of 
unmannerliness, too… Day by day, beautiful Istanbul is attempted to be 
transformed into Arabia under the hegemony of political Islamism.'  In his 
language use, ‘Arabisation’ of Istanbul is negatively portrayed with the 
concepts of ugliness and unmannerliness, which can be seen as a humiliation 
of Arab culture. Here, the image of Arab and Middle East are represented as 
the ‘others’ of Turkey through the stereotypical construction of political 
Islam with an allegory of black clouds. Contrary to that, ‘enlightenment’ 
emphasis discursively constructs Turkey’s distinctive situation and national 
difference from the Arab countries. He expressed his unrest from Arabic and 
Islamic influence on Turkey, in particular on Istanbul. He noted how this 
changed his feeling of belonging: 
“Until recently, when they asked me, ‘Where are you from?’ I said, 
‘I’m from Istanbul’. It was true, indeed. I was born and grew up in 
Istanbul. But now I answer this as, ‘I’m from Izmir’. This city where 
I go to at least once a year, where my parents and grandparents 
were born and grew up is still warmer, closer to me. Above all, it is 
more enlightened.” 
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This quotation contains highly personalised phrases (me, I said, I answer) 
and it conveys a rigid conception of Turkey through the expression of Izmir’s 
uniqueness in enlightenment. He distinguished Izmir from Istanbul and other 
parts of the country.  Here, the symbolic meaning of city and city life is 
remarkable in order to understand the reproduction of power relationship in 
everyday life. Izmir, one of the Western cities of Turkey, is known as castle 
of Kemalism or ‘non-Muslim Izmir’ in Islamist discourses. Therefore, the 
shift in his feeling of belonging to a city from Istanbul to Izmir seems a 
personal sentiment, this nevertheless rhetorically symbolises secularist 
nationalist resistance to Islamisation. Based on this observation on the 
changing city life and his feeling of belonging, Kavukcuoglu ends his 
passage with a call to regain consciousness right away, feed and foster hope, 
transfer and extend it to cities, protest again reaction, get out of the darkness 
and arrive at light. Then remain there forever, just like Izmir. 
 
5.5.1. Advocate Media:  Expanded Axis in Turkish Foreign Policy 
An overview on the developments in Turkish Foreign Policy in the last 
decade demonstrates that neo-Islamist elites have been successful in the 
integration of Turkey to neo-liberal politics and globalisation. Therefore, it 
can be said that pragmatism has dominated Turkey’s relationship with the 
others and the media discourse. 
The Muslim conservative newspaper Zaman (01.01.2010, p.8) reported that 
Turkish people believed there was no shift in Turkish foreign policy. 
According to USAK’s survey, eighty per cent of people supported progress in 
relationship with neighbouring countries. Moreover, in order to support 
government policies, the opinions from economic and business sectors that 
were parallel to the official state discourse on foreign policy have been 
covered. In contrast to the Kemalist perspective, Ihsan Dagi wrote (Zaman 
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15.06.2010, p.12) about why the axis shift debate was on the political agenda. 
He argued that the AKP transformed the Kemalist-militarist regime by the 
help of the West. Those who blamed the Islamist AKP turned its face to the 
East aimed to fear the West and position themselves on the side of the 
Kemalist-militarist again. Dagi (Zaman 20.02.2009, p. 12) called ‘silent 
revolution’ for what the AKP brought to the Turkey’s external relations. He 
defined it as a liberal transformation that was based on cooperation, 
negotiation and multilateralism. Essentially, he claimed if one looked at 
Turkey through Kemalist eyes, its language use and practise, the liberal 
transformation could be understood. In this Kemalist traditional narrative, 
Turkey was surrounded by its enemies. This security discourse was 
instrumentalised for establishing, legitimatising, reproducing and 
maintaining a militarist social and political order. For the sake of keeping 
security against invented internal enemies, the regime victimised democracy, 
law and pluralism which were seen as luxurious and risky demands. Dagi 
indicated that the authority of militarist political culture fell by a new 
perspective on other states and people. The perspective changed from 
‘everybody is a potential enemy’ discourse to ‘everybody is a potential 
partner for cooperation’ discourse. According to his analysis, this was 
liberalisation of Turkish foreign policy by redefinition of its privileged 
principles as democracy, economic development. Therefore, it was argued 
that it was not the axis deviation. 
On these emerging developments, Mehmet Ali Birand wrote the previous 
world order is no longer present (Hurriyet 20.10.2010, p.6). For him, the 
times when the USA and Europe looked down on Turkey and managed the 
world are all in the past. A new world order is being established and Turkey 
is trying to find its own place in this new order. With a departure from this 
belief, he found the axis shift debate exaggerated (Hurriyet 16.06.2010, p.6): 
'Erdogan took two steps, we all protested... Some of us are frightened.' He 
noted what was behind the worries, the deviation which began with foreign 
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policy might continue internally with the deviation in the secular system. He 
advised: 'We shall not frighten ourselves in vain.' He believed, anyone, even 
those among the most radical Islamists, would not like to see an 
economically downfallen Turkey dealing with the war between the Turks-
Kurds. Turkey cannot go anywhere by promoting anti-Westernism. 
In Radikal, Eyup Can (12.06.2010, p.11) asked whether Turkey was falling 
out with the USA and caring for the Middle East Union more than the 
European Union as the ‘re-awakening of New Ottomanism’. In his opinion, 
Foreign Minister Davutoglu is neither a typical Islamist nor a romantic 
Ottomanist. He supported the objective of Turkey’s new target, which the 
Middle East Union intends to turn this generation into a generation of 
complete security and economic integration. Here, Can reproduce the official 
discourse emphatically in the same way as the discourse of government 
representatives. When the AKP came to power, they consciously distanced 
themselves from the traditions of Turkey’s mainstream Islamist movement, 
National Outlook, rather they reformed a conservative discourse, 
encapsulating centre right parties’ sentiments. Despite the fact that neo-
Ottomanism does not appear in Davutoglu’s ‘Strategic Depth’ approach, the 
historical depth means that the Ottoman Empire and its cultural focus is 
highly on Muslim solidarity, particularly Sunni Islam (Oktem 2013, p.78). 
 
On the debate of neo-Ottomanism in Turkish Foreign Policy, Cengiz Candar 
(Radikal 30.06.2010 p.8) supported Turkey’s newly emerging identity in 
international relations. He reminded us firstly of Stephen Kinzer’ words on 
the re-rise of Turkey in the new century particularly on the old Ottoman 
geography: 'In the new world map, Turkey isn’t located at the side of 
anything. Rather, as it has always been on this geography, it is just at the 
centre of the great Eurasia land. Turkey’s location and its ability to integrate 
into the Ottoman heritage, Islamism and democracy successfully provide the 
perfect strategic potential not only for itself but also for the USA and the 
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West.'  He further quoted from Obama’s speech in the Turkish Grand 
National Assembly: 'The ones discussing about the future of Turkey are 
wondering whether you will be pulled towards one way or the other. I guess 
they don’t seize understanding of one thing: Turkey’s greatness comes from 
its ability to stay at the centre of everything. Here (in Turkey), the West and 
the East are not separating from each other. Just the opposite, they are 
coming together.' 
 
Using these argumentations, it was claimed that the world needs Turkey as a 
country to undertake the role of a mediator, peacemaker and arbitrator. 
Candar proved these roles of Turkey in noting Turkey was trying to relieve 
the tensions between Iran and the USA, Syria and Iraq, Armenia and 
Azerbaijan. No diplomats other than Turks were accepted in Tehran, 
Washington, Moscow, Tiflis, Damascus and Cairo. No other country was 
respected by Hamas, Hezbollah and Taliban while maintaining good 
relationships with Israel, Lebanon and Afghanistan governments. The 
obstacle before Turkey can take its ‘global role’ is defined as ‘interior’ by 
Candar with a reference to Stephen Kinzer. A country that cannot solve its 
Kurdish problem cannot ensure ‘civil peace’ and will not be able to reach any 
‘strategic skyline’. Turkish law still restricts freedom of expression and the 
minorities are not protected completely, either.  While Turkey is on its way to 
become one of the indispensable forces in the world, there is one important 
obstacle it has to pass – it’s time to organise its own country. Undoubtedly, 
this perspective on ‘peace’ confirms the main assumption of this research in 
validating the link between Turkey’s identity constructions in relation to 
insider and outsider others of the nation-state. 
Davutoglu’s ‘zero problems with neighbours’ formula in the language of 
diplomacy and democratisation built an inclusive platform for both Turkey's 
neighbours abroad and at home (Fisher-Onar 2013, p.72). Soft power of 
Turkey in foreign policy in embracing economic liberalism empowered the 
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AKP’s legitimacy in pursuit of democratic initiatives for traditional domestic 
others of Turkish nation-state, non-Muslims, Kurds and Alevis. This is why it 
has given 56 per cent support in its nation-wide referendum for constitutional 
reform in September 2010. The rhetorical shifts of government from 
democracy discourse to security discourse came out, the limits of Sunni-
Islamic conservative change (Kadioglu 2013, p. 54), consolidating parties 
power, conservative values and interests in politics rather than aiming 
democracy for whole people. Therefore, the main challenges facing Turkey 
nowadays is the tendency of a conservative majoritarian populism, which 
causes a strong anxiety in the secularist and liberal people of the country as 
is shown in the previous section by Kemalist discourse. The democratic 
depth appears to lack the ingredient for ensuring different lifestyles and 
rights of the others that constitute half of the population. 
Beyond the domestic challenges, political movements and transitions in the 
Arab world continue to put Turkish foreign policy to a serious test in terms 
of balancing its regional and global policies. The main challenge of Turkey’s 
foreign policy in the Middle East is facing its relations with USA, Israel, Iran 
and Syria. For instance, on the one hand Turkey improved its relations with 
Iran due to its energy and security interests; on the other hand, Turkey found 
itself in the opposition camp to Iran with regards to their approach to the 
Syrian uprising. The Syrian regime’s brutal reaction to the demonstrators has 
damaged the AKP government’s ties with President Bashar al-Assad and its 
economic and cultural engagement with Syria. Turkey’s democracy discourse 
and soft power policy failed in the Syria test.  Since 2011, the AKP 
government has shifted to a security discourse towards the emerging 
challenges in domestic and external affairs. 
 
Findings and Conclusion 
Differences in the conceptualisation of Turkish inter-national identity employ 
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different inclusion and exclusion categories, which involve different actors in 
the 'we' group and 'they' group. On this assumption, the first case study 
showed that religion and different interpretations of it shift discursive 
construction of Turkish identity and antagonisms. The second case study 
revealed how these antagonisms project different foreign policies; therefore it 
moved the issue of Turkey's post-Kemalist identity formation into Turkey's 
European integration debate and redefinition of Turkey's external relations. 
Lastly, this case study demonstrated that the concepts of foreign policy, 
which is embedded in the news discourse, construct and shift new Turkey's 
identity depending on the domestic power struggle. It analysed how foreign 
policy discourse in the Turkish media constructs and challenges emerging 
post-Kemalist Turkish nation-state identity and the power struggle on 
definition of this identification. It focused on the representations of 9/11 and 
Iraq War in order to trace conceptualisations of Turkey's inter-national 
identity, in particular its Western, Middle Eastern, Muslim and secular 
identities. In this way, it argued that there are competing Turkish national 
identity discourses, which map Turkey and its relations with other nations in 
various ways.    
 
According to the ATAUM’s academic survey (2010) on Turkish public 
perceptions on Turkish foreign policy, 37.5 per cent of the participants 
identified the USA as Turkey’s enemy, 10.9 per cent Armenia and 10.6 per 
cent Israel. The country most likely to befriend Turkey is Azerbaijan with 
29.9 per cent, None with 16.7 per cent and KKTC (Northern Cyprus Turkish 
Republic) with 15.6 per cent.  Here, it is clear that Turks abroad are defined 
as friends of Turkey. When it comes to the identity of Turkey, diversity 
appears in the answers. 28.9 per cent of the survey participants defined 
Turkey as a European country, 22.6 per cent say Turkey is a Turkic country, 
15.5 per cent view it an Islam country, 11.4 per cent say Middle Eastern, 8.7 
per cent note Mediterranean and 8.6 per cent define it as an Asian country. 
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This quantitative study of ATAUM showed the diversity of perceptions on 
Turkey's foreign policy identity. This project contributed to the debate with a 
further understanding of why and where these different perceptions exist and 
come from, and how they relate and challenge with each other. David 
Campbell (1998, pp.48-50) noted that nation-state identity is secured through 
discourse of danger, that requires definition of difference and 'otherness' for 
securing the 'self' and its world. The state and 'man' grounds and justifies its 
policies and actions by offering who and what 'we' are, who and what 
'foreigners' are, and what 'we' have to fear. Therefore, national security and 
foreign policy texts locate and define national identity and values and 
nation's place in the world. As Campbell illustrated US foreign policy against 
Soviet threat in the 60s reinforced American identity. The definition of the 
enemy as the communism system itself and discourse of 'freedom under God 
versus ruthless, godless tyranny' (ibid p.30) reproduced religious character of 
the nation. 
Similarly, in the case of 9/11 and Iraq War, this chapter showed that Turkish 
media reminded and constructed Muslimhood of Turkish nation. During the 
war in Iraq, a common 'enemy' perception united the different nationalist 
discourses on anti-Americanism. The findings confirmed that Turkey has 
been searching for its new place in the new world order, in particular in 
changing dynamics of the Middle East. The Turkish media defined a pivotal 
role for Turkey in transformation of the region. Thus, the majority of the 
reporting and columnists interpreted that Turkish foreign policy has not 
shifted its Western orientation, but it expanded its axis. Post-Kemalist 
reimagination of Turkey is just challenged by the Kemalist discourse of 
Cumhuriyet newspaper. The representation of the foreign policy issues in the 
media involves representing boundaries which mark the inclusion and 
exclusion, or who belongs, to the unity. The examples showed that the Arabs 
are one of the external others in the Kemalist identity discourse. On the other 
hand, new state discourse of Turkey constructs a sameness discourse and 
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stresses on the common cultural and historical roots between Muslim 
countries. In addition, neo-liberal, pragmatic politics of Islamist AKP 
government helped to improve Turkey's relationship within its Muslim 
neighbourhood. 
For a general evaluation of the axis shift in Turkish Foreign Policy, the 
examples from Zaman, Taraf, Hurriyet and Radikal indicate that the Turkish 
media supported the AKP and its policies in foreign relations. It is a fact that 
Muslim intellectuals, liberal democrats and socialists came to the point of 
consensus for a democratic transformation and wanted to distance 
themselves from Kemalist authoritarianism and 'isolationism'. The re-
imagination of the nation during the last decade shows that Turkey’s 
engagement with neo-liberal politics has satisfied some liberals and they 
seemed eager to portray Turkey as the ‘Western country of the Middle East’ 
(Birand, Hurriyet 25.03.2011, p.8). However, this general support can be 
read as growing self-censorship (Arsan 2013) and there has been widespread 
silence in the Turkish media due to increasing government pressures and 
Erdogan’s intolerance against the dissident voices of the media. However, the 
warnings for ‘peace at home’ as a condition of ‘peace in the borders and 
abroad’ appear in drawing the limits of support in line with AKP’s re-
imagination of Turkey. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
This thesis has shown that a deeper post-Kemalist transformation has been 
going on in Turkey since the AKP came to power in 2002. In this regard, the 
analytical research agenda examined how Turkish national identity in 
domestic and foreign policy constructions articulated by the Turkish media 
reinforced or contested with each other in maintaining and transforming the 
Kemalist nation-state identity between 2001 and 2011. The literature on 
Turkey’s new identity is mostly built upon the AKP’s influence in Turkish 
politics that focus on the role of the Islam and Ottoman heritage in its 
discourse (Ozkan 2014; Duran 2013; Fisher Onar 2011; Bilgin and Bilgic 
2011; Sozen 2010; Altunisik 2009). In contrast, this has focused on the 
concept of national identity and has contributed to the literature of 
Contemporary Turkish Studies and Nationalism by being the first to apply 
Ruth Wodak’s (2001) Discourse-Historical Approach to the 'process' of 
power struggle in the discursive construction of Turkish nation-state identity 
in the Turkish media. It challenged the both the dominant view of Turkey as 
a Kemalist state (Azak 2013; Alaranta 2011; Casier and Jongerden 2010; 
Ciddi 2010; Karasipahi 2009; Zurcher 2004), characterised by its secularism 
and that has aimed to be a part of the large family of European states for the 
past fifty years (Cengiz and Hoffmann 2014; Nas and Ozer 2012; Cakir 2011; 
Usul 2010). It has examined the form taken by challenges to Turkey's 
Kemalist identity, focusing in particular on the AKP's Muslim conservative 
and non-European narrative of the nation over the past decade. It concluded 
that there is not just the clash of different narratives of Turkish nation-state, 
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but a complex interdependence between Islam, secularism, modernism and 
Europeanisation in Turkey. The thesis has also made an important 
contribution to discourse analysis in Politics (Larsen 2014; Hansen 2006; 
Waever 2001; Diez 2001) by making use of Critical Discourse Analysis and 
‘making sense of diversity’ (Carta and Morin 2014); the complexity in the 
identity of Turkey said much about both the religious and cultural dimensions 
of International Relations, in particular European and Middle East Studies. 
 
In contrast to the state-centric explanations that dominant in international 
relations literature, in particular in the study of Turkish Foreign Policy (Hale 
2012; Oran 2011), approached Turkish politics from a media perspective. 
Outcomes of foreign policy decision-making directly influence the daily 
lives of individuals. What people think about themselves and others matters, 
reprodued in the media and considered in foreign policy making. This work 
responded to this gap in literature of Turkish Politics by paying attention to 
the national tension on definition of Turkey’s identity through analysing 
discursive practices as fostering or reinforcing relations of domination in the 
media. 
 
Furthermore, the Turkish case has assumed even a greater importance during 
the writing this thesis. Identity politics and the rhetoric of 'blaming others' in 
different national imaginations have become pervasive in Turkish politics 
and society. Moreover, political parties have benefited from the polarisation 
of the electorates. Identity matters have been instrumentalised in order to 
cloak social, economic and political problems of Turkey. It seems that banal 
nationalism and banality of evil in Turkey has been difficult to overcome and 
a 'daily plebiscite' of living together peacefully has been lost (Ozkirimli 
2014). In this context, this thesis may raise awareness of the tensions, as part 
of the processes by which identity is constructed, and discriminatory 
practices committed for the sake of political interests. To highlight how the 
thesis has contributed to academic scholarship concerning the struggle over 
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Turkey's identity, the theoretical and methodological assumptions of the 
research will be revisited in the first section below. It outlines the key themes 
and issues that an application of the critical discourse analysis to the case of 
Turkey. Then, the empirical findings will be connected together in the 
content of the discursive constructs of Turkish national identity in domestic 
and international contexts at the first decade of the 2000s. These will be 
summarised in the light of the main strategies and forms of linguistic 
realisations in the Turkish media discourse. 
 
6.1. Theoretical and Methodological Results 
This project took its theoretical inspiration from two disciplines: nationalism 
tudies and media studies. The theoretical starting point is an approach that 
adopts nationalism as an ideology; as patterns of belief, practice, assumption, 
habit and representation that are reproduced discursively (Wodak et al 1999) 
by the state, its institutions but also in the daily lives of citizens in everyday 
conversations (Billig 1995). Based on this assumption, the concept of nation 
is defined as a mental construct of the imagination of the nation (Anderson 
1983) in people’s mind, embedded in ideological power relations, politics 
and the everyday language. An imagined unity is based on recognition and 
opposition in definition of ‘us’ and ‘them’, by promoting a sense of 
belonging together in a historical narrative (Wodak et al 1999). Beyond 
official state discourse, there are multiple understandings of nationhood in 
political discourse according to different identities and ideologies that 
diversely imagine national uniqueness and difference towards ‘others’. It is 
also assumed that nation-state identity is constructed in interaction with both 
domestic and international ‘others’ rather than simply one or the other 
(Campbell 1998; Neumann 1999; Diez 2001; Hansen 2005; Waever 2006). In 
three case studies, in discursive practices of differentiation and exclusion in 
the media articulated construction of the national identity and its self/other 
relations within and outside the borders of Turkey. 
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Based on this discursive approach to nationalism, this thesis has argued that 
Turkish national identity is discursively constructed and that a fundamental 
conflict has existed between competing nationalist discourses in Turkish 
society over the definition of what Turkish identity should be and how to 
place Turkey in the world. Examination of these changing and contrasting 
definitions of ‘Turkishness’ has shed light on the struggle between the 
domestic actors and ideologies and illuminated competing views of the world 
that differ with regards to Turkey’s regional and world role. In so doing, the 
thesis has made an original contribution to the study of contemporary Turkish 
nationalism. With a specific focus on the media, expanding the focus beyond 
official state discourse to a wider set of actors within debate provided an 
indication of how and why dominant Muslim conservative and opponent 
political discourses changed as a consequences of the transformation of 
power relations over the last decade. Thus, the research broadened the 
analytical scope to media discourse in order to demonstrate competing 
discursive constructions of Turkish national identity by considering the major 
‘symbiotic antagonisms of nationalisms’ (Kadioglu and Keyman 2011) in 
Turkish politics.  
 
Chapter One outlined the theoretical and methodological framework for 
analysing the struggle on over redefining Turkey’s inter-national identity in 
media discourse. By taking a critical stand, Ruth Wodak’s discourse-
historical approach (1999) was formed the methodological framework for 
investigating the different discursive construction of thematic identities in the 
case of Turkey. This theoretical part assumed that discourse affects the way 
in which people define and talk about identity politics and how they express 
their ideologies, perspectives on the world and social relations. It argued that 
different perspectives on the nation construct ‘sameness’ and ‘difference’ 
between groups and an identification of ‘we’ and ‘they’. This framework for 
studying Turkish national identity construction in the post 9/11 historical 
domestic and international context, made it possible to bring out the tension 
256 
in maintaining and changing Turkish identity. It also showed that the media 
is a site where both official state discourse and opposing discourses could be 
studied as part of the investigation of Turkey's post-Kemalist identity 
transformation. Chapter Two was devoted to build the historical background 
for studying Turkey's identity. Since the main assumption in the Turkish case 
is that there are multiple Turkish nationalisms rather than an essentialist, 
single Turkish nationalism, the historical overview and literature on Turkish 
nationalism in Chapter Two examined the origins and developments in 
different versions of Turkish nationalisms. It argued that the official concept 
of Kemalist nation-state identity has been challenged by the AKP's new 
imagination of the nation which has played the main role in redefining nation 
and the relationship of Turkey with Europe and the West in the post 9/11 
world. 
 
This chapter suggested that a power struggle existed between two 
understandings of what it means to be a ‘Turk’ and narratives of Turkish 
nation-state in the first decade of the AKP government, which articulate 
various mainstream Turkish nationalisms: the pro-secular narrative  consists 
of Kemalist nationalism and ethnic-nationalism; the post-Kemalist narrative 
consists of Islamist nationalism and Liberal nationalism.The thesis then 
moved on to an empirical study of how they imagine the nation and the 
different ways in which they define Turkish identity depending on their 
particular perspectives, the context and the ongoing power struggle in Turkey.  
The empirical part aimed to make clear what led different interpretations and 
perspectives of Turkish national identity, and showed why analysing media 
discourse empirically was appropriate for studying these processes. That is 
the fact that the media provide readily accessible and useful data in the form 
of ideologically diverse language usages. By the discourse-historical 
approach, it was shown that, specific language usages established power 
relations and served or challenged hegemonies in the context of the 
construction of a post-Kemalist nation-state identity in Turkey. The key 
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question concerned how Turkish media discursively re/constructs Turkey's 
inter-national identity. It discussed both the national and international 
dimensions in three of the thematic chapters (Chapter 3, 4, 5). The rationale 
was to throw light on the interaction between national identity and foreign 
policy by bringing out how media discourse link the two. 
 
In relation to Islamic, secular and non-Muslim elements in Turkish national 
identity, critical discourse analysis was applied in Chapter Three to the case 
of the assassination of Hrant Dink and the Presidential Elections in 2007. 
The second case study in Chapter Four demonstrated how European identity 
was influential in the reconstruction of Turkish identity and its challenge 
with Kurdish identity, showing how this struggle also played a role in 
changing perceptions on whether Turkey should aspire to become a member 
of the European Union. Finally, the third case study in Chapter Five showed 
how 9/11 and the Iraq War served to reveal multiple imaginations of Turkey, 
its Western, Muslim and secular identities in the international context. In 
these three different discursive contexts, five newspapers were used, to 
survey a broad range of constructs of Turkish identity, the form taken by each, 
how they challenged each other, and their implications for Turkey's future. 
 
In summary, this thesis is perhaps the first academic attempt to examine the 
discursive construction of Turkish nation-state identity within wider political 
and thematic discourses, comparing how being Turkish, Kurdish, Muslim, 
Armenian, European and Western have been discursively articulated in 
relation to a domestic power struggle over the last decade. It has investigated 
the various ways of being Turkish in the changing conditions of the post-9/11 
area of international relations. Since these events are still relatively recent, 
these analyses remain provisional, even if the thesis has highlighted the 
complex and dynamic processes that lie behind the emergence of a new 
Turkey. 
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6.2. The Empirical Findings: Reimagination of Turkey in the Post 9/11 
Era 
The detailed investigation the three case studies has confirmed a central 
claim of this thesis; namely, that there are different and context-determined 
narratives on the Turkish nation that highlight different interpretations of 
Turkey's common past, present, future and common territory. Turkish media 
discourse reveals the diversity of political discourses on the issues of Turkish 
national identity and foreign policy are based on people’s positions and 
perspectives on the world. The analysis undertaken reveals that the power 
struggle in Turkey has been more than the secular-Islamic dictomony (Somer 
2011; Somer 2010a; Somer 2010b); it is the clash of different national 
imaginations. The discourse-historical approach makes it possible to 
highlight how each Turkish nationalism use constructive strategies to express 
specific narrative of the nation, to determine who belongs to the Turkish 
nation, and their understanding of common history and the future. 
 
In this context, this thesis revealed that the two main pillars of Kemalist 
Turkish nation-state identity, secular Turkish nationalism and Europeanism, 
have been challenged by post-Kemalism under the AKP government. 
Secularlism has been confronted by the normalisation of civil-military 
relations and the abolition of bans on Islamic symbols in public institutions 
in the universities, the hospitals and parliament. Moreover, Kemalist Turkey 
asserted that every citizen of the Republic is a Turk or a 'future Turk', in 
particular the Muslim peoples of Anatolia. This left Kurdish identity as not 
recognised in Kemalist politics. However, Islamists in power changed the 
state discourse on the Kurdish problem by acknowledging Kurdish rights. 
The dominant ideology is changing and Kemalist Turkey's definition of 
nation and citizenship is challenged by Kurdish and Islamist identities. 
Within this context, this thesis has shown how the Turkish media has 
contributed to the AKP’s power and discussed its new interpretation of 
nation-state identity and foreign policy which is an imagination of a Muslim, 
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non-European Turkey in the formation of a new historical and geographical 
Ottomanism; in other words, the post-Kemalist narrative of the nation which 
academic literature has been hesitant to recognize. The Turkish media played 
a role in forming, constructing, and distributing new narrative of the nation 
and creating a general consent for new policies. This reformation in nation-
state discourse has opened the way for economic, cultural and political good 
relationships with countries in the Middle East region and adapted Turkey’s 
Islamists to international cooperation. This brought about a new look for 
Islamists and empowered their soft power to convince different groups on 
decision making. Hence, liberal nationalist discourse has become allied with 
the AKP in the transformation of Kemalist nation-state identity. By focusing 
on this power struggle, it can be argued that his thesis developed an analytic 
and critical reading of the post-Kemalist Turkish politics and its challenges. 
 
In this context, the empirical findings reported above gave important clues 
about selective, ideological readings of common political past directly played 
the role in definition of domestic and external others of Turkey. For instance, 
on one side Islamist nationalism constructs its discourse on Ottoman history 
and Islamic heritage, while on the other side secularists construct a national 
discourse on the Republican times, M. Kemal Ataturk’s principles and 
heritage. These insights also illuminated what shape these diverse discourses 
and their perspectives on the foreign policy issues, specifically in the cases of 
Turkey’s bid for EU membership and Iraq War. The analysis originally 
makes clear that Islamist discourse in the media construct Turkey as the 
‘other’ of Europe and the West from a historical and cultural perspective. 
According to Kemalist secularist perspective, Turkish culture and nation is a 
part of the modern European family. However, in the terms of common 
political past with the European countries, the Sèvres Syndrome and the 
memory of Independence War against the European powers have played a 
role in the construction of their Euro-sceptic discourse. Therefore, beyond 
the official Kemalist discourse, the leftish tone of Kemalism (ulusalcılık) has 
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an anti-imperialist nationalist discourse. In the terms of the common political 
present and future with Europe, Kemalist discourse has not been able to 
adapt itself to democratisation and globalisation process due to the security 
concerns related with the Kurdish (Chapter 4) and non-Muslim (Chapter 3) 
identity politics, in particular the fear of Islamic reactionism and separation 
of the country.  Secularism is a 'must' for the Kemalist nation-state 
imagination; it is the only way of modernisation, enlightenment, science and 
civilisation. Despite the fact that secular nation-state identity built in a top-
down process by the Kemalist state, the case of the Presidential Election in 
2007 showed that the secularist way of life has been accepted, internalised by 
the some circles and became a part of Turkish national identity. In the last 
decade, the media have witnessed and mirrored the Kemalist resistance to 
Islamic reformation in Turkey's identity. 
 
Moreover, the results demonstrate that historical fear of Kemalism defines 
domestic others, untrustworthy citizens of the nation-state, non-Muslims 
such as Armenians and Greeks. During the nation-building era of the 
Republicanists, the new secular regime fought against an Islamist and 
Kurdish resistance; thus the Islamists and Kurds were defined as the 
domestic ‘others’ and  as ‘threats’ to the regime and modern Turkish identity. 
In the last decade, European support for Islamist AKP’s policies and Kurdish 
demands contributed to darken the Euro-sceptic tone of the Kemalist 
discourse, as part of the domestic power struggle on the post-Kemalist 
reformation of Turkey’s identity. More significantly, by highlighting certain 
inter-textual themes such as Turkishness and Muslimhood in Turkey’s 
national identity and foreign policy discourse in the press, the findings of the 
thesis demonstrate the limitations and borders in mapping post-Kemalist 
Turkey both in the national and international contexts. 
 
Furthermore, the data made it possible to see the slippery character of the 
link between these competing narratives. Especially, the ethnic-nationalist 
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understanding of nation and citizenship has been addressed instrumentally 
when it is required politically in other nationalist discourses. Even this 
tactical addressing produces a new concept in the Turkish politics as 
‘MHPlesmek’ which means resembling, mimicking radical ethnic-nationalist 
party, the MHP. On the other hand, Kemalist secular nationalism, Islamist 
and liberal nationalisms and their reformations also appear within the 
selected timeframe. 
 
Analysing language use in the data revealed an important result in 
identification of three main strategies used in discursive construction of 
national identity: constructive strategies, strategies of perpetuation or 
justification and strategies of transformation. According to the findings, the 
Kemalist nationalist perspective used the strategies of perpetuation to resist 
changes to the dominant narrative in the 2000s. Supporters of this 
perspective hold a secularist, modernist, enlightenmentalist approach to 
Turkey’s identity and its place in the world. Based on their belief that AKP 
was backed by foreign powers, their foreign policy discourse had a 
Eurosceptic outlook and anti-imperialist leftish colouring against the West, 
particularly the USA. 
 
Islamists at the beginning of the new millennium have succeeded in adapting 
themselves globally and economically by becoming allies with neo-liberal 
world politics. Islamists in the power have used the strategy of 
transformation to break the Kemalist status quo and hegemony in the nation-
state discourse and bureaucracy. The analysis indicated that Zaman’s Islamic 
perspective of the nation is not ethnic-nationalist toward the Muslim nations, 
but it would be xenophobic to non-Muslims and discriminatory to secularists, 
non-believers and LGBTs. The instances from Hurriyet, Radikal and Taraf 
newspapers demonstrated that liberals tended to corroborate AKP’s 
pragmatist policies as it was seen in the case of the ‘axis shift’ debate in 
Turkish foreign policy. In general, there was the lack of social and ethical 
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perspective for promoting rights and civil liberties for the others. Looking at 
the representation of the core elements in discursive construction of Turkish 
identity in Turkish media, among the newspapers, Radikal was the only one 
which could have the pluralist perspective in three case studies. 
 
 
6.2.1. The Nation and Identity: Being Turk and Muslim 
In Chapter 3, the first case study on the assassination of journalist Hrant 
Dink and the Presidential elections in 2007 showed the perception of Turkish 
identity in an everyday context in both citizenship and religion-based 
elements. What explicitly occurs in the data of the Dink case is that members 
of religious minorities are addressed in contradictory definitions which 
underline the fluid perception of the Turkish people on the citizenship and 
core elements of the Kemalist nation-state identity. The Presidential 
Elections case contributed to a fruitful observation on contested 
conceptualisations of Turkish nation and the fact they contained culture and 
religion based elements. 
 
In the case of Hrant Dink, on the one hand Kemalists blamed Islamists and 
argues that everyday racism was a result of AKP’s religious policies. On the 
other hand Islamists and liberals tended to see rising violence and racism as a 
result of Kemalist identity and citizenship politics. Islamists expressed an 
explicit rejection of Republican assertive secularist politics by directly 
indicating that it was responsible for present political problems. In the terms 
of common political past, the legacy of Turkish nation-state was represented 
negatively by the Islamists, liberal and leftist circles. Muslim conservative 
Zaman's columnists referred to the multicultural Ottoman Period to justify 
their argumentation and oppositional perspective on Kemalist nation-state 
whenever they mention the Republican period and its secularist policies. 
They hold a victim thesis, according to which the Sunni majority are a victim 
of the Kemalist nation-state. They argued that the state suppressed lifestyles 
263 
and beliefs of religious Turks. The universities did not accept female students 
wearing headscarves, the courts regularly banned Islamist political parties, 
and the military constantly intervened to maintain suppression. This victim 
thesis points to the core element of Islamic perspective on Turkish national 
identity which constructs Kemalists as the ‘others’ of their identity. 
 
The ‘blaming others strategy’ was also used in the terms of referring to the 
origins of Turkey’s Kurdish problem in the second case study. What was 
particularly remarkable in this debate was that Islamists and liberals 
highlighted the Kemalist denial of Kurdish culture and language in the public 
sphere. Like Islamists, Kurds were portrayed as the victims of Turkey’s 
Republican past and on the assessment of current political problems. 
Assertive secularist policies and military-state structure were directed to 
justify the demand of transformation in new constitution writing and 
consolidation of democracy in parallel with the EU reforms. Regarding this 
post-Kemalist transformation, the AKP used democracy discourse to change 
the laws introduced following the 1980 military coup and also had the 
support of left-wing and right-wing citizens in the Constitutional 
Referendum in September 2010. The liberals and the majority of Kurds have 
taken the side of the AKP in democratic transformation. However, the more 
challenges the AKP faced, the more it mimicked the Kemalist methods for 
suppression of the opposition. Under the AKP government, secular Turks and 
bureaucracy lost their privileged positions in the centre and had to take 
second place. But, the post-Kemalist nation-state under Sunni-Muslim 
conservative nationalism has defined new others and victims in the last 
decade. 
 
 
6.2.2. The Construction of Non-Europeannes in Turkey's New Identity 
In order to have a full picture of the narrative of the Turkish nation, the 
second case looked at Turkish debates on Europe. This example suggested 
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various conceptions of Turkish national identity, the Kurdish question and 
Turkey’s place in the EU. In terms of imagining a common future, the debate 
about Turkey’s EU membership demonstrated that the future prospects of 
Turkish society depend on the domestic power relations. In this way, it 
challenged the argument that there was a common Europeanist perspective in 
Turkey and a constant attempt to be a part of Europe for fifty years in spite 
the Sisyphean story it turned out to be (Cakır 2011). In this research,  
discourse analysis revealed that Eurosceptism was the common discourse in 
Turkish nationalisms in the last decade and there has been a rising discourse 
emphasizing the separateness of Turkey from Europe in the media. 
 
Beside the fact that the golden years of Turkey and EU relations (1999–2005) 
engendered wide democratisation reforms in Turkish identity politics, EU 
membership of the Republic of Cyprus in 2004 opened up the possibility of a 
‘train crash’ on the way to the EU accession (Kadioglu 2012, p.43). That 
duly happened in 2006 with the rejection of the UN’s Annan Plan on the 
island. The ongoing dispute caused the EU Council to suspend accession 
negotiations with Turkey in December 2006. Inevitably, the discourse of ‘it is 
not a fair game’ and ‘they do not want us to integrate’ had popularity in the 
media. However, the main focus of the data discussed in Chapter 4 was the 
culture- and identity-based discussions, particularly on religion and group 
rights. On this point, Islamists’ frustration was shown regarding the Grand 
Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights decision in November 
2005 which was that Turkey did not violate human rights by banning the 
wearing of religious headscarves in universities. These examples 
demonstrated that Islamists become pro-European as long as the EU 
integration process served to challenge the secularist nation-state identity and 
promoted religious freedom in the Turkish public sphere. Western, European 
Turkey discourse in the Kemalist perspective was replaced by the EU as a 
‘threat’ to the unity of the nation-state and the secular system. The examples 
from the Cumhuriyet newspaper showed that Kemalist perspective has seen 
265 
the Kurdish problem as a security issue rooted within the external powers – 
the EU or the USA – that aim to divide Turkey. Islamists allied with the EU 
in the democratic solution of the Kurdish question and transformation of the 
military-state for the sake of the normalisation of civil-military relations. Due 
to the fact that Kemalists perceive the military as a guardian of secular 
system and democracy in Turkey, they have turned to be soft Euro-sceptics. 
The instances from leftist Radikal and liberal Taraf newspapers revealed that 
there has been a common will for Turkey’s democratic transformation to the 
post-Kemalist nation-state identity and the constitutional change in military 
coup legislations. On the other hand, the Cumhuriyet newspaper represented 
sceptic Kemalist views on the AKP’s intentions and strong expressions of 
secular Turkish resistance to a change in their status and identity in the 
process of EU integration. 
 
This thesis took on the discursive analysis of Turkey’s identity between 2001 
and 2011. However, since 2011 the dynamic domestic power relations and 
international relations have reconstructed the image of the AKP and Turkey. 
In particular, political transformations and challenges of Middle East 
uprisings contributed to the significance of Turkey’s Kurdish problem and 
European integration for the future of Turkey. 
 
 
6.2.3. The New Turkey: Post-Kemalist Narrative and Its Challenges 
In the post-9/11 area, the establishment of AKP in Turkey with a discourse on 
conservative democracy had strong implications at both national and 
international levels. In 2002, the reformist wing of Turkey’s Islamists 
departed from the anti-Western National Outlook movement and moved 
towards the US-based Fetullah Gulen’s liberal Islamist movement. This gave 
a moderate Islamic country image to Turkey or a democratic ‘model’ for a 
liberal political system able to incorporate an Islamic party. However, the 
discourse-historical approach revealed that anti-Americanism was common 
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in Turkish nationalist discourses in the last decade due to the perceptions on 
the events of 9/11 and Iraq War. 
 
In the terms of democratic consolidation of identity politics, the AKP brought 
a paradigmic change in Kemalist nation-state discourse and its vision of 
Turkey’s self and other relationships. In fact, for Kemalists, being a part of 
the West or Europe meant being a member of ‘contemporary civilisation’. 
Nevertheless, the coverage of the Cumhuriyet newspaper demonstrated that 
the memory of the Independence War against the Western powers is still 
alive in the Kemalist minds. This means that, in principle, they are pro-
Western but naturally they are also sceptical as to its outcome. In the last 
decade, domestic power struggles on redefinition of Turkey’s identity and 
influences on the global market economy enhanced this scepticism and 
caused them to be inward-looking. They believed that the newly emerging 
narrative of the nation and the dress of the state is Islamic and is a threat to 
Kemalist secular regime and lifestyles. In the third case study on Turkish 
foreign policy, the linguistic instances from Cumhuriyet point out the 
Kemalist belief that AKP follows the Islamic agenda in foreign policy as well. 
Improving relations with the Islamic countries in the Middle East called as 
Arabisation of Turkey. In addition, Muslim conservative Zaman's columnists 
contributed to reconstruct the new foreign policy discourse with the new 
geographic imagination of Turkey which addressed to the Ottoman legacy 
and constructed a responsibility discourse in related with Muslim peoples in 
the Ottoman territory. The conception of ‘Self’ in Turkey’s foreign policy 
widens its boundaries with this new imagination. Other newspapers' 
coverage represented a common support for AKP’s pragmatist and economy-
based policies in the Middle East. Since 2011, it has been questioned whether 
the Turkish model offered by AKP is good for democracy and the future of 
Turkey (Taspinar 2014). Indeed, the new Turkish model, the so-called post-
Kemalist Turkey, has the paradoxes of adopting the authoritarian legacy of its 
Kemalist predecessors and drawing new religious fault lines which constitute 
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illiberal models both for Turkish democracy and the countries in political 
transitions in the Arab world. 
 
Since its third victory in the general elections in 2011, AKP has openly 
articulated a mission for social engineering in the pursuit of bringing up 
religious generations on the basis of a conservative Sunni view of social 
morality that privileges the Sunni Hanefi Turks (Yesilada and Rubin 2013). 
It also followed the same Sunni line in foreign policy (Ozkan 2014; Uzgel 
2013). The main challenge Turkey’s foreign policy in the Middle East is 
facing is its relations with the USA, Israel, Iran and Syria. For instance, on 
one hand Turkey improved its relations with Iran due to its energy and 
security interests; while on the other hand, Turkey found itself in the 
opposition camp to Iran with regards to their approach to the Syrian uprising. 
Syrian regime’s brutal reaction to the demonstrators has damaged the AKP 
government’s ties with President Bashar al-Assad and their economic and 
cultural engagement with Syria. Turkey’s democracy discourse and soft 
power policy failed in the Syria test. These developments have realised the 
Islamisation fears of secular-Westernist people and confirmed the anxieties 
of Kemalist circles. It can be said that the domestic struggle has turned from 
the matter of who governs Turkey to who has the power of maintaining 
different lifestyles in highly polarised society (Keyman 2014). Unfortunately, 
Erdogan’s ‘new brave Turkey’ (Akkoyunlu 2013) is mimicking the 
authoritarian methods of the old Kemalist nation-state. The state’s 
ideological apparatus such as the media, the educational institutions and 
jurisdiction have been restructured to strengthen the government’s power and 
its mission in every aspects of life.  Illiberal anti-terrorism laws and routine 
imprisonments have been used for suppression on opposition voices coming 
from students, journalists, politicians and civil society activists alike 
(Ozbudun 2014). That means, government’s way of dealing with the social 
diversity and demands of plurality has become problematic and signals a 
democratic deficit both at home and abroad. Emerging challenges have made 
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AKP authoritarian against its opponents, which have caused losing its 
supporters from leftists and liberals. More recently, an open clash between 
Turkey's Islamists appeared in December 2013 as a major earthquake in the 
political agenda of Turkey which exhibited the difference between the 
perspectives of Islamists, their conservatism and their practice of power 
politics (Taspinar 2014b). As the national media and opposition have became 
dysfunctional for a powerful democracy, new power struggles of Islamists on 
the top of the power hill seem to have determined the country’s future. 
Therefore, a further research arena would focus on an observation of 
different nationalist perspectives of Islamic discourses in Turkey. Moreover, 
this research can be inspiring for using Critical Discourse Analysis in 
identity politics in International Relations. In particular, Turkish experience 
in both with Islam and secularism with the clash of different narratives of the 
nation offers lessons for other countries in the Middle East and North Africa 
seeking to transform identity and power politics. In addition, the social media 
would be useful to broaden the understanding of the daily construction of 
national identities, renegotiation of definitions and perceptions on the self 
and other categories in politics. One of the aims of this study was to open a 
channel for more discussion on the political polarisations in Turkey rather 
than provide definitive answers. Hopefully, new studies and attempts would 
contribute to open the ways to break the fear wall and censorship that can 
lead Turkey to having free press and academia for construction of a common 
discourse of democracy and justice for everyone. 
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Table I: The Thematic Key Word Search as the Example of Narrowing 
the Selection of the Data 
Hurriyet 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Assassination 
of Hrant Dink 
- - - - - - 58 21 11 14 17 
Assassination 
of Hrant Dink 
and Turkish 
Identity 
- - - - - - 17 6 3 6 3 
Republican 
Meetings 
- - - - - - 117 30 40 25 17 
Secularism 
and Islam 
25 43 78 138 97 118 186 198 80 73 68 
European 
Union and 
Turkish 
Identity 
29 21 15 43 32 25 29 23 17 8 12 
Kurdish 
Problem and 
European 
Union 
8 36 21 46 84 39 44 37 60 41 40 
11 
September 
and Irak War 
- 60 136 108 70 64 31 28 16 30 20 
Irak War, 
West, Islam, 
Turkey 
- 6 20 19 20 21 12 6 16 16 15 
Axis Shift and 
Foreign 
Policy 
- - - - - - - - 9 47 9 
   Source: http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/index/  (accessed on 20.10.1014) 
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The empirical analysis was conducted on the basis of the Turkish 
newspapers sources: 
 
 Hurriyet Cumhuriyet Radikal Zaman+Taraf 
Case I 21 21 22 15 
Case II 10 13 15 9+8 
Case III 18 20 5 11+11 
Total 197 
 
 
The First Case Study 
Cumhuriyet, 31.12.2005, Sahiller Türklere kapanır 
Cumhuriyet, 20.01.2007, Türkiye'ye Kurşun 
Cumhuriyet, 20.01.2007, Orhan Bursalı: Darbeciler Yargılanmalı 
Cumhuriyet, 30.01.2007, ‘Türklüğü aşağılama’ düzenlemesi 76 yılda 8 kez, 
2002’den bugüne 4 kez değişti 
Cumhuriyet, 23.04.2007, Hıristiyanların vahşice öldürülmesi münferit bir 
olay değil, Türkler bir yalanı yaşıyor 
Cumhuriyet, 19.01.2007 Emine Kaplan: Yabancılar bir bölümünü aldıkları 
bankaların hisselerini satın alarak tam egemenlik kuruyor. 
Cumhuriyet, 27.10.2005, Türban yasağı işlemiyor 
Cumhuriyet, 20.10.2005, 'Başkent için kara leke' 
Cumhuriyet, 03.12.2005, Çağın Neresindeyiz? 
Cumhuriyet, 27.10.2005, Oktay Akbal: Çılgın Türkler'den Şaşkın Türklere! 
Cumhuriyet, 31.12.2005, Müfettişten Atatürk'e hakaret 
Cumhuriyet, 13.10.2005, Dursun Atılgan: 'İhanet Cephesi' işbaşında 
Cumhuriyet, 08.06.2006, Uğur Demir: 'TRT, AKP'nin çiftliği' 
Cumhuriyet, 08.06.2006, Ali Sirmen: Yurtseverlik Ayıp Olurken... 
Cumhuriyet, 14.04.2007, Tehlikenin farkındayız 
Cumhuriyet, 23.04.2007, Erdal Atabek: İki Ayrı Türkiye (mi Var?)... 
Cumhuriyet,30.01.2007, Usta yazar Ayla Kutlu, "Nasıl bir cumhurbaşkanı" 
istediği sorusuna şu yanıtı veriyor. 
Cumhuriyet, 24.07.2007 p.7, Sonuçlar Dünya Basınında. AB’nin Yorumları: 
‘Türkiye’de ılımlı İslam kazandı’ 
Cumhuriyet, 24.07.2007 p.7, Merkez Sağda Hasar Büyük 
Cumhuriyet, 30.07.2007, AKP'nin seçim başarısı bir ölçüde merkez sağın 
çöküşü üzerine sağlanmıştır. 
Cumhuriyet, 30.07.2007, Emre Kongar: Nasıl Oldu? Ne Yapmalı? 
Hurriyet, 21.01.2007 p.1, Türkiye'yi Vurdular 
Hurriyet, 20.02.2007, Utanç Verici Bir Suikasttir 
Hurriyet, 20.02.2007, Radikal Ermeniler Türkiye'yi Suçladı 
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Hurriyet, 21.01.2007, Emin Çölaşan: Dink Soruları!!! 
Hurriyet, 21.01.2007, Ferai Tınç: Koruyamadık 
Hurriyet, 21.01.2007, Cüneyt Ülsever: Bugün ben Ermeni'yim. 
Hurriyet, 28.01.2007, Turgut Özakman: ‘Hrant da Türktü’ demek doğru 
olurdu 
Hurriyet, 25 .01.2007, Hürriyet’te dev anket: Hepimiz Ermeniyiz" sloganı 
atılması sizce doğru mu yanlış mı?” ve "Hrant Dink için Fatiha okunur mu 
okunmaz mı?" anketleri katılım sayısı olarak Türkiye rekoruna imza attı. 
Hurriyet, 14.01.2007, Bülent Arınç: Dindar cumhurbaşkanı seçeceğiz. 
Hurriyet, 25.04.2007, Bekir Coşkun: Demokrasiyi soytarılaştırmak... 
Hurriyet, 22.07.2007, Deniz Baykal: Biz değil merkez sağ çöktü. 
Hurriyet, 24.072007, Bekir Coşkun: Utangaç Seçmen 
Hurriyet, 22.07.2007, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan: "Hepimizi birleştiren ortak 
değer ve hedeflerimiz var. 
Hurriyet, 24.08.2007, Özdemir İnce: ‘’Türban ve Göstergebilim’’ 
Hurriyet, 26.08.2007, Özdemir İnce: Laikçilik ve Kalpazanlık 
Hurriyet, 28.07.2007, Mehmet Barlas: Orada bir köy yok uzakta… O köy 
artık kente ve iktidara geldi 
Hurriyet, 24.07.2007, Hadi Uluengin: Sivil Zafer 
Hurriyet, 24.07 2007, Cengiz Çandar: Türkiye Yanılmadı, Yanıltmadı 
Hurriyet, 15.04.2007, Bekir Coşkun: Güzel Günler Göreceğiz Çocuklar... 
Hurriyet, 15.04.2007, Ahmet Hakan: Ey Tayyip Erdoğan!..Ey Deniz 
Baykal!.. 
Hurriyet, 29.08.2007, Cüneyt Ülsever: Ayrışan Türkiye 
Radikal, 20.01.2007, Bir Ermeni olduğum için haddim bildirilmeliydi, tıpkı 
bir güvercin gibiyim, dikkatli ve ürkek... 
Radikal, 20.01.2007 p.1, Irkçıların hedefi Hrant Dink üç kurşunla katledildi, 
Eserinizle gurur duyun 
Radikal, 20.01.2007, 'O vatanseverdi, Türk bayrağına sarılmalı' 
Radikal, 20.01.2007, Perihan Magden: Hrant Dink Yazısı 
Radikal, 20.01.2007, İsmet Berkan: Hrant Dink'i öldürdük 
Radikal, 28.01.2007, Meyda Yeğenoğlu: Buralıyım, ev sahibiyim 
Radikal, 28.01.2007, Cem erciyes: Mahallemizden bir delikanlı 
Radikal, 28.01.2007, Hasan Bülent Kahraman: Sıradanlık, faşizm ve kültür 
Radikal,18.02.2007, Ahmet Gökçen: Kahramanyak, kimlikkeş, şiddetperest 
Radikal, 04.02.2007, Murathan Mungan: Cinayetin arkasındaki en büyük 
örgüt 
Radikal, 13.01.2008, Hrant için, adalet için... 
Radikal,14.05.2007, Işık Üniversitesi Rektörü siyaset bilimci Prof. Ersin 
Kalaycıoğlu: Darbeden daha kötüsü olabilir 
Radikal,14.04.2007, Sezer: Rejim tehdit altında, Gül: Halk bunlara 
inanmıyor 
Radikal, 08.09.2007, Murat Belge: Üçüncü Millet 
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Radikal, 20.05.2007, Baskin Oran: Antiemperyalizm 
Radikal, 23.07.2007 p.1, Bu da Halkın Muhtırası 
Radikal, 23.07.2007 p.1, 'Orijinal Demokrasi'nin zaferi 
Radikal, 23.07.2007, Mahfi Eğilmez :Başarının temel unsuru ekonomi 
Radikal, 23.07.2007, Haluk Şahin: 'Demokrasime dokunma' 
Radikal, 19.08.2007, İsmet Berkan: Fransız ordusu gibi mi olacak? 
Radikal, 30.08.2007, Hasan Celal Güzel: 'Gül devri' ve yeni dönem 
Radikal, 06.07.2010, Nuray Mert: II. Abdülhamid, AKP ve muhalefet 
Zaman, 20.01.2007, Bu Kurşun Türkiye'ye Sıkıldı 
Zaman, 21.01.2007, İhsan Dagi, Milliyetçiliği Yeniden Düşünmek 
Zaman, 23.01.2007, “Ulusalcıların piri Türkiye'yi Bölmekte Kararlı “  
Zaman, 22.01.2007, Ekrem Dumanlı: Hrant Dink Suikastı ya da Üslup için 
Bir Dönüm Noktası 
Zaman, 22.01.2007, Ali Ünal: Hrant Dink 
Zaman, 22.01.2007, Etyen Mahcupyan: Türkler 
Zaman, 25.01.2007, Alev Alatlı: Mealin Hükümsüzleştirilmesi 
Zaman, 14.01.2007, Halkin cogu Sezer’in dusuncelerini paylasmiyor. 
Zaman, 22.01.2007, Emine Dolmacı: Sezer’in cumhurbaskanligi tanimi: 
devlete kalkan, icraate fren 
Zaman, 23.04.2007, Malatyadaki cinayetler dini motifli degil 
Zaman, 14.04.2007, Tuncay Ozkan’in provakasyonu ADD’I bile kizdirdi. 
Zaman, 14.04.2007, Vahap Coskun: Şuna demokrasiyi sindirmek bize ağır 
geliyor desenize 
Zaman, 14.04.2007, ADD’liler “darbeci''diye anilmaktan rahatsiz. 
Zaman, 22.04.2007, Mustafa Armağan: Ataturk Turkiyesinin Hitler 
Almanyasina ekonomik bagi 
Zaman, 23.07.2007, Dünya sonuçtan memnun: demokrasi için büyük başarı 
 
The Second Case Study 
Cumhuriyet, 04.10.2005 p.1, Türkiye'nin 1959'da başlayan AB yolculuğu, 
zorlu ve sonu belirsiz bir sürece girdi: Müzakereler başladı 
Cumhuriyet, 04.10.2005 p.1, 'Laik Türkiye'yi tebrik ediyorum' 
Cumhuriyet, 04.10.2005, Orhan Erinç: İstenilen ödünler 
Cumhuriyet,13.10.2005, Başbakan kimi temsil ediyor 
Cumhuriyet 13.10.2005, Dursun Atılgan: İhanet Cephesi 
Cumhuriyet, 10.10.2005, Emre Kongar: Atatürkçülük, Yurtseverlik ve 
Avrupa Birliği 
Cumhuriyet, 23.04.2007, Erdal Ataberk: Hollanda’da tesettür yok... 
Cumhuriyet, 17.01.2008 p.17, Deniz Som: Sessiz Sedasız (!) 
Cumhuriyet, 22.11.2010, Erol Manisali: Keynes, Sistem ve Siyasal 
Partilerimiz 
Cumhuriyet 23.07.2010, Suheyl Batum: 28 Şubat ve 27 Nisan 
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Cumhuriyet,18.08.2011 p.1 Bahçeli, şunları kaydetti:“Açılım denilen yıkım 
projesine son verilmeli ve bu projenin koordinatörü olan ilgili Basbakan 
Yardımcısı acilen istifa etmelidir. 
Cumhuriyet, 01.11.2011 p.8, Belçika’nın baskenti Brüksel’de terör olaylarını 
kınamak için düzenlenen mitingde, Avrupa Parlementosu binası önüne 
üzerinde Çukurca sehitlerinin fotografları bulunan 26 tabut bırakıldı. 
Cumhuriyet, 07.05.2011, Ali Sirmen: İpleri Geren Gerene 
Hurriyet, 08.10.2004, DEHAP ve Aleviler: Azınlık değil, asli unsuruz 
Hurriyet, 26.09.2005, Baydemir: Bayrak tüm yurttaşların ortak değeri 
Hurriyet, 29.09.2005, Emin Çölaşan: Hezimetin başlangıcı  
Hurriyet, 22.11.2005, Emin Çölaşan: Elden çıkan Güneydoğu 
Hurriyet, 29.11.2005, Cüneyt Ülsever: Şemdinli Üzerinden Irak 
Hurriyet, 11.04.2006, Mehmet Ali Birand: Ali Babacan Aranıyor (!) 
Hurriyet, 09.11.2007, Ulusu: Sevr ile AP Kararlı Aynı 
Hurriyet, 21.09.2009, Dönüş gövde gösterisine döndü 
Hurriyet, 22.10.2009, CHP Genel Başkanı Deniz Baykal: ''Teröristler 
kahraman haline dönüştü...'' 
Hurriyet, 06.22.2010, Bahçeli: AKP küresel siyasi taşerondur 
Radikal, 04.10.2005, Türker Alkan: “Mutlu Son” 
Radikal, 22.10.2009 p.1, Dağdakilerin hepsi gelsin 
Radikal, 22.10.2009, Havai fişek ve kutlama ateşleriyle karşıladılar 
Radikal, 23.10.2009, Cengiz Candar: Kör olmayin 
Radikal, 26.09.2010, Fuat Keyman: Uzlaşmaya Çağrı 
Radikal, 08.11.2010, Sirri Sureyya Onder: Naylondan Kelepçe, Kanlı Kına 
Radikal, 25.01.2010, Sırrı Süreya Önder: Senin Yurdun Neresi? 
Radikal, 17.01.2010, Aysel Tuğluk: Gösteri Siyaseti ve Gerçek 
Radikal, 18.09.2011, Aysel Tuğluk: Sahiden Bildiğiniz Gibi Değil 
Radikal, 02.10.2011, Aysel Tuğluk :Gerekenler Yapılacaktır 
Radikal, 20.11.2011, Ahmet Insel: Kadim Ankara Kriterlerinin Dönüşü 
Radikal, 23.10.2011, Ahmet Insel: Nihai Hesaplaşma Arzusu 
Radikal, 11.09.2011, Fuat Keyman: Silahlar Sussun, Söz Bitmesin 
Taraf, 17.08.2009, Cihan Aktaş: Dağa Çıkan Kürt 
Taraf, 25.08.2009, Ahmet Altan: Savaş Tımarhanesi 
Taraf, 28.12.2009, Murat Belge: Yirmibeş Yılın Birikimi 
Taraf, 24.10.2009, Murat Belge: Şov Yapmak 
Taraf, 08.06.2009, Ayhan Aktar: Türkiye, sadece Türklerin midir? 
Taraf, 23.10.2010, Ahmet Altan: Rota 
Taraf, 28.02.2010, Ahmet Altan: Kürtler ve Demokrasi 
Taraf, 08.01.2011, Ahmet Altan: Bir Cumhuriyet Batarken 
Zaman, 20.12.2004, Başörtüsüne özgürlük için 3 bin kişi dua etti  
Zaman, 02.10.2005 p.1, Doğu ve Batının kaygısı ortak:Türkiye'yi dışlamak 
hata olur 
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Zaman, 02.10.2005 p.12, AB üyesi bir Turkiye Ortadogu ülkeleri icin de 
çıkış yolu olacak 
Zaman, 02.10.2005 p.13, Ankara'ya Ret Haçlı Mantığının Sürdüğünü 
Gösterir 
Zaman, 25.12.2010, Turan Alkan: Sizi Yaramazlar Sizi 
Zaman, 01.01.2010, Mumtazer Turkone: Tarihin "açılım"ı 
Zaman, 28.12.2010, Mumtazer Turkone: Kürt Sorunu Çözülür 
Zaman, 28.10.2011, Mumtazer Turkone: Kürt Sorununda Paradigmayı 
Değiştirmek 
Zaman, 31.07.2011, Mumtazer Turkone:'Yeni Türkiye' Hepimize Hayırlı 
Olsun 
Zaman, 09.01.2011, Mumtazer Turkone: MHP ve Kürt Sorunu I: 
AntiKürtçülük 
 
The Third Case Study 
Cumhuriyet, 11.09.2002, Ergin Yıldızoglu: Beyaz Adamın Yükü 
Cumhuriyet, 11.09.2002 , Engin Aydin: Sor: 11 Eylül Nedir? 
Cumhuriyet, 15.10.2001, Ataol Behramoglu: 11 Eylül 2001'i ''Amerikan 
rüyası'' nın sona erdiği tarih sayabiliriz. 
Cumhuriyet, 01.03.2003, Ilhan Selcuk: Irak Savaşı 'Örtülü'Bir Türkiye Savaşı 
mı?.. 
Cumhuriyet, 01.03.2003, Hikmet Cetinkaya: İşte 1930'ların Türkiyesi, işte 
2003'lerin Türkiyesi 
Cumhuriyet, 01.03.2003, Ataol Behramoglu: 'Türkiye Amerikan işgali 
altında'  
Cumhuriyet, 01.03.2003 p.6, SONAR'ın araştırmasına göre yurttaşların 
yüzde 83'ü ülkede Amerikan askeri istemiyor. 
Cumhuriyet, 01.03.2003 p.8, 'Barış nöbeti' 
Cumhuriyet, 11.9.03, p.06, Orhan Bursali: 11-12 Eylüller 
Cumhuriyet, 1.09.2006, Emre Kongar: Amerika Irak'ta batağa saplandı. 
Cumhuriyet, 12.06.2010 p.8, Türkiye’nin BM Güvenlik Konseyi’nde 
İran’dan yana tavır koyması, Başbakan Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’ın Arap 
dünyasına dönük mesajları “eksen kayması” tartışmalarını da beraberinde 
getirdi. 
Cumhuriyet, 17.04.2010, Cüneyt Arcayürek: Su Yolunu Bulmuş 
Cumhuriyet, 17.04.2010 p.10, Devlet Bahçeli genişlemeyi özetledi 
Cumhuriyet, 16.06.2010, Güray Öz: Bilinç Kayması 
Cumhuriyet, 25.07.2010, Öztin Akgüç: Türkiye'nin Ekseni 
Cumhuriyet, 12.06.2010, Emre Kongar: Çağdaş Demokrasiden Ortadogulu 
Otoriter-Totaliter Rejime Doğru 
Cumhuriyet, 30.01.2011, AKP oyun kurmaya çalışırken oyuncak oluyor 
Cumhuriyet, 31.01.2011, p.15, Hüner Tuncer: Dış Politikamızda Eksen 
Kayması 
323 
Cumhuriyet, 27.04.2011, p.15, Deniz Kavukçuoğlu: Karanlıktan Aydınlığa  
Hurriyet, 12.09.2001, ABD savaştaymış gibi karşılık verecek  
Hurriyet, 13.09.2001, ABD insan avı başlattı 
Hurriyet, 17.12.2002, ABD, Suudileri ve Pakistanlıları fişleyecek  
Hurriyet, 26.12.2002, Cüneyt Ülsever: Irak'ta savaş 
Hurriyet, 11.09.2002, Amerikan ruyasinin sondugu gun..  
Hurriyet, 11.09.2002, Yalım Eralp: 11 Eylül'ün Birinci Yılı 
Hurriyet, 01.12.2002, 140 örgütten 'Irak'ta Savaşa Hayır' mitingi 
Hurriyet, 11.12.2002, Yalçın Doğan, Türkiye'den geçecek Amerikan askeri 
sayısı ‘‘80-125 bin’’ dolayında!.. 
Hurriyet, 09.01.2003, Mehmet Ali Birand: Türkiye, büyük düşünebiliyor mu? 
Hurriyet, 27.12.2006, Tabut yarışı  
Hurriyet, 26.12.2006, Irak'ta ölen ABD'li asker sayısı 11 Eylül 
kurbanlarından fazla  
Hurriyet, 11.09.2008, Asrın şüphesi  
Hurriyet, 01.11.2008, Bush'la 8 yıl dünyayı nasıl altüst etti  
Hurriyet, 24.10.2008, Ferai Tınç: Obama ve Türkiye ile ortaklığın onarılması 
Hurriyet, 20.10.2010, Mehmet Ali Birand: Bakışlar Hızla Türkiye'ye 
Dönüyor 
Hurriyet, 16.06.2010, Mehmet Ali Birand: Gerçek Eksen Kayması Öyle 
Değil Böyle Olur 
Hurriyet, 16.01.2011, Cüneyt Ülsever, “Biz bize yeteriz!” 
Hurriyet, 25.03.2011, Mehmet Ali Birand: Türkiye Orta Doğu’nun “Batılı 
ülkesi” olduğunu gösterdi 
Radikal,30.12.2002, Ahmet Insel: Müdahale Fırsatçılığı 
Radikal,10.09.2003, Haluk Şahin: Korku Devam Ediyor 
Radikal,03.09.2004, Türker Alkan: Din ve Teror 
Radikal,12.06.2010, Eyüp Can: ABD ve Türkiye: Dost mu Düşman mı? 
Radikal,30.06.2010, Cengiz Çandar: İki Türkiye; ikisi de Türkiye... 
Taraf, 14.06.2010, Sezin Oney: Eksen kaymıyor, kilitler açılıyor 
Taraf, 13.06.2010, Eksen kayması kara propaganda 
Taraf, 11.06.2010, Türkiye’nin ekseni insan 
Taraf, 13.06.2010, Türkiye’nin Doğu’ya kaydığı tezi bir fantezI 
Taraf , 15.06.2010, Türkiye’nin eksenine AB onayı 
Taraf, 15.06.2010, Gül: Biraz tartışılsın 
Taraf, 17.06.2010, Eksen yerinde hedef büyüdü 
Taraf, 20.06.2010, Çin 10 yıl sonra büyük abi olacak 
Taraf, 15.06.2010, Kazim Celiker, Eksen ticarete doğru kaydı 
Taraf, 03.02.2011, Arapların özlemi Türkiye  
Taraf, 04.02.2011, Olaylar Türkiye’nin önemini gösterdi 
Zaman 25.09.2001, Ali Bulac: Haçlı seferi ve cihat 
Zaman, 21.01.2004, Ali Bulac: Müslüman fobisi 
324 
Zaman, 12.02.2004, Ali Bulac: Butune Ait Olmak  
Zaman, 20.11.2004, Ali Bulac: Hepimiz Ilgiliyiz 
Zaman, 23.08.2005, Ali Bulac: Kurana ve Kutsala Hakaret  
Zaman, 05.03.2007, Ali Bulac: "Batı-dışı modernleşme" mümkün mü? 
Zaman, 26.05.2007, Ali Bulac: Müdahalenin maliyeti  
Zaman, 10.05.2008, Ali Bulac: Tezkere'nin faturası 
Zaman, 20.02.2009, Ihsan Dagi: Eksen Kayması mı, Liberal Dönüşüm mü? 
Zaman, 15.06.2010, Ihsan Dagi: Eksen Tartışması Neden Gündemde? 
Zaman, 08.11.2010, Ali Bulac: Önümüzdeki badire! 
 
 
 
 
